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ABSTRACT 
The study describes how estrogen was standardized in Canada, in the 1940s and early 
1950s, under the Food and Drugs Act. Contributing to interdisciplinary conversations, it provides 
an empirical case of how regulatory practices enact material realities. Using archival material, 
the study describes how estrogen was achieved, in part, through heterogeneous practices of the 
Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards, National Health, and government 
solicitors. These regulators disagreed on whether, how, and by whom estrogens should be 
standardized. Rather than resolve these disagreements, Canada enacted multiple regulations 
purporting to standardize estrogen, and government solicitors practiced “techniques of 
validating” to render the regulations as lawful. I argue that these regulatory enactments 
materialized estrogen as a potent, unpredictable, and multiple object.  Further, I show how 
estrogen spawned novel regulatory techniques in Canada, particularly the use of consumer 
product labels. In this way, estrogen catalyzed an early example of risk regulation in Canada. 
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PART I 
An introduction 
All substances are poisons; there is none which is not a poison. The right dose differentiates a poison 
from a remedy. – adage credited to Paracelsus (1493-1541)  
Take a moment to consider the temporalities of toxicity; or less rhetorically, and better refining 
the realities being put into relation, to consider the historicity of hormone disruption. How has 
hormone disruption been materialized in the past? When have estrogenic chemicals, drugs and 
cosmetics been potent in bodies? When has the dose made the poison? 
Today, in Canada, hormone (or endocrine) disruption is a well-established phenomenon.1 
That synthetic industrial chemicals could disrupt the endocrine systems of humans and wildlife 
alike burst into popular consciousness in the mid-1990s, with the publication of Our Stolen 
Future.2 In translating the emerging science to policy makers and publics, researchers and 
activists have often leveraged the fact that endocrine disrupting chemicals can mimic estrogen 
in bodies.3 Some have drawn connections between these chemicals and the synthetic estrogen 
DES,4 or troubled distinctions between so-called “natural” hormones and “synthetic” chemicals.5 
Some have perpetuated repronormative, heterosexist, transphobic, or ableist discourses that 
reinforce sex panics about endocrine disruption of normative bodies;6 others in queer and trans 
studies, and critical animal studies, have explored the chemical (and multispecies) productions 
                                                          
1 See e.g. House of Commons, Healthy Environment, Healthy Canadians, Healthy Economy: Strengthening the Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act – Report of the Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development (June 2017) 
(Chair: Deborah Schulte), online: <https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/ENVI/report-8>.  
2 Theo Colborn, Dianne Dumanoski & John Peterson Myers, Our Stolen Future: Are We Threatening Our Fertility, Intelligence 
and Survival? – A Scientific Detective Story (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1996).  
3 Such that these chemicals were called “environmental estrogens” in the 1980s. That term has fallen out of use as scientists 
have come to understand that endocrine disrupting chemicals have many different and complex modes of action. In addition to 
estrogenic activity, EDCs can have androgenic or anti-androgenic effects. Further, they do not only mimic hormones in bodies 
by attaching to hormone receptors, but can block hormone receptors, among myriad other participations and interferences. 
For one scientist’s account summarizing the field since the DES crisis in the early 1970s, see JA McLaclan, “Environmental 
signaling: from environmental estrogens to endocrine-disrupting chemicals and beyond” (2016) 4 Andrology 684. 
4 See e.g. Nancy Langston, Toxic Bodies: Endocrine Disrupters and the Lessons of History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2010) [“Langston 2010”]. 
5 See e.g. Celia Roberts, Messengers of Sex: Hormones, Biomedicine and Feminism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007) [“Roberts 2007”]. 
6 For critique of these moves, see e.g. Giovanna Di Chiro, “Polluted politics? Confronting Toxic Discourse, Sex Panic and 
Econormativity” in Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands and Bruce Erickson, eds, Queer Ecologies, Sex, Nature, Politics, Desire 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010); Dayna Nadine Scott, “Gender-benders”: Sex and Law in the Constitution of 
Polluted Bodies” (2009) 17 Fem Leg Stud 241; and Malin Ah-King & Eva Hayward, “Toxic Sexes: Perverting Pollution and 
Queering Hormone Disruption” (2014) 1 O-Zone: A Journal of Object-Oriented Studies 1. 
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of sex,7 and celebrated the queer intimacies and pleasures of endocrine disruption.8 Without 
mongering these fears or indulging these pleasures, it can be said that endocrine disrupting 
chemicals can change birth weights and fetal reproductive and neurological development; can 
impact fertility, metabolism, and behaviour; and can cause cancer, among multitudinous other 
effects and affects.  
Endocrine disrupting chemicals have upset the toxicological truism that the “dose makes the 
poison”. Conventionally, the greater the amount of a substance administered to an organism, 
the greater the physiological response – a relationship that, in pharmacology, is referred to as 
potency. In recent years, however, novel facts have crystallized. Not only do some endocrine 
disrupting chemicals cause adverse effects at low doses, but they can have relatively greater 
toxicity at lower doses, and little or no effects at high doses.9 This non-conventional dose-
response relationship has major implications for risk assessment and for public policy, as it 
suggests that there is no safe threshold for exposure to these chemicals.10  
Nonetheless, truisms about dose remain embedded in regulatory habits. As one discrete (if 
not isolated) example, in 2011, when environmental and health organizations asked Health 
Canada to explain why it was not applying an existing legal prohibition against the sale of 
cosmetic products containing an “estrogenic substance” to endocrine disrupting chemicals such 
as phthalates and parabens, the Minister’s response emphasized that “in their present practices 
of use”, these ingredients were “less potent than the natural estrogens in the body”.11  That 
prohibition, created at the peak of concern about estrogenic drugs in the 1970s, brings to mind 
further examples. By the beginning of that decade, the contraceptive pill had been tied to a 
                                                          
7 See e.g.  Anne Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality (New York: Basic Books, 
2000) [Fausto-Sterling 2000]; Anne Pollock, “Queering Endocrine Disruption” in Katherine Behar, ed, Object-Oriented Feminism 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016); Donna Haraway, “Awash in Urine: DES and Premarin® in Multispecies 
Response-Ability” (2012) 40:1-2 WSQ 301 [“Haraway 2012”]; and Eva Hayward, “Transxenoestrogenesis” (2014) 1:1-2 TSQ 255. 
8 See e.g. Paul B Preciado, Testo Junkie: Sex, Drugs, and Biopolitics in the Pharmacopornographic Era (New York: The Feminist 
Press, 2013) [“Preciado 2013”]; and Mel Y Chen, Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2012). 
9 See e.g. Laura Vandenberg et al, “Hormones and Endocrine-Disrupting Chemicals: Low-Dose Effects and Nonmonotonic Dose 
Responses” (2012) 33:3 Endocr Rev 378; and World Health Organization, “State of the science of endocrine disrupting 
chemicals”, in An assessment of the state of the science of endocrine disruptors prepared by a group of experts for the United 
Nations Environment Programme and WHO (Geneva: WHO Press, 2013). 
10 See e.g. Dayna Nadine Scott, “Conclusion: Thinking about Thresholds, Literal and Figurative” in Dayna N Scott, ed, Our 
Chemical Selves: Gender, Toxics, and Environmental Health (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015) [“Scott 2015”]; and Sheldon Krimsky, 
“Low-Dose Toxicology: Narratives from the Science-Transcience Interface”, in Soraya Boudia & Nathalie Jas, eds, Powerless 
Science? Science and Politics in a Toxic World (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2014). 
11 Health Canada, “Health and environmental impact of endocrine disrupting chemicals used in cosmetics”, Response to 
Petition No. 310 to the Commissioner on Environment and Sustainable Development (June 2011, Canada), online: 
<http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/pet_310_e_35780.html>. 
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range of adverse health effects;12 soon thereafter, its association with ovarian cancer saw the 
original pill removed from markets, replaced with a pill just one-tenth the dose.13 In 1971, the 
synthetic estrogenic chemical DES – three times more potent than estradiol – was found to 
cause a rare vaginal cancer in the daughters of women who had been given the drug while 
pregnant.14 In the second half of the 1970s, high-profile studies found that women taking 
hormone replacement therapy (“HRT”) were four to 14 times more likely to develop endometrial 
cancer. Cancer was more likely the higher the dose of drug that the women had taken, and the 
longer they had taken it.15 At some times, in some bodies, dose clearly mattered.  
If (different) doses make the poison, what is to be done? Who – or what – shall be delegated 
to do it? Thinking with these examples hints at a pattern, different though its repetitions may be. 
During the 1970s, DES was banned for use in pregnancy, though its lack of therapeutic efficacy 
was arguably as weighty a factor as its toxicity. For more efficacious estrogens, however, 
another regulatory technique emerged. By the late 1970s, North American regulators required 
packages for both oral contraceptives and HRT to include patient package inserts (“PPIs”), with 
detailed information about the health risks of these prescription drugs that patients could read 
for themselves.16 In shifting power from physicians to their patients, PPIs also delegated 
responsibility; patients considering birth control or HRT must now exercise (a more informed) 
choice about whether to assume the risks. Moving from feminist health activism of the 1970s to 
the neoliberal market-based advocacy of the present, and from drugs to cosmetics, the strategy 
now favoured by North American regulators to mitigate risk of cosmetics is to require ingredient 
                                                          
12 Including blood clots, heart attack, stroke, depression, weight gain, and loss of libido; see e.g. Barbara Seaman, The Doctor’s 
Case Against the Pill (New York: P.H. Widen, Inc., 1969). 
13 Barbara Seaman, The Greatest Experiment Ever Performed on Women: Exploding the Estrogen Myth (New York: Hyperion, 
2003) [“Seaman 2003”] at 30. 
14 Arthur L Herbst, Howard Ulfelder & David C Poskanzer, “Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina: Association of Maternal Stilbestrol 
Therapy with Tumor Appearance in Young Women" (1971) 284:15 N Engl J Med 878.  
15 Harry K Ziel & William D Finkle, “Increased Risk of Endometrial Carcinoma among Users of Conjugated Estrogens” (1975) 
293:23 N Engl J Med 1167; and Donald C Smith et al., “Association of Exogenous Estrogen and Endometrial Carcinoma” (1975) 
293:23 N Engl J Med 1164. These December 1975 findings were corroborated by two studies in the June 1976 issue of the New 
England Journal of Medicine. By the decade’s end, US researchers were unanimous that HRT substantially increases the risk of 
endometrial cancer, with nine more studies showing that women using HRT were four to 20 times more likely to develop it; see 
Frances McCrea, “The politics of menopause: the discovery of a deficiency disease” (1983) 31 Social Problems 111 [“McCrea 
1983”] at 115. British researchers, however, were less convinced; see Frances B McCrea & Gerald E Markle, “The Estrogen 
Replacement Controversy in the USA and UK: Different Answers to the Same Question?” (1984) 14:1 Soc Stud Sci 1. See also 
Elizabeth Watkins, The Estrogen Elixir: A History of Hormone Replacement Therapy in America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2007) [“Watkins 2007”] at 92-98; she also notes that two 1976 studies considered effects on all estrogen 
users, regardless of whether they had uteruses or ovaries, finding a very slight correlation with increased risk of breast cancer. 
16 In the late 1970s, the US Food and Drug Administration required PPIs for four types of prescription drugs, all of which were 
hormonal drugs for women: oral contraceptives, DES as a postcoital contraceptive, other estrogenic products (i.e. HRT), and 
progestational products. See Marsha Wertzberger Gardner, “Increasing Patient Awareness in Drug Therapy: Ramifications of a 
Patient Package Insert Requirement” (1978) 66 Geo LJ 837 at 839-841. 
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labels on product packaging.17 As a technique of responsibilization and governance of the self,18 
ingredient labels delegate to women, as consumers, responsibility for ensuring safety from 
toxics by virtue of “precautionary consumption”.19 While it can be tempting to represent product 
packaging as apolitical – consumer advocates might ask who suffers from having the “right to 
know” – the adoption of labelling for potent substances, marketed to women, has a political and 
regulatory history. How did the labelling of estrogenic drugs and cosmetics come to be required 
by law in Canada, and with what distributive consequences?   
Now take all these questions and elements, and stir them into one concentrated concoction, 
by asking: if the dose made the poison, then what made the dose?  
*** 
While it is now scientifically accepted that endocrine disrupting compounds can have greater 
effects at lower doses, in the field of pharmacology in the 1940s, the conventional paradigm 
ruled supreme. It structured determinations of whether a substance was safe for therapeutic 
use, as pharmacologists evaluated what precise amounts and strengths a substance should be, 
in pharmaceutical form, to induce physiological effects and to avoid toxicity. Such investigations 
of potency were especially important for drugs made from biological substances, which had to 
be standardized. And perhaps no substances were so resolutely characterized as potent, in the 
1940s, as were sex hormones.20 So-called “natural” estrogens like estrone and estradiol, and 
“synthetic” estrogens like DES, had been crystalized or synthesized in researchers’ labs in the 
late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, and pharmaceutical firms were eager to capitalize.  
How exactly, though, did these potent molecules get transformed into therapeutic drugs? As 
of 1939, menopause had only just begun to be constructed as a disorder;21 estrogens could 
                                                          
17 Mandatory ingredient labelling for cosmetic products was introduced in the United States in 1977, and in Canada in 2004. 
However, as shown in Chapters 5 and 6, in Canada the first uses of ingredient labels to regulate potent substances, in lieu of 
regulatory standards, were for estrogenic drugs in 1944 and estrogenic cosmetics in 1949. 
18 For a summary of the huge body of Foucauldian scholarship on governmentality, aimed at socio-legal scholars, see Nicholas 
Rose, Pat O’Malley & Marianna Valverde, “Governmentality” (2006) 2:1 Annu Rev Law Soc Sci 83. 
19 Norah MacKendrick, “Media Framing of Body Burdens: Precautionary Consumption and the Individualization of Risk” (2010) 
80:1 Sociol Inq 126; Norah MacKendrick, “More work for mother: chemical body burdens as a maternal responsibility” (2014) 
28:5 Gend Soc 705; and Norah MacKendrick & Lindsay Stevens, “‘Taking Back a Little Bit of Control’: managing the 
contaminated body through consumption” (2016) 31:2 Sociol Forum 310. 
20 The expression “sex hormones” is fraught with difficulty and has been problematized in Nelly Oudshoorn 1994, Anne Fausto-
Sterling 2000 and Celia Roberts 2007. Like them, I continue to use the term in its historical context. Scientists and bureaucrats 
on the Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards did not always use this expression. At risk of overgeneralizing here, 
members tended to speak of “sex hormones” when contemplating end-use drug products (and relatedly, in the context of the 
Sex Hormone Regulations), and in other contexts spoke of estrone, estradiol, stilboestrol, or collectively the “oestrogens”.  
21 Susan E Bell, "Changing ideas: The medicalization of menopause" (1987) 24:6 Soc Sci Med 535 [“Bell 1987”]; McCrea 1983.  
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“best be described as drugs looking for diseases”.22 Moreover, evidence from lab studies in the 
1930s demonstrated that estrogens were carcinogenic in animals.23 How then did sex hormones 
begin their explosive transformation into drugs and cosmetics that, in the second half of the 
century, would be used by millions of women?24 
Feminist scholarship in the history of science, sociology, and science and technology studies 
(STS) has given rich insight into this question.25 Perhaps most foundational is Nelly 
Oudshoorn’s study showing how hormonal drugs emerged in “the triangle of the laboratory, the 
pharmaceutical industry and the clinic”.26 However, my research suggests that the better 
geometric metaphor is a square – as regulators were critical actors. In Canada in the 1940s, 
regulators laboured to enumerate, standardize, and control estrogens, facilitating the circulation 
of certain materialized forms of drugs and cosmetics in products, markets, and bodies. 
Contributing to interdisciplinary conversations in socio-legal studies, legal history, STS, and 
pharmaceutical history by providing an empirical case of how regulatory practices enact material 
realities, this study composes a series of toxic enactments. Using archival material not 
previously written about by historians, the study describes how the enactment of estrogen in 
Canada was achieved, in part, through heterogeneous practices of regulators brought together 
in 1942 through the Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards (“the Committee”). 
Comprised of physicians, pharmacists, pharmaceutical researchers, and federal bureaucrats, 
                                                          
22 Nelly Oudshoorn, Beyond the Natural Body: An Archeology of Sex Hormones (London: Routledge, 1994) [“Oudshoorn 1994”] 
at 108. 
23 See Chapter 1, section 1.i. 
24 There appears to be no research into how many millions of Canadian women used estrogenic drugs (or cosmetics) in the 
twentieth century; however, “millions” is a very safe estimate when extrapolating from American research. As growth 
hormones, estrogens were also transformed into growth promoters for livestock, administered through feed or implants; see 
Langston 2010 and Jean-Paul Gaudillière, “DES, Cancer, and Endocrine Disruptors: Ways of Regulating, Chemical Risks, and 
Public Expertise in the United States” in Soraya Boudia & Nathalie Jas, eds, Powerless Science? Science and Politics in a Toxic 
World (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2014) [“Gaudillière 2014”]. However, those technologies are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
25 Susan E Bell, “Gendered Medical Science: Producing a Drug For Women” (1995) 21:3 Fem Stud 469 [“Bell 1995”]; Fausto-
Sterling 2000; Jean-Paul Gaudillière, “Better prepared than synthesized: Adolf Butenandt, Schering Ag and the transformation 
of sex steroids into drugs (1930–1946)” (2005) 36 Stud Hist Phil Biol & Biomed Sci 612 [Gaudillière 2005a”]; Jean-Paul 
Gaudillière,”The Visible Industrialist: Standards and the Manufacture of Sex Hormones”, in Christoph Gradmann & Johnathan 
Simon, eds, Evaluating and Standardizing Therapeutic Agents, 1890-1950 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) [“Gaudillière 
2010”]; Gaudillière 2014; Haraway 2012; Nancy Krieger et al, “Hormone replacement therapy: cancer, controversies, and 
women’s health: historical, epidemiological, biological, clinical, and advocacy perspectives” (2005) 59:9 J Epidemiol Community 
Health 740 [“Krieger et al 2005”]; Langston 2010;  Allison Li, “Marketing Menopause: Science and the Public Relations of 
Premarin” in Georgina Feldberg et al, eds, Women, Health and Nation: Canada and the United States since 1945 (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003) [“Li 2003a”]; Bob Ostertag, Sex Science Self: A Social History of Estrogen, 
Testosterone, and Identity (Amherst and Boston, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2016) [“Ostertag 2016”]; Oudshoorn 
1994; Sheila M Rothman & David Rothman, The Pursuit of Perfection: The Promise and Perils of Medical Enhancement (New 
York: Vintage Books, 2003) [“Rothman & Rothman 2003”]; Roberts 2007; Seaman 2003; Chandak Sengoopta, The Most Secret 
Quintessence of Life: Sex, Glands, and Hormones, 1980-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006) [“Sengoopta 2006”]; 
and Watkins 2007. This list excludes historiography on the contraceptive pill. 
26 Oudshoorn 1994, at 82. 
6 
 
with its proposed regulations reviewed by federal solicitors, the Committee was coordinated by 
the Department of Pensions and National Health (“the Department” or “National Health”).27 
When it came to standardizing estrogen(s) and their potency, these actors practiced numerous, 
divergent scientific and statutory techniques for enumerating substances, prescribing test 
methods, and mandating labelling. Analytically, my study shows how these practices often 
“hinged” on practices of delegation, used both in a doctrinal administrative law sense and with a 
more Latourian valence, in which desired behaviours are inscribed into technology.28 In brief, 
responsibility for ensuring safety was repeatedly directed away from the Department. Following 
Annemarie Mol’s praxiological reformulation of actor-network theory,29 I argue that these varied 
regulatory practices materialized estrogen as a potent and multiple object. Further, drawing on 
notions of co-production, I show how estrogen spawned novel regulatory techniques in Canada. 
Toxic enactments potentiated legal substances, and substantiated potent laws.30 
*** 
Part I sets the historical, conceptual and methodological stage. Chapter 1 relates numerous 
families of history and theory. It begins by recalling mid-twentieth century histories on the 
emergence of sex hormones and on the standardization of biological drugs. Swerving from 
history to theory, the chapter turns to review the more theoretical literature that grounds this 
story. Distilled here to one word, the key concept is enactment. Rather than a grand explanatory 
theory of historical events, enactment describes how realities are done in practice. In this, I draw 
heavily on the ontological and praxiological concepts of Annemarie Mol, an STS scholar and 
philosopher of medicine. The rest of the chapter canvases literature by some of Mol’s scholarly 
relatives: first, Larry Busch’s political sociology of standards; and second, intersections between 
                                                          
27 I refer to “the Department” or “National Health” to capture the department’s various names during 1939-1951. In October 
1944, a reorganization divided what had been the Department of Pensions and National Health into the new Department of 
Veterans Affairs and new Department of National Health and Welfare, the latter of which continued to house the Food and 
Drugs Division. See An Act to establish a Department of National Health and Welfare, SC 1944-1945, c 22. See also AL Davidson, 
The genesis and growth of food and drug administration in Canada. (Ottawa: Ministry of National Health and Welfare, 1949) 
[“Davidson 1949a”] at 88; and AL Davidson, Canada Pioneers in Food and Drug Control: The Story of the Food and Drug 
Directorate (Canada: Department of National Health and Welfare, Information Services Division, 1949) [“Davidson 1949b”].  
28 Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999) [Latour 1999a] at 185; and Bruno Latour, 
“Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts” in Wiebe W Bijker & John Law, eds, Shaping 
Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992) [Latour 1992] at 226-236. 
29 Annemarie Mol, The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002) [“Mol 2002”]. 
30 “Legal substances” comes from Javier Lezaun, “The Pragmatic Sanction of Materials: Notes for an Ethnography of Legal 
Substances” (2012) 39:1 J Law & Soc 20 [“Lezaun 2012”]. 
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socio-legal studies and STS,31 including not only Sheila Jasanoff’s concept of co-production, but 
newer work by Javier Lezaun, Emily Grabham, and Emilie Cloatre that takes a material turn.  
Chapter 2 details the research methods practiced in this study. To the extent that studies of 
enactment-in-practices are fundamentally empirical,32 the first chapter already addresses 
methodology. Yet it says nothing of the disciplinary kin to which this thesis – arguably – most 
closely relates, namely legal history.33 Thus, the second chapter ponders relations of (legal) 
history-in-theory and theory-in-(legal)-history. Recalling concern with the familiar method that 
centers law as nucleus and everything else merely as extended family (or “context”), the second 
chapter identifies recent engagements of legal history with materiality that allow (legal) 
historians to compose a different object, one in which law and matter are imbricated. 
Part II provides my account of how estrogen co-emerged with regulatory techniques in 
Canada, between 1939 and 1953. Necessarily arbitrary, these dates bracket a time of explosive 
growth in the variety of sex hormone products available;34 DES arrived on the market in Canada 
in 1939, Premarin in 1941.35 Moreover, the 1940s belonged to an era in pharmaceutical history 
often referred to as the “therapeutic revolution”, in which drug development, and the economic 
and political power of the drug industry, grew immensely.36 The 1940s also witnessed a major 
expansion of National Health’s aims and ambitions; in the wake of the Treaty of Westminster, 
senior officials seized the opportunities, including those presented by WWII, to unleash a suite 
of food and drug regulations and to build the Department’s bureaucratic machinery. During this 
decade, the Food and Drugs Act aimed to protect public health through a scheme heavily 
premised upon delegation. Notably, while the Act did not at the time require pre-market approval 
for new drugs (unlike in the US), drug standards could still be imposed by delegated legislation.  
                                                          
31 To contest and collapse the distinctions between “law”, “society” and “science” inherent to this formula, Cloatre and 
Pickersgill propose instead the “social studies of law”; see their introduction to Emilie Cloatre & Martyn Pickersgill, eds, 
Knowledge, Technology and Law (London: Routledge, 2015) [“Cloatre & Pickersgill 2015”] at 8-9. 
32 Mol follows Latour and others in querying whether ANT can properly be characterized as a “theory”. Annemarie Mol, “Actor-
Network Theory: sensitive terms and enduring tensions” (2010) 50:1 Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 
(Sonderheft) 253 [“Mol 2010”] at 253-254, 261-262. 
33 Some historiography canvassed here, such as environmental history by Nancy Langston and pharmaceutical history by Jean-
Paul Gaudillière, examines patterns in regulatory decision-making, providing close readings of judicial decisions and exploring 
transformations in regulatory logics regarding sex hormones. But these scholars do not situate their work as legal history per se.  
34 Note that this is not the same as claiming there was explosive growth in the use of estrogenic drugs in the 1940s. 
35 Both DES and Premarin were already on the Canadian market before they were approved for sale in the U.S.  
36 Vivianne Quirke, “From alkaloids to gene therapy: a brief history of drug discovery in the 20th century”, in Stuart Anderson, 
ed, Making Medicines: A brief history of pharmacy and pharmaceuticals (London: Pharmaceutical Press, 2005) [“Quirke 2005”] 
at 177.  
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Alongside these legal, political, and economic dynamics, the human and nonhuman actors in 
this story are also introduced in Chapter 3. There is no analytic magic to the word actor;37 one 
could also use actants,38 agents,39 participants,40 or actives (with its pharmacological invocation 
of active ingredients). Nor does it reflect a puritanical commitment to an imagined actor network 
theory (“ANT”).41 There is, however, much more deliberation behind estrogen, the term chosen 
for the leading actor. Readers may protest that this term is ahistorical or unscientific, carries too 
much gendered or heteronormative baggage,42 or, if they are especially perceptive, that the 
term is a self-serving attempt to render semantically singular what is a group of substances, in 
order to better dramatize the argument that estrogen is multiple. After all, estrogen carries no 
single specific meaning for biochemists, endocrinologists, physicians, or pharmacists, nor did it 
in the 1940s. Thinking of steroidal estrogens, the molecules produced endogenously in human 
bodies, this umbrella term colloquially refers to what biochemists have known, since the 1930s, 
was a class of hormones – the three main such estrogens being estradiol, estrone and estriol.43 
Other “natural” estrogens also used in pharmaceuticals are endogenous not to human but to 
equine bodies, like equilin and equilenin, extracted from pregnant mares’ urine and conjugated 
into the hormone replacement therapy branded so memorably as Premarin.44 The best known 
“synthetic” estrogen, referred to here as DES,45 was synthesized in 1939 as an inexpensive 
                                                          
37 Mol 2010, at 255: “It is easy, everyone knows what an actor is – an actor does things – it, he, she acts. But no, of course it is 
not easy, because in different theoretical repertoires an ‘actor’ is made to be different things. Look at these sentences. First, 
they state that an actor acts and then that an ‘actor’ is made to be. From one sentence to the next there is a shift from a real 
life actor who acts to the term actor which is made to be and, at the same time, a shift from the active to the passive. Making 
such shifts and playing with them to see what happens, is one of the pleasures of engaging in ‘actor-network theory’.” 
38 Adopted originally from semiotics, “actant” has been used in material-semiotic traditions such as ANT; see e.g. Bruno Latour, 
“On Recalling ANT” (1999) 47:1 Sociol Rev 15 [“Latour 1999b”] at 19-20. 
39 In Messengers of Sex, Celia Roberts conceives of hormones as “active agents in bio-social networks that constitute material-
semiotic entities such as ‘sex’”; Roberts 2007 at 22. 
40 In the specific context of endocrine disrupting chemicals, see Dayna Nadine Scott, Jennie Haw & Robyn Lee, “‘Wannabe Toxic-
Free?’ From precautionary consumption to corporeal citizenship” (2017) 26:2 Environ Politics 322 at 332; and Max Liboiron 
“Redefining pollution and action: The matter of plastics” (2016) 21:1 J Material Cult 87 [“Liboiron 2016”] at 97. 
41 Latour has often disclaimed the terms actor, network and theory (and the dash); see e.g. Latour 1999b. 
42 While estrogen and androgen hormones are produced in bodies of all sexes and serve many physiological functions, culturally 
these steroid hormones continue to be positioned as female and male (Fausto-Sterling 2000; Roberts 2007). The names 
historically assigned to them are examined in detail by Anne Fausto-Sterling; see Fausto-Sterling 2000, at 170–194. Unlike 
androgen, which means to produce a man, estrogen means to produce estrus. In her analysis, not only does this entrench a 
hormonal model of sex, but it reduces “woman” to reproductive fecundity; at 188. Continued use of the word estrogen to refer 
to these hormones arguably continues to produce reproductive femininity and cis-heterosexuality as biologically natural. 
43 These are the three principle forms of estrogen in human bodies, although there are others. Estradiol is the most potent and 
abundant in women’s bodies before menopause; estrone forms from estradiol and predominates after menopause; estriol is 
abundant during pregnancy. Progesterone and testosterone, other steroid hormones, also play roles in menopause. By 1939, 
biochemists “had crystalized at least seven estrogenic molecules”, including equilin and equilenin; Fausto-Stirling 2000 at 189.  
44 It is thought that Premarin was so named for pre(gnant) mar(e) (ur)in(e). 
45 From its origin, DES was assigned different proper names in different countries’ pharmacopoeia and regulations. In the US, it 
was diethylstilbestrol, while in Britain, it was stilboestrol. In Canada, after some debate, the 1944 Sex Hormone Regulations 
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alternative to estradiol preparations, and other synthetic estrogens followed.46 While the phrase 
“estrogenic substance” gets closer to my intended meaning, it is encumbered as a term of art in 
the Sex Hormone Regulations,47 and it may run a risk of re-enacting the nature-culture divide, 
implying a substance with fixed, natural, essential attributes that active cultural actors may then 
manipulate. Crafting terminology adequate to a performative approach to socio-materiality has 
been vexing; the closest concept might be “estrogenizer”. Assigning effects to substances is 
also vexing, as it requires measurement practices. Yet, as will be seen, when presented with 
legal opportunities to standardize measurements for defining sex hormones and their activities, 
Canadian regulators demurred. Trying to hold together undefined estrogenic effects and their 
many materialized forms, I have settled on the term estrogen.  
What of the argument that it is self-serving to lump a class of substances under a singular 
noun? In arguing that estrogen was multiple, I am striving to capture something beyond simply 
its many material compositions (as oestrone, oestradiol, estriol, DES, estrogenic substances, 
conjugated equine estrogens, the drug and cosmetic products containing them, etc.). Estrogen 
is capacious enough also to encompass these entities’ many onto-epistemological modes, in 
which different human practices of knowing are implicated in the active becoming of matter,48 
whether as chemical structures, biological sources, physiological functions, pharmacological 
effects, forms of administration, or industrial intentions. Put at its simplest here, estrogen was 
multiple because it was done multiply. And not just by humans. Nonhuman supporting actors in 
this estrogenic cast will also be credited – mice and rats, vaginas and ovaries, bioassays and 
monographs, delegation and validity, telephones and stenographers, reference materials and 
labels, hot flashes and skin wrinkles, injections and inunctions, inscriptions and prescriptions.   
The human actors introduced in Chapter 3 suffer from fewer nomenclatural difficulties, 
although identifying professors as regulators may seem, to some, to extend that word too far. 
                                                          
assigned it the proper name “stilboestrol”, while the Canadian Supplement to the British Pharmacopoeia, and Part V of 
Schedule B to the Food and Drugs Act, used the term “stilboestol” (with “diethylstilbestrol” indicated as a synonym in the 
Canadian Supplement) and the term “stilboestrol diproprionate” (a derivative ester). This study uses “DES” to refer both to the 
substance and its esters, unless otherwise noted.  
46Another well-known synthetic estrogen is ethinyl estradiol. Derived from estradiol, and patented by German scientists in 
1938, it is seventeen times more potent than estradiol. It was approved by the FDA for use in humans in 1949 and has been 
used in most oral contraceptives since the 1960s. See Seaman 2003, at 31, 34.  
47 The 1944 Sex Hormone Regulations, at s C.02.006(b)(i), assigned “estrogenic substances” as the proper name of the category 
of “mixed or impure” estrogenic sex hormone products. By contrast, the other category of sex hormone products was that of 
“pure synthetic or natural crystalline products”, which included oestrone, oestradiol, oestriol, and stilboestrol. Also, as of 1977, 
cosmetic products containing an “estrogenic substance” – which, consistent with the Sex Hormone Regulations, meant a mixed 
or impure sex hormone product – were banned from import or sale in Canada; see Cosmetic Regulations, CRC, c 869, s 15(b). 
48 Karen Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter” (2003) 28:3 Signs 
801 (“Barad 2003”). At 829, she describes onto-epistem-ology as “the study of practices of knowing in being”. 
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Yet even without drawing on the enormous literature “decentering” the concept of regulation,49 it 
should be sufficient to recall that the Committee was empowered by an order-in-council and its 
members appointed by the Minister to advise on new drug standards and regulations.  
Chapter 4 examines the events, decisions, and practices that first materialized estrogen   
under the Food and Drugs Act, homing in on a series of technical and legal controversies. At the 
Committee members’ first meeting in Ottawa in January 1943, and in the next two years of their 
deliberations and deferrals, no substances were as contentious and complicated as estrogens. 
Their nature was contested – were they biological substances, chemicals, or pre-made 
products? What were the best methods for measuring their potency? Who should decide on the 
methods? Disagreement bedeviled discussion of whether, how, when, and by whom estrogen 
should be standardized or regulated. When solicitors were consulted, matter(s) became further 
destabilized. The chapter shows how resolution officially arrived through legally debated and 
experimental techniques – including delegating to industry the power to standardize sex 
hormones’ potency, through regulating via labels rather than by standards. In the fall of 1944, 
Committee members came to the realization that these heterogenous and incommensurable 
practices for standardizing drugs had, ironically, led to multiple versions of single substances. 
In the second half of the decade, estrogen increasingly shaped regulations under the Food 
and Drugs Act. Chapter 5 describes estrogen’s legal trajectories in the late 1940s and early 
1950s. Regulatory tinkering aimed to close controversies and gather estrogen together as a 
singular, stable, and safe object. However, concurrent with new statutory powers, other 
amendments extended regulatory coverage to estrogenic cosmetics while sustaining National 
Health’s retreat from setting standards for products sold to women. Not only did new regulations 
and their implementation (re)enact estrogen as indeterminate and unpredictable, they were an 
early foundation for conceptualizing risk in Canadian law. Absorbed into new domains, estrogen 
spawned novel techniques of delegating to consumers, through labelling, the responsibility for 
ensuring a product’s safety. In these ways, the regulation of estrogen was coterminous with its 
materialization as a potent substance – law and toxicity were being co-produced.50  
Part III offers some brief concluding reflections – on potency, on power, and on possibility.
                                                          
49 This literature is far too large to adequately capture here. For a leading intervention, see Julia Black, “Decentring Regulation: 
Understanding the role of regulation and self-regulation in a ‘post-regulatory’ world” (2001) 54:1 Current legal problems 103. 
50 On the co-production of knowledge and order, see Jasanoff’s essays “The Idiom of Co-production” and “Ordering Knowledge, 
Ordering Society”, in Sheila Jasanoff, ed, States of Knowledge: The co-production of science and social order (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2004) [together, “Jasanoff 2004”]. For scholarship addressing the co-production of toxicity and regulation, see 
e.g. Soraya Boudia & Nathalie Jas, “Introduction: The Greatness and Misery of Science in a Toxic World””, Soraya Boudia & 
Nathalie Jas, eds Powerless Science? Science and Politics in a Toxic World (New York: Berghahn, 2014) [“Boudia & Jas 2014”]. 
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Chapter One 
History and theory: toxic enactments  
...hormones message across this mobile boundary, between social and biological, disrupting any attempts 
at delineating what belongs in each category, or indeed where the outline of the categories might lie. – 
Celia Roberts (2007) 
 
By what strange alchemy is a legal obligation transformed into a material constraint? – Javier Lezaun 
(2012) 
 
 
My story of the enactment of estrogen and legal techniques in Canada in the 1940s is 
animated by many strands of history and theory. This chapter weaves those literatures together.  
 
1. Sex hormones and drug standardization in the 1930s-1940s 
 This chapter summarizes two related mid-twentieth historiographies, which recount the 
emergence of sex hormones and the standardization of biological drugs. 
 
1.i.  Sex hormones on the edge of transformation  
Over the last 80 years, estrogen has become among “the most widely used drugs in the 
history of medicine.”1 Beginning in the 1950s, estrogen became an ever-present “elixir”, used for 
combatting aging, promoting beauty, and, later that decade, for practicing birth control.2 
However, in Canada in the late 1930s and early 1940s, sex hormones were still marginal drugs. 
What changed, and how did regulatory practices contribute to this transformation? 
This thesis appears to be the first study of the standardization of estrogen in Canada. With 
the exception of Allison Li’s research on Premarin, there are no Canadian histories of sex 
hormones.3 Nor, more generally, have historians attended to the Canadian Committee on 
Pharmacopoeial Standards or its role in standardizing and regulating drugs, or to the Food and 
Drugs Act and its implementation in the 1940s.4 Beyond Canada, a rich body of research exists 
                                                          
1 Oudshoorn 1994 at 9. However, note that Oudshoorn makes this claim as of 1994.  
2 Watkins 2007. The US FDA approved Enovid for menstrual irregularities in 1957 and for birth control in 1959. 
3 Li 2003a. Although see Haraway 2012, which weaves Canadian strands into a tale of Premarin’s many entanglements. 
4 Two exceptions addressing this period, with a range of methodologies, are Joel Lexchin, Private profits versus public policy: the 
pharmaceutical industry and the Canadian state (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016) [“Lexchin 2016”]; and Matthew 
Herder, "Denaturalizing transparency in drug regulation" (2015) 8:2 McGill JL & Health S57 [“Herder 2015”] at S101-S115. 
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on sex hormones in this period, arising from sociology, history of science and medicine, and 
science and technology studies (STS).5 Hormones are “interesting precisely because they sit at 
the boundary between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’”;6 thus, not surprisingly, much of this scholarship 
examines how hormonal knowledges have produced or problematized sex and gender. 
Of this work, perhaps most foundational and influential is Nelly Oudshoorn’s study, Beyond 
the Natural Body.7 Oudshoorn provides an account of the development of endocrinology in the 
1920s and 1930s, a period in which scientists rushed to identify, isolate, and purify hormones in 
an endocrinological “gold rush”,8 and “established the basic concepts and techniques that have 
served as cornerstones in structuring our knowledge of hormones to this day.”9 Drawing on 
Foucauldian concepts regarding the materiality of discourse-building, she investigates not only 
how these scientists used “cultural notions as resources in their research practice”, but also, 
and indeed primarily, the “complex instruments, research materials, careful preparatory 
procedures and testing practices” that were the material conditions of endocrinal knowledge.10 
With special attention to the Dutch context, Oudshoorn painstakingly sets out the scientific 
alliances and material practices through which scientific claims about sex hormones were 
naturalized into universalized facts and stabilized as technological artefacts in the form of drugs.  
Focused on steroidal hormones, she describes how, in the 1920s and early 1930s, 
biochemists like Adolf Butenandt and Edward Doisy created techniques to extract “female” and 
“male” sex hormones from glands, isolate them from urine, and purify them as crystalline 
preparations.11 In the process, they established new facts about sex hormones – which, by the 
late 1930s, they apprehended as the molecules estrone, estriol, and estradiol – that profoundly 
challenged a binary model of sex centered on reproductive organs: estrogens were in all male 
bodies and androgens in all female bodies, ovaries secreted not only estrogen but also 
testosterone, and these hormones were not made only in gonads but in adrenal glands. Rather 
than anatomical, sex increasingly appeared to be chemical.12 Oudshoorn argues that this new 
                                                          
5 See Introduction at note 25. As noted, that list excludes historiographies of the contraceptive pill. 
6 Emilia Sanabria, Plastic Bodies: Sex Hormones and Menstrual Suppression in Brazil (Durham, NC: University Press, 2016) 
[“Sanabria 2016”] at 105; see also 5, 149. 
7 Oudshoorn 1994. 
8 On the “gold rush” or “golden age” in endocrinology, see Li 2003a at 103, and Fausto-Stirling 2000 at 170. The metaphor 
appears to have originated with leading reproductive endocrinologist Alan S Parkes; see e.g. Alan S Parkes, “The rise of 
reproductive endocrinology, 1926-1940” (1966) 34:3 J Endocrinol 20. 
9 Oudshoorn 1994 at 9. 
10 Ibid at 10-11 and 12-13; see also 148-150 and fn 17 at 154-155. 
11 Ibid including at 46-48, 71-79. 
12 Ibid at 24-34, 145. 
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endocrinological knowledge radically transformed views of sex and the body. Nonetheless, most 
scientists continued to produce the same dualistic model of sexual difference.13  
In one chapter of her book, Oudshoorn describes the bioassay methods and standardization 
techniques developed by laboratory scientists, and, critically, how these testing tools contributed 
to transform sex hormones into material realities.14 In subsequent chapters, she examines two 
other means by which sex hormones materialized. Research materials – gonads and urine – 
were required by laboratories and served to connect laboratory scientists’ practices to clinics 
and pharmaceutical firms. The ability of industrial and clinical actors to supply materials, and 
pre-existing gynecological (and not andrological) clinical practices, led to a concentration of 
research activity on “female” sex hormones.15  While these practices ultimately materialized sex 
hormones as chemical products, they were further shaped into estrogenic drugs through the 
socially networked practices of clinical trials and industrial marketing. In short, before companies 
could create markets, they needed to work with clinicians to help them identify diseases for their 
drugs. Oudshoorn’s history illustrates how the properties of estrogenic drugs were not fixed 
before being marketed. Rather, marketing practices, themselves deeply shaped by gendered 
cultural norms, materialized sex hormones as drugs for menstruation and female menopause 
(and not for contraception or male menopause).16 As Li notes, this challenges “the traditional 
linear model of drug development in which it is assumed that a new drug is tested and its 
purpose defined before it is taken to the marketplace.”17 In examining these structural 
relationships and material practices, Oudshoorn concludes that estrogenic drugs emerged in the 
interactions within “the triangle of the laboratory, the pharmaceutical industry and the clinic”.18 
Oudshoorn’s historical findings have been built upon and distinguished by scholars in many 
disciplines.19 Often this scholarship aims to trouble hormonally deterministic constructions of sex 
and gender, demonstrating how feminists can engage with the materiality of bodies without 
simply rejecting biological knowledge as a social construction. In Sexing the Body, biologist and 
                                                          
13 Ibid at 144-148. See also Fausto-Stirling 2000 at 182-191.  
14 I leave more detailed engagement with this chapter of Oudshoorn’s book, on measuring sex hormones, to my discussion of 
the historiography on standardization of biologicals (including estrogen); see Chapter 1, section 1.ii, below. 
15 Ibid at 65-81. 
16 Ibid at 82-111, and 140-141. 
17 Li 2003a at 102; see also Oudshoorn 1994 at 3. 
18 Oudshoorn 1994 at 83. 
19 In this paragraph I discuss the work of scholars who, while not disciplinarily situated in history per se, have partly framed their 
inquiries historically. I exclude from this discussion scholarship on sex hormones that is purely ethnographic, regardless that it 
explores similar questions about pharmaceutical ontology, such as Sanabria 2016.  
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gender theorist Anne Fausto-Sterling also considers endocrinology during the interwar period.20 
Agreeing that scientists created chemical sex through practices used to isolate and purify, 
measure and standardize, and define and name the “sex hormones”, she also describes their 
work as deeply informed both by prevailing gender norms and by social struggles against them. 
Scientists intersected with other social worlds – “feminists, advocates of homosexual rights, 
eugenicists, birth control advocates, psychologists, and charitable foundations” – which 
empowered and shaped hormone research, not least through philanthropic and political 
support.21 Further, while emphasizing how “scientists are a diverse lot” and indeed how some 
scientists of the time resisted efforts to fit new, unexpected test results into existing gender 
constructs, Fausto-Stirling examines closely the ways that many scientists embraced and 
incorporated pre-existing cultural assumptions in developing new endocrinological facts.22   
Feminist theorist Celia Roberts further augments this body of work in Messengers of Sex.23 
While lauding Oudshoorn’s account of how sex hormones “were not ‘discovered’ in nature, but 
rather were produced through scientific interaction and work”,24 she takes pains to distinguish 
her approach from what she paints as Oudshoorn’s use of social network analysis.25 She 
argues that, in studying how hormones were produced in interactions of human actors, 
Oudshoorn circumscribes networks of practice in a way that “tends to leave important questions 
open”.26 The critique typifies frustrations that normatively-oriented scholars, including feminist 
scholars, can have with network or assemblage analyses that describe how but do not explain 
why realities materialize. Unsatisfied by Oudshoorn’s description, for example, of how existing 
gynecological practices facilitated translation of hormones into drugs, Roberts asks “why were 
clinics set up around women’s bodies and not around men’s? Which ‘practices of masculine 
supremacy, or … other systems of structural inequality’ were built into this practice fact?”27   
To approach such questions, Roberts attempts to avoid separating culture from science, or to 
deploy it as an ahistorical explanation for science. Developing STS network approaches,28 
                                                          
20 Fausto-Sterling 2000.  
21 Ibid at 148; see generally 170-177. 
22 Ibid at 190; see generally 147-148 and 177-194. 
23 Roberts 2007.  
24 Ibid at 44. 
25 Ibid at 36; see generally 37-45. See also Oudshoorn 1994 at 153-154 (at fn 13), addressing her use of social network theory 
rather than ANT.  
26 Ibid at 44; see also generally 36-46.  
27 Ibid. At 38-39, Roberts also asks why new endocrinological facts of the 1920-30s did not mean “the end of the two-sex 
model”, a question that was likewise investigated in Fausto-Stirling 2000. 
28 Ibid at 41. In this respect, Roberts considers Bruno Latour’s ANT approach alongside Donna Haraway’s reservations that ANT 
can over-emphasize technical aspects of science and under-emphasize power. 
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including by adopting Serres’ notion of crumpled or folded time to explain the persistence of 
notions of sexual difference in the history of hormones,29 she expands her analytical focus 
beyond technoscientific practices to include non-human actors – most particularly, by 
foregrounding “the activities of sex hormones themselves.” She theorizes hormones not merely 
as biological substances, but as bio-social actors that “actively participate in the enactment of 
particular versions of the biological (or nature) and the social (or culture) and of sex”.30 In the 
form of HRT technologies, hormones have social and biological effects that are produced 
through networks of representation and that cannot be parsed. Nor can these effects be isolated 
from the culturally and historically situated and already sexed/gendered bodies in which they are 
circulated and with which they interact.31 As messengers, hormones create a relationality 
reflected by the hyphen in bio-social, “which represents a constituting, active relation between 
two entities (the biological and the social) that do not pre-exist on their own but are constituted 
through their connection with each other.”32 These methodological and conceptual differences 
signal a modified answer to the question of how estrogen became a drug for menopausal 
women. In Roberts’ view, pre-existing cultural conceptions of racial and sexual difference were 
folded into the new science of endocrinology in the 1920s and 1930s, and were carried through 
into the estrogenic technologies that developed during the twentieth century. Embedded in HRT, 
specifically, were discourses in which femininity was inextricably linked to reproductivity and in 
which menopause was unnatural.33  
None of these scientific and cultural histories consider how regulators’ activities may have 
contributed to transforming sex hormones into drugs. Other historical subdisciplines, however, 
have since brought regulators into the picture. In Toxic Bodies, environmental historian Nancy 
Langston gives a detailed account of the regulatory history of DES.34 In 1938, the biochemist 
Edward Dodds invented DES as a coal-tar based synthetic substitute for steroidal estrogens. 
While dissimilar in chemical structure to the steroids, it was a potent analog of estrogens.35 DES 
“could cornify the lining of mouse vaginas far more potently than anything produced by living 
                                                          
29 Ibid at 46-50. 
30 Ibid at 47. Notably Roberts describes these enactments as historically contingent: “such enactments are historically specific 
materializations (to use Judith Butler’s term) or articulations (to use Donna Haraway’s term)”. 
31 Ibid at 155-158. 
32 Ibid at 181.  
33 Ibid at 114-34. 
34 Langston 2010. For other work that integrates political, legal and/or regulatory history into scientific and social histories of 
DES and steroid hormones, see Gaudillière 2014; Gaudillière 2005a; and Gaudillière 2010.  
35 Langston 2010 at 32; and Gaudillière 2014 at 78. 
16 
 
bodies”, making it “more estrogenic than estrogens”.36 Langston unearths the record of the US 
FDA’s deliberations, in 1939 to 1941, on whether to approve DES as a drug for menopause 
(and of later US regulatory decisions, in 1947, to approve DES for use by pregnant women and 
for poultry).37 She does not, however, query whether the US FDA played a role in materializing 
DES. This is perhaps unsurprising, as the statutory setting of her DES story in the US tends to 
obscure such questions. As of 1939, the US Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Act required all new 
drugs to obtain pre-market approval; in that context, it is more difficult to perceive how a drug 
can be approved if it does not yet exist. In Canada, by contrast, where drugs did not require 
approval and yet were increasingly shaped by regulatory standards, I argue that regulators’ 
activities were more constitutive, and that, in their practices of enumerating and standardizing 
estrogen, regulators were not simply sanctioning pre-existing substances but enacting them.  
Beyond DES, many other new estrogenic products were marketed in the 1930s, despite little 
evidence of therapeutic efficacy. Proof of efficacy was not a legal precondition for the US FDA’s 
approval of DES, nor a precondition for its clinical use.38 For steroid estrogens, in the late 1920s 
and 1930s, drug companies promoted a plethora of indications, “starting from a restricted group 
of menstrual disorders and extending, by the late 1920s, to include the treatment of menopause, 
infertility, problems of the genitals, psychiatric conditions such as schizophrenia and depression, 
dermatological diseases such as eczema, and even diseases of the joints”.39 Estrogen even 
instigated the proliferation of new disease categories, largely related to menstruation and 
sterility.40 Despite this, estrogen therapies were not popular in the 1930s.41 In expanding 
Oudshoorn’s research into clinical domains, Chandak Sengoopta shows that physicians were 
not convinced that estrogen was an effective remedy for anything. He asks “[w]hat exactly 
happened in the clinic once the sex hormones were available as potent, standardized and 
reliable therapeutic preparations? Did they bring about the therapeutic revolution prophesied by 
                                                          
36 Ostertag 2016 at 63-64. 
37 Langston 2010 at 32-47. In his work on DES, contrary to (and without citing) Langston, Jean-Paul Gaudillière asserts that DES 
was never approved by the US FDA for use by pregnant women but was prescribed off-label; Gaudillière 2014 at 68, 78-79. 
38 Oudshoorn 1994 at 89; Gaudillière 2014 at 78-79; Rothman & Rothman 2003 at 70; and Watkins 2007 at 28-29. 
39 Li 2003a at 104; see also Oudshoorn 1994 at 97-98; Gaudillière 2014 at 78-79; and Watkins 2007 at 21-22. 
40 Rothman & Rothman 2003 at 72: “…the traditional category of amenorrhea was divided and then subdivided into infantilism 
(underdevelopment of sexual organs), Fröhlich’s syndrome (infantilism due to a pituitary dysfunction), primary amenorrhea 
(delayed or imperfect development of secondary sex characteristics), secondary amenorrhea (premature menopause), 
polymenorrhea (short menstrual cycle), hypomenorrhea (too little menstrual flow), oligomenorrhea (delayed menstruation due 
to pituitary dysfunction), and endocrinopathic amenorrhea and sterility…”. 
41 Fausto-Stirling 2000 at 184, 341 (at fn 68); Rothman & Rothman 2003 at 74-75; Langston 2010 at 30; Krieger et al 2005 at 
741; and Watkins 2007 at 22-23. 
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so many in the 1920s?” For menstrual disorders, by the late 1930s, most gynecologists had 
answered this question in the negative – clinical results were “notoriously unsatisfactory”.42  
That being said, gynecologists also believed that the therapeutic efficacy of estrogens was 
closely connected to the dosage level.43 Despite this centrality of dose to medical discourses, 
radical variability continued to characterize the dosages of therapeutic estrogen preparations, 
the bioassays used to measure their potency, and the units used to express potency.44 
The change, if you will, began in the early 1940s. Some firms, like the Dutch firm Organon, 
had sought as soon as the early 1930s to position sex hormones as a remedy for menopause.45 
Yet throughout that decade many women, and many gynecologists, did not see menopause as 
a disease.46 Physicians tended to view it as a stage of life that, for a minority of women, involved 
unpleasant symptoms for a short period. However, the very possibility of relieving these 
women’s discomfort with dependable estrogenic drugs, even in the short-term, “resulted in the 
reconceptualization of menopause as a deficiency disease”.47 Put differently, “before Ayerst 
could sell the drug, it had to sell the disease”.48 The rush to sell estrogen – and with it, 
menopause – took off after the US FDA approved DES in September 1941. Before DES was 
available, most preparations on the North American market were estradiol or estrone products, 
but in comparison, DES was much cheaper to produce, and as it was unpatented, many firms 
promptly began manufacturing DES products.49 Less than a year later, conjugated estrogen, 
branded as Premarin, received US FDA approval as a new menopause therapy.50 By some 
measures, Premarin was nearly as potent as DES, but without the notoriously noxious side 
effects. As a tablet, it was easier to administer than DES or oestradiol preparations, typically 
given by intramuscular injection. Further, by aggressively marketing it as a “natural” product, 
                                                          
42 Sengoopta 2006 at 71, citing Novak, “The Therapeutic Use of Estrogenic Substances” (1935) 104:20 JAMA 1815 [“Novak 
1935’”] at 1817.  
43 Sengoopta 2006 at 159-163; and Krieger et al 2005 at 741. 
44 Ibid at 162, citing Novak 1935 at 1817. For further discussion of the role of standardized bioassays in materializing and 
measuring the potency of estrogenic drugs, see Chapter 1, Section 1.ii, below. 
45 Oudshoorn 1994 at 97-98. 
46 Bell 1987; McCrea 1983; Sengoopta 167-168; Langston 2010 at 31; and Watkins 2007 at 22-24. Even those gynecologists who, 
in the 1930s, promoted estrogen for relief from menopause saw it as only appropriate for a small number of severe cases; see 
e.g. Novak 1935 at 1819. Some historians have found that, while gynecologists in the 1930s “perceived their use to control the 
symptoms of menopause as something suspicious...many women backed the use of these drugs”; see Gaudillière 2005a at 608. 
47 Li 2003a at 104, drawing on Margaret Lock, Encounters with Aging: Mythologies of Menopause in Japan and North America 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994) at 342-344. 
48 Ostertag 2016 at 66.  
49 Langston 2010 at 30-32; Seaman 2003 at 13, 43; Ostertag 2016 at 64; Watkins 2007 at 29; and Gaudillière 2014 at 78. 
50 Li 2003a at 103; and Watkins 2007 at 29. In Canada, Premarin was introduced to the market in 1941; see Watkins 2007 at 23. 
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Ayerst quickly established Premarin as the main competitor to DES.51 Together these “two 
products became the treatment of choice” for menopause,52 though as Premarin grew in 
popularity over the decade, drug companies began promoting DES for other purposes (notably, 
to reduce miscarriage and promote healthy pregnancies).53 This proliferation of potent products, 
and the consolidation of menopause as a disorder, caused skeptical physicians to reconsider 
their views in the years after WWII, when there was an explosion of “menopausal disorders” and 
drugs to treat them.54   
The number of commercial preparations grew in the 1930s not only despite tenuous evidence 
of efficacy, but in the face of carcinogenic hazards. Historians generally concur that, while data 
published in major American journals was not conclusive, the “possibility that estrogen use 
caused cancer” was “well appreciated in the late 1930s and early 1940s”.55 With respect to 
DES, within mere months after it was synthesized and then continuing throughout the 1940s, 
researchers were linking it with cancer, and with genital and reproductive abnormalities.56 By 
1939, “nearly all researchers agreed that natural estrogens had the potential to be carcinogenic 
in laboratory animals, and that DES was at least as carcinogenic, if not more so, than natural 
estrogens because it was more potent”, though researchers and physicians were often 
dismissive of the significance of these animal studies to human health.57 Throughout the 1930s, 
steroidal estrogens had also been found carcinogenic in laboratory experiments by biochemists 
and endocrinologists, though “for clinicians, these studies translated to debates about the 
correct dose to be given”.58 Furthermore, studies were published showing that “high doses of 
estrone over prolonged periods could produce malignant breast tumours in hitherto healthy 
mice”;59 whether sex hormones were carcinogenic or not – and debates raged in major journals 
                                                          
51 Li 2003a at 102; and Watkins 2007 at 25-26. 
52 Rothman & Rothman 2003 at 70-71. Cf Ostertag 2016 at 65 (claiming that Premarin “immediately displaced” DES as the drug 
of choice for menopause).  
53 Langston 2010 at 48-60; see also Ostertag 2016 at 69; and Gaudillière 2014 at 68. 
54 Rothman & Rothamn 2003 at 71; Sangoopta 2006 at 168-170; Bell 1987; McCrea 1983; and Watkins 2007 at 30-31. See also 
e.g. Emil Novak, Gynecology and Female Endocrinology (Boston: Little, Brown, 1941) at 447. 
55 Rothman & Rothman 2003 at 79, and 80-81; see also Krieger et al 2005 at 741-742, 743-744, and 746-747 (fns 25-43, 68-70). 
56 Langston 2010 at 10-11, 31-33; Seaman 2003 at 14, 38; Rothman & Rothman 2003 at 80-81; Gaudillière 2014 at 78-79. As just 
one example, see e.g. CL Buxton & Earl Engle, “Effects of the Therapeutic Use of Diethylstilbestrol” (1939) 113:26 JAMA 2320. 
57 Langston 2010 at 33; see also 34-39. However, as Langston shows, specifically with respect to DES, some research had also 
shown, as early as 1939, that toxicity did not relate to the amount of dose, and that “low doses of DES could be more toxic than 
high doses”; at 38. “As early as the 1930s, however, researchers knew that estrogens do not act in linear or predictable ways”; 
at 38. Some physicians at the time also recognized “the same harm may be obtained through the use of small doses of estrogen 
if they are maintained over a long period”; see “Contraindications to Estrogen Therapy”, editorial, (1940) 114:16 JAMA 1560. 
58 Krieger et al 2005 at 741; see also Watkins 2007 at 34-35 and 43. 
59 Sengoopta 2006 at 195. 
19 
 
– there was also little doubt that they stimulated existing breast malignancies in humans.60 
Sengoopta argues that while some practitioners in the 1930s “strongly suspected a link between 
the sex glands and certain kinds of cancer”, it was not widely accepted that hormones may 
cause breast, uterus and prostate tumours until the 1940s.61 Yet other scholars date this 
acceptance to the late 1930s.62 As early as 1933, even those gynecologists enthusiastically 
promoting estrogen acknowledged that “estrogenic substances administered in large doses and 
for prolonged periods in certain experimental animals, have been shown to produce cancer”.63 
Thus, regardless of when precisely the hazard of cancer hardened into a fact, throughout the 
1930s and 1940s, the question of estrogen’s safety was widely conceived as a matter of dose.  
 
1.ii.  Standardization of biological drugs in the mid-twentieth century 
In order to contextualize the activities of the Committee and National Health officials, and 
their approaches to enumerating, standardizing and regulating estrogen in the 1940s, I 
summarize the relevant pharmaceutical historiography.64 Until the 1990s, pharmaceutical history 
tended towards disciplinary stratification; in particular, historians of pharmacy adopted 
methodological approaches that limited their inquiries to the techniques of pharmacists, or to the 
changing professional boundaries between pharmacy and medicine in various times and 
places.65 More recently, some social historians have tried to reunite history of pharmacy and 
pharmaceutical history, so as to encompass “the entire history of medicines and those who 
make them”.66 Yet, even that approach was inadequately interdisciplinary, as understanding 
                                                          
60 Sengoopta 2006 at 195-196. 
61 Ibid; see also e.g. EC Dodds, “Hormones in Cancer” (1944) 2 Vitam Horm 353. 
62 Oudshoorn 1994 at 107; Langston 2010 at 31-33; and Rothman & Rothman 2003 at 79-81. 
63 Rothman & Rothman 2003 at 80, citing Novak 1935. 
64 There is little historiography on drug standardization in Canada in the 1920s-40s, other than for insulin; see e.g. Christianne 
Sinding, “Making the unit of insulin: Standards, clinical work and industry, 1920-1925” (2002) 76:2 Bull Hist Med 213. Generally 
on the Canadian history of pharmacy, see Canadian Academy of the History of Pharmacy, One Hundred Years of Pharmacy in 
Canada, 1867–1967: Centennial Symposium (Toronto: Canadian Academy of the History of Pharmacy, 1969); Arnold Raison, A 
Brief History of Pharmacy in Canada (Toronto: Canadian Pharmaceutical Association, 1969) [“Raison 1969”]; JW Preston, The 
Canadian Pharmaceutical Association, 1907-1957: a review (Toronto: Canadian Pharmaceutical Association, 1957); and Claire 
Gillis & Melanie Rantucci, Canadian Pharmacists Association, 1907-2007: 100 years of leadership in pharmacy (Ottawa: 
Canadian Pharmacists Association, 2007). 
65 In the 1960s, the major historiography included Leslie G Matthews, History of Pharmacy in Britain (London: Livingstone, 
1962); George Trease, Pharmacy in History (London: Bailliere, Tindall and Cox, 1964); FNL Poynter, Evolution of Pharmacy in 
Britain (London: Pitman Medical Publishing Co, 1965); and Glenn Sonnedecker, Kremers and Urdang’s History of Pharmacy, 4th 
ed (Madison, WI: American Institute for the History of Pharmacy, 1976).  
66 See e.g. Stuart Anderson, ed. Making Medicines: A brief history of pharmacy and pharmaceuticals (London: Pharmaceutical 
Press, 2005) [“Anderson 2005”]. Other work giving greater emphasis to social or political history included Sydney Holloway, 
Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain 1841 to 1991: A Political and Social History (London: Pharmaceutical Press, 1991); 
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pharmaceuticals requires following the interactions of medicine, science, technology, industry, 
and law. Fortunately, within the last fifteen years, a more sociologically-inflected, disciplinarily-
integrated historiography of pharmaceuticals has emerged.67 Enriching our understanding of 
drugs as enacted by historically and locally specific medical, laboratory, technological, and legal 
practices, these studies place drugs “at the centre of complex networks that bind together the 
various professionals involved in their invention, the companies responsible for their production, 
the doctors who prescribe them, and the pharmacists who sell them, as well as the patients and 
consumers who take them.”68 They take, as entry points to more integrated histories of 
scientific, technological and medical practices, topics previously disregarded in the history of 
medicine – including biological drugs (or biologics), and drug standardization.69 The efforts of 
the Committee and National Health, including negotiations between physicians, 
pharmacologists, pharmacists, manufacturers, bureaucrats, and lawyers, are properly placed 
within this pharmaceutical history. After all, the Committee was not a sex hormone committee, 
but a committee on pharmacopoeial standards. By thus situating my story, I aim to more fully 
historicize the Canadian debates on standardization of estrogen, the decision to define drugs in 
the Canadian Supplement by chemical and biological methods, and the ways in which Canada 
regulated sex hormones differently than other (biological) drugs in the 1940s.  
Narratives about pharmaceuticals in the twentieth century have often been chemical. 
Gaudillière summarizes this historiography as typified by an emphasis on drugs’ molecular 
structure and on the industrialization of synthetic drug manufacturing (and relatedly, the 
marginalization of pharmacists),70 and by a diminishment of the role of physicians in shaping 
drugs and their uses.71 Whatever its merits, this chemical narrative is troubled by the biological 
                                                          
Dennis Worthen, Pharmacy in World War II (London: Haworth Press, 2004) [“Worthen 2004”]; and David Cohen & William 
Helfand, Pharmacy: An Illustrated History (New York: Harry N Abrams, 1990). 
67 See e.g. John Pickstone “Ways of Knowing: Towards a Historical Sociology of Science, Technology and Medicine” (1993) 26:4 
Br J Hist Sci 433; Jean-Paul Gaudillière, “Introduction: drug trajectories” (2005) 36 Stud Hist Phil Biol & Biomed Sci 603 
[“Gaudillière 2005b”]; Christoph Gradmann & Johnathan Simon, eds, Evaluating and Standardizing Therapeutic Agents, 1890-
1950 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Alexander Von Schwerin, Heiko Stoff & Bettina Wahrig, eds, Biologics, A History of 
Agents Made from Living Organisms in the Twentieth Century (London: Picking & Chatto, 2013); and Jean-Paul Gaudillière & 
Volker Hess, eds, Ways of Regulating Drugs in the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).  
68 Gaudillière 2005b at 603. Nelly Oudshoorn’s work, discussed above, is a relatively early example of this approach. 
69 Gaudillière 2005b at 610; Gaudillière 2010 at 175; Alexander Von Schwerin, Heiko Stoff & Bettina Wahrig, “Biologics: An 
Introduction” in Alexander Von Schwerin, Heiko Stoff & Bettina Wahrig, eds, Biologics, A History of Agents Made from Living 
Organisms in the Twentieth Century (London: Picking & Chatto, 2013) [“Von Schwerin, Stoff & Wahrig 2013”]; and Christoph 
Gradmann & Johnathan Simon, “Introduction,” in Christoph Gradmann & Johnathan Simon, eds, Evaluating and Standardizing 
Therapeutic Agents, 1890-1950 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) [“Gradmann & Simon 2010”] at 3-4. 
70 Gaudillière 2005b at 604-605; and Gaudillière 2005a at 613.  
71 Gaudillière 2005b at 604-605. In Gaudillière’s view, this diminishment of physicians’ role is achieved through narratives in 
which drugs are invented to respond to existing diseases or demand (suggesting a unidirectional relationship from 
manufacturers to clinicians), and which position physicians as wary of growing industrialization.  
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drugs that “dominated the world of pharmacy until the Second World War” – both by the plant 
extracts long described in pharmacopoeias and, in the interwar years, by the drugs derived from 
biologically active substances in living organisms like vaccines, antibiotics, sera, vitamins, and 
hormones.72 As historians are quick to note, biologics were not understood in strict opposition to 
chemicals. In some cases, biological extracts were converted easily into artificially synthesized 
chemical compounds; further, some substances could simultaneously “in one setting be viewed 
(and handled) as a biological while in another context as a chemical”.73 The ongoing efforts, in 
this period, to chemically synthesize biological substances arguably “dissolved the boundaries 
between natural and artificial substances”.74 Still, despite this lack of essential difference, 
“[b]iologicals were often more complex, more difficult to handle, and less standardized than the 
chemical drugs”.75 Many biological substances were highly potent and unstable, with multiple 
physiological effects that “oscillate between desirable and harmful”.76 Rather than see these as 
side effects, Alexander Von Schwerin, Heiko Stoff and Bettina Wahrig argue that biologics were 
ontologically precarious. This precariousness arose precisely from their “historical construction 
as both natural and artificial objects”, as the “naturalness” of biologics made them culturally 
desirable and pharmaceutically promising, and yet difficult for humans to produce and control.77 
The task of stabilizing these “natural” substances, and converting them into drugs, fell to 
standardization. At a technical level, drug standardization referred to “a formal agreement to use 
the same instrument, the same substance or the same procedure in order to enforce the 
comparability and the replication of measures and – more generally – of technical operations.”78 
Replicability had multiple goals: industrially, to produce identical high-quality goods; clinically, to 
ensure safe use; and scientifically, to measure properties and effects.79  
                                                          
72 Gaudillière 2010 at 176. 
73 Gaudillière 2005b at 606. 
74 Von Schwerin, Stoff & Wahrig 2013 at 29. 
75 Gaudillière 2005b at 606. 
76 Von Schwerin, Stoff & Wahrig 2013 at 28. 
77 Von Schwerin, Stoff & Wahrig 2013b at 29, see also 26-30. Gaudillière has also theorized biologics as not just made from 
biological substances, but as sociotechnical objects whose naturalness was socially and industrially produced; Jean-Paul 
Gaudillière, “Biologics in the Colonies: Emile Perrot, Kola Nuts and the Industrial Reordering of Pharmacy”, in Alexander Von 
Schwerin, Heiko Stoff & Bettina Wahrig eds, Biologics, A History of Agents Made from Living Organisms in the Twentieth Century 
(London: Picking & Chatto, 2013) [“Gaudillière 2013”] at 48, 62-63. 
78 Gaudillière 2010 at 175. Pharmaceutical historians also theorize drug standards as moral and social devices, entangled with 
economic interests; further, they describe the different goals and logics of laboratory, industrial, and regulatory standards. 
Standardization should be analyzed as “political discourses and practices that connect molecules in a historically specific regime 
of knowledge and power”; Von Schwerin, Stoff & Wahrig 2013 at 25-26. I leave more general discussion of types, functions, and 
effects of standards, beyond the drug context, to Chapter 1, section 2.ii. below. 
79 Gaudillière 2005b at 606-607. 
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Importantly, although this is much oversimplified, whether a drug substance was taken as 
chemical or biological changed the approach to its standardization. Chemical approaches 
involved purifying a chemical substance, measuring its weight, and determining the amount to 
be included in a drug product based on a (linear) dose-response curve. A pure chemical was a 
more compliant ingredient, making it easier to guarantee product identity and uniformity; further, 
chemicals attracted greater patent protection. By contrast, biological substances, in their natural 
variability, required more complexly constructed dose-response curves based on repeated 
physiological tests using different species and evaluating different physiological effects.80  
Bioassays aimed to “know – or to fix – a product’s activity by performing animal experiments”.81 
They were necessary to measure potency, ideally by making it quantifiable in potency units. By 
translating anticipated physiological effects into the activity of a biological substance, expressed 
and measured in units, the therapeutic efficacy of the substance could be fixed numerically. 
Such tests were then the basis for determining dosage, and as such were critical to patients and 
physicians.82 Mobilizing this technical distinction more ontologically, I broadly contemplate that 
chemical standardization apprehends what a drug is – its properties, essence, composition – 
while biological standardization apprehends what a drug does – its activity, capacity, potency. 
Historians have shown how these elements all crystallized in estrogen. Oudshoorn examines 
how test methods in the 1920s and 1930s contributed to transforming sex hormones into 
material realities.83 With a comparable methodology, Jean-Paul Gaudillière has examined 
bioassay techniques in sex hormone networks, but with a different emphasis; while Oudshoorn 
focused primarily on laboratory research, Gaudillière zeroed in on industrial testing.84 Their 
histories explore how bioassays were “magic tools” for standardizing estrogen and determining 
its potency, and a necessary means for scientific evaluation of physiological effects, industrial 
control of drug manufacturing, and pharmacological decisions about dosage.85 
In describing and analyzing work by laboratory scientists in the 1920s and 30s to biologically 
standardize sex hormones, Oudshoorn begins with their efforts to define which substances 
would be defined as “male” or “female”.86 For the “female” substance, they agreed that the 
                                                          
80 See e.g. Gradmann & Simon 2010; Gaudillière 2005b; Gaudillière 2010. It should be noted, however, that even where 
bioassay methods were used to standardize hormones, the characterization of these substances still involved chemical assays; 
see e.g. Gaudillière 2010 at 197. 
81 Gradmann & Simon 2010 at 3. 
82 Gaudillière 2010 at 175-176; Gradmann & Simon 2010 at 1, 5-6. 
83 For the other means by which sex hormones materialized, as analyzed by Oudshoorn, see Chapter 1, section 1.i. 
84 Gaudillière 2005a at 615, stating how he similarly aims at a unified history of biology, medicine and technology. 
85 Gaudillière 2005a at 617. 
86 Oudshoorn 1994 at 43-54. 
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standard should be a physiological function that changed in an organism after ovariectomy.87 
While they also agreed that ovarian extracts should be used to test for the “female principle”, 
when it came to methods for testing these extracts, gynecologists and laboratory scientists 
diverged. The former tested the weight of the uterus, often in ovariectomized rabbits. The latter 
tested a wide variety of physiological changes – on “the feathers of domestic fowl; the growth of 
mammary rudiments in male mice; the growth of the vulva and the mammary glands in infantile 
female rat; and muscular activity basal metabolism, and the levels of calcium and sugar in 
blood, both in mice and women” – such that, by the late 1920s, there was a “bewildering variety” 
of test methods.88 During the 1920s, use of the vaginal smear test, created by American 
physiologist Edgar Allan and biochemist Edward Doisy, gained momentum. The Allen-Doisy test 
involved injecting an ovariectomized female rodent – a mouse or a rat – with an ovarian 
preparation and, three days later, examining a vaginal smear under a microscope for any 
changes in epithelial cells considered characteristic of estrus. These tests effectively defined a 
female sex hormone as “any extract, purified product or any synthetic compounds bearing some 
resemblance to the natural preparation inducing a ‘female’ reaction in such a standardized 
test.”89 As summarized by Fausto-Stirling, while these tests “distanced animal masculinity from 
reproduction, linked animal femininity directly to the cycle of generation, and made less visible 
the effects of these hormones on nonreproductive organs in both males and females”, the 
particular tests that scientists chose to use were not somehow required by “nature”.90  Further, 
using biological standards allowed substances other than steroid hormones to make the 
estrogenic grade; DES could be perceived “as a potent estrogen rather than as an aromatic 
compound with an ethylene side chain”.91  With these tests, estrogen – and sex – materialized.  
Moreover, these bioassays also measured the potency of the estrogen that they materialized, 
through numerical units that could be used to quantify the potency of any estrogenic substance. 
To continue with our example, the Allen-Doisy test defined one mouse-unit (or sometimes, one 
rat-unit) as the minimum dose of substance potent enough to induce changes in vaginal 
epithelial cells characteristic of estrus in the spayed female rodent.92 Here, too, methods 
proliferated. Specifically, estrogenic activity (potency) was expressed using a variety of different 
                                                          
87 Ibid at 43-45. 
88 Ibid at 44, 46. See also Fausto-Stirling 2000 at 183-184. 
89 Gaudillière 2005a at 617; see also Oudshoorn 1994 at 46. 
90 Fausto-Stirling 2000 at 186-187. 
91 Gaudillière 2014 at 78-79. 
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units connected to different bioassay tests – rat units, mouse units, rabbit units, and eventually 
international units. Some scientists were vexed by the existence of many units to express the 
potency of the same substance, and British scientists with the National Institute for Medical 
Research (NIMR), led by Henry Dale, spearheaded efforts for greater standardization.93 In 
1932, at an international conference on the standardization of sex hormones, organized through 
the League of Nations, a group of elite physiologists and biochemists adopted the Allen–Doisy 
vaginal smear test for producing estrus as the international standard (or definition) for “female 
sex hormone”. Ironically, they adopted two standard units – either mouse units or rat units, 
which reflected European versus American lab practices respectively – as the ‘international unit’ 
of female sex hormone.94 After 1935, related in part to new abilities to isolate estrogen from 
urine, a shift to a more chemical paradigm of standardization and testing emerged, although 
chemical testing did not completely supplant bioassays.95 The conferences also spurred 
creation of an official reference material to be kept by NIMR – a pure substance prepared from 
the urine of pregnant mares – against which estrogenic hormones could be compared. As a 
result, “the unit of estrogen would no longer be an animal unit, but a weight unit, even if the 
relationship between weight and potency remained based on biological assays.”96  
This push by laboratory researchers for molecular standardization of estrogen was not, 
however, widely reflected in clinical use or industrial practices in the mid or late 1930s. Instead, 
these practices were marked by national and corporate variation. As Gaudillière has shown, 
different firms’ laboratories used different species, strains, and numbers of animals (which 
reacted in different ways); they used different modes of administration (i.e. single versus 
fractionated inoculations, and subcutaneous versus intravenous injections); and even different 
timing changed results (for example, “mice did not react well in dry, cold weather”). Units used 
by manufacturers were wildly variant, as the Allen-Doisy rat unit was still common in the US, 
and “[t]here were other ‘rat units’ too – not to mention ‘mouse units’ – and many manufacturers 
were slow to standardize their products in the new ‘international units’.” For example, the 
                                                          
93 Noting that standardization was a central agenda of sex hormone experts in the 1930s, Fausto-Stirling notes that 
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German firm Schering made its products using a rat unit equivalent to almost five international 
units, while the US firm Parke Davis employed a rat unit equivalent to 3.3 international units.97   
With rigorous attention to different institutional and commercial research and production sites 
such as Schering, IG Farben, Bayer, and Butenandt’s research institute (and the intricate 
collaborations among them), Gaudillière details the heterogeneity of sex hormone bioassays 
and potency units in Germany and France in the interwar years and during WWII.98 While this 
diversity did not necessarily diminish quality control within each firm, for estrogenic products, 
“comparability and robustness remained local achievements”.99 Scientists and engineers in 
German firms adapted existing bioassays, and generated new techniques to test commercial 
preparations.100 Some laboratory scientists viewed this multiplicity as a “source of discrepancies 
and chaos that one could only overcome with stronger standardization that could cut across 
laboratories, firms and national lines”. However, as Gaudillière points out, this heterogeneity had 
important benefits. Using a variety of bioassays for estrogen allowed for a greater number of 
physiological effects to be identified – which also multiplied a drug’s indications, and its 
marketable forms.101 Bioassays thus always had a “double meaning”, serving many masters –  
as “the boundaries between research and control were often blurred … this porosity could 
become an industrial asset”.102 The role of industry in standardizing estrogenic drugs meant that 
bioassays were also entangled with medical practices and normalization, most directly through 
relationships to dosage, mode of administration, and indications, as mediated by clinical 
testing.103 Notably, in this time, the German state did not seek to impose standards on firms, 
nor, unlike in the US, did this demand arise from “elite physicians in teaching hospitals”.104     
In concluding this brief review of pharmaceutical history, I also highlight Jean-Paul Gaudillière 
and Volker Hess’s theoretical framework on “ways of regulating drugs”.105 While they stress that  
ways of regulating are “sociohistorical products” which have been “utterly variable” in their 
                                                          
97 Gaudillière 2010 at 183. 
98 Gaudillière 2005a; Gaudillière 2010; and Jean-Paul Gaudillière, “Genesis and development of a biomedical object: styles of 
thought, styles of work and the history of the sex steroids” (2004) 35 Stud Hist Phil Biol & Biomed Sci 525 [“Gaudillière 2004”]. 
99 Gaudillière 2010 at 196. 
100 Gaudillière 2004 at 537; Gaudillière 2010 at 181. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Gaudillière 2010 at 197. 
103 Gaudillière 2010 at 193-198; see also Gaudillière 2004.  
104 Gaudillière 2010 at 196. 
105 Jean-Paul Gaudillière & Volker Hess, “Introduction”, in Jean-Paul Gaudillière & Volker Hess, eds, “Ways of Regulating Drugs 
in the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) [“Gaudillière & Hess 2013”]. See also the volume’s essays, 
including Gaudillière 2013, which applies this framework to compare industrial and professional ways of regulating herbalists, in 
the context of industrialization in mid-century Germany and France. 
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historical articulations, as a basic framing heuristic, the framework “seeks to bring to light the 
internal logic of specific combinations of practices and procedures, describing the various 
rationalities underpinning the management of therapeutic agents”.106 Pharmaceutical 
historiography has largely conceived of regulation as legal control by state actors of drug-
making and marketing activities (despite that obviously many actors, and not just firms, are 
involved in making markets). Yet the diversity of sociohistorical practices involved in shaping 
drugs – including a range of standardization practices both between and within laboratories, 
factories, and clinics – suggests that drug regulation should be defined more broadly.107  More 
specifically, based on the distinct social actors, and their aims and values, forms of evidence 
and expertise, and intervention tools, Gaudillière and Hess propose five ways of regulating 
drugs: professional, industrial, administrative, public, and juridical.108 Of these, the first three are 
relevant to this thesis. The professional way of regulating drugs has involved state delegation to 
physicians (with grants of autonomy) and pharmacists (with grants of monopoly). Professional 
regulation has often relied on “pharmacology, animal models, dosage, indications” as key forms 
of evidence, and employed “pharmacopoeia, prescription, guidelines” as key regulatory tools.109 
In many states, with the emergence of mass-produced and widely-marketed pharmaceuticals, a 
transition from professional to industrial ways of regulating drugs marked the interwar years and 
WWII, even if one mode did not automatically replace the other but rather they often operated in 
parallel.110 Industrial regulation by firms, aided by representative associations, has aimed not 
only at profit but at product quality. It has used tools of intellectual property rights, quality 
control, and scientific publicity; it has engaged scientific evidence and cost-benefit analyses.111 
While administrative ways of regulating have attracted relatively greater attention, this 
scholarship often focuses on the postwar period, when most industrialized states first adopted 
                                                          
106 Gaudillière & Hess 2013 at 7. 
107 Ibid at 5-7; see also Gaudillière 2013 at 67. Other social studies of medicine likewise urge a broader definition of regulation, 
especially in relation to standardization; see Alberto Cambrosio, “Standardization Before Biomedicine: On Early Forms of 
Regulatory Objectivity” in Christoph Gradmann & Johnathan Simon, eds, Evaluating and Standardizing Therapeutic Agents, 
1890-1950 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) [“Cambrosio 2010”]. At 259-260, Cambrosio writes: “the analysis of the 
different forms of regulation should not be separated from the analysis of the constitution of the entities, processes and 
activities that are the subject of regulation. But if this is so, then the challenge for historians is to find a way of producing 
historical narratives that, far from relying on a common sense understanding of a small set of “usual suspects”, each cleanly 
assigned to a pre-established, watertight domain (state, industry, science), and of the categories (political, economic, cultural, 
technical) within which their activities allegedly fall, will instead focus on the shifting composition and modalities of actions of 
the collective”.  
108 Gaudillière & Hess 2013 at 7-8. 
109 Ibid at 8-9. 
110 Gaudillière 2013 at 67-68. 
111 Gaudillière & Hess 2013 at 8-9. 
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and implemented legislation that required pre-market approval supported by evidence from 
clinical trials.112 Administrative actors include not only state agencies but also governmental 
committees; their regulatory tools include not just approvals or enforcement but also labelling.113  
Understanding pharmaceuticals, then, involves tracing interactions between ways of 
regulating that were often multiple, overlapping, and dynamic.114 The authors propose that 
historians ask “[w]hich values guide the regulation process? Which problems or adverse 
practices are targeted? Who are the most important actors? What are the forms of evidence 
accepted in decision making? Which regulatory tools are mobilized to oversee and control the 
fate of drugs?”115 By asking such questions, which drive not only at “who benefits” but “through 
what regulatory practices”, historians can take their studies of pharmaceuticals beyond historical 
contingency and draw out the unequal power gradients at the “very core of drug regulation”.116 
 
2.  Theoretical literatures on enactment 
Moving from historiography and towards a framework for theorizing law in-and-of estrogen, 
the remainder of this chapter contemplates enactment. First, it summarizes Annemarie Mol’s 
contributions to theorizing how realities are enacted in practices, and places her work both in 
relation to actor-network theory (ANT) and the material turn more broadly. It next considers 
Lawrence Busch’s typologies of standards, which draw on Mol’s performative approach, and the 
new embrace by socio-legal studies of Mol and other STS scholars’ approaches to materiality. 
 
2.i. Annemarie Mol and the enactment of multiple ontologies 
The theorist that most empowers the history of estrogen told here is Annemarie Mol. Her now 
canonical study, The Body Multiple, has been hugely influential in STS and social studies of 
medicine.117 Empirically, it is an ethnography of atherosclerosis practices in a Dutch hospital. 
Methodologically, she argues that studies of science, technology, and medicine should abandon 
                                                          
112 Few European countries required pre-marketing approval or other controls on drugs before the mid-1960s; John Abraham & 
Graham Lewis, Regulating Medicines in Europe: Competition, expertise and public health (New York: Routledge, 2000). 
113 Gaudillière & Hess 2013 at 8-9. 
114 Gaudillière 2013 at 93. 
115 Gaudillière & Hess 2010 at 8. 
116 Ibid at 12. They remind us, here, that “[d]efining power relations as only financial would…be a caricature”. For a leading 
study of the history of the US FDA’s regulatory power, see Daniel Carpenter, Reputation and Power: Organizational image and 
pharmaceutical regulation at the FDA (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010) [“Carpenter 2010”]. 
117 Mol 2002. 
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an epistemological focus on their objects of analysis, and take a praxiological approach.118 That 
is, rather than approaching objects as being one fixed reality represented or known by multiple 
perspectives, Mol argues that reality is enacted in practice – reality is performed, achieved, 
done.119 As practices in medicine are not singular and coherent, but are often incommensurable 
or contradictory in the various techniques, tests, materials, and actors that are involved, the 
diseases enacted in these practices are also multiple. From the leg pain felt by patients, to 
tissue studied on microscope slides, to arterial surgeries, atherosclerosis is multiple. The 
realities of diseases and bodies are enacted multiply in diverse socio-material practices.120 
This begs the question of how this multiplicity manages to “hang together”.121 Mol shows how 
it is that “the singularity of objects, so often presupposed, turns out to be an accomplishment”.122 
This achievement is the work of various forms of coordination,123 which include simply adding 
diverse testing practices together without concern for their cohesion, hierarchizing diverse 
measurement techniques if one must be prioritized, ignoring and bracketing discrepancies, and, 
as described in ANT studies, translation of tests and outcomes to make them comparable.124 
Sometimes, incoherent practices cannot be smoothed away; here, rather than resort to the STS 
metaphor of “closure” where differences are “settled” and matter stabilized, Mol looks at how in 
practice differences are diffused and distributed, controversies dissolved rather than solved.125 
In labelling her approach “empirical philosophy”, Mol re-emphasizes the need for questions 
about ontologies – how objects and orders come to be and do – are best approached through 
detailed evidence of the provisional, relational practices that perform them. 126 This also raises 
the question of where to begin – who or what enacts, who or what is enacted. The term 
enactment intentionally leaves open who or what the actor is, and who or what is acted upon.127 
Enactment is, of course, also a legal term. Loosely speaking, enactment refers both to the 
making of a piece of legislation – an act – and to the law that is the outcome of that process. 
More technically, at least with respect to federal law in Canada, an enactment means “an Act or 
regulation or any portion of an Act or regulation”. Further, “to enact” includes “to issue, make or 
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establish”. 128 In the theoretical tenor suggested in this thesis, toxic enactment simultaneously 
captures how regulatory practices perform toxicity and how toxicity shapes and infuses laws.129 
Toxic enactment does not reflect any pretensions of a new theoretical development. Rather, I 
am trying to experiment, if rather unfaithfully, with Mol’s approach, by expanding and extending 
enactment to regulatory practices. This thesis tests whether enactment is as generative a 
concept for studying regulatory practices, as performances that shape the material world, as it 
has been for investigating other techniques, scientific, medical, or technological, for doing 
realities. It also aims to contribute to discussions on the nature of toxicity, by apprehending a 
potent and changeable substance as the effect of multiple regulatory practices. While using a 
concept developed within social studies of medicine in a legal history context may seem like a 
stretch, as this thesis examines drug standardization and the activities of scientist-regulators, I 
suggest this is a natural extension.  
It should be noted that enactment, as does ANT, comes largely out of ethnomethodological 
and ethnographical traditions. That ethnographers would embrace a praxiological approach to 
studying ontological questions makes sense, as ethnography provides immediate access to 
what (living) people say and do. Admittedly, historians may be limited to primarily documentary 
records to find evidence about (often dead) people’s practices; they lack direct access to 
physical performances of humans or nonhumans in past times. There is no reason in theory 
though that historical methods cannot provide access, if more mediated, to past practices, and 
efforts to do so have offered historians of medicine a productive way to keep material practices 
in sight.130  
Similarly, environmental historians have taken, if in modified theoretical vocabularies, 
praxiological approaches to studying how toxicity is materialized within human and nonhuman 
assemblages. In her wide-ranging study into the ontologies of low-dose chemical exposure, 
historian Michelle Murphy argues that “exposures were brought into existence in multiple, often 
conflicting circumstances – the result of not just specific environments but new arrangements of 
                                                          
128 Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21, s 2(1). In some other jurisdictions in Canada, such as Ontario, technically only the 
legislature “enacts” laws and only Acts of the legislature are “enactments”, while regulations are by contrast “made”; see 
Legislation Act, 2006, SO 2006, c 21, Sched F, ss 5-6 and 17-18. 
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may resonate for some readers, by “toxic enactments”, I do not intend to convey either “bad laws” or “bad performances”.   
130 Latour’s study of bacteriology in France was, of course, partly a historical account; see Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of 
France (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993) [“Latour 1993”]. For more recent praxiological histories of medicine, 
see e.g. Alberto Cambrosio & Peter Keating, Cancer on Trial: Oncology as a new style of practice (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2011), and Geertje Mak, Doubting sex: Inscriptions, bodies and selves in nineteenth-century hermaphrodite case histories 
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context of legal history, see Chapter 2.  
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technologies and practices through which laypeople, scientists, and corporate experts 
apprehended the health effects of buildings on bodies,”131 using the term “apprehended” to 
grasp both the epistemic and physical capture of phenomena. Weaving together numerous 
histories, from the organizing activities of women office workers embracing epidemiology to the 
toxicological dose-response curves originating from industrial hygiene, she argues that sick 
building syndrome formed as a phenomenon in the encounters between these multiple practices 
and knowledges.132 As with estrogen, materialized in diverse historical practices of laboratory 
science, clinical medicine, and pharmaceutical developments, and in Canada through particular 
arrangements – in other idioms, networks, assemblages, entanglements – of heterogenous 
regulatory practices, sick buildings also came into existence “with divergent and even 
contradictory qualities”,133 and their “very existence contained uncertainty, multiplicity, and 
nonspecificity”.134 In short, multiple historical practices lead to a multiple object: “[m]ultiplicity 
was itself one of the ways that historical actors brought sick buildings into being. That is, 
multiplicity was a quality with which objects, like buildings, could be imbued”.135  
Focusing on the “contested ontological politics” that materialized indoor chemical exposure, 
Murphy shows that while these multiple histories helped to mobilize some people into action, 
they also precluded certain causal narratives about low-dose exposures.136 This produces what 
she calls regimes of imperceptibility.137 As toxicological instruments and methods “required toxic 
exposures to be both regular and specific”, this in turn served to render “ubiquitous and low-
level exposures unprovable and imperceptible.”138 Considering, then, the ways in which experts 
deploy toxicological technologies – whether in laboratories or in regulations – can render 
perceptible the historicity of toxicity and of hormone disruption. Sliding back from history to 
ethnography, anthropologists are now elaborating on Murphy’s concepts, aiming to move 
beyond documenting the existence and dominance of historical regimes of imperceptibility and 
                                                          
131 Michelle Murphy, Sick Building Syndrome and the Problem of Uncertainty (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006) 
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theorizing, though she cites Mol’s writings as an example of works that “emphasize the multiplicity of objects and ontologies”; 
see 182 (fn 7). Moreover, Murphy’s work historicizing low-dose toxicity as a material effect of expertise and power is indebted 
intellectually to concepts developed by Michel Foucault and Judith Butler, which also heavily influenced Mol’s theoretical 
approach in The Body Multiple. However, the concept of multiplicity that Murphy uses is not Mol’s but reflects that provided by 
Gilles Delueze and Félix Guattari, incorporated into otherwise her “largely Foucauldian analytic toolbox”; at 183 (fn 14). 
132 Ibid at 107-110. 
133 Ibid at 149.  
134 Ibid at 108. 
135 Ibid at 150. 
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towards theorizing the techniques by which such regimes are accomplished and constituted. 
Nicholas Shapiro has documented how divergent scientific and legal practices, in US federal 
regulatory agencies and in court proceedings, have strategically shaped the “unknowing” of 
formaldehyde exposures in FEMA-issued trailers following Hurricane Katrina.139 Drawing on 
participant observation in a law firm, expert evidence, and internal FEMA emails, he analyzes 
multiple “techniques of un-knowing” that actively functioned to induce ignorance of and disavow 
adverse health effects,140 including “secrecy, assessment postponement, scientific 
disqualification/knowledge subjugation, knowledge avoidance, and the ontological obfuscation 
of environmental triggers”.141 By extending analyses of the enactment of chemical exposure, 
moving beyond technoscientific practices to encompass regulatory and legal practices, the 
processes by which toxic harms are concealed and ignored – whether intentional, willfully 
ignorant, or through “unpremeditated discursive blinders” – can be better apprehended.142 
These historicizations and theorizations of toxic techniques afford a rich conceptual language to 
articulate how estrogenic potency was achieved in Canada. As will be seen, despite the 
dominance of dose-response discourses in pharmacology in the 1940s, specific dose-response 
relationships for estrogenic drugs were rendered imperceptible and unknowable in the 1944 Sex 
Hormone Regulations. Dose-response logics did not disappear in estrogen regulation, however; 
in 1950, National Health resurrected them for estrogenic cosmetics, materializing dose through 
novel labelling techniques, and mobilizing response from consumers rather than manufacturers.  
It should also be noted that, while Mol does not expressly situate her study on atherosclerosis 
in ANT,143 her work on enactment is an extension – perhaps better, a transmutation – of that 
material-semiotic tradition.144 Where ANT scholars inquired into (social) construction of reality 
through networks, Mol considers the (multiple) enactments of realities through practices.145 The 
metaphor of enactment is more contingent, situational, precarious, fluid, and arguably more 
                                                          
139 Nicholas Shapiro, “Un-knowing exposure: Toxic emergency housing, strategic inconclusivity and governance in the US Gulf 
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140 Ibid at 191-193.  
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feminist. As practices change, so do realities – the material world becomes less fixed. 
Enactment moves us away from ANT’s masterful, masculinist, Machiavellian mobilizer and 
maker of reality, with his efforts to translate facts and actors into ever-further domains, to 
stabilize interactions within a constructed network, to enroll others to play supporting roles, to 
inscribe materials with scripts that ensure control from a distance.146 Further, the temporality of 
enactment differs from construction, which suggests a hard dividing line before and after reality 
is built. Social construction tends to describe “social processes that result in durable realities”, 
while performance describes practices “that produce ephemeral effects – effects essentially 
coextensive with the practices that create them”.147 Yet there are also many similarities and 
overlaps. Both approaches claim to be more methodological and empirical, mapping relations in 
action, than they are theoretical.148 Both attempt to describe and, importantly, to expand the 
repertoire of actions – translation, stabilization, delegation, in the case of early ANT, or 
coordination, distribution, inclusion, in the case of Mol’s enactment – that bring about worlds. 
Drugs and their diseases have been a favoured focus of ANT-inspired or material-semiotic 
analyses.149 In ANT, pharmaceutical substances do not have inherent, stable properties that are 
interpreted varyingly; rather, their properties are “the outcome of multiple events and scripts that 
they embed and carry”.150 Andrew Barry gives an especially rich theorization of chemical 
ontology.151 Building on Stengers and Bensaude-Vencent’s notion of informed materials – a 
concept conveying that chemistry is not the discovery of “bare molecules” but rather involves 
invention – Barry posits that, even before bodies consume them, pharmaceutical chemicals are 
“constituted in their relations to informational and material environments”.152 Informational 
                                                          
146 See early feminist critiques of ANT by e.g. Susan Leigh Star and Donna Haraway, infra note 165. 
147 Woolgar & Lezaun 2015 at 463.  See also Annemarie Mol, “A reader’s guide to the “ontological turn” – Part 4” (2014), online: 
<http://somatosphere.net/2014/03/a-readers-guide-to-the-ontological-turn-part-4.html> [“Mol 2014”]. 
148 This claim is also made in socio-legal studies, where ANT is routinely described as a methodology; see e.g. Ron Levi & 
Mariana Valverde, “Studying Law by Association: Bruno Latour Goes to the Conseil d’État” (2008) 33:3 Law & Soc Inq 805 [“Levi 
& Valverde 2008”]; and Simon A Cole & Alyse Bertenthal, “Science, Technology, Society, and Law” (2017) 13 Annu Rev Law Soc 
Sci 351 [“Cole & Bertenthal 2017”]. 
149 Emilie Cloatre, Pills for the Poorest: An Exploration of TRIPS and Access to Medication in Sub-Saharan Africa, (London UK: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2013) [“Cloatre 2013”] at 19-20. Some canonical examples include e.g. Latour 1993, and Steven Epstein, 
Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 
1998). In socio-legal studies, ANT has been used by Cloatre to research practices of patent protection for drugs in two African 
countries, and Emily Grabham to study HIV-AIDS treatment and advocacy; see Chapter 1, section 2iii., below. 
150 Cloatre 2013 at 20, citing Barry 2005 infra note 151. For a foundational ANT essay on the inscription of technological objects, 
see Madeleine Akrich, “The De-Scription of Technical Objects” in Wiebe Bijker & John Law, eds, Shaping Technology/Building 
Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992) [“Akrich 1992”]. 
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enrichment of these molecules happens in laboratory practices, as well as through legal and 
economic relations, for example those mediated by intellectual property law.153  
Rather than discovery narratives, then, close study of institutional, epistemic, and regulatory 
practices will disclose how chemicals and drugs are enacted. In this vein, Mol has criticized calls 
for a “turn to ontology” by the “so-called ‘new materialists’”, whom she views as essentializing 
matter and dichotomizing materiality and discursivity, discarding hard-earned STS lessons and 
“naively echoing natural science textbooks and journal articles”.154 In contrast, as she argues 
that objects are not essentially stable or singular but afforded their essences only in relational 
interactions (or intra-actions), Mol positions her own work as relational materialism.155 
Nonetheless, Mol’s materialism is reasonably situated within an ascendant trend in the 
humanities and social sciences, over the last 15 years,156 that centers the interaction of matter 
and meaning. This material turn has found tremendously diverse expression.157 Without 
minimizing the important differences in these literatures, for the limited purpose of considering 
practices that enact law and materiality,158 some high-level commonalities can be identified. 
First, the trend reacts to a perceived over-emphasis on discursivity in postmodern scholarship, 
which underplays materiality.159 Further, these literatures often reject rigid analytic dichotomies 
between “subject (human, social, representational) and object (thing, material, real)”.160 Rather 
than inert substance awaiting cultural interpretation, nonhuman matter is active or agential; as 
Barad puts it, matter kicks back.161 These theoretical commitments all challenge nature-culture 
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divides – regardless of whether conceptual labour is supplied by feminist material-semiotics,162 
Haraway’s natureculture,163 Barad’s onto-epistemology,164 or Mol’s relational materialism. 
These versions of (new, relational and/or feminist) materialisms all wrestle, moreover, with 
the political implications of their ontologies, particularly in the wake of critiques of ANT. In 
viewing power largely as an effect of the relational associations or networks being investigated, 
rather than as a ready cause or explanation of events, ANT’s originators have long been 
criticized by feminist scholars as reproducing narratives of the powerful and masterful, and as 
sidestepping any meaningful analysis of power (or of patriarchy, racism, capitalism, or 
colonialism).165 Put differently, while material-semiotic approaches can map very effectively the 
relational webs that enact, maintain, transform, or dissolve material realities, they may do “little 
to navigate one through the theoretical thickets of legitimacy, obeisance, and power that are the 
‘standard fare of sociolegal research’”.166 Unlike some theorists building on ANT traditions, Mol 
has tried to directly confront ontological politics. Mol first articulated this term two decades 
ago,167 and STS scholars continue to leverage the concept.168 Opening up consideration of how 
the “real is implicated in the political and vice versa”,169 at its simplest, ontological politics 
recognizes that, once one accepts that multiple versions of realities are enacted in different 
practices and relations, then one should next ask “[w]hich version might be better to live with? 
Which worse? How, and for whom?”170 Mol rejects that this is simply a matter of “choice”, 
recalling how the scientific and medical practices that perform realities differently rarely emerge 
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165 See e.g. Susan Leigh Star, “Power, technologies and the phenomenology of conventions: on being allergic to onions” in John 
Law, ed, A sociology of monsters: Essays on power, technology and domination (London: Routledge, 1991) [“Star 1991”]; and 
Donna Haraway, “The promise of monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d Others” in Lawrence Grossberg, Cary 
Nelson, Paula A Treichler, eds, Cultural Studies (New York: Routledge, 1992) [“Haraway 1992”]. 
166 Cole & Bertenthal 2017 at 361, citing Levi & Valverde 2008 at 822. 
167 Annemarie Mol, “Ontological Politics: A word and some questions” (1999) 47:1 (supp) Sociol Rev 74. In this article, Mol 
credits John Law with inventing this term and for allowing her to develop it; see fn 1 at 87.  
168 Michelle Murphy, “Studying Unformed Objects: Deviation”, July 15, 2013, Cultural Anthropology website, 
https://culanth.org/fieldsights/364-studying-unformed-objects-deviation [“Murphy 2013”]. 
169 Mol 1999 at 74. 
170 Mol 2012 at 381.  
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explicitly in any decisive moment or definitive place,171 how the political implications of each of 
these realities are themselves extensive and complex,172 and how “choice” wrongly implies that 
multiple realities do not co-exist or depend on one other.173 Tentatively, Mol begins to grapple 
with the ontological politics of clinical versus surgical ways of enacting atherosclerosis;174 the 
same questions are possible for regulatory ways of enacting estrogen. Additionally, ontological 
politics is one further reminder to be self-reflexive and accountable in approaching the objects 
that we study – recalling that our own scholarship performatively participates in their invention 
and, as Murphy cautions those swept up in an ongoing always becoming, scholarly “exuberance 
for unformed objects” is not necessarily “a critical or politically-charged commitment”.175  
 
2.ii  Enactment and the sociology of standards  
Informed in part by these performative approaches, a growing sociological literature seeks to 
theorize standards and standardization. To understand Canadian drug standards in the 1940s, I 
draw on Lawrence Busch’s work on standards, especially his readily applicable typologies.176  
Busch describes how, given their ubiquity, standards are rarely noticed until they break down. 
Both material and ideational, “standards are where language and world meet; better still, the 
widespread use of standards and their virtual inescapability illustrates the interpenetration of 
language and world”.177 Standards “always incorporate a metaphor or simile, either implicitly or 
explicitly”; indeed, they make metaphors real. Maybe the most tangible example of this is 
reference materials, prepared by state agencies, against which substances can be calibrated.178 
In short, standards are “means by which we perform the world” and “recipes for reality, or 
perhaps for realities”.179  Busch takes inspiration from Mol’s ontological theory, in which our 
                                                          
171 Mol 2002 at 79-80. 
172 Ibid at 81-83. 
173 Ibid at 83-85. 
174 Ibid at 172-184. 
175 Murphy 2013: see also Mol 2002 at 153. 
176 Lawrence Busch, Standards: Recipes for Reality (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2013) [“Busch 2013”]. Busch’s work builds on 
the classic STS text: Geoffrey C Bowker & Susan Leigh Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification and its Consequences (Cambridge, 
Mass: MIT Press, 1999) [“Bowker & Star 1999}. See also Martha Lampland & Susan Leigh Star, eds, Standards and Their Stories: 
How Quantifying, Classifying, and Formalizing Practices Shape Everyday Life (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2009), Stefan 
Timmermans & Steven Epstein, “A World of Standards but not a Standard World: Toward a Sociology of Standards and 
Standardization” (2010) 36:1 Ann Rev of Sociol 69 [“Timmermans & Epstein 2010”); Alison Marie Loconto & David Demortain, 
“Standardization as Spaces of Diversity” (2017) 3 Engaging Science, Technology, and Society 382 [“Loconto & Demortain 2017”]. 
177 Busch 2013 at 2-3; see also 24. 
178 Ibid at 10-12. On reference materials, see also Lezaun 2012. 
179 Ibid at 13, 73-74.  Other scholars echo this view, noting it is a “generic finding” that “a world in which standards proliferate is 
not necessarily more homogenous and standardized world. Standardization processes produce homogeneity, but also new 
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techniques do not just allow us to know the world, but to enact it multiply. Standards accomplish 
realities, providing “the scripts, the playbooks, the librettos, the recipes that guide practice”.180   
Busch’s typologies of standards help to clarify estrogen regulation in Canada in the 1940s. 
He posits that all standards fall into one of four types which he calls Olympics, filters, ranks, and 
divisions.181 Relevant to this thesis are filters and divisions. Filters are designed to “eliminate the 
unacceptable” by requiring things to “pass through the filter”’. Foods that pass through a food 
safety standard, for example, can then be considered safe. Divisions are unranked categories, 
often aimed at product differentiation; for example, apples are divided into categories like 
McIntosh and Granny Smith. Such divisions allow “different” products to be sold without price 
competition, and the constructed differences can then be “linked to an implied or demonstrably 
superior quality”.182 Relatedly Busch outlines different purposes or logics of standardization, 
distinguishing between industrial and merchant standards (among others). Commonly acting as 
filters, industrial standards aim to ensure things are all “the same” and “make the grade”. Often 
numerically premised, industrial standards promote precision and accuracy, fundamentally 
aiming at replicability. Reference materials are an obvious example. In contrast, drawing on 
work by sociologist and STS scholar Michel Callon, Busch describes merchant standards as 
intended “to qualify things to enter the marketplace”, by letting otherwise incommensurable 
things be made comparable. Targeted at product identity, such standards are often indicated by 
labels designed to facilitate market transactions.183 While drug standards have been naturalized 
as proxies for quality, safety, and replicability, and thus understood as industrial standards and 
filters, efforts to standardize estrogen in Canada also involved market standards and divisions.  
Also very useful is Busch’s distinction between standards, tests, and indicators, interrelated 
concepts that can easily be conflated. He gives the simple example of citizenship: the standards 
for citizenship would be set out in legislation, the test to meet this standard usually “requires 
                                                          
diversities;” Loconto & Demortain 2017 at 383. Loconto and Demortain further point to the diversities that arise when 
approaching standardization from different sites, including “standards in the making” and “standards in action”. Standards in 
the making is “where standards-making bodies, experts and other interested stakeholders assemble to construct standards as 
outcomes of negotiations and strategic action amongst these various actors … This is the classically studied process of 
standardization as a site in which the negotiation around key values, qualities, knowledge, and semantics take place. Here, the 
process of creating a standard is the closing down of possible contestations in order to create a static, codified object – a 
standard.” For standards in action, “despite the immutability of the standard, politics also thrive in this space as both the values 
and the actors co-evolve to fit each other”; Loconto & Demortain at 385. See also Timmerman & Epstein 2010. 
180 Ibid at 74-5. Without elaboration, Busch also claims, at page 27, that the dominant approach taken in his book is a 
“phenomenological approach”. Though some similarities exist between ANT and phenomenology. I would not characterize 
Mol’s work as phenomenological, particularly given Mol’s efforts to escape representationalism. 
181 Busch 2013 at 13, 42. He acknowledges, at 42, that these four types can blend into each other at their margins. 
182 Ibid at 43-44 and 46-47. 
183 Ibid at 252-255. 
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being born in or swearing allegiance to a given nation”, and an indicator that this test has been 
met is a passport.184 Notably, standards cannot be implemented unless tests exist for measuring 
compliance with them. However, constructing tests or measurements for standards is often 
complicated and iterative. To prevent a disconnect between a standard and its test, Busch 
argues that tests must robustly measure the key dimensions of concern in the standard, be 
rigorous enough to “prevent exaggerated claims or even outright fraud”, and involve neither too 
much nor too little “precision and accuracy for the purposes at hand”.185 This distinction between 
standards, tests, and indicators, and the role of tests in the performance of standards, allows for 
better apprehension of the Sex Hormone Regulations and of the estrogen they enacted, as 
explored in Chapter 4.186  
Finally, readers are also reminded of the ethical and political implications of standards. Not 
only can standards create path dependence and thus burden future generations, they have 
distributive consequences, as their benefits and costs are differentially allocated.187 In the 
context of estrogen, dose and potency standards not only have health implications, they 
distribute risk and power differentially to women, physicians, manufacturers, and state actors; 
less obviously, tests used to identify estrogen arguably produce sex and gender differently. In 
considering how estrogen standards, tests, and indicators were “constructed, contested, 
modified, enforced and abandoned” in regulatory practices, this thesis therefore opens up 
political questions.188   
 
2.iii  Enactment in interdisciplinary legal studies  
While ostensibly a work of legal history,189 this thesis has as its main theoretical guide a 
philosopher and anthropologist of medicine who works in STS and ANT-inflected veins. How 
have legal studies incorporated STS insights? Have STS approaches to materiality, and 
particularly Mol’s theory of enactment, been taken up in socio-legal studies? If so, how?  
In recent years, socio-legal scholars have begun to embrace STS approaches to materiality. 
Working within ANT, Emilie Cloatre has researched local practices and socio-legal assemblages 
                                                          
184 Ibid at 13, 52.  
185 Ibid at 53, 304. 
186 The four sections comprising the Sex Hormone Regulations nominally address standard (ss. 1-2, under headings “Definition” 
and “Standards”), test (s. 3 under the heading “Potency”), and indicator (s.4 under the heading “Labelling”). As will be seen in 
Chapter 4, section 3, the relations between standard, test and label were essentially inverted in the Sex Hormone Regulations. 
187 Ibid at 246, 303-304. 
188 Ibid at 13. 
189 For how legal history has interacted with approaches within STS to materiality or ontology, see Chapter 2, section 1. 
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related to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 
which inscribe pharmaceuticals with multiple scripts. Weaving together an ANT-inspired 
methodology with other philosophical and methodological traditions, Emily Grabham has written 
about law, materiality, and the enactment of time. Before relating to their work, l summarize 
more generally certain types of interaction – or imbrication – between legal studies and STS.  
Legal scholars deploy STS in different ways. While legal scholars are notoriously late to every 
party – as Simon Cole and Alysa Berthenthal note, “STS found law before law found STS” – the 
contention regarding when, exactly, law “found” STS reflects the diverse ways in which legal 
studies engage STS.190  
Perhaps the most dominant framework used is coproduction. Popularized in a 2004 volume 
edited by Sheila Jasanoff that gathered together a wide variety of literatures,191 coproduction is: 
“…shorthand for the proposition that the ways in which we know and represent the world 
(both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it. 
Knowledge and its material embodiments are at once products of social work and 
constitutive of forms of social life”.192  
 
Jasanoff’s basic argument is that scientific knowledges and social orders, whether historically or 
presently, are properly understood only if conceived as being produced together. Studying how 
knowledge-making practices are integrated within state-making practices or other forms of 
governance, and conversely how governance practices shape knowledge, provides greater 
explanatory power of complex sociotechnical worlds. While often focusing on expertise and 
epistemic authority, coproduction studies can have an ontological focus, in viewing knowledge 
as “crystallizing in certain ontological states – organizational, material, embodied”.193 Jasanoff 
characterizes coproduction not as a theory but as a framework, and speaks of research in a co-
production idiom.194 Nonetheless, beyond the rich description that results from considering 
                                                          
190 Cole & Bertenthal 2017 at 354. These authors date synergies between socio-legal and STS scholarship to 1994. However, as 
they note, Valverde dates the convergence to 2003; see Mariana Valverde “Authorizing the production of urban moral order: 
appellate courts and their knowledge games” (2005) 39:2 Law & Soc Rev 419 [“Valverde 2005”] at 420. Others point to the late 
2000s as when “SLS and STS scholars and texts … started to intermingle more widely”; Alex Faulkner, Bettina Lange & 
Christopher Lawless, “Material Worlds: Intersections of Law, Science, Technology, and Society” (2012) 39:1 J Law & Soc 1 
[“Faulkner, Lange & Lawless 2012”] at 12. 
191 Notably, in neither of her own two chapters, in Jasanoff 2004, does Jasanoff cite to any socio-legal scholarship. This supports 
Valverde’s view that socio-legal scholars were not engaging STS prior to 2004; see Valverde 2005.  
192 Jasanoff 2004 at 2. 
193 Ibid at 3. However, not all scholarship employing Jasanoff’s coproduction framework neatly aligns with either an 
epistemological or ontological mode of analysis. For example, a think piece on chemical regulation by Elizabeth Fisher largely 
asks an epistemic question of how chemical regulation “understands” or “conceives” of the chemicals being regulated, it 
occasionally slides toward a more ontological and more constitutive question of how chemicals assume different identities in 
different regulatory regimes. See Elizabeth Fisher, “Chemicals as Regulatory Objects” (2014) 23:3 RECIEL 163 [“Fisher 2014”]. 
194 Ibid at 3-6. 
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connections between knowledge and power, it is claimed that coproduction carries explanatory 
and normative force – in its abilities to analyze the formation of new sociotechnical objects, and 
to find power in non-traditional places – and indeed even holds predictive power, insofar as it 
allows us to better perceive contingent patterns in sociotechnical networks.195 While the latter 
claim seems overblown and unnecessarily scientistic, coproduction has no doubt helped to 
further dismantle instrumental notions of law as purely a “tool” that is epistemically and 
normatively distinct from, and that simply reacts and responds to, the separate domain of 
science and technology. Instead, it brings a less linear and more entangled relationship into 
view, in which legal processes have constitutive power in stabilizing facts and shaping 
technology. This recalls what Jasanoff labels the constitutive tradition in coproduction, which 
she says goes back to Latour.196 As a second broad stream of coproductionist thought, she 
identifies work in an interactional tradition, which she says “is less overtly concerned with 
metaphysics and more with epistemology”, in which research examines boundary conflicts 
between scientific and social knowledges.197  My research describes how regulators’ practices 
materialized estrogen as a potent and malleable object, and analyzes how estrogen sparked 
new regulatory logics and techniques centered on product labelling; coproduction is a natural fit 
with these processes. Thus, while this research takes an elementally constitutive approach, in 
focusing on conflicts between Committee members (and departmental lawyers) in deciding how 
to understand estrogen and how to regulate it, it also engages certain interactional concerns. 
Scholars have recently reclassified the ways in which STS is engaged specifically by socio-
legal studies. In reviewing law and society scholarship that draws on STS, Cole and Bertenthal 
identify two distinct avenues in the literature: interaction and analogy.198  As they use it – which 
differs somewhat from Jasanoff’s formulation – interaction involves areas “in which there 
actually is interaction between law and science”, including law in laboratories, intellectual 
property, controversies that are simultaneously scientific and legal, and law’s response to 
scientific expertise and uncertainty. In such contexts, legal scholars can use STS to ensure 
                                                          
195 Ibid at 42. 
196 As Jasanoff notes, Latour introduced the term coproduction in We Have Never Been Modern, an extended essay that “linked 
constructivist themes from S&TS with themes of political philosophy”; Jasanoff 2004 at 22. 
197 Jasanoff 2004 at 19. For an example of a generally interactional approach, see Roger Brownsword & Karen Yeung, eds 
Regulating Technologies: Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and Technological Fixes (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008).  
198 Cole & Bertenthal 2017 at 355. For another theorization of the relationship between STS and legal studies, see Cloatre & 
Pickersgill 2015. The introduction to this volume largely follows a constitutive (Jasanoff) or analogy (Cole & Bertenthal) 
tradition. The editors challenge distinctions between “law”, “society” and “science” inherent to the “interactional” formula, and 
instead propose the expression “social studies of law” to reflect STS-inspired work in legal studies.  
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nuanced understanding of scientific knowledge.199 Analogy, in contrast, refers to legal research 
that approaches law analogously to how STS approaches science, as a social phenomenon or 
epistemic institution. While this arguably describes most socio-legal research, legal scholars 
have analogically borrowed STS concepts, including from ANT, and methods to examine 
reflexivity and materiality.200 Law and STS can swap “tools, methods and concepts, in order to 
study their respective objects of inquiry”,201 though often the trade is unidirectional as legal 
scholars adopt STS methods (if not its theoretical traditions).202 The leading or at least earliest 
proponent of this adaptation might be Mariana Valverde, who has long urged borrowing STS 
methods and promoted ANT to socio-legal scholars.203 If, as Valverde urges, rather than study 
static categories of scientific or non-expert, legal or lay knowledge, one tries to trace “the 
dynamics of knowledge processes” in socio-legal-technical networks, then “one sees new 
things”.204   
Materiality is a pervasive theme in socio-legal research proceeding analogically from STS,205 
inspired by growing theoretical attention to matter and materialization in feminist science 
studies,206 posthumanist philosophy,207 and political theory.208  Studying materiality in and of law 
requires considering how things shape legal processes, how law is entangled in material forms, 
and “how materials become sites that produce, stabilize, and perpetuate particular kinds of 
                                                          
199 Cole & Bertenthal 2017 at 355, and 356-359. At 359, the authors place coproduction as one of seven thematic groups under 
their interaction umbrella, while conversely Jasanoff describes interaction as a type of coproduction. 
200 Ibid at 359-364. 
201 Valverde 2005 at 421. 
202 It has been noted that STS functions less like a theoretical intervention and more like an antitheory in socio-legal work, as it 
tends to focus “even greater attention on the contingent details of specific legal and scientific practices in specific places at 
specific times, at the expense of abstract theorizing”; Cole & Bertenthal 2017 at 364.  
203 Valverde 2005; Levi & Valverde 2008; Mariana Valverde, “Jurisdiction and Scale: Legal ‘Technicalities’ as Resources for 
Theory” (2009) 18:2 Soc Leg Stud 139; and Mariana Valverde, Ron Levi & Dawn Moore, “Legal Knowledges of Risk” in Law 
Commission of Canada, ed, Law and Risk (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005) [“Valverde, Levi & Moore 2005”]. For a recent study 
using legal and STS approaches to regulatory knowledge, see Alex Faulkner & Lonneke Poort, “Stretching and Challenging the 
Boundaries of Law: Varieties of Knowledge in Biotechnologies Regulation” (2017) 55:2 Minerva 209 [“Faulkner & Poort 2017”]. 
204 Valverde 2005 at 421. Abandoning such categories also tends to open up questions about what, if anything, distinguishes 
law and science, returning socio-legal scholars to the question of what “law” is; Cloatre & Pickersgill 2015 at 3. In these authors’ 
view, in their Introduction at 8: “[i]f the insights of STS are taken seriously…law seems to become a set of fluidly defined 
associations within shifting networks, even though its language, institutional landscapes, and modes of deployment may appear 
specific … In other words, law can be reimagined as co-constituted rather than presupposed, in the way that social relations and 
objects are more generally”.  
205 Cole & Bertenthal 2017 at 362. 
206 Works cited herein from this field include e.g. Haraway 1991; Murphy 2006; Roberts 2007; and Mol 2002.  
207 See e.g. Barad 2003; and Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013). 
208 See e.g. Coole & Frost 2010; and Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: a political ecology of things (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2010). 
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power”.209 Analytic tools from STS include apprehending things as socio-legal objects, in which 
legal, technological and social relations are inscribed. Such objects are performative – they do 
things in the world, with potentially powerful effects that enact socio-techno-legal realities.210  
An oft-cited example is Javier Lezaun’s compelling ethnography of the European agency 
that creates “reference materials” for the many substances enumerated in EU law.211 He asks 
how law comes to matter: “[b]y what strange alchemy is a legal obligation transformed into a 
material constraint?”212  Also called reference standards – such as in the Sex Hormone 
Regulations – reference materials instantiate legal categories; they are things which “the law 
would be unable to find in the world if it were not for the availability of an official, stable version 
of the material in question”.213 Resulting from ontological practices of certification, 
documentation, and technical handling, reference materials render law and matter indivisible. In 
approaching standards as material rather than as texts or rules, Lezaun shows how, within a set 
of broader practices and relations, legal scripts get embedded in matter. Thinking with this 
“strong case” of legal ontology,214 I likewise approach law’s materialization through estrogen.215 
Though inspired by ANT and investigating the textual, handling, machinic, and physical 
practices that materialize law, Lezaun does not explicitly draw on Mol. Yet other socio-legal 
scholars have recently have done so, demonstrating the utility to legal studies of evaluating how 
realities are enacted in practice. In Brewing Legal Times, Emily Grabham brings together 
philosophical work on time, literatures on law and time, social and legal history, and ANT-
inspired literature that engages questions of materiality.216 She does so to explore relationships 
among time, matter, and law. Following Mol, she aims to move beyond the idea that time has 
many representations, to think about how practices enact “multiple legal ontologies of time” or 
the “more-than-oneness of time”.217 In the context of a case study on HIV activism, for example, 
she shows how new temporalities result from law’s entanglements with clinical knowledge, tests 
and drugs. Other case studies review practices that do things with law to “trace the provisional, 
                                                          
209 Cloatre & Pickersgill 2015 at 7-8. 
210 Cole & Bertenthal 2017 at 362. 
211 Specifically, the Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements, in Belgium. 
212 Lezaun 2012. For other scholars’ discussions of Lezaun’s study as exemplifying research into law and materiality, see Cole & 
Bertenthal 2017 at 362; Cloatre & Pickersgill 2015 at 6-7; and Grabham 2016 at 41-44. 
213 Lezauan 2012 at 38. 
214 Grabham 2016 at 44. Lezaun’s study is especially generative in light of how legal responsibility for the creation of reference 
materials for estrogenic drugs was delegated to industry in Canada in the 1940s; see chapters 4 and 5. 
215 See e.g. Alain Pottage, “The Materiality of What?” (2012) 39:1 J Law & Soc 167 [“Pottage 2012”] (arguing for analysts to 
begin with materiality rather than with law, to understand what becomes materialized as law). See also Chapter 2, section 1. 
216 Grabham 2016 at 6-8. 
217 Ibid at 16, 23. 
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and thing-related, enactment of legal temporalities as they constitute new legal worlds”.218 Thus, 
by applying Mol’s praxiographic approach to temporalization, Grabham argues that objects and 
humans together enact and sustain multiple legal temporalities, and materialize law.219 
In Pills for the Poorest, Emilie Cloatre also draws on Mol’s scholarship on the ontological 
multiplicities performed by knowledge-making and technical practices.220 Cloatre’s theoretical 
vocabulary and her ethnographic methods are both heavily guided by a traditional ANT 
approach, and her study into localized public health practices surrounding TRIPS and 
pharmaceutical patents in Dijoubiti and Ghana are framed around ANT-inspired research 
questions, including how legal texts are “black boxed” and stabilized through ongoing 
translations, how controversies settle into beliefs, how nonhuman actors contribute to these 
shifting relations, processes and events. The main object of her study is the performance of 
TRIPS as a socio-legal assemblage. Building on a nascent literature that employs ANT to 
explore the constitution of law, Cloatre asks what practices create effects that come to be 
known as “legal”, how legal objects like patents materialize, and how legal texts become 
entangled in broader sociotechnical assemblages.221 In particular, guided by Andrew Barry, 
pharmaceutical drugs are characterized as being inscribed with and carrying multiple events 
and legal scripts, which may or may not travel cleanly. “[I]n their most material form, in their 
packaging, in their labelling”, including the differences between brand and generic forms, 
Cloatre argues that drugs are “influential and symbolic actors”.222 Effectively, drugs are “legal 
things” shaped by socio-legal relations and materializing regulatory practices.223  
Guided by Mol’s praxiological ontology, and its resonances in the sociology of standards 
and in work by socio-legal scholars, in the next chapter I describe my own practices, detailing 
my historical research methods and how they materialized this account of toxic enactment.  
                                                          
218 Ibid at 176. 
219 Grabham 2016 at 21, 31, 171-173. 
220 Cloatre 2013. 
221 Ibid at 7-18. 
222 Ibid at 20. 
223 With others, Cloatre has also deployed ANT to study the co-emergence of nicotine gum, regulatory regimes, and knowledge 
of tobacco addiction; see Catriona Rooke, Emilie Cloatre & Robert Dingwall, “The Regulation of Nicotine in the United Kingdom: 
How Nicotine Gum Came to Be a Medicine, but Not a Drug” (2012) 39:1 J Law & Soc 39 [“Rooke, Cloatre & Dingwall 2012”]. 
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Chapter Two 
Legal history, in theory: historical approach and research methods 
“These conjoined insights—that nonhuman stuff can have some sort of determinative influence on (or 
agency in relation to) humans, and that “the material” is a cultural construct—have particular implications 
for how we understand law in both past and present societies. … In different times and places, then, legal 
processes formed one of the means by which “objects” were created and policed. The particular material 
forms that law inhabited (hedge, slave, deodand) were culturally variable. Law projected a certain kind of 
materiality, and these projections manifested in material things.” – Tom Johnson (2015) 
 
This study adopts historical methods to critically examine how estrogenic drugs emerged 
together with new regulatory practices in Canada in the 1940s. While this project’s methods are 
historical, however, it does not simply narrate one past. Without attempting to expound any 
general theory of the relationship between law and toxicity, let alone law and matter, this study 
still gestures towards a broader concept of toxic enactment. Conceptually, toxic enactment 
rejects purely positivist conceptions of legal rules that respond (or fail to respond) to an already 
fixed and stable matter, of governance techniques that try to control toxic substances or 
technological innovations already fully formed in the real world. It also departs from strongly 
constructivist accounts, in which social or legal norms, rules, and powers dictate the existence 
or form of substances and technologies. Instead, inspired by praxiological and performative 
ontology, toxic enactment theorizes an active and ongoing process in which toxics regulations 
and legalized toxins become together. Yet, despite gesturing towards this general abstraction, 
the history told here is of course not universalizable. Rather, using legal history methods, this 
study gives a detailed empirical account of the intersections between estrogen and regulation in 
mid-century Canada – of how regulatory practices enacted estrogen as drugs, as potent, as 
unstable, as multiple; and how estrogen triggered new regulatory techniques, namely new types 
of delegation and labelling, with implications for social relations and women’s health. Potent 
though they were, these estrogenic enactments were the contingent and even peculiar results of 
specific actors’ performances on particular institutional stages, done in their own time and place. 
 
1.  An historical approach – but, to what? 
While this study adopts an “historical approach”, identifying “to what exactly” this approach 
applies demands further articulation. Does this project take an historical approach only in 
service of a more abstract account of enactment, leveraging archival evidence to illustrate how 
regulatory practices can materialize different versions of reality? It is true that this narrative of 
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the activities of regulators and estrogen is conceptually driven, however it does not attempt to 
elucidate a general meaning of or parameters for the concept of “enactment”. Is this study better 
understood, then, as legal history? After all, it seeks to describe temporally bound and shifting 
approaches to drug regulation, their evolution with new scientific practices for sex hormones, 
forgotten and abandoned regulatory directions, and unintended and unpredicted regulatory 
effects. Further, in recounting how estrogen was enacted, it examines alternative practices 
embedded in different lawyers’ assessments of the validity of subordinate legislation and sub-
delegation under the Food and Drugs Act, in the context of administrative law ideas at the time.  
While these questions lack simple resolution, they are clarified in scholarship grappling with 
how legal theory and legal history do, or should, relate to one another. In Law in Theory and 
History: New Essays on a Neglected Dialogue, Maks Del Mar and Michael Lobban assemble 
explorations of the interdisciplinary space of legal theory and legal history, a space they deem to 
be “very young”. 1 In Del Mar’s contribution, after contrasting different cognitive and affective 
modes embraced by historians and philosophers, and arguing that historical work must be 
understood as always theorizing law, he advocates a strategy of entangling history in theory and 
vice versa, by abandoning claims to universality in theory and to particularity in history. The goal 
of this cross-disciplinary entanglement should be scholarship that “models the variability of law 
across time and space”.2 Similarly, a 2015 special edition of the Virginia Law Review explores 
commonalities in philosophical and historical inquiries into law. The introductory essay reminds 
us that a primary use of history in legal scholarship is to cast doubt on current concepts and 
values; in the same vein, Nicola Lacey’s contribution argues that the power of historical 
scholarship lies in its ability to reveal the contingency of and denaturalize current legal practices, 
especially when viewing law as a structured social practice embedded in specific institutions.3 
Accepting that historicizing law need not and perhaps cannot be disentangled from theorizing 
law, and that legal history can powerfully destabilize concepts viewed as “natural”, perhaps the 
better question is whether this study is properly characterized as legal history? Is the object of 
study law – or is it estrogen? As my research details how regulators’ practices fabricated a 
potent, changeable estrogen, and how estrogen catalyzed new governance techniques for such 
                                                          
1 Maks Del Mar & Michael Lobban, “Preface”, in Maksymilian Del Mar & Michael Lobban, eds, Law in Theory and History: New 
Essays on a Neglected Dialogue (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016) at vi.   
2 Maks Del Mar, “Beyond University and Particularity, Necessity and Contingency: On Collaboration between Legal Theory and 
Legal History”, in Maksymilian Del Mar and Michael Lobban, eds, Law in Theory and History: New Essays on a Neglected 
Dialogue (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016) at 25-26 and 34. 
3 Dan Priel & Charles Barzun, “Jurisprudence and (Its) History” (2015) 101:4 Va L Rev 849 at 853-856; and Nicola Lacey, 
“Jurisprudence, history, and the institutional quality of law” (2015) 101:4 Va L Rev 919 at 931-935. 
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substances, a more apt realization of my object might be “law in estrogen” or “estrogen in law”, 
or better yet, both of these descriptors. Unlike “law and estrogen”, these phrases refuse to 
render law and estrogen as wholly distinct phenomena. They challenge legal historians’ 
traditional approach of exploring law by putting it in (political, economic, social) context, and its 
classic division “between law and what is extrinsic to it”.4 Instead, methodologically, they let me 
compound my object as essentially conjugated – as “more than one and less than many”.5   
Part of the challenge in pinpointing the precise object being approached historically is that 
few legal historians frame their inquiries around “law and matter” or within new materialisms.6 In 
his work, Christopher Tomlins proposes “materiality” as an alternative methodology. However 
rather than “historicism”, which, after Walter Benjamin, he describes as an approach which 
futilely attempts to see the past by differentiating law from its context, Tomlins argues for a 
historical materialism that “stresses the formal intersection between law and legal thought and 
technologies, artefacts and material practices; it considers how law might be expressed as 
technology and artefact, how law as a differentiated category of action is fabricated”.7 While 
legal historians engaging with materiality would surely also endorse moving away from law 
primarily as discourse, autonomous from the “real” world yet bestowing meaning upon it, they 
need not jettison the idea that something called “law” can be apprehended in history. As put by 
Tom Johnson, one of the few legal historians to have taken up materiality,8 the material turn 
allows us “to conceive ‘law’ as a quality that can inhabit physical stuff, as well as legal treatises 
and social practices”.9 As Johnson concedes, in identifying law and the material world as 
analytical realms, we perform “precisely the kind of ontological partition…that we are purporting 
                                                          
4 Christopher Tomlins, “After Critical Legal History: Scope, Scale, Structure” (2012) 8 Annu Rev Law Soc Sci 31 at 31 [“Tomlins 
2012a”]. 
5 Mol 2002 at 55, 82. Mol uses this phrase to capture how different practices enact multiple objects. As she discusses at pages 
78-82, the phrase originally derives from Marilyn Strathern’s conceptual work on partial connections.  
6 Excluded from this claim is the materialism of Marxist historiography, a tradition in which Tomlins’ writing is partly situated. 
7 Christopher Tomlins, “Historicism and Materiality in Legal Theory” in Maksymilian Del Mar & Michael Lobban, eds, Law in 
Theory and History: New Essays on a Neglected Dialogue (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016) [“Tomlins 2016”] at 59. See also 
Christopher Tomlins, “What is left of the law and society paradigm after critique? Revisiting Gordon’s ‘Critical Legal Histories.’” 
(2012) 37:1 Law Soc Inq 155 [“Tomlins 2012b”].  
8 Tom Johnson’s forthcoming chapter brings legal history into conversation with literatures on materiality, proposing various 
new research avenues. Johnson identifies legal and historical geographers such as Nicholas Blomley and legal anthropologists 
such as Javier Lezaun whose research engages materiality. He also identifies socio-legal scholars who have explored materiality 
using historical methods, like Marianna Valverde and Alain Pottage. However, he cannot identify much existing work that 
positions itself as “legal history”. Two exceptions are Teresa Sutton, “The deodand and responsibility for death” (1997) 18:3 J 
Legal Hist 44; and Cornelia Vismann, Files: Law and Media Technology, trans. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2008). See “Legal History and the Material Turn,” in Christopher Tomlins & Marcus Dubber (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Historical Legal Research. Oxford University Press (forthcoming) [“Johnson, forthcoming”]. 
9 Johnson 2015 at 410. 
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to refute”.10 Still, this philosophical difficulty can help to ensure that legal historians’ turns to 
matter are empirically and conceptually well-grounded.11 Thus, following Johnson 
methodologically, this thesis conjoins legal history methods with the insights of ANT and 
performative approaches to materiality, so as to apprehend law’s imbrication with matter.  
 
2.  Research methods – or, how practices enact realities 
Having situated this study in historiographies of sex hormones and drug standardization, and 
having set out the conceptual and methodological issues at stake in this study, this section now 
details the research methods that were adopted to answer these questions. Or rather: that 
sentence is what I might write if it were entirely accurate to characterize my methods as flowing 
in a smooth and linear progression from the methodology, the methodology as flowing inevitably 
from the concept of toxic enactments, and that concept springing to life from the literature. I 
might write that first sentence if I wished to create the impression that research practices, 
habits, and methods were separate from, and subordinate and subsequent to, ideas, concepts, 
and theories – if thinking were distinct from doing, if concepts dictated practices.  
To avoid severing the relations between discursivity and materiality, that sentence can be set 
aside. Rather than imply that my evidence-gathering practices were an afterthought to reading 
theory and history (which implication may be unfortunately solidified by following, as I do here, 
the standard practice of presenting methods after the literature review, almost as a postscript), 
these practices were vital in conjuring my object of study. That object – law in estrogen, 
estrogen in law – was not fully formed, waiting to be discovered in the archives. To the contrary, 
estrogen and law have been performed together in an ongoing intra-action, to use Karen 
Barad’s term,12 through a specific combination and sequence of legal and archival research.   
Besides, a more candid account would be that I began this project with different research 
questions in mind. Originally, I was interested in assembling an intellectual history of “estrogenic 
substances” in Canadian food and drugs law, in light of present debates about that concept’s 
meaning. However, as documented below, when I started searching for, wading through, and 
comparing the contents of archival files from the 1940s – initially conceiving of this material as 
“context” for regulations – the records took me by surprise. A cast of human actors and active 
substances were engaged in a plethora of competing and ostensibly incommensurate 
                                                          
10 Johnson, forthcoming, at 7. 
11 As Johnson says “[w]hat works for enclosure and deodands may not add much that is useful to the history of trusts”; ibid at 8. 
12 Barad 2003. 
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discourses, professional traditions, representational strategies, and practices. This was not a 
story of regulatory texts constructing estrogenic substances as a static legal concept through 
which matter was corralled and disciplined. These actors were actively performing multiple kinds 
of estrogen – through experimental regulatory techniques, chaotic scientific knowledges, stalling 
industry practices, intransigent laboratory animals, and highly potent molecules. In the archives, 
estrogen was never one thing. The archival material revealed that the regulations I had traced 
were not the only or even core object of interest, and certainly not a representation of a fixed 
and stable substance, but were the effects of scientists, physicians, pharmacists, bureaucrats, 
and solicitors’ practices in trying to know, measure, and standardize estrogenic substances.  
In this way, my research practices transformed my questions and the theoretical literature 
guiding them, animating more elemental questions about the entanglement of law and 
materiality. Likewise, my methods triggered the realization that the feminist historical and STS 
literature addressing sex hormones, while foundational, was insufficient to understand how 
estrogens materialized as drugs – as, with noted exceptions, this literature largely studies 
laboratories, clinicians, patients, and industry, yet typically disregards regulators. This process 
led me to histories of drug enumeration, standardization, and regulation in the mid-20th century.   
Out of order though it seems, then, the archival evidence raised, in large part, the questions 
that this study turns to answer. Still, stating that I “started with the evidence” is not quite right. 
Only by reading Nelly Oudshoorn and Celia Roberts on sex hormones, Annemarie Mol and 
Michelle Murphy on multiple ontologies, Sheila Jasanoff on co-production and Emily Grabham 
on law and materiality, could I bring to those materials an awareness of estrogen’s history and 
with questions beginning to brew. So perhaps there is some truth in that first sentence, too. 
 
2.i.  Legislative and regulatory sources 
I began my research by working to assemble the complete regulatory history of “estrogenic 
substance” in regulations under the Food and Drugs Act prior to 1977. To do this, I searched the 
Canada Gazette, primarily using the electronic database. Where there were gaps in digitization, 
I consulted the hardcopy volumes in various libraries in Toronto. Additionally, knowing that 
Health Canada’s interprets “estrogenic substance” as referring to sex hormones,13 I researched 
the full legislative and regulatory history of “sex hormones” under the Food and Drugs Act.  
In doing this research, I was able to start from some existing, albeit incomplete, attempts by 
students and law librarians to help me piece together a regulatory history of “estrogenic 
                                                          
13 Health Canada 2011. 
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substances” and “sex hormones”.14 Those efforts mistakenly identified one or the other of two 
orders-in-council amending Schedule B, both made in 1949, along with a 1949 amendment to 
Division II of Part C of the Food and Drug Regulations, (“the Sex Hormone Regulations”), as the 
first time that “sex hormones” had been addressed in the scheme.15 Eventually, I located the 
original version of the Sex Hormone Regulations, dated May 18, 1944, and a corresponding 
earlier order-in-council adding sex hormones to Schedule B, dated May 4, 1944.16 Having found 
the earliest enactments, I then mapped out a full history of all revisions and repeals, tracing the 
evolution of the Sex Hormone Regulations and Schedule B to the Act, until 1980. As 
amendments to these enactments were made by orders-in-council, my method was searching 
electronic versions of the Canada Gazette and, where necessary, returning to bound volumes.  
To ensure statutory context for Schedule B and the Sex Hormone Regulations, I researched 
legislative history as well. Here my aim was to identify the genesis and evolution of statutory 
sections authorizing these two enactments and their provisions, with especial focus on sections 
authorizing the 1944 enactments (and authorizing their predecessors, like the biological 
products regulations). The Food and Drugs Act was amended many times between 1920, when 
it was first enacted, and 1953, when it was overhauled.17  For this research, I used the Table of 
Public Statutes, and annotations in and appendices to the Revised Statutes of Canada (1953). 
 
                                                          
14 While only one name appears on the front of this thesis, the author is, of course, just one actor within the assemblage that 
enacted it. Many other actors who have materialized this thesis are credited in the Acknowledgements. This footnote identifies 
the people who helped me with legislative research. Prior to commencing my LLM program, as a staff lawyer at Ecojustice 
Canada and working with staff scientist Dr. Elaine MacDonald, I supervised articling student Ian Arnold and University of Ottawa 
law student Sally MacKinnon in their efforts to help us begin to map out a partial history of “estrogenic substances” and “sex 
hormones” in regulations under the Food and Drugs Act. Three law librarians also assisted this effort, first at the University of 
Ottawa and the Great Library in Osgoode Hall, and, once I began this LLM research in fall of 2016, at Osgoode Hall Law School.  
15 The students and librarians noted, ibid, all identified either the April 5, 1949 order-in-council amending Schedule B (PC 1949-
1537), or the November 8, 1949 order-in-council amending Schedule B (PC 1949-5643), as the first time “sex hormones” were 
addressed in the Act. Yet upon reading those two orders, on their face, it was evident those conclusions could not be correct. 
The April 5, 1949 order expressly removed the term “sex hormones” from the Schedule, replacing it with the word “hormones” 
(although this was reversed shortly thereafter, with an order reinserting “sex hormones”; see PC 1949-3483 (13 July 1949)). 
Thus, it was evident that sex hormones must have been listed on Schedule B prior to April 1949. 
16 Professor John Davis of Osgoode Hall Law School resolved the confusion. Through creative searches for terms included in the 
1949 versions of Schedule B, he located the earlier May 4, 1944 order-in-council (PP 1944-3308) that added “sex hormones” to 
Schedule B; while this order is located within the electronically archived Canada Gazettes, it is not indexed or searchable by the 
term “sex hormone” or “hormone”. Ultimately, even this May 4, 1944 order proved not to be the first time that sex hormones 
were added Schedule B, although this only became apparent through archival research. The first time that sex hormones were 
added to Schedule B was on January 11, 1944 (PC 1944-96) but this order-in-council is not searchable in the electronic Gazettes. 
17 Whenever the Food and Drugs Act or the Act is mentioned in the body of the text, reference is made to the 1927 
consolidated statute, An Act Respecting Food and Drugs, RSC 1927, c 76 [“Food and Drugs Act” or “FDA” or “the Act”]. 
Whenever a later amendment is relied upon, reference is made, in the footnotes, to the amending statute as well. The 
amending statutes include: RS 1930, c 23; RS 1930, c 30; RS 1934, c 54; RS 1939, c 3; RS 1945, c 7; RS 1946, c 23; and RS 1950, c 
50. In 1953, the legislation was revised significantly; see Food and Drugs Act, RS 1952-1953, c 38. The 1953 Act was assented to 
on May 14, 1953, and it came into force on July 1, 1954; see SOR/54-293.  
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2.ii.  Archival research 
Concurrently, I searched the Library and Archives Canada (“LAC”) database for materials 
regarding the 1944 Sex Hormone Regulations, Schedule B, and associated enactments. Two 
files on the Sex Hormone Regulations were open: a lawyer’s file maintained by Elmer Driedger, 
who provided advice on the draft regulations;18 and a file maintained by the Department of 
Pensions and National Health (“National Health”).19 I obtained similar files, of either solicitors or 
National Health officials, on the development of the 1944 amendments to Schedule B,20 and the 
1944 Parenteral Regulations.21  
As explained, using my legislative and regulatory research to inform my archival research, 
and vice versa, redirected the project’s focus. Preambular recitals in the above-mentioned 
regulations referenced the Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards. As I soon 
learned, the Committee was established in 1942 to advise – in practice, sometimes to decide, 
sometimes to simply sign off – on many of Canada’s first drug standards. Based on the 
preambles, I obtained LAC archival materials documenting the Committee’s activities. As these 
Committee files were numerous and voluminous, I initially limited my review to late 1942 to May 
1944,22 expecting to find “context” for the Sex Hormone Regulations. Context soon became 
centre, and the scope expanded,23 after I learned in the archives that the Committee and 
Department had enumerated four estrogens – oestrone, oestradiol benzoate, stilboestrol, and 
stilboestrol diproprionate – in Schedule B,24 and had standardized these drugs in the Canadian 
                                                          
18 Library and Archives Canada, “Pensions and National Health – Food and Drugs Act – Regulations Respecting Sex Hormones”, 
RG13-A-2, volume/box 2116, file no. 146937, reproduction copy number e011193404 [“EA Driedger’s Sex Hormone Regulations 
File, 1944”].  
19 Library and Archives Canada, Department of Health fonds, RG 29, “Canadian Committee on Pharmaceutical (sic) Standards – 
Proposed Regulation – Sex Hormones”, 1944/03-1945/03, volume 250, file no. 339-4-3, reproduction copy number e011193404 
[“National Health’s Sex Hormone Regulations File, 1944-1945”]. 
20 Library and Archives Canada, “Food & Drugs Act Part V – Proposed Amendment to Schedule B of the FDA Adding Certain 
Drugs to Part II & Adding a New Part V”, RG 13, volume 2619, file no. 6-146115 (Part 1) [“EA Driedger’s Schedule B File, 1943”]. 
This file was released to me under the Access to Information Act, under LAC file no. A201700062, on May 19, 2017. 
21 Library and Archives Canada, Department of Health fonds, RG 29, “Canadian Committee on Pharmaceutical (sic) Standards – 
Proposed Regulation – Parenteral Drugs”, volume 250, file no. 339-4-6, reproduction copy number I-106866 [“National Health’s 
Parenteral Drug Regulations File, 1943-1944”].  
22 Library and Archives Canada, Department of Health fonds, RG 29, “Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards – 
Correspondence”, 1942/09-1943/06, volume 250, file no. 339-4-7 (Part 1), reproduction copy number e011193405 [“Davidson’s 
Committee Materials, 1942-1943”]; Library and Archives Canada, Department of Health fonds, RG 29, “Canadian Committee on 
Pharmacopoeial Standards – Correspondence”, 1943/06-1944/01, volume 250, file no. 339-4-7 (Part 2), reproduction copy 
number e011193406 [“Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1943-1944”]; Library and Archives Canada, Department of Health 
fonds, RG 29, “Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards – Correspondence”, 1944/01-1944/05, volume 251, file no. 
339-4-7 (Part 3), reproduction copy number e011193404 [“Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1944”]. All files under file no. 339-
4-7 were files maintained by the Committee’s Secretary A. Linton Davidson, of the Department’s Food and Drug Division. 
23 An additional 15 files were reviewed in person at LAC offices in Ottawa; see the list of archival sources in the Bibliography.  
24 PC 1944-96 (10 January 1944), Canada Gazette, Vol LXXVIII, No 4, at p 354 (January 22, 1944).  
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Supplement.25 These two enactments had not appeared in my Gazette research. The archival 
files raised new ontological questions, causing me to apprehend estrogen as legally multiple. 
Further LAC holdings reviewed included two files containing newspaper and magazine 
advertisements for food and drugs, along with related compliance discussions and activities, 
maintained by National Health staff in 1938-1940 and 1949-1953.26 I also reviewed prosecution 
and inspectors’ records from 1950-1953, to determine if estrogenic drugs or cosmetics were 
ever the target of enforcement activities (and specifically if, in the process, the nature, 
composition or identity of these products had ever been contested).27 
 
2.iii.  Other primary historical sources 
Building upon my regulatory and archival research, I reviewed all articles addressing 
Canadian food and drug law published in the 1940s and 50s in the Food Drug Cosmetic Law 
Quarterly and, later, the Food, Drug, Cosmetic Law Journal.28 Many are authored by National 
Health officials, including Robert Curran, Dr. Leonard Pugsley, and Dr. Clare Morrell; some are 
by American officials and counsel. A pamphlet and book published in 1949, authored by Linton 
Davidson, a departmental official and the Secretary to the Committee, coupled discourses of 
nation-building and Christian fervor with key developments in the growth of the Food and Drugs 
Division (later the Directorate) and details on the Committee.29 In more restrained bureaucratic 
prose, historical reviews by Pugsley and Dr. Gordon Cameron provided factual detail on the 
Department’s evolution,30 and a book summarizing food and drugs law in Canada by Curran 
gave insight into legal preoccupations.31 
                                                          
25 The Canadian Supplement, 1944, to the British Pharmacopoeia, Being Division III of the Regulations under the Food and Drugs 
Act, enacted through PC 1944-2515 (11 April 1944), Canada Gazette, Vol LXXVIII, No 30, at p 2983 (July 22, 1944). 
26 Library and Archives Canada, Department of Health fonds, RG 29, “Food and drugs - Articles taken from newspapers 
magazines & newspaper advertisements”, 1938/12-1940/05, volume 258, file no. 347-1-6 (Part 2) reproduction copy number 
e011195705 [“Food and Drug Newspaper Clippings, 1938-1940”]; Library and Archives Canada, Department of Health fonds, RG 
29, “Food and drugs - Articles taken from newspapers magazines & newspaper advertisements”, 1949-1953, volume 259, file 
no. 347-1-6 (Part 4), reproduction copy number I-115336 [“Food and Drug Newspaper Clippings, 1949-1953”]. 
27 Library and Archives Canada, Department of Health fonds, RG 29, “Monthly Reports of Completed Prosecutions and 
Seizures”, volume 261, file no. 347-6-4; [“Monthly Prosecutions and Seizures Reports, 1950-1953”] and Library and Archives 
Canada, Department of Health fonds, RG 29, “Inspectors Reports”, 1950-1953, volume 261, file no. 347-2-9 [“Inspectors’ 
Reports, 1950-1953”]. Both of these files were reviewed in person at the LAC building in Ottawa. 
28 In 1992, this journal was again renamed, as the Food and Drug Law Journal. 
29 Davidson 1949a; and Davidson 1949b.  
30 Leonard I Pugsley, “The Administration and Development of Federal Statutes on Food and Drug Legislation” (1967) 23 Med 
Serv J Can 387 [“Pugsley 1967”]; and GDW Cameron, “The Department of National Health and Welfare” (1959) 50:8 Cdn Jour 
Pub Health 319 [“Cameron 1959”]. 
31 Robert E Curran, Canada’s Food and Drug Laws, Food and Drug Law Institute (Chicago: Commerce Clearing House Inc, 1953) 
[“Curran 1953”]. 
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With little history on estrogenic drugs or drug standardization in Canada, and needing 
further insight into the background views likely held by the Canadian physicians, pharmacists, 
drug manufacturers, and scientists on the Committee, I did some targeted research in medical 
journals, relying most heavily on the Vancouver Medical Association Bulletin.32 This research 
aimed to determine what estrogenic products were on the market in the late 1930s and 1940s in 
Canada, what “diseases” were being associated with estrogenic therapies and medical views on 
the therapies’ efficacy, and how estrogenic drugs were being advertised. Similarly, I did targeted 
searches in endocrinology, pharmacology, and pharmaceutical journals, for studies examining 
reference standards and assay methods for biological substances, including estrogens, 
including for scientific studies published in the 1930s and 1940s by Pugsley and Morrell.  
Finally, to situate departmental solicitors’ requests for advice and Driedger’s legal opinions 
on the validity and form of enactments including the Sex Hormone Regulations, Part V of 
Schedule B, the Canadian Supplement, and the order creating the Committee, I identified 
leading administrative law scholarship and judicial decisions, in this period, addressing statutory 
interpretation and (sub)delegation.33  I also reviewed some of Driedger’s own scholarly work.34 
 
2.iv.  Secondary historical sources  
In addition to the historical literature already introduced, I researched secondary sources for 
further historical context and information regarding: scientific knowledge, at different times in the 
last 90 years, on the composition, production, clinical uses, marketing, potencies, and effects of 
substances including DES, Premarin, estradiol, and estrone; trends and controversies regarding 
hormone replacement therapy; the politics of menopause and its medicalization; the evolution 
and function of pharmacopoeias; and comparative developments in drug regulation in the US.  
Having set out my methodological framework and my research methods, I now turn to Part II 
of this thesis. In the next three chapters, I describe how law materialized estrogen and how 
estrogen sparked new legal techniques in Canada in the 1940s and early 1950s.  
                                                          
32 This journal has been digitized and made searchable as part of an open collection on the history of nursing at the University 
of British Columbia; see https://open.library.ubc.ca/collections/historyofnursinginpacificcanada.  
33 Including John Willis, “Delegatus Non Potest Delegare” (1943) 21:4 Can Bar Rev 257 [“Willis 1943”]; John Willis, “Statutory 
Interpretation in a Nutshell” (1938) 16 Can Bar Rev 1 [“Willis 1938]; Reference as to the Validity of the Regulations in Relation to 
Chemicals Enacted by Order in Council and of an Order of the Controller of Chemicals Made Pursuant Thereto, [1943] SCR 1. 
34 Elmer A Driedger, “Subordinate Legislation” (1960) 38 Can B Rev 1 [“Driedger 1960”]; and Elmer A Driedger, “The Preparation 
of Legislation” (1953) 31 Can B Rev 33 [“Driedger 1953”]. 
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Chapter Three 
Delegating standards, assembling regulators: new ways of regulating drugs in Canada at 
the start of the 1940s 
 
Delegation, as that word is generally used, does not imply a parting with powers by the person who grants 
the delegation, but points rather to the conferring of an authority to do things which otherwise that 
person would have to do himself … If it is correct to use the word in the way in which it is used in the 
maxim as generally understood, the word “delegate” means little more than an agent. – Huth v. Clarke 
(1890) 25 QBD 391 at 395, per Wills J. 
Incompatibilities between objects enacted are no obstacle to medicine’s capabilities to intervene – as 
long as the incompatible variants of an object are separated out…Distributions separate out what might 
otherwise clash. – Mol 2002. 
 
This chapter begins my historical account of how estrogen co-emerged with new regulatory 
practices and techniques in Canada, between 1939 and 1953. It starts to demonstrate 
methodologically and empirically what was set out more theoretically and conceptually in Part I. 
Before describing the multiple ways in which Canadian regulators performed estrogen, however, 
it is necessary to give some shape and definition to the regulatory assemblage in which 
estrogen was enacted. As a prelude to showing how estrogen is a historically contingent 
artefact of multiple regulatory practices, it is necessary to constellate my regulatory network.  
Thus, this chapter draws together some critical legal formations that had assembled by 1940. 
To insist on a rigid distinction between “regulations” and “regulators” can be artificial and 
unproductive – both are actors, after all – and like regulators, regulations “both shape and are 
shaped by the networks of which they are part”.1 Despite this, the chapter begins by setting forth 
statutory and regulatory provisions and amendments under the Food and Drugs Act, from the 
late 1920s to late 1930s, that, as will be shown in later chapters, would ground understanding 
and action in the standardization, regulation, and multiplication of estrogen. Trying to avoid 
toggling back and forth between something conceived as statutory “context” or “structure”, on 
the one hand, and human “agents” or “actors”, on the other, some of the humans entangled with 
these regulatory events, such as National Health officials A. Linton Davidson and Harry Mills 
Lancaster, are also introduced in this first section. More specifically, the first section outlines the 
distinct modes or ways of standardizing drugs under the Act, particularly pharmacopoeial 
standards and delegated legislation, and how these modes relied on a growing turn to increased 
                                                          
1 Rooke, Cloatre & Dingwall 2012 at 56. 
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delegation. In the case of the Biologicals Regulation, these delegations were often unlawful, as 
National Health officials in the Food and Drug Division and the Laboratory of Health developed 
a deeply entrenched habit of delegating themselves power without statutory authority. This 
section also examines how National Health excluded estrogen from the ambit of the Biologicals 
Regulation, despite the original intention behind their empowering statutory provision, finding 
that the ambiguous legal status of sex hormones in the 1930s did not simply reflect estrogenic 
substances’ apparent lack of therapeutic action, but performed estrogen as a marginal therapy. 
As estrogen was also an ingredient in cosmetics, the section ends by briefly noting the 
legislative amendments covering cosmetics in 1939, which were passed but not brought into 
force at that time.  
The second and shorter section of this chapter describes the formation of a new regulatory 
community for drug standards in Canada, one that expanded beyond and overlapped with some 
departmental regulators. It details the inconsistent, contested advocacy efforts by senior 
Departmental officials and academic scientists that lead to the establishment of the Canadian 
Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards (“the Committee”). Canvassing the political and legal 
concerns with delegating drug standards to non-governmental scientists, the section shows how 
National Health officials’ habit of legally doubtful delegation would be central to cementing the 
Committee. After two years of debate and confusion, the Committee was created in the summer 
of 1942 and its members appointed that fall. Reviewing this assemblage in the making, and the 
activities through which interests and knowledges were aligned, will give a richer understanding, 
in later chapters, of the regulatory practices that enacted estrogen-in-law and law-in-estrogen.2  
In demarcating this socio-technical-legal assemblage, through this chapter, certain choices 
have been made, and some of these choices are exclusionary. Most obviously, excluded from 
the assemblage defined here are women – whether as patients, consumers, participants in 
clinical trials, National Health officials, physicians, pharmacists, or citizens. When one begins 
with regulatory practices in the 1930s, it is easy to lose sight of those not invited to the table.3 
From the boardroom tables around which the Committee members would soon gather, in their 
letters preceding and following those gatherings, in their deliberations about estrogen, women 
were almost entirely absent (except for all the unnamed stenographers whose transcriptions 
formed the basis for the Committee’s meeting minutes and thus for some of this research).4 As 
                                                          
2 Levi & Valverde 2008 at 811. 
3 See e.g. Star 1991. 
4  Only four women are mentioned more than once in the archival files consulted: Dr. Morrell’s and Mr. Davidson’s wives; Miss 
A. Dixon, the Associate Private Secretary to Minister Mackenzie, and Rebecca Lee Scott. In 1943, Scott worked as a secretary to 
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will be seen, only one Committee member expressed any concern about the safety of 
estrogenic drugs, and his concern was ignored. While the archival evidence relied on admittedly 
tends to render women invisible,5 it remains the case that, in most every way, women were 
excluded from efforts to regulate and standardize estrogen in Canada in the 1940s.  
Another implication of choosing to focus on the Committee’s and related Departmental actors’ 
regulatory practices in standardizing estrogen in the 1940s is that earlier events become 
characterized as “context”. Of course, “context’ can all too quickly be regarded as sufficient 
explanations of what is happening.”6 As Woolgar and Lezaun emphasize, in ontological 
analyses, “the invocation, construction, and constitution of ‘the context’ are intimately implicated 
in the situated determination of what the object is.”7 Thus, in beginning this history with an 
account of regulations and regulators, apprehending estrogen as an object embedded in and 
enacted by regulation is arguably rendered more straightforward. While it is impossible to 
abstain from context, whether characterized as legal, political, bureaucratic, or economic, this 
chapter endeavours to “set the scene” in a way that does not reduce the reason for subsequent 
events to statutory frameworks, regulatory dynamics, or the identity or interests of Committee 
members enlisted in the “estrogen regulation network” that I have chosen to assemble here.  
Finally, throughout this chapter, certain regulatory practices are highlighted that were pivotal 
to the emergence of new approaches to drug standardization in Canada. Generally, these 
practices can all be understood as examples of delegation. Delegation, here, is experimented 
with in two distinct though overlapping registers. In a sense straightforward to legal readers, 
delegation refers to the practice of one body conferring its powers to a subordinate body, 
whether this takes the form of a legislature conferring to the executive its powers to legislate, or 
a minister conferring to her officials (or committees) her powers to make statutory decisions, 
                                                          
Dr. Cook of Ayerst, McKenna, & Harrison Ltd. She had “attended McGill, the only woman in her class, graduating in 1937 with a 
BA in Economics and Political Science” (despite the opposition of Stephen Leacock, the Chair of the department, to women 
studying economics, but with the support of her tutor Eugene Forsey). In the summer of 1943, when Cook had been stalling on 
providing input on two draft monographs for DES, Davidson approached Scott to enlist her help in securing Cook’s reply. She 
died in Toronto in 2015 on her 102nd birthday. See Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1943-1944; and Deaths: Rebecca Lee 
Taylor (nee Scott)”, The Globe and Mail (7 March 2016), online:  
<http://v1.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/Deaths.20150307.93357518/BDAStory/BDA/deaths>.  
5 This thesis endeavours to bring women into the network, if in a limited way, by examining how they were represented and 
targeted in advertisements for estrogenic drugs and/or estrogenic cosmetics, and how National Health responded to those ads. 
6 Steve Woolgar & Javier Lezaun, “The wrong bin bag: A turn to ontology in science and technology studies?” (2012) 43:3 Soc 
Stud Sci 321 [Woolgar & Lezaun 2012”] at 327. 
7 Ibid. 
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subject to doctrinal constraints in administrative law, such as limitations on sub-delegation.8 In 
another register, delegation alludes to technological practices that assign or distribute a task, 
action, or activity from one actor, human or nonhuman, to another.9 While this could include 
legislators delegating the power to regulate to Cabinet members, as in the sense of delegated 
legislation, it is a much broader concept that also captures, for example, how socio-technical 
objects can serve as delegates.10 This second sense of delegation is developed in subsequent 
chapters, as National Health materialized a potent estrogen by delegating responsibility for its 
safety to other humans and nonhumans, and as that object in turn sparked new regulatory 
practices. Yet it is introduced here as a reminder that National Health’s practices of delegation 
were not merely legal but also socio-technical in nature, and to keep in sight that these 
regulatory practices had material effects. 
 
1.  Delegation and standard-setting under the Food and Drugs Act prior to 1940 
 
The regulatory practices that brought estrogen to life in Canada were enacted with the Food 
and Drugs Act.11 In this section, I set out the statutory backdrop to my regulatory history of 
estrogen. In the 1930s, National Health officials practiced multiple regulatory modes of 
standardizing drugs. All these modes of drug standardization relied on significant delegation, not 
all were lawfully authorized, and, though they could have been, none were applied to estrogen.  
Passed in 1920, the Food and Drugs Act is one of Canada’s oldest statutes. Its origins stretch 
back to the Adulteration Act,12 which had targeted dishonest and fraudulent trade practices, 
particularly through offences against adulteration and misbranding. By the early twentieth 
century, with this focus challenged by the “age of advertising”, the law’s failure to protect public 
health with food and drug standards was viewed as increasingly outdated.13 At that time, the 
                                                          
8 Common law doctrine governing both such forms of delegation has changed remarkably little, over time, in Canada. However, 
as addressed in Chapter 4, the year 1943 witnessed a significant appellate decision, in the form of the Chemicals Reference, that 
was interpreted as further empowering the delegation of legislative powers and of ministerial powers respectively. 
9 See Chapter 1, section 2.i. 
10 Ibid. Latour introduced the concept of “delegation” to ANT, deploying it to study technology in a way that arguably tended to 
reinforce the stability of the technological object; see Latour 1992, Latour 1999a. See also Akrich 1992.  
11 Whenever the Food and Drugs Act or the Act is mentioned in the body of this text, reference is made to the 1927 
consolidated statute, An Act Respecting Food and Drugs, RSC 1927, c 76, as amended [“Food and Drugs Act” or “FDA” or “Act”]. 
Whenever a later amendment is relied upon, the amending statute is also referenced. In the period addressed in this thesis, the 
Food and Drugs Act was often amended, including through the following enactments (excluding, from this list, the various 
amendments to the Act’s two Schedules made by orders in council): SC 1927, c 56; SC 1930, c 23; SC 1930, c 30; SC 1934, c 54; 
SC 1939, c 3; SC 1944-1945, c 22; SC 1945, c 7; SC 1946, c 23; and RS 1950, c 50. 
12 An Act to Impose License Duties on Compounders of Spirits, Amend the Act Respecting the Inland Revenue, and To Prevent the 
Adulteration of Food, Drink and Drugs, SC 1874, c 8.  
13 Robert E Curran, “Canada’s Food and Drugs Act” (1946) 1 Food Drug Cosm LQ 492 [“Curran 1946”] at 492-3, 497-8. 
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federal government’s jurisdiction to legislate in relation to food and drugs was not obvious, as 
the provinces had been assigned significant authority to legislate in relation to health and to the 
medical professions.14 Thus, it was federal legislative authority over criminal law that provided 
the necessary foundation for the Food and Drugs Act.15 In 1933 the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal confirmed as much, holding in Standard Sausage Company v. Lee that the Act was 
validly authorized by the federal criminal law power; the concurring opinion held that it was also 
sustained by the federal legislative power over peace, order, and good government.16 
By 1939, the Act’s purpose was seen as twofold: to protect public health and the consumer’s 
pocketbook. As put by Departmental legal adviser Robert Curran,17 the Act, “as a consumer’s 
statute, is concerned with the protection of the public, both as to safety and honesty”.18 By the 
start of the 1940s, this twofold purpose was increasingly pursued through setting and enforcing 
standards for food and for drugs, although these purposes were also promoted through labelling 
requirements prescribed in regulations under the Act.19 As will be explained, drug standards 
were set through various means, including pharmacopoeial standards and delegated legislation. 
Canada’s turn to standards was generally consistent with American regulatory trends, as the 
1920s and 1930s saw increased effort by the US FDA to lead, or influence, the development of 
drug standards.20 Calls for uniformity came from many directions. US drug manufacturers 
wanted standards to make it easier to compete for wholesale buyers, while consumers wanted 
assurances of consistency and quality.21 The Pure Food and Drugs Act, passed by Congress in 
1906, had provided American administrators with only an anemic ability, however, to make 
delegated legislation; instead, it “in essence required all drugs and drug products listed in the 
USP and the NF to conform to the specifications and standards” set out in these two 
pharmacopoeial works.22 In 1933, a bill was introduced to reform that act, though it took five 
                                                          
14 British North America Act, 1867, 30-31 Vict, c 3, ss 92(7), (13), and (16). 
15 Ibid, s 91(27); see also Robert E Curran, “Drug Legislation in Canada” (1956) 11 Food Drug Cosm LJ 590 [“Curran 1956”] at 
593. 
16 [1933] 4 DLR 501 (BCCA) at 505-507 per Macdonald JA; and [1934] 1 DLR 705 (BCCA) at 716, 722 per Martin JA. At 723-725, 
Martin JA explicitly left open whether the Act might also be sustained under the trade and commerce power in s. 91(2). Neither 
judge facially limited his holdings to the constitutionality of certain provisions but appeared to uphold the Act on a global basis.   
17 Curran became the Department’s in-house legal adviser in 1945; see Curran 1953 at 5.  
18 Curran 1946 at 494. The BC Court of Appeal endorsed this view of the Act’s twofold purpose; [1933] 4 DLR 501 (BCCA) at 507. 
19 Curran 1946 at 492-493, 498. 
20 Richard H Parrish II, “Negotiating Reality: The Construction of Enforceable Pharmaceutical Standards” (2002) 57 Food & Drug 
LJ 457. 
21 Gwen Kay, Dying to be Beautiful: The Fight for Safe Cosmetics (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2005) [“Kay 2005”] 
at 59-60. 
22 Martin L Blake, “The Role of the Compendia in Establishing Drug Standards” (1976) 31 Food Drug Cosm LJ 276 [“Blake 1976”] 
at 288; see also William W Goodrich, “The Canadian Approach to Enforcement Problems” (1950) 5 Food Drug Cosm LJ 667. 
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years – and the Elixir Sulfanilamide crisis in 1937 – before the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(“US FDCA”) was passed in 1938.23 The US FDCA generally maintained the existing focus on 
misbranding and adulteration, and more strongly affirmed the role of pharmacopoeias in 
supplying standards for drugs.24 The most notable distinction, then, between Canadian and US 
legislation was that, under the US FDCA, US drug companies were required to provide 
information showing the safety of a new drug before it could be sold in interstate commerce.25 
The new drug approval process was first put to the test in a contested application to market 
DES.26 By contrast, in Canada new drugs did not need approval, and DES and Premarin were 
marketed here before the US FDA approved them. This absence of pre-market approval for 
drugs in Canada markedly sharpens the significance of standards. To use a Premarin-inspired 
metaphor: with no legal ability to close the barn door before the horse bolted, Canadian 
regulators could nonetheless determine what a “horse” should be – and as will be seen, under 
the Food and Drugs Act, there was more than one way to standardize a horse.  
In Canada, drug standards were not set out in the Act. Rather, they were delegated. Indeed, 
the Food and Drugs Act was, and remains today, a scheme heavily premised upon delegation. 
Delegated authority to make regulations – by 1927, confirmed to have the same force and effect 
as the Act’s provisions27 – was a relatively new,28 and sometimes controversial,29 feature of the 
country’s legislative landscape. From the outset, the Act granted the Governor in Council (in 
effect, Cabinet) broad powers to make regulations.30 Such regulations were often issued in the 
form of orders in council and, depending on the source of authority, were published in the 
Canada Gazette.31 In the 1930s and early 1940s, National Health officials routinely conceived, 
drafted, and submitted regulations and orders to Cabinet, with a review by their departmental 
                                                          
23 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, c 675, 52 Stat. 1040 [“US FDCA”]; see also David Cavers, “The Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and Its Substantive Provisions” (1939) 6 L & Contemp Probs 2 [“Cavers 1939”]. With respect 
to the role of the Elixir Sulfanilamide crisis, see e.g. Kay 2005 at 103-14; and Cavers at 20, 40. 
24 See e.g. Blake 1976 at 288; Kay 2005 at 96-97; and Cavers 1939 at 27-30 (food) and 32-38 (drugs). 
25 Cavers 1939 at 20, 40; Watkins 2007 at 26-29. Another distinction is that, as of 1939, the US FDCA applied to cosmetics and 
the FDA did not. 
26 Langston 2010. 
27 Food and Drugs Act, s 3(3), as added by An Act to Amend the Food and Drugs Act, SC 1927, c 56, s 9. 
28 Other federal and provincial schemes relied on delegation, although none so foundationally as the Food and Drugs Act. The 
Adulteration Act had been amended in 1890 to give the Governor in Council authority to make standards; and in the Act in 
1920, this power was enlarged and formalized to encompass delegated legislation. See Curran 1953 at 157; and Pugsley 1967. 
29 The literature, in the 1920s-1940s, on the merits or deficiencies of delegated legislation to democratic governance, in which 
realists pitted themselves against formalists, is far too large to summarize here. As late as the 1950s and 1960s, Food and Drugs 
Act administrators felt it necessary to defend the use of delegated legislation; see e.g. Curran 1953 at 158-159; Pugsley 1967. 
30 Food and Drugs Act, s 3. As will be discussed, statutory powers to make regulations were expanded in the next two decades.  
31 Subsection 3(2) required all regulations made under ss 3(a) and (b) to be published in the Gazette. In 1939, this provision was 
replaced by a requirement that all regulations made under any provision of the Act shall be so published; SC 1939, c 3, s 6.  
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solicitor, and sometimes also by Department of Justice counsel, for legal validity and form. In 
this period, National Health created a burgeoning suite of regulations aimed at standardizing the 
quality, purity, and, importantly for this history, the potency of drugs. Further, in this period, the 
development and adjustment of drug regulations started to become a constant, ongoing, and 
iterative process. The approach to delegated legislation under the Food and Drugs Act 
revolutionized Canada’s approach to public health and to public administration more generally, 
becoming “very much the pattern and trend of legislation in Canada”.32   
By 1939, the Act and its administrators had come to embrace multiple modes – both lawful 
and unlawful – of delegating drug standards. Three key modes of delegation are summarized 
here: pharmacopoeial standards, regulated drug standards, and regulated standards specific to 
biologics. Pharmacopoeial standards were an ancient, traditional mode of governing the safety 
and composition of drugs. Texts prepared by physicians (sometimes jointly with pharmacists) to 
guide drug-making,33 pharmacopoeia can colloquially be thought of as “recipe books” for drugs 
and therapeutic substances, originally for the benefit of druggists, with each drug identified and 
described in a monograph through various technical specifications – that is, through standards.  
While the Act did not endorse or adopt any pharmacopoeia, the default drug standards were 
those set forth in the British Pharmacopoeia. One of the oldest, most respected pharmacopoeia, 
the British Pharmacopoeia was the only pharmacopoeial work that was, or had ever been, 
expressly referenced in the Act.34 To be clear, the Act did not require manufacturers or 
pharmacists to comply with the British Pharmacopoeia; rather, the Act made it a default 
pharmacopoieal authority for determining if drugs were adulterated. Section 6 deemed drugs to 
be adulterated if they were sold under a name recognized in a pharmacopoeia or another 
authoritative work on drugs, yet they differed “from the standard of strength, quality or purity laid 
down therein”. While manufacturers or pharmacists could pick any pharmacopoeia to which 
their drugs could conform,35 if they wished a drug’s quality to be judged under an authority other 
than the British Pharmacopoeia, they were required to name that authority when selling the 
drug. If they did not do so, then unless their drug conformed by default to the British 
                                                          
32 Leonard I Pugsley, “Food Laws and Regulations in Canada” (1964) 19 Food Drug Cosm LJ 374 at 376; and Curran 1953 at 157. 
33  Glenn Sonnedecker, “The Founding Period of the US Pharmacopoeia: European Antecedents” (1933) 35:4 PhH 151 at 158-
159. At 151, Sonnedecker provides a general definition of pharmacopoeia as a work that “contains pharmaceutical 
specifications that are intended to secure uniformity in the composition, quality, and therapeutic activity of medicines and that 
are made obligatory within a political unit by legally effective authority”. 
34 Food and Drugs Act, ss 6(a) and 6(2). For interpretations by National Health staff of the nature of the priority given by s 6 to 
the British Pharmacopoeia, see e.g. Robert E Curran, “Canada’s Food and Drug Regulations” (1949) 4 Food Drug Cosm LQ 391 
[“Curran 1949”]; and Clarence A Morrell, “Administration of the Canadian Food and Drugs Act” (1950) 5 Food Drug Cosm LJ 656 
[“Morrell 1950”]. 
35 Food and Drugs Act, s 6(1). 
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Pharmacopoeia standard, it was deemed to be adulterated.36 Canada was not unique in relying 
on pharmacopoeias in this way. Subject to institutional and statutory nuances, Britain and the 
US also relied on pharmacopoeias to supply presumptively official standards, likewise applying 
and enforcing those standards through adulteration or misbranding claims.37  
The second way that the Food and Drugs Act contemplated the imposition of drug standards 
may seem more “standard”, at least from a current vantage point. Paragraph 3(a) of the Act 
delegated to Cabinet the power to make regulations prescribing “standards of quality” for food 
and drugs.38 This authority was rarely invoked though, as by the 1930s, it had effectively been 
overtaken and replaced by a new, third way to standardize drugs under the Act. This third mode 
is especially significant to this story. In 1927, the Act was amended to create new regulatory 
authorities for biological drugs. These amendments authorized standards that took precedence 
over any other standards contemplated by the Act,39 and “for practical purposes, replace[d] the 
necessity for the authority in section 3(a).”40 To achieve this, beyond widening the definition of 
drug,41 the 1927 amendments authorized the standardization and control of biologics.42 
                                                          
36 Food and Drugs Act, s 6(2).  
37 Walton M Jr Wheeler, “Validity of Official Drug Standards” (1946) 1 Food Drug Cosm LQ 588; DM Dunlop & TC Denston, “The 
History and Development of the ‘British Pharmacopoeia’” (1958) 2:5107 BMJ 1250 [“Dunlop & Denston 1958”] at 1251-1252.  
38 Relatedly, s 3(b) of the Act empowered regulations requiring that drugs be labelled. In 1939, this was replaced by a new s 3(b) 
which broadened powers over labelling and packaging, including for cosmetics; see SC 1939, c 3, s 3. The new s 3(b) was 
proclaimed into force as of August 1, 1939 except for the part of it related to cosmetics; Proclamation, 22 July 1939, Canada 
Gazette, Vol LXXIII, No 8, p 509 (August 19, 1939). 
39 For an articulation of this view that standards authorized by s 6(3)(a) took precedence over standards authorized by s 3(a), 
which turned on the phrase “not otherwise prescribed by this Act” in s 3(a) and on s. 6(4), see Curran 1953 at 176-177. 
40 Ibid. It is not wholly clear what the Department perceived as the central limitations of s 3(a). In this period, it continued to 
sometimes provide a source of authority for certain drug regulations, as noted here by Curran. 
41 Food and Drugs Act, s 2(c), as amended by SC 1927, c 56, s 1(2)(c). 
42 Food and Drugs Act, ss 6(3) and (4), as amended by SC 1927, c 56, s 2, and providing: 
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsections one and two of this section, the Governor in Council may make 
regulations respecting any or all of the drugs mentioned or described in Schedule B to this Act, –   
(a) prescribing standards of quality and potency 
(b) defining official methods for biological testing which methods shall permit manufacturers to have 
biological tests made in any laboratory; 
(c) providing for the licensing of manufacturers preparing drugs mentioned or described in Parts II and III of 
Schedule B; 
(d) providing for the inspection of premises, equipment and technical qualifications of the staff of 
manufacturers preparing drugs mentioned or described in Parts II and III of Schedule B; 
(e) requiring that manufacturers of drugs mentioned or described in Part IV of Schedule B submit test 
portions of each and every batch of such drugs to be tested in the laboratories of the Department of Health, 
and requiring that only approved batches may be imported, sold or offered for sale; 
(f) prescribing a tariff of fees for inspection, licensing and biological testing. 
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Following legislative developments in Britain,43 and in the US,44 these 1927 amendments 
were specifically intended to facilitate the standardization and control of antitoxins, vaccines, 
viruses, sera, insulin, and other substances positioned as biologics. Given the centrality of 
potency to defining and standardizing biological drugs, and to ensuring their safety, potency was 
addressed for the first time in the Act, which now empowered regulations prescribing potency 
standards for drugs.45 Furthermore, the 1927 amendments envisioned that bioassays – official 
methods for biological testing, by which potency was measured – would also be prescribed by 
regulation.46 As explained in 1949 by A. Linton Davidson, long-serving Dominion analyst in the 
Food and Drug Division and unofficial chronicler of the history of the Department,47 these 
amendments were intended to allow “for the standardization of which animals had to be used”.48 
The amendments also empowered the government to impose regulatory controls on the 
manufacture of biologics, through licensing and inspections,49 as well as through batch testing. 
Schedule B was also added to the Act through these amendments, or at least it was in intention, 
if not in the legally required form.50 This made the regulations that followed, in 1928, technically 
                                                          
(4) Any drug mentioned or described in Schedule B to this Act shall be deemed to be adulterated if it has not been 
manufactured, tested and labelled in accordance with regulations made by the Governor in Council under this 
section, or if it differs in quality or potency from the standard for such drug established by such regulations. 
43 In Britain, biologicals were controlled under the Therapeutic Substances Act, 1925. Similar to Canadian law, the British statute 
did not limit the sale of biological drugs (i.e. through prescription requirements), but instead sought to control purity and 
potency of drugs through scientific testing and manufacturing controls; see Stuart Anderson, “From ‘bespoke’ to ‘off-the-peg’: 
community pharmacists and the retailing of medicines in Great Britain, 1900 to 1970” (2008) 50:2 PhH 43 at 49. 
44 In the US, biologics were not regulated under the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act. They were regulated under the 1902 Act to 
Regulate the Sale of Viruses, Serums, Toxins and Analogous Products in the District of Columbia, to Regulate Interstate Traffic in 
Said Articles, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 57-244, 32 Stat. 728, 42 U.S.C. §§ 141-48 (informally, the “Biologics Act” or the 
“Biologics Control Act”), and an act creating the US Public Health Service and its Hygienic Laboratory (later the National 
Institute of Health). In the 1930s and early 40s, these acts formed a biologics regime focused on testing, standardization, 
licensing, and inspection, aimed at ensuring products’ purity and potency. See Von Schwerin, Stoff & Wahrig 2013 at 3-9; and 
Terry S Coleman, “Early Developments in the Regulation of Biologics” (2016) 71 Food & Drug LJ 544 [“Coleman 2016”].  
45 Food and Drugs Act, s 6(3)(a). 
46 Food and Drugs Act, s 6(3)(b). 
47 According to an obituary in 1950, Davidson had been “one of the best known members of the staff”. Born in Montrose, 
Scotland in 1888, he received his pharmaceutical chemistry degree from the University of London in 1909. Emigrating to Canada 
after WWI, he worked briefly in industry and joined government in 1925. In the late 1940s, in association with the Department, 
he “produced an extensive history of the Food and Drug Divisions and was the author of the departmental book Canada 
Pioneers in Food and Drug Control, issued to mark the 75th anniversary of Canada’s first such regulations. He launched, and 
continued to edit, the division’s publication ‘Food and Drug News – Canada.’” See Ministry of National Health & Welfare, 
“Davidson Obituary” (1950) 4:2 The Food and Drug News (Canada): 75th Anniversary Issue 1 [“Davidson Obituary 1950”]. 
48 Davidson 1949b. 
49 These controls were only permitted for drugs on Parts II and III of Schedule B. Moreover, the amendments empowered but 
did not require licensing. This will be illustrated, in the next two chapters, by sex hormones, which were first enumerated on 
Part II (but were never made subject to any licenses for Part II drugs) and then, intriguingly, were moved to Part I in 1949. 
50 SC 1927, c 56, s 14. Due to an apparent drafting error, it was denoted in the consolidated Act later that year as “Schedule” 
rather than as “Schedule B”; see RSC 1927, c 76, Schedule. The drafting error was corrected legislatively in the next amendment 
to the Act in 1934; SC 1934, c 54, s 4. The fact that no “Schedule B” existed did not stop Cabinet, on the Department’s request, 
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ultra vires, and just the first example of the many (often unlawful) delegations through which 
National Health would standardize and enact biological drugs in the coming decades.51  
As envisioned in the 1927 amendments, Schedule “B” comprised Parts I through IV. One can 
cavalierly characterize these four parts as containing drugs derived respectively from vegetable, 
animal, bacterial, or mineral sources. More accurately characterized, Part II – the part arguably 
applicable to sex hormone products in the 1920s and 1930s – listed “Preparations of Pituitrin, 
Thyroid, Adrenalin and any other animal tissue preparations”.52 When Part II was first drafted in 
1927, the few estrogenic preparations available were all made from animal tissues, typically 
ovarian extracts.53 Indeed, it seems that Part II may have been intended originally to cover sex 
hormones. This view is bolstered by Davidson’s views on the origins of the 1927 amendments, 
which drew upon his close working relationship assisting Harry Lancaster throughout their long 
careers at National Health. Lancaster was the Chief Dominion Analyst from 1923 to 1945,54 
head of the Food and Drug Division, and deeply involved in preparing the 1927 amendments. 
These amendments, according to Davidson, were motivated by rapid changes in pharmacology, 
biologics, and endocrinology in the 1920s, and challenges in standardizing existing biologics like 
digitalis and ergot; overall, he felt that the “real reason for amending the Act” in 1927 was that:  
“Again, drugs of animal origin, for example, pituitary, epinephrine and sex hormones were 
coming into vogue and called for special legislative treatment. The great field of viruses, 
serums, toxins, vaccines and other bacterial products were engaging increased attention in 
the medical world … the need for control of such remedies in Canada was considered a 
matter of urgency.”55   
Though nothing suggests these developments did not motivate the bill, the amendments also 
served to build the bureaucratic machinery at National Health. Davidson himself notes that the 
bill received “much criticism” in the House of Commons and some opposition in the Senate. 
Delegated legislation was a new feature of governance in Canada, and Parliamentarians were 
apprehensive to extend these powers as they “raised the spectre of a still wider bureaucracy”.56  
                                                          
from purporting to exercise its authority in relation to “Schedule B drugs”, by making regulations governing the “Schedule 
drugs”, in 1928. To avoid confusion, the remainder of this chapter refers to the 1927 Schedule to the Act as “Schedule B”. 
51 While I have not obtained any solicitor-client advice sought or received by National Health on this issue, any departmental 
legal advisors, who were tasked with reviewing the form and validity of regulations, likely would have advised National Health 
officials that they lacked jurisdiction to make regulations for any “Schedule B” drugs until something called Schedule B existed.  
52 Part I listed “Preparations of Strophanthus, Digitalis, Ergot and any other vegetable preparations for which biological tests are 
deemed necessary”; Part III listed “Serums, Viruses; Toxins, Vaccines; Analogous biological preparations”; and Part IV listed 
“Organic compounds of arsenic and analogous preparations prepared for parenteral medication”.  
53 See Chapter 1, section 1.ii, particularly some of the content associated with notes 11-15, 87-89, and 95-96. 
54 Cameron 1959 at 321. 
55 Davidson 1949a at 67; and Davidson 1949b. 
56 Ibid. 
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After the 1927 amendments were enacted, National Health officials immediately began to 
draft the requisite regulations. Davidson, Lancaster, and Dr. Harris – the latter, as the Chief of 
the Laboratory of Hygiene,57 would assume new responsibilities for researching and testing 
biologicals – together “spent many afternoons on this in the late summer and early fall of 
1927”.58 What became known as the “Biological Products Regulation”, or simply the “Biologicals 
Regulation”, was made on February 6, 1928, as part of the wider Food and Drug Regulations.59 
No provisions of the 1928 Biologicals Regulation referred specifically to sex hormones. 
However, understanding how the 1928 Biologicals Regulation defined and standardized the 
quality and potency of biological drugs is critical to appreciating the divergent approach that 
would later emerge in the mid-1930s, and that would transmogrify yet further in the 1944 Sex 
Hormone Regulations. The first part of the 1928 Biologicals Regulation addressed three plant-
based drugs mentioned on Part I of the Schedule – digitalis, strophanthus, and ergot.60 These 
plant-based drugs were legally defined according to their source material – for example, the 
leaves of the digitalis plant – as well as according to the means by which they were extracted 
therefrom. For each of these drugs, the Biologicals Regulation fixed standards of quality by 
identifying a standard reference material, kept by the Laboratory of Hygiene and obtainable on 
application. Furthermore, as envisioned by the Act, for these drugs, the Biologicals Regulation 
also explicitly prescribed both quantitative potency standards and specific biological test 
methods for measuring potency. Thus, for digitalis, the regulations prescribed detailed bioassay 
methods set out in Appendix A to the regulations; for strophanthus, the regulations adopted the 
bioassay methods used in the tenth revision to the US Pharmacopoeia (“USP X”); and for ergot, 
the method prescribed for biological testing was either that described in Appendix B or that in 
                                                          
57 In the 1920s and 1930s, the Food and Drug Division and the Laboratory of Hygiene were organized as separate units in the 
Department. As stated by Curran, “[t]he Food and Drug Division is responsible for the administration and enforcement of the 
Act”, while the “Laboratory of Hygiene is by administrative arrangement, responsible for the biological control of the products 
mentioned in Part III of Schedule B”, and “undertakes the inspection of premises, equipment and technical qualifications of the 
staff of manufacturers preparing drugs mentioned or described in Parts II and III of Schedule B, and it is also responsible for 
special services in relation to the enforcement work of the Food and Drug Division, such as the identity of certain drugs”. Until 
1945, Lancaster administered the Food and Drug Division as the Chief Dominion Analyst; see Curran 1953 at 193. The 
Laboratory of Hygiene was established in 1921. It was envisioned to operate as a national public health laboratory. It hired its 
first pharmacologist in 1923 and its second in 1928. See Pugsley 1967; Davidson 1949b; and Cameron 1959 at 321, 330. 
58 Davidson 1949a at 67.  
59 PC 1928-127 (6 February 1928) (Regulations for Fixing Standards of Quality and Potency, and Defining Official Methods of 
Biological Testing of Drugs mentioned or described in Schedule, Part 1 of the Food and Drugs Act, RS 1927; Proposed 
Regulations for the Licensing, Manufacture and Sale of Drugs listed in Schedule B, Part II of the Food and Drugs Act, RS, 1927, 
hereinafter referred to as Biological Products; and Regulations for Fixing Standards of Quality and Potency, and Defining Official 
Methods of Biological Testing of Drugs mentioned or described in Part IV, of the Schedule of the Food and Drugs Act, RS 1927) 
[together, the “1928 Biologicals Regulation”], in Canada Gazette, Vol 61, Supp, pp 15-26 (February 18, 1928). 
60 At this time, Part I stated “Preparations of Strophanthus, Digitalis, Ergot and any other vegetable preparations for which 
biological tests are deemed necessary”. 
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the USP X.61 This same approach to prescribing identity and potency was taken for most of the 
animal-based drugs and bacterial drugs described respectively in Parts II and III of Schedule B 
– such as pituitary extract, thyroid, epinephrine, and antitoxins for diphtheria and tetanus – with 
the regulations defining these drugs by source material, prescribing quality and identity through 
standard reference materials, and prescribing biological methods for testing their potency either 
by incorporating scientific test methods or referring to methods in existing pharmacopoeias.62  
Within a few years of the Treaty of Westminster, in July 1934, National Health secured from 
Parliament a further delegation of authority to create Canadian drug standards. In 1933, 
Lancaster had unsuccessfully advocated, in tandem with academic pharmacologists, that the 
Act should be amended to allow Cabinet to add any drug to Schedule B at the request of a new 
committee comprising representatives of the Canadian Medical Association, the Canadian 
Pharmaceutical Association, and the Canadian Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association. 
Their goal had been to incorporate, holus bolus into the Act, the 1932 addendum to the British 
Pharmacopoeia prepared by Canadian academic physicians and pharmacists.63 While this 
proposed amendment was rejected before reaching Parliament, the Act was amended to better 
enable ready use of Schedule B. Specifically, substances could now be added to or removed 
from Schedule B by regulation, rather than by legislation, where the Minister of Pensions and 
National Health deemed that addition or removal to be “necessary in the public interest”.64  
On the heels of this amendment, the Biologicals Regulation was repealed and replaced, in 
August 1934.65 In a move that, a decade later, would be rejected as unlawful sub-delegation in 
the specific – and the limited – context of sex hormone products,66 National Health officials 
changed their regulatory approach to measuring the potency of biological drugs. For the three 
                                                          
61 1928 Biologicals Regulation, at pp 15-16 and 25-26. 
62 Ibid at pp 19-23. For the arsenicals and organic chemicals in Part IV, the 1928 Biologicals Regulation defined these substances 
by chemical name rather than source material, and rather than bioassays for potency, they prescribed tests for toxicity.  
63 EA Driedger’s Schedule B File, 1943 at 71-75. See also the content associated with infra notes 113-115. 
64 Food and Drugs Act, s 3(i), as amended by SC 1934, c 54, s 1. The 1934 amendments also added a prohibition against import 
or sale of any remedy represented as a treatment for the diseases listed in a new Schedule A to the Act, which included, for 
example, cancer, diabetes, tuberculosis, alcoholism, influenza, and sexual impotence; Food and Drugs Act, s 6A, as amended by 
SC 1934, c 54, ss 2 and 4. Additionally, the drafting error in the 1927 amendments was corrected, such that the heading 
“Schedule” was now properly revised to “Schedule B”; Food and Drugs Act, Schedule B, as amended by SC 1934, c 54, s 4.  
65 PC 1934-123/1852 (16 August 1934) (Regulations for Fixing Standards of Quality and Potency, and Defining Official Methods 
of Biological Testing of Drugs Mentioned or Described in Parts I and II of Schedule B of the Food and Drugs Act, RS 1927; 
Regulations for the Licensing, Manufacture and Sale of Drugs Listed in Parts II and III, Schedule B of the Food and Drugs Act, RS 
1927; and Regulations for Fixing Standards of Quality and Potency and Defining Official Methods of Biological Testing of Drugs 
mentioned or described in Part IV, of Schedule B of the Food and Drugs Act, RS 1927) [together, the “1934 Biologicals 
Regulation”] in Canada Gazette, Vol LXXV, No 3, Supp, pp 16-27 (September 28, 1934).  
66 See Chapter 4, section 2, particularly that content associated with notes 98-135. 
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plant-based products on Part I,67 and for some animal hormone products such as thyroid, 
pituitary extract, and epinephrine on Part II,68 while they continued to prescribe quantitative 
potency units,69 the 1934 Biologicals Regulation no longer set forth any official biological test 
methods. Despite that paragraph 6(3)(b) of the Act contemplated that regulations would define 
the official methods for biological testing, for these drugs, the 1934 Biologicals Regulation 
instead subdelegated the selection of test methods to departmental scientists, providing that 
official bioassay methods would be whatever methods were employed in the Laboratory of 
Hygiene, details of which could be obtained upon application to the Chief of the Laboratory.70   
As in 1928, none of the provisions of the 1934 Biologicals Regulation expressly applied to sex 
hormones. Did National Health officials ever apply the general provisions of these regulations to 
estrogenic products? Despite Davidson’s view that the “real reason” for the 1927 amendments 
empowering these regulations included a need to regulate sex hormones, it appears not. In 
governing the license, manufacture, and sale of animal-based drugs, the 1934 Biologicals 
Regulation included a newly broadened licensing provision, requiring a license to manufacture 
products that were “a virus, serum, toxic, antitoxin, a preparation of pituitrin or other animal 
tissue preparation, or a product analogous thereto, and of established value in the prevention or 
treatment of diseases of man, and intended for parenteral administration”.71 This echoed US 
regulations, in 1934, that required satisfactory evidence of therapeutic efficiency before a 
license could be granted to a new biological product, driven by concern to not bestow “worthless 
drugs with the imprimatur of a governmental license”.72 Indeed, as historians have shown, in the 
1930s, estrogenic products were arguably not of “established value” in treating diseases in man 
(let alone in women).73 Leaving that important point aside, as of 1934, many estrogenic products 
were clearly injectable “animal tissue preparations”, made from ovaries, and had they wished to 
National Health officials could have required their manufacturers to obtain licenses.  
                                                          
67 1934 Biologicals Regulation at pp 16-17. While the three plant-based drugs remained digitalis, strophanthus and ergot, the 
1934 regulations expanded their coverage to include additional types of products derived from these plants. 
68 Ibid at 17 and 21-26. 
69 Ibid at 17 (with the exception of ergot, for which the potency standard prescribed by the regulations was instead a material 
standard of activity: “whatever is equal to the specific activity of the standard preparation when tested biologically”). 
70 Ibid at 17 (thyroid) and 21 (pituitary and epinephrine). 
71 1934 Biologicals Regulation (specifically, the Regulations for the Licensing, Manufacture and Sale of Drugs Listed in Parts II 
and III, Schedule B of the Food and Drugs Act, RS 1927), s 1 at p 18 (emphasis added).  
72 Coleman 2016 at 595, and also see 594.  
73 See Chapter 1, section 1.i., particularly that content associated with notes 39-44. 
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By this time, some estrogenic products were not made from ovarian extracts but from urine.74 
Furthermore, materializing estrogen from urine, whether expelled by women or horses, was a 
particularly Canadian undertaking. In 1930, McGill University endocrinologist Dr. James Collip, 
in partnership with the new Canadian drug company Ayerst, McKenna & Harrison Ltd.,75 first 
extracted estrogen from pregnant Canadian women’s urine. By 1933, Ayerst was marketing 
Emmenin, one of the “first orally active estrogens, distributed in the palatable form of sugar-
coated tablets”, for clinical uses.76 Did National Health officials consider urine-based estrogenic 
drugs like Emmenin to be animal tissue preparations, or “a product analogous thereto”,77 for 
licensing purposes? Again, it appears not. Digging into National Health’s licensing practices, it 
does not seem that the Department ever issued a license under the 1934 Biologicals Regulation 
for any sex hormone product. From time to time, the Department would publish, in the Canada 
Gazette, lists of those firms that were licensed to manufacture drugs listed in Parts II and III of 
Schedule B, accompanied by an identification of the types of preparations for which each such 
firm was licensed. 78 While sex hormone manufacturers such as Ayerst, Abbott, and Parke, 
Davis & Co. appeared on these lists, sex hormone preparations did not.79  
Whatever was restraining National Health from applying the regulations to estrogenic drugs, it 
does not appear to have been the statute. Admittedly, Schedule B of the Act was limited, in Part 
II, to animal tissue products, and drugs like Emmenin were made from human urine. However, 
National Health did not otherwise let this statutory wording limit its regulatory practices. For 
example, in another instance of endemically unlawful delegation typifying Canada’s regulation of 
biologics, the 1934 Biologicals Regulation were amended in 1942 to purport to cover not just 
animal tissue preparations as authorized by Part II, but also human tissue preparations.80 
Nor was this regulatory restraint reflective of satisfaction with the situation amongst Canadian 
medical professionals. By the late 1930s, Canadian physicians were frustrated by the failure to 
                                                          
74 See supra note 53. 
75 Ayerst was founded in 1924; see Raison 1969 at 15. It was granted letters patent in January 1925; see Government Notices, 
Canada Gazette, Vol LVIII, No 81, p 2257 (January 25, 1925). 
76 Li 2002 at 103; Haraway 2012 at 308, 314 (fn 5). 
77 The 1934 Biologicals Regulation, in further defining “biological products”, appeared to consider analogous products as 
analogous only to a virus, serum, toxin or antitoxin; see 1934 Biologicals Regulation (specifically, the Regulations for the 
Licensing, Manufacture and Sale of Drugs Listed in Parts II and III, Schedule B of the Food and Drugs Act, RS 1927), s 11 at p 18. 
While s 1 of this part of the regulations required licenses for products of established value in treating disease, in defining 
analogous products, s 11 used a lower threshold of “applicable to the prevention or treatment of diseases”.  
78 These notices do not appear to have been required by any provision of the 1934 Biologicals Regulation.  
79 See e.g. Government Notices, List of Firms Licensed for the Manufacture of Drugs Mentioned in Parts II and III, Schedule “B”, 
Food and Drugs Act, Canada Gazette, Vol LXXV, No 3, p 173 (July 19, 1941). 
80 1942 Biologicals Regulation, s 11 at p 2172; see Chapter 4 at note 126. 
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standardize estrogenic products, writing in journals about how much “confusion has arisen from 
the many and varied trade names under which the oestrogenic preparations are dispensed, and 
the fact that there are two international units of different potency complicates the picture”.81 
National Health’s apparent indifference to estrogen in the 1930s was also not the result of 
any lack of pharmacological expertise or knowledge of bioassay methods amongst its staff. In 
the latter half of the 1930s, under Dr. Harris, the Laboratory of Hygiene was steadily expanding 
its research activity, including through new research on the standardization and control of 
biologics.82 Its pharmacological section was led by Harvard-trained pharmacologist Dr. Clare 
Morrell,83 who had expertise in bioassays, including plotting and calculating dose-response 
curves with statistical techniques.84 Morrell developed official methods of assay that could be 
distributed to manufacturers and used to test their products, and collaborated on scientific 
subcommittees of the British Pharmacopoiea Commission and the US Pharmacopoeia Revision 
Committee.85 In 1936, Dr. Leonard Pugsley, a biochemist who had trained at McGill, joined the 
Laboratory to do work on sex hormones. Sex hormones were at the center of much of the 
Laboratory’s growing activity; according to Davidson, “[b]y the time the Second Word War broke 
out, extensive work was being done on vitamins, liver oils and extract, and sex hormones.”86 
Nor did Canadian regulatory inaction wholly track American approaches. Admittedly, in the 
US, sex hormones (and other glandular preparations) had long been carved out of the 
legislative and licensing regime that existed for biologics; legally speaking, hormones were not 
biologics in the US.87 This did not diminish American compliance activities, however. In the 
second half of the 1930s, the US FDA was busily enforcing the US FDCA and its predecessor 
statute against estrogenic preparations. As explained by two scientists with the US FDA’s 
                                                          
81 EA Trites, “The Treatment of Functional Menstrual Disorders” (Jan 31, 1940) XVI:4, The Bulletin of the Vancouver Medical 
Association 97 [“Trites 1940”] at 100, in UBC Open Collections, History of Nursing in Pacific Canada, online: 
<https://open.library.ubc.ca/collections/historyofnursinginpacificcanada>. 
82 Dr. GDW Cameron succeeded Dr. Harris as the new Chief of the Laboratory of Hygiene in 1939; see Cameron 1959 at 322. 
83 One of two divisions within the Laboratory of Hygiene in the late 1930s, after WWII, the pharmacology section was 
incorporated into the new Food and Drug Directorate; see Davidson 1949b. 
84 For some of his research, see CW Chapman and CA Morrell, “On the biological assay of strophanthus” (1931) 4 Quart J Phar & 
Pharm 195; CW Chapman & CA Morrell, “On the biological assay of digitalis and strophanthus” (1932) 45 J Pharm & Exp Thera 
229; CW Chapman & CA Morrell, “The potency and standardization of digitalis in Canada” (1934) 31:3 Can Med Assoc J 400; CA 
Morrell & CW Chapman, “Recent developments in pharmacology”, (1934) 53:21 Chemistry and Industry 467; and Leonard I 
Pugsley & Clarence A Morrell, “Variables Affecting the Biological Assay of Estrogens” (1943) 33:1 Endocrinol 48. 
85 By the early 1940s (and perhaps earlier), Morrell was an auxiliary member of the USP Subcommittee on Biological Assays, and 
by early 1943, he was a member of the USP Advisory Committee on the Standardization of Insulin; see January 12, 1943 
memorandum from Morrell to Cameron, in Library and Archives Canada, Department of Health fonds, RG 29, volume 248, file 
no. 339-4-1 (Part 5) 1940 to Oct 1943 [“Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943”]. 
86 Davidson 1949a at 82, and see also at 77-81; Davidson 1949b; and Cameron 1959 at 350.  
87 Coleman 2016 at 577-578, 598-600, and 604-606. 
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Division of Pharmacology, a sex hormones unit had been established in 1935 “for the purpose 
of making investigations of these products by use of the recognized methods available for some 
of them and for the purpose of the investigation of new methods for the assay of others.”88 
Ensuing prosecutions enforced misbranding and adulteration prohibitions against estrogenic 
products. Many preparations, particularly those in oil solutions, were found to have a potency 
that was “quite high”. However, the most common legal allegation was essentially that 
estrogenic preparations had a lower potency than labelled.89 For example, a prosecution 
involving Follicovar, which “contained approximately 25 percent of the number of International 
Units of ovarian follicular hormone declared on the label”, alleged adulteration as the product’s 
strength fell below the professed standard under which it was sold.90 Apparently unimpeded by 
the variance in manufacturers’ potency units and test methods, these prosecutions targeted sex 
hormone preparations the potency of which was expressed in everything from “International 
Units”, to “mouse units”, to “Rat Units Standardized by the vaginal smear method”.91  
At base, National Health’s inaction simply reflected – and performatively enacted – the fact 
that, in the 1930s, estrogenic drugs were neither very prevalent nor demonstrably effective for 
identified diseases. This challenges conventional wisdom that if a technology is unregulated, its 
sale and use will increase. As will later be seen in the context of the Sex Hormone Regulations, 
however, National Health officials were concerned that extending regulation to sex hormone 
products would equate to an endorsement. The same concern had driven, for three decades, 
the US Public Health Service’s resistance to licensing hormonal products derived from glands 
“because it thought that most of them were worthless, although basically safe, and that a license 
would be seen as a governmental determination that they were effective.”92 Recognizing 
                                                          
88 Jack M Curtis & Ewald Witt, “Activities of the Food and Drug Administration in the Field of Sex Hormones” (1941) 1:4 J Clin 
Endocrinol 363 [“Curtis & Witt 1941”] at 363. 
89 Ibid at 364, also stating that “[l]egal action has been concluded against a number of the preparations found to be deficient in 
their labelled potency”. For examples of prosecutions alleging that potency was lower than claimed, see U.S. v 174 Boxes of 
Cristallovar, Notices of Judgment under the Food and Drugs Act, No. 28698 (S.D.N.Y., October 13, 1937); and U.S. v. 2 Packages, 
2 Packages and 8 Packages, each containing six 1-ec Ampuls of Thelestrin Ovarian Follicular Hormone, Notices of Judgment 
under the Food and Drugs Act, No. 27268 (D. Mass., May 17, 1937). 
90 U.S. v Hypo-Medical Corporation, Notices of Judgment under the Food and Drugs Act, No. 30321 (S.D.N.Y., January 11, 1939). 
91 See e.g. U.S. v 353 Boxes, et al of Endofolllicolina, Notices of Judgment under the Food and Drugs Act, No. 28325 (S.D.N.Y., 
October 13, 1937); and U.S. v 5 Packages of Ampacoid Estrogenic Hormone, Notices of Judgment under the Food and Drugs Act, 
No. 26973 (E.D. La., January 6, 1937). 
92 Coleman 2016 at 577. As an early example of this concern to not endorse hormonal products, he quotes from a 1909 PHS 
memo opposing licensing: “[M]ost of these organo-therapeutic preparations are in the experimental stage; but few of them are 
really useful and but a few of them are occasionally harmful; with the exception, perhaps, of adrenalin, these glandular extracts 
cannot be standardized; to license them would give respectability to a class of drugs some of which are on the borderline of 
being non-ethical; to license these preparations would serve little or no useful purpose, and it is doubtful if they may be 
properly considered as either viruses, serums, toxins or analogous products under the Law of July 1, 1902”; at 577-578. 
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through regulation that a substance was a drug served as official sanction. Critically, from this 
perspective, regulation as was much about enacting estrogen – calling it into action – as 
constraining it. Despite repeated delegations of authority to standardize biologics between 1927 
and 1942, National Health did not deploy these delegations to sanction sex hormones as 
therapeutically effective drugs, and, in partial consequence, estrogen remained marginal.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: List of 18 estrogenic preparations commercially available in Canada as of 1940 
From EA Trites, “The Treatment of Functional Menstrual Disorders” (1940) XVI:4 Bulletin of the 
Vancouver Medical Association 97 (UBC Open Collections, History of Nursing in Pacific Canada) 
 
Indeed, by early 1940, according to a contemporaneous account, only 18 estrogenic 
products, prescribed mostly for menstrual disorders, were available commercially in Canada. 
Most of the 18 preparations were based on estrone or estradiol benzoate. Yet as the list above 
shows, a couple were new creatures – not animal, vegetable, bacterial, or mineral, but 
stilboestrol.93 Within less than a year of the synthesis of DES, these new DES products, 
developed for parenteral and oral use, had arrived.94 In two years, Premarin would join them. 
                                                          
93 Stilboestrol was the British name for what was referred to in the US as DES; see the Introduction at notes 46-48. 
94 The first ad in Canada for DES that I have located is dated April 30, 1939. However, my search was not exhaustive, and it is 
possible that DES was marketed somewhat earlier. See British Drug Houses Ltd advertisement, (April 1939) XV:7 The Bulletin of 
the Vancouver Medical Association at 191, in UBC Open Collections, History of Nursing in Pacific Canada, online: 
<https://open.library.ubc.ca/collections/historyofnursinginpacificcanada>. 
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Turning away from drug standards and to other statutory provisions relevant to estrogen, in 
1939, cosmetics arrived on the legislative agenda. In 1938, US food and drug law had been 
extended, for the first time, to cover cosmetics.95 In response to the US FDCA, in the spring of 
1939, Parliament hastily passed amendments to the Food and Drugs Act, including a new 
definition of drug (making “any cosmetic” a drug), a definition of cosmetics, a provision related to 
cosmetic packaging, and a provision empowering the licensing of cosmetics manufacturers.96 
While many of the 1939 amendments were proclaimed into force as of August 1, 1939, the 
cosmetic provisions, which comprised half of the bill, were not.97 Davidson and others argued, 
implicitly, that masculine war efforts were more important than feminine beauty products, 
claiming that the reason the government refused to bring the cosmetic legislation into force was 
because of WWII. Ironically, Davidson then continued his account by writing that “[t]he outbreak 
of the Second World War in September 1939, had little immediate effect upon the Food and 
Drug Division since its work is equally essential in war and in peace”.98 Cosmetics were surely 
not the highest priority of the Canadian government in August 1939, yet the same could be said 
of matters addressed by the amendments that were brought into force that month (like 
preconditions to customs entry, or misleading advertisements).99 The better explanation may be 
that, before the bill passed, there had been murmurs that its cosmetic provisions might not be 
constitutional.100 Indeed, Davidson acknowledged that “questions of validity loomed” regarding 
                                                          
95 The US FDCA provisions applicable specifically to cosmetics did not come into force until July 1, 1939 (except for a provision 
relating to coal tar dyes used in mascara, eyebrow dyes, etc); see Kay 2005 at 105. 
96 SC 1939, c 3, ss 1, 2, 3 and 5. In 1939, the Dominion Council of Health expressed concerns over the unrestricted sale of potent 
drugs to the general public; see Curran 1953 at 130, citing Grant L Kalbfleish’s article entitled “Prescription Drug Legislation” in 
the February 1952 issue of the Canadian Pharmaceutical Journal. In response to these concerns, the 1939 amendments also 
empowered regulations prohibiting the sale or defining the conditions of sale of any substance which may be injurious to health 
when used as drug – allowing certain drugs to be sold only on prescription – and restricting use of injurious substances as drug 
ingredients; Food and Drugs Act, s 3(k), as added by SC 1939, c 3, s 5. Paragraph 3(k) came into force on August 1, 1939; 
Proclamation, 22 July 1939, Canada Gazette, Vol LXXIII, No 8, p 509 (August 19, 1939). Regulations setting out prescription 
drugs were not made under this power until 1941; see Chapter 4, section 1.i., particularly content associated with notes 24-26. 
97 For the Proclamation, see ibid.   
98 Davidson 1949b. Similarly, Pugsley attributed the failure to bring these provisions into force to “the outbreak of the war and 
the difficulties encountered in obtaining qualified personnel to enforce the cosmetic regulations”, and he incorrectly claimed 
that “the portion of the Act dealing with cosmetics was not brought into force until 1946”; Pugsley 1967. He likely relied on 
Curran’s book, in which Curran had likewise argued that the cosmetics provisions were held up due to the war, and likewise 
erroneously claimed the provisions were brought into force in 1946; see Curran 1953 at 155. Curran did go on to acknowledge 
that “[b]ecause of the constitutional decisions respecting attempts in federal legislation to regulate particular trades and 
industries through forms of licensing or other devices, doubt might well be cast on the validity of such a provision”, at 155. 
99 SC 1939, c 3, ss 7 and 8. 
100 Library and Archives Canada, “Powers to License Manufacturers of Cosmetics if Section 3(j) of Food & Drugs Act is 
Unconstitutional”, RG 13, Vol 2635, file no 9-150108. This file was partially released under the Access to Information Act, LAC 
file no. A201700062, on May 19, 2017, and after a complaint to the Office of the Information Commissioner, fully released on 
January 29, 2018 [“EA Driedger’s Cosmetics Regulation File, 1946-1947”]. In January 1946, Driedger opined that section 3(j), the 
cosmetics licensing provision in the bill, was unconstitutional. His opinion indicates that, in 1938, the provision “was reviewed 
in this Department in its draft stages and although the constitutionality of the provision in question does not appear to have 
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the bill in the House and Senate.101 Moreover, the government declined to proclaim another 
provision, unrelated to cosmetics, which one suspects may have attracted legal concerns.102  
By 1939, estrogenic cosmetics were on the Canadian market.103 As Parliamentarians were 
debating the cosmetics bill, departmental officials were discussing whether to act on estrogenic 
preparations advertised for breast enhancement. In March 1939, Davidson brought his 
supervisor’s attention to an advertisement for S-8 Brand Hormone Preparations, a product 
represented as “restoring the breasts to the graceful contours and firmness of youth”. 104  While 
characterizing the product as a cosmetic and not a drug – landing it outside the Department’s 
statutory jurisdiction – Davidson nonetheless proposed investigatory efforts. In response, Aime 
Valin, the Assistant Chief Dominion Analyst, advised Davidson to take “no action for present”.105  
The start of the 1940s was a turning point in Canadian drug regulation. Despite the 
economic depression of the previous decade, the pharmaceutical industry in Canada had been 
expanding. New Canadian drug companies had opened in Toronto and Montreal; and British, 
American, and even Swiss companies had set up subsidiary operations in Canada.106 With 
demand high and supply low, drug manufacturing would expand in Canada during WWII.107 
Relatedly, the 1940s would also witness a major expansion of National Health’s ambitions and 
activities. In the wake of the Treaty of Westminster, senior officials seized the moment to make 
Canada-specific food and drug regulations. Though there had been little regulatory activity 
under the 1934 amendments and Schedule B in the 1930s, this was about to change. During 
WWII, National Health took further opportunities to distance Canadian drug regulation from 
                                                          
been considered at any length, the then Deputy Minister of Justice did state in his letter of December 30, 1938, with respect to 
this amendment that “the breadth of the field of “jurisdiction sought here may occasion contention but “I am not prepared to 
object to the form of the paragraph “as drafted”.” See also Chapter 5, section 1, content associated with notes 7-8. 
101 Davidson 1949a at 81. 
102 Only one provision, unrelated to cosmetics, was not proclaimed to come into force on August 1, 1939. It purported to permit 
a sub-delegation of federal powers to provincial officials, empowering regulations “for designating as Dominion analyst …upon 
the request of any province, city or other municipality, any duly qualified analyst then and for such time as the said analyst shall 
remain so employed by the said province, city or other municipality…”; SC 1939, c 3, s 4. 
103 Beginning in 1931, Toronto newspapers carried occasional advertisements for consultation sessions or for hormone facial 
treatments, in person, at the Helena Rubinstein salon at 126 Bloor Street West. While my search was not exhaustive, the 
earliest advertisement located which offered a hormone “beauty aid” product for sale, rather than a salon treatment, dated to 
1938; see The Globe and Mail (1936-Current) (27 May 1938), p 11, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Globe and Mail. 
104 “Venus de Milo” advertisement (March 1, 1939), in Food and Drug Newspaper Clippings, 1938-1940. 
105 Analyst’s Report from AL Davidson to JGA Valin (March 22, 1939), in Food and Drug Newspaper Clippings, 1938-1940. 
106 Raison 1969 at 17.  
107 Davidson 1949b.  
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Britain, and expanded its workload and its bureaucratic machinery significantly; as just one 
example, the sampling done by the Laboratory of Hygiene tripled between 1938 and 1944.108  
 
 
Figure 2: “Venus de Milo” advertisement for S-8 Brand of Hormone Preparations, The 
Montrealer, March 1, 1939  
 
Library and Archives Canada, RG 29, Vol 258, File 347-6-6 (Part 2), reproduction copy number e-
011195706 
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Figure 3: Analyst’s Report on S-8 Brand Advertisement, Linton Davidson, March 22, 1939 
 
Library and Archives Canada, RG 29, Vol 258, File 347-6-6 (Part 2), reproduction copy number e-
011195706 
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Indeed, by 1950, Dr. Clare Morrell, by that time the Chief Dominion Analyst and Director of the 
Food and Drugs Divisions, would comment that, to avoid the confusion of drugs being put on 
the Canadian market under “a great variety of names and strengths”, the drugs on Schedule B 
had “been considerably increased in the last few years”.109 This situation would not materialize, 
however, through any abstract power of the Canadian pharmaceutical industry nor through 
some bureaucratic master plan. Rather, this growth in Canadian drug standards began in 1940 
with messy, laborious, and contested activities to create the Canadian Committee on 
Pharmacopoeial Standards. In the process, National Health deployed regulatory techniques – in 
particular, questionable delegations of power supported by erasures of evidence of the invalidity 
of those delegations – that would later characterize the regulatory enactment of estrogen. 
 
2.  The formation of the Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards, 1940-1942  
Having described the legal dynamics, this section introduces many of the human regulators 
that would come to enact estrogen in Canada in the mid-1940s. Before estrogen could be 
enrolled into different regulatory regimes, these actors first needed to assemble. The 
Committee’s formation was bitterly contested, controversial, and confused, and as time would 
show, the Committee itself would prove to be unstable. Yet, for a brief time in the mid-1940s, it 
enacted socio-material realities in Canada – and when it came to estrogen, some of those 
realities would be more durable. Uncovering the regulatory techniques that enacted the 
Committee, and the interests of its future members, will ensure greater insight into the 
regulatory players, practices, and techniques that later together enacted estrogen. 
If one reads closely, one can identify three stories that have been told about the Committee. 
The first is the “wartime shortages” story. One finds this explanation for the Committee’s 
formation and its activities in articles and books by National Health officials, beginning in the late 
1940s with Davidson’s accounts, in the 1950s and 1960s with sporadic articles by other officials, 
and in the prefaces to Canadian pharmacopoeial or pharmaceutical works.110 A second story 
also comes through, if more subtly, in these accounts, celebrating the Committee as one 
weapon in a swelling arsenal of departmental machinery and regulatory prowess at National 
Health. Sometimes this story is less subtle, as in the occasionally nationalistic, triumphant, and 
Christian tones of Davidson’s work (including visual narratives of nation-building through 
                                                          
109 Morrell 1950 at 659. Indeed, by 1946, standards of quality and potency had been established for over 200 drugs, contained 
in the Canadian Supplement to the British Pharmacopoeia; see Curran 1946 at 500-501. 
110 See e.g. Davidson 1949a, Davidson 1949b, Curran 1953, and Pugsley 1967. 
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pharmacy, as illustrated below). Finally, recent work in legal and policy history has touched 
upon the Committee, summarily suggesting its formation reflected something akin to regulatory 
capture of National Health by the pharmaceutical industry.111 
 
 
Figure 4: Book cover for AL Davidson’s Canada Pioneers in Food and Drug Control, 1949. 
                                                          
111 Herder 2015 at S112-S114; and Lexchin 2016 at 17-18. 
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The story narrated here, about the Committee, has not been told before. I follow certain 
scientists, regulators, and lawyers, within and outside the Department, as they schemed to form 
(or deflate) the Committee and to shape its powers. This involves tracing relations among 
departmental officials, physicians and pharmacists and their professional associations, and 
representatives of the Canadian Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (“CPMA”). In 
particular, this section traces the vigorous, year-long debate that occurred within National 
Health, and between National Health officials and stakeholder associations, regarding the 
political and legal validity of delegating authority to the Committee and the scope of that 
authority. In the process, it introduces the idea that disputed delegation practices would be 
central to how certain drugs were standardized and materialized in Canada.  
In tracing these associations, this chapter also shows that, while the human actors were 
influenced by forces of the interwar period, with its declining British colonial influence, and by 
the outbreak of WWII, with its declining drug standards in Britain, and furthermore while these 
actors drew on wartime exigencies and Canadian nationalism where rhetorically productive, 
WWII did not cause the Committee to come into being. Nor was the formation of the Committee, 
in its structure or duties, reflective of a successful “capture” of the Department by any person, 
profession, or industry. Rather, archival evidence and other primary sources suggest that the 
better metaphor to describe the Committee’s formation is a regulatory experiment. The actors 
who generated the Committee did not begin with any overarching vision of its structure, powers, 
or purposes, but were trying to move beyond failed attempts in the 1930s to create a meaningful 
role for Canadians in drug standardization. Like many experiments, it had unintended and 
ambiguous effects. Significantly, the creation of the Committee contributed to novel enactments 
of power and legitimacy within National Health and the drug industry, and, ultimately, to a 
diminished role for pharmacopeias as a way of regulating drugs. Furthermore, it would lead to 
other innovations as, through and with its later activities, estrogen would become multiple.  
Two people were most influential in establishing the Committee – Dr. Velyien Henderson, a 
professor at the University of Toronto and Harry Lancaster, the Chief Dominion Analyst. 
Henderson and Lancaster were long-time collaborators, and they seem to have been friends. By 
1940, they had known each other for at least thirty years, going back to time studying and 
teaching at the University of Toronto’s Faculty of Medicine. From 1908 to 1923, Lancaster had 
been a demonstrator in that faculty, a professor of chemistry at the College of Dental Surgeons, 
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and a Director of the Provincial Board of Health.112 About five years older, Henderson joined the 
faculty in 1904, becoming a full professor of pharmacology in 1909.113 A recognized expert on 
pharmacopoeial standards, he had many years of experience drafting pharmacopoeial 
monographs in consultation with British scientists. Through the late 1920s and 1930s, 
Henderson served in leadership roles with the Canadian Medical Association (“CMA”). 
The two men’s interests in establishing distinctly Canadian drug standards originated long 
before WWII, entangled with the decline of British colonialism in the interwar years. In 1925, 
Great Britain communicated officially with academic faculties and licensing bodies in the 
Dominion (and in other colonies) to seek suggestions on upcoming proposed revisions to the 
British Pharmacopoeia; in 1927, the British Pharmacopoeia Commission also asked the 
Dominion government to collaborate on these revisions. To coordinate a unified response, 
leading professors of medicine and pharmacy decided to form a “Canadian Committee on 
Pharmaceutical Standards”, which was chaired by Henderson and joined by Lancaster, and this 
informal committee was the channel through which Canadian pharmacologists and pharmacists 
assisted with the monographs for the 1932 revision to the British Pharmacopoeia. Over time, 
and fuelled by nationalism, committee members became concerned that British revisions were 
not meeting Canadian needs, as drugs still used in Canada were deleted from, or not added to, 
new editions. Emboldened by the preface to the 1932 revision,114 this committee prepared a 
detailed Canadian “addendum” to the British Pharmacopoeia, which was published as part of 
the Canadian Formulary.115 Its legal status under the Act was ambiguous, and its effects on 
Canadian medical practice were underwhelming. However, its more lasting impact was the idea 
that such supplements or addenda were a direct means to Canadian-specific drug standards.116  
While WWII was not the cause of new Canadian drug standards, it was a catalyst. Henderson 
became especially agitated by a series of changes to the British Pharmacopoeia that began in 
                                                          
112 Davidson 1949b. He served in some of these roles simultaneously. It is not entirely clear if Lancaster’s degree was a B.Sc. or 
an M.Sc. Davidson says the former as does the Canadian Formulary 1948; Cameron says the latter. Davidson likely knew better, 
as he worked with Lancaster for 20 years. See Davidson 1949a at 62; Canadian Formulary 1948 at 7; and Cameron 1959 at 321. 
113 JH Gaddum, “Obituary: Prof. Velyien Henderson” (December 8, 1945) 156:3971 Nature 638 [“Henderson Obituary 1945”]. 
114 Canadian Formulary 1948 at 5, citing the 1932 revision to the British Pharmacopoeia at xii-xiii: “where it is desired that 
official recognition should be given in any part of the Empire to local drugs or local substances, we suggest that this should be 
left to the Governments concerned, which by means of Supplements or Addenda to which they may accord the necessary 
sanction, can meet any local requirement or introduce any modifications or alternatives desired.”  
115 Davidson 1949a at 85; and Pugsley 1967. For contemporaneous accounts by pharmacists, see Canadian Conference of 
Pharmaceutical Faculties, The Canadian Formulary (Toronto: The Canadian Pharmaceutical Association, 1949) at vi-vii; and 
Canadian Committee on Pharmaceutical Standards, The Canadian Formulary, 4th ed (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1948) 
[“Canadian Formulary 1948”] at 5-6. 
116 For a window into Henderson and Lancaster’s earlier effort, in 1933, to revise the Act to enable the addition of such addenda 
to Schedule B, see EA Driedger’s Schedule B File, 1943 at 71-75. See also the content associated with supra notes 63-64. 
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1936 and continued at a greater frequency during the war.117 Due to wartime shortages in Great 
Britain of various chemicals, such as glycerin, alcohol, and vitaminized oils, the British had been 
substituting certain drug ingredients, through “wartime addenda” to their Pharmacopoeia. 
Canada, by contrast, did not suffer shortages of these ingredients. Furthermore, the British were 
no longer consulting the Canadian committee on these weakened drug standards.  For 
Henderson, these deficiencies were intolerable. Legally, the situation was lowering drug 
standards in Canada (as explained, British Pharmacopoeia monographs had a default official 
status in determining drug adulteration under Canadian law, except where replaced by 
Canadian standards in regulations). Henderson wanted to create new standards in a Canadian 
Supplement to the British Pharmacopoeia, and he insisted to Lancaster that new standards be 
legally binding. Though the desire and groundwork for Canadian drug standards stretched back 
to 1925, Henderson and Lancaster leveraged the wartime addenda to justify more urgently a 
new, official Canadian Committee.118 
Together the two men began to cook up a new way of regulating drugs in Canada. After 
meeting together in Toronto, they started to refine their ideas over the fall of 1940.119 Henderson 
felt it would be easy to enlist pharmacists’ support through the Canadian Pharmaceutical 
Association and possible to obtain support of the medical profession, though “the question 
remains – is it worthwhile making a fight and forcing the Department to put the Canadian 
Formulary and its Addendum Section particularly on a more official basis?” Lancaster quietly 
egged on the fight, promising backup by stressing how “it would be quite within the powers of 
the Food and Drugs Act to establish both name and standard of quality” for drugs in Canada.120  
Henderson was insistent that any reconstituted committee should have legal standing. A 
decade later, Davidson suggested legal standing was needed to “enable the Government to pay 
out-of-pocket expenses in connection with meetings”.121 Expenses were no doubt a relevant 
factor, yet Henderson sincerely viewed making a committee legally official as a precondition to 
                                                          
117 Henderson’s correspondence with Lancaster and Davidson could tend toward condescension, pedantic clarification, and 
exaggeration; further, he often took a “kitchen sink” approach that argued from multiple angles. Put another way, his letters 
vividly convey his concerns and are useful to understanding challenges with drug standardization in Canada in the early 1940s. 
118 By the time the order establishing the new Committee was made in June 1942, five such addenda had been officially added 
to the British Pharmacopoeia. Henderson’s former committee, the Canadian Committee on Pharmaceutical Standards, had 
been permitted to comment on the first addendum in 1936, but not on the subsequent four addenda. Not only were shortages 
an issue, but the Commission’s offices were destroyed during the war and it lost many of its documents. See Lancaster’s File, 
1940-1943; Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1943-1944; and Davidson 1949a at 85-86. See also Worthen 2004 at 7, 93-98. 
119 In 1940 and early 1941, some of Henderson’s letters were sent on behalf of himself and the other two Toronto-based 
members of the informal committee. Over 1941 he increasingly began to correspond with Lancaster on his own behalf. 
120 September 24, 1940 letter from Henderson to Lancaster, and September 28, 1940 letter from Lancaster to Henderson, in 
Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943. 
121 Davidson 1949a at 85; and November 24, 1941 letter from Lancaster to Wodehouse, in Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943. 
78 
 
making new drug standards legally binding. In January 1941, he made a lengthy pitch to the 
CMA, drawing on nationalist sentiment and pragmatism. Taking a kitchen sink approach, he 
claimed that the existing addendum in the Canadian Formulary was already legally binding and 
that National Health had always intended it be an official work under paragraph 6(c) of the Act, 
yet simultaneously advocated that the CMA should support a new official committee to make 
standards which would need to be “officially published in the Gazette” in order to be binding.122  
As Henderson enlisted allies, Lancaster worked to identify a statutory basis for any standards 
created by a new committee, that would award such standards legal precedence – as any new 
pharmacopoeial work, whether or not published in the Gazette, would be trumped, by default, by 
the British Pharmacopoiea.123 Drawing from his failed effort, in 1933, to incorporate holus bolus 
the earlier committee’s addendum into the Act, he resurrected the idea that new standards by a 
new committee could be incorporated through Schedule B, although he felt “only in exceedingly 
important cases should this procedure be invoked”.124 Lancaster did not seek legal advice on 
the idea, and did not always seem confident that the Act provided the requisite authority. 
Nonetheless, by March, this idea had crystallized into a plan. By June, Henderson was urging 
the CMA to support an official committee to make new drug standards that if “concurred in by 
the Government, could be made legally binding by notification in the Gazette, under powers now 
probably possessed in the Act”.125 That same month, Lancaster set about trying to persuade Dr. 
Robert Wodehouse, the Deputy Minister,126 and his chief executive assistant, Dr. John 
Heagerty.127 Presenting the use of Schedule B as the easiest option, he cautioned that rather 
than give a new committee all of the powers that the physicians appeared to be seeking, which 
would require an amendment to the Act – never a politically palatable option, especially as it 
had been amended only two years prior – the better way to replace the British Pharmacopoeia 
for drugs requiring Canadian standards would be to list those drugs on Schedule B. Within a few 
months, Wodehouse and Henderson were meeting directly to discuss the plan.  
However, by November 1941, the plan had stalled, and the physicians were growing anxious. 
Lancaster attempted to assure senior departmental officials that the new committee would just 
                                                          
122 January 6, 1941 memorandum from Henderson to the CMA committee on pharmacy, in Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943. 
123 See also the content associated with supra notes 34-36. 
124 January 25, 1941 letter from Lancaster to Henderson, in Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943. 
125 March 24, 1941 letter from Lancaster to Henderson, in Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943 (emphasis added). 
126 Wodehouse had been appointed Deputy Minister of National health in 1932; see Cameron 1959 at 321. 
127 Heagerty was a physician who also had earned a doctorate in public health at McGill in 1912. He had been the head of a 
Departmental division on venereal disease control from 1921 to 1928, and in 1929, he had become the Chief Executive 
Assistant of National Health, as well as the Director of Public Health Services. See ibid; and also Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943. 
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be advisory, though he had a very robust notion of what qualified as advice. He clarified that the 
committee’s decisions should not be given the force of law, except that the committee would 
decide which drugs to list on Schedule B, and those drugs could then be the subject of special 
regulations.128 The proposal had clearly evolved to encompass greater delegation. Earlier that 
year, the proposal had envisioned that the committee’s main duty would be to advise the British, 
through the Department, of proposed modifications to the British Pharmacopoeia; only as a 
secondary activity would the committee recommend which drugs to add to Schedule B. Further, 
in the earlier proposal, the committee was limited to recommending which drugs to enumerate 
on Schedule B; it had not been contemplated that it would advise how to regulate those drugs. 
Now, the proposal was that the committee would have the power to add drugs to Schedule B – 
under a new Part V to be candidly entitled “Any drug which the Canadian Committee on 
Pharmacopoeial Standards may designate for addition to the Pharmacopoiea, deletion from the 
Pharmacopoiea, or for modification of name or of composition” – and also advise on regulations. 
This triggered a major debate amongst senior departmental officials on the appropriate nature 
and extent of delegation to the committee. Heagerty felt that the delegation contemplated was 
excessive and impermissible. In annotations in red ink scrawled all over a draft of the proposal 
in November, Heagerty wrote that “[t]his ties the hands of the department by giving the 
Committee the right to set up standards which are binding upon the department. I am opposed 
to this delegation of powers to vested interests.”129 The vested interests that concerned 
Heagerty were those of physicians and pharmacists. From his experience labouring to create a 
national health insurance program, Heagerty was strongly attuned to the excessive influence of 
medical practitioners on public health planning, and alive to labour and agricultural groups’ 
concerns that physicians had too much political power in existing provincial health commissions. 
Heagerty enlisted Mr. B.W. Russell, K.C., the Acting Departmental Solicitor. Russell opined 
that sufficient statutory authority existed to empower a committee, but he needed more detail 
about just what the committee was anticipated to do, before he could advise whether that 
mandate was valid. Therefore, in December 1941, Lancaster prepared a draft order-in-council 
empowering the committee. The draft order proposed that a committee would directly advise the 
British Pharmacopoeial Commission.It also proposed that the Committee would recommend 
what pharmacopoeial drugs to list in Schedule B, and would recommend standards of quality 
and potency. In a postscript, Lancaster flagged that it would “be necessary to pass a further 
                                                          
128 November 24, 1941 memorandum from Lancaster to Heagerty and Wodehouse, in Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943. 
129 November 1941, unattributed, “Proposed Addition to Schedule B to the FDA”, and November 25, 1941 memorandum from 
Heagerty to Wodehouse, in Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943. 
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Order in Council amending Schedule B to the Act so as to include a new Part V”. His insistence 
on the need for Part V became a running theme in all his communications with Departmental 
officials regarding the committee.  
Lancaster understood the legal interrelations between section 6 of the Act, Schedule B, and 
its Parts I through IV. His continued insistence on the need for a new Part V is therefore curious. 
He cannot have been unaware that Canada lacked statutory jurisdiction to regulate the 
licensing, manufacture, and sale of Schedule B drugs unless those drugs were listed on Parts II, 
III or IV. The only matters that could be regulated, for a Schedule B drug not on one of those 
Parts, were quality and potency – and yet the very raison d’etre of a new committee was that its 
members themselves would, in the process of recommending modifications to the standards in 
the British Pharmacopoeia, define these drugs’ identity, quality, and potency. That is, in 
recommending any new, improved or Canada-specific “recipe” for any given drug, the 
committee would already have codified that drug’s qualities and potencies. One rather 
unavoidable conclusion, therefore, is that Lancaster was contemplating Part V to be a separate 
“holding zone”, a place where drugs newly defined by technical standards could be enumerated, 
without the Department being required then to divide up those drugs amongst the existing four 
Parts or to make any regulatory decisions about whether or how to control or license those 
drugs. However, Lancaster does not appear to have considered the potential problem of 
duplication; namely, what would occur if, as a result of the committee’s additions to Part V, a 
drug ended up being mentioned twice in Schedule B? Was it not foreseeable that a drug might 
be listed on one of Parts I through IV for the purpose of a regulation under subsection 6(3), and 
then be listed again on a new Part V for the purpose of supplementing the British 
Pharmacopoeia? In that situation, which would take precedence? To this, a lawyer might 
respond that such a situation would never occur, because given the words and legislative 
history of subsections 6(3) and (4), Schedule B was not intended to contain anything but those 
biological drugs that might be standardized and regulated under subsection 6(3).   
When Russell reviewed Lancaster’s draft order, he flagged to Heagerty that the Chairman 
should be a National Health official and suggested that the committee be reduced in size. 
Disagreeing on both counts, Lancaster felt that a larger committee would “avoid any suggestion 
of domination by a small group”; despite his concern that the committee might be captured by 
narrow interests, in January 1942, Lancaster solicited revisions from Henderson alone on the 
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draft order and advanced the revisions to his superiors.130 The revisions gave the committee the 
power to dictate additions, deletions, or modifications to Part V of Schedule B.  
The Department’s solicitors were having none of this. Russell and Gunn each reviewed the 
revised order, in early February, and they concurred that, in proposing to give the committee the 
right to add any drugs that it saw fit to Schedule B, the order was ultra vires. Russell, now the 
Departmental Solicitor, opined that “the proposed addition to Part V of Schedule B to the Food 
and Drugs Act is unconstitutional” as it amounted to allowing Cabinet to subdelegate. In his 
view, only the Governor in Council could add or remove drugs from Schedule B. Gunn went 
even further, opining that if the committee’s input into the British Pharmacopoeia was intended 
to bind Canada, then he was “very doubtful if the method proposed would be constitutional”.131 
This exemplified Departmental officials’ practices, at this time, of consulting the legal division on 
the validity of a regulatory proposal only after consulting professional associations and industry 
representatives on the substance of that proposal. Predictably, one effect of this practice was 
that legal concerns with regulatory proposals were identified late in the process, and solutions 
focused on rendering the proposals technically valid rather than on substantive reconsideration.   
Faced with his solicitors’ opposition, the Deputy Minister intervened. He brought Lancaster, 
Heagerty, and Russell together for a meeting to review the draft order in council, and to address 
concerns with the invalidity of a new Part V to Schedule B. The group decided that, as long as 
the Department (and not the committee) made the decision to add drugs to a new Part V, and 
as long as each drug was added to Part V individually (and not by blanket incorporation of the 
committee’s addendum), the textual reference to Part V could remain in the order-in-council.132  
This agreement was short-lived, however. In the next draft of the order, in March, the decision 
was made to excise all textual reference to the anticipated Part V. The intention to employ a 
new Part V remained but, with continuing skepticism on its legality, the technique adopted was 
erasure – Part V was disappeared from the face of the order. The plan to allow the committee to 
enumerate this new list of drugs, outside the statute’s existing structure, was made invisible.133    
As the drafting challenges simplified, the external relationships got more complicated. 
Reflecting entrenched distrust between medical professionals and drug manufacturers, and 
suspicion of a proposal instigated by Henderson, the CMPA opposed the Committee. First their 
                                                          
130 January 16, 1942 memorandum from Lancaster to Heagerty and Wodehouse, in Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943. 
131 February 6, 1942 memorandum from Heagerty to Wodehouse, February 9, 1942 memorandum from Russell to Heagerty, 
and February 9, 1942 memorandum from Gunn to Heagerty, all in Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943. 
132 February 11, 1942, memorandum-to-file by Lancaster, in Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943. 
133 March 1942 draft of proposed order-in-council establishing the Committee, in Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943. 
82 
 
leadership approached Lancaster; when that went nowhere, they set about lobbying other 
senior officials. On February 27, 1942, three CMPA members “dropped in” on Heagerty, who 
loaned them a receptive ear. Shortly thereafter, the President of the CMPA, Mr. Laverty, met 
with the Minister, Ian Mackenzie, to again oppose the committee, to support the existing 
department-lead process for drug standards, and to express “that the Committee would be an 
embarrassment” to drug manufacturers.134 Faced with opposition, Lancaster and Henderson 
turned up the rhetoric of nationalism and emergency, stressing how wartime addenda were 
being made without regard to Canadian conditions and interests.135 
Under the influence of the drug manufacturers, and cutting Lancaster entirely out of the 
loop, on March 12, 1942, Heagerty wrote to Wodehouse with his own advice for the Minister. 
While agreeing that a committee should be recognized the purpose of revising the British 
Pharmacopoiea, he strongly objected to allowing the committee to advise on what drugs should 
be listed on Schedule B or on new drug regulations. This he viewed as an unlawful delegation. 
In this respect, he particularly opposed the proposal to add a new Part V to Schedule B, that 
would include whatever drugs the Committee wished to add or remove. Heagerty had no love 
lost for Henderson; he referenced a past conversation in which Henderson had suggested 
National Health “was not competent to set up standards of food and drugs”. He recommended 
that the Committee be authorized to draw up a Canadian Pharmacopoeia, which he felt would 
make Canada “independent” with respect to drug standards, but that it should not be authorized 
to advise the Department on drug standards under section 6 of the Act.136 
Wodehouse advised Minister Mackenzie the next day. Ignoring the debate about delegation, 
his advice was pure political pragmatism – how to respond to wartime challenges, while keeping 
the most economically powerful actors happy. Sympathetic to physicians’ desire to clarify 
standards, especially given the “peculiar” situation whereby multiple pharmacopoeias were 
statutorily recognized under Canadian law and the “tremendous” wartime modifications to the 
British Pharmacopoiea, Wodehouse nevertheless rejected the idea that Canada should 
“shoulder the expenses” of its own Canadian Pharmacopoeia. The real dynamic underlying the 
discord, in his view, was competition between retail pharmacists and drug manufacturers; in a 
                                                          
134 February 28, 1942 memorandum from Heagerty to Wodehouse; March 5, 1942 letter from White to Mackenzie; and March 
6 letter from Lancaster to Henderson, all in Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943.  
135 The only concession that Lancaster made to the CMPA was to increase their membership from one to two members, 
reflected in the next draft of the order on March 6. 
136 When Lancaster learned a week later of Heagerty’s advice, he told Wodehouse that Heagerty had “misunderstood and 
overemphasized” the alleged delegation, and that the current proposal left regulatory power “exactly where it is at the present 
time, in the hands of the Minister.” Further, while in Lancaster’s view a Canadian Pharmacopoeia was an excellent idea, it was 
“twenty-five years ahead of its time” and would be legally complex, diplomatically challenging, time-consuming, and expensive. 
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postscript, he added statistics showing that, despite massive economic growth in drug 
manufacturing in Canada between 1930 and 1940, pharmacists remained the larger 
constituency (not only did the number of retail pharmacies vastly exceed manufacturers, but 
investments and sales were higher).137 Rather than bootstrap broader regulatory changes to 
wartime exigencies, Wodehouse suggested an alternative option of a temporary order in council 
under the War Measures Act to prevent revisions to the British Pharmacopoeia from being 
automatically effective in Canada. In any event, he recommended that the Minister convene a 
conference of the interested parties, to “see just how far we want to go to meet the changing 
war conditions”. Mackenzie agreed, and the conference was scheduled for April 28, 1942. 
At first blush, the conference seemed to resolve the discord. The next day, National Health 
revised the draft order in council, such that the Committee’s proposed duties were twofold: to 
advise the Department “with regard to any modifications to the British Pharmacopoeia” thought 
to be “necessary in the public interest”; and, upon request of the Department, to advise it “with 
regard to regulations proposed to be made under section 6 of the Food and Drugs Act 
respecting any drug included or be included in Schedule B”. Ironically, the revised draft went 
slightly further than earlier versions in delegating power. Yet perhaps because it addressed the 
concern that Schedule B should not be amended by the Committee, the drug manufacturers 
approved it.  
Unexpectedly, the physicians advised that they could not support the order. While the order 
failed to give Henderson what he had long desired – the ability to dictate legally binding 
standards for drugs in Canada – the CMA had accepted for months that the trade-off for legally 
binding standards was that the Committee would be limited to recommendations. Rather, the 
CMA’s objection was driven by Henderson’s outrage at the appointment processes. Having 
anticipated that he would chair the committee, he was furious that the professional associations 
were not empowered to nominate members directly and the committee would not elect its own 
chairman. On these points, and on the advice of Gunn, National Health would not budge, as 
they felt the Minister required “absolute discretion” as to whether associations’ nominees should 
be appointed. Dissenters also remained within the Department, including its legal division. 
However, Lancaster’s idea survived. On June 5, 1942, an order in council was made authorizing 
the Committee, empowering the Minister to appoint its members, and fixing its duties.138  
                                                          
137 “The total investment in the manufacture of pharmaceutical products in 1930 was $18.433,000 and in 1940 it was 
$28,158,000, a tremendous increase. Investments in the retail trade (drugs stores) in 1930 was $36,000,000 being twice that of 
the manufacturing industry. Sales from the retail trade (drug stores) in 1930 was $76,848,000. Sales for 1940 were 
$75,473,000”; see March 12, 1942 memorandum from Wodehouse to Mackenzie, in Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943. 
138 PC 1942-4739 (June 5, 1942); see Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943. I could not locate this order in council in the Canada Gazette. 
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Appointed were four professors of medicine and pharmacology, and two deans of pharmacy, 
chosen by the Minister from nominees submitted by three professional organizations.139 Bitterly 
disappointed that he had not been made Chair, Henderson accepted his invitation belatedly and 
petulantly, saying he had “reluctantly come to the conclusion that it is my duty to serve”.140 He 
had received the message – this was the Department’s Committee and not his. In the Chair 
would be Lancaster.141 Lancaster struggled with a serious illness in 1942, and he was often 
bedridden (and by 1944 occasionally hospitalized). His illness caused the inaugural Committee 
meeting, scheduled for November 1942, to be postponed twice. That postponement did not stop 
the Department from trumpeting to newspapers that Canada might soon achieve its own drug 
standards independent from Britain. The other departmental officials appointed were Aime 
Valin, the Assistant Chief Dominion Analyst, and Dr. Morrell, the senior pharmacologist with the 
Laboratory of Hygiene. Davidson, a Dominion analyst and pharmaceutical chemist, was 
appointed as the Committee’s Secretary. He would serve diligently in that role until his untimely 
death in 1950.142 No solicitor was assigned to the Committee, a fact that would later prove quite 
relevant to the practices of the Committee, and of the Department, in standardizing drugs.143 
The Minister also appointed two industry scientists. The CPMA nominated four candidates 
but identified two as “by far best qualified to represent us”. 144 One industry favourite was Dr. A. 
Stanley Cook, Director of Research and Biological Laboratories at Ayerst, McKenna & Harrison 
Ltd. At the time of Cook’s appointment, Ayerst had been selling Premarin in Canada for over a 
year. The other favoured candidate, also appointed, was Mr. North of Canada Pharmacal Co. 
In their negotiations over the Committee’s formation, and in the approach that they later took 
when nominating members for the Minister to appoint to the Committee, CMPA officials 
consistently advanced the position that the role of “their” two members was to represent the 
CMPA. Unlike Henderson, who saw himself as independent of his nominating organization, the 
                                                          
139 In 1942, the six academic members appointed were Dr. D Sclater Lewis, Dr. VE Henderson, Dr. Ray F Farquharson, Dr. J 
Alfred Mousseau, Dean EL Woods and Dean RO Hurst. The three professional organizations asked to submit nominees were the 
Canadian Medical Association, the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons, and the Canadian Pharmaceutical Association. 
These appointments were made by Minister Mackenzie on September 19, 1942; see Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943. 
140 September 29, 1942 letter from Henderson, in Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943. 
141 Lancaster was made the Chair, on the advice of the Department’s solicitor and motivated by the desires of both the Deputy 
Minister and Minister to ensure Committee members accepted that the Committee’s role was just advisory, at least officially.  
142 Davidson Obituary, 1950. Arising from his role as the Committee’s Secretary, Davidson’s correspondence files, and his files 
documenting the Committee’s proceedings and meetings, are a substantial source of material for this thesis. 
143 In contrast, an analogous committee, the Advisory Committee on Health Insurance, also created in 1942 and chaired by Dr. 
Heagerty, included as a member the Departmental solicitor (presumably either Mr. Gunn or Mr. Russell). See Cameron 1959 at 
322; and Canadian Museum of History, “Dr. John J. Heagerty”, online exhibition, “Making Medicare: The History of Health Care 
in Canada, 1914-2007”, online: <https://www.historymuseum.ca/cmc/exhibitions/hist/medicare/medic-3k06e.shtml>. 
144 See the two October 10, 1942 letters from Laverty to Wodehouse, in Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943. 
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CPMA repeatedly would position Cook and North as representatives of drug manufacturers’ 
interests. To be fair, National Health senior officials had initially implied, as part of their efforts to 
solicit CPMA’s support for the proposed Committee, that the CMPA’s appointed members would 
play precisely this representative role. Depending on the circumstances, National Health’s 
position fluctuated on whether Committee members, especially the industry scientists, were 
appointed as independent experts or to represent their associations’ interests. Left unresolved 
in the negotiations in the spring of 1942, the following year, the question flared up repeatedly. In 
the spring of 1943, Wodehouse advised Laverty that the CMPA should raise protests about 
Committee matters directly to the Committee through the two industry members rather than to 
him; yet, in the fall of 1943, when the CMPA tendered resolutions to the Committee through 
North, Wodehouse shifted gears, insisting that the CMPA should write to him personally about 
such “special interests” and arguing that Committee members were independent.145 Much of the 
CPMA’s concern with the Committee’s activities, over 1943, was triggered by Henderson and 
other academic members’ strong advocacy for establishing, through regulations, the proper or 
official names of drugs to appear on labels, and by the physicians’ general hostility to patents 
and trademarks for drugs.146 Arguably, these disputes about intellectual property rights would 
make it easier for Committee members to agree on matters deemed “technical” rather than 
regulatory – or at least, they agreed that they should be able to agree on technical matters.147 
*** 
In playing this prelude of the formation of the Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial 
Standards, I have offered an entry point to an integrated Canadian history of the standardization 
of estrogen. When studying drug regulation, as Cambrosio puts it, “the analysis of the different 
                                                          
145 April 8, 1943 letter from Wodehouse to Laverty, in Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943; and October 2, 1943 letter from Wodehouse 
to Laverty, in Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1943-1944. The CMPA’s position persisted, however. For example, on October 
8, 1948, AK North resigned from the Committee as the firm that he worked for was no longer a CMPA member and he believed 
Committee members should be “representatives” of the CMPA; Library and Archives Canada, Department of Health fonds, RG 
29, volume 249, file no. 339-4-1 (Part 8) Oct 1948 to Sept 1949 [“Unknown Committee Member’s File, 1948-1949”]. 
146 Space precludes discussing the growing trend towards increased intellectual property in drugs (and their names), as part of 
which vast numbers of new drugs (including Premarin) increasingly were introduced under proprietary names, during the 
1920s-1940s. This “unsatisfactory position created by the issue of the same drug under a variety of such names by different 
manufacturers and the restrictions put upon their use is generally acknowledged and has been the subject of frequent 
comment”; Dunlop & Denston 1958 at 1252. As in other states, in Canada this trend was generally opposed by elite physicians, 
who advocated for non-proprietary names on product labels and in prescriptions, including through the Committee. By contrast 
the CMPA, sometimes through “its” Committee members, sought to blur the differences between patented and common 
drugs, and to protect brand names from encroachment in pharmacopoeias or regulations. The Committee “considered, on 
various occasions, proper names for drugs, so as to ameliorate the confusing situation arising from the multiplicity of trade 
names for new drugs”; Davidson 1949a at 85-86. In 1944, with the Committee’s input and despite CMPA opposition, Cabinet 
made regulations prescribing common names, to be used on labels, for a limited subset of 18 drugs; PC 1944-1981 (21 March 
1944), Canada Gazette, Vol LVXVIII, No 14, at p 1328 (April 1, 1944). 
147 See e.g. April 10, 1943 letter from Laverty to Wodehouse, in Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943. 
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forms of regulation should not be separated from the analysis of the constitution of the entities, 
processes and activities that are the subject of regulation”.148 By reviewing recurring practices 
giving rise to the Committee – the pugnacious negotiation, drafting techniques that supported 
legally dubious delegations, a holding together of diverse ways of regulating drugs in hybrid 
configurations – one is better placed to grasp how estrogen was later enacted in practices. 
Through the formation of the Committee, a new “way of regulating drugs” emerged in 
Canada.149 What were formerly distinct practitioners, logics, and modes of standardization were, 
for the first time, lumped together in and around this new collective. Previously, elite physicians 
and pharmacists, associated with universities or other teaching institutions and represented by 
individuals like Dr. Velyien Henderson, had shaped the contents of the British Pharmacopoeia 
and other pharmacopoeial works. Through pharmacopoeia, these professional regulators 
determined the potency and dosage of drugs. In essence, elite physicians like Henderson had 
been the sous chefs helping to write the colonial cookbook, and they saw, in a new committee, 
a chance to become Canadian chefs de cuisine. Canadian drug manufacturers perceived this 
incursion by Henderson and his enlisted professional supporters as an embarrassment, as 
ethical manufacturers endeavoured to regulate drug standards through rigorous quality control 
of drugs, including through bioassay methods standardized within firms, if not within states. 
Rather than pre-scripted recipes that interfered with innovation, industry expected its pre-made 
products to be endorsed (or, for bad actors, rejected) through government-issued licenses. 
Within National Health, regulatory practices had become ever more divaricated. On the one 
hand, National Health had emulated professional ways of regulating, as empowered by the 
1927 statutory amendment, through efforts to codify drugs’ identities and potencies in the 
Biologicals Regulation. Initially, this effort had involved the formal adoption of pharmacopoeial 
standards and bioassay methods directly into law. Later, in the 1934 Biologicals Regulation, this 
effort involved purporting to delegate to Departmental officials in the Laboratory of Hygiene the 
power to select their own methods for measuring and materializing drugs and their potencies. 
Fuelled by growing scientific capacity and bioassay expertise within the Laboratory of Hygiene, 
and less beholden to external professionals, the Department had shifted from endorsing the 
experts’ cookbooks to adopting its own secret recipes (or more fairly, its own changing and 
unwritten recipes, apparently available upon request). On the other hand, again sparked by the 
1927 amendments and effected through the Biologicals Regulation, National Health also began 
                                                          
148 See Chapter 1 at note 107. 
149 For Gaudillière’s and Hess’ framework, see Chapter 2, section 1.ii, including the content associated with notes 106-117. 
87 
 
controlling drugs through licensing. In this mode, standards advanced a different logic; rather 
than a guide to drug compounding, standards were a means to test if a pre-made product 
measured up – although what pre-existing products should measure up to was not always clear. 
These varying modes of regulating drugs in Canada were all embedded into the Committee’s 
structure and mandates. The establishment of the Committee further naturalized the notion, still 
quite new in 1942, that Canada should enact its own drug standards. Just as notably, the 
structure of the Committee reinforced that manufacturers should have a say, though whether 
that “say” was to be voiced by members serving as scientific experts or industry mouthpieces 
was left open-ended. The Committee would also continue to advance professional modes of 
regulation through pharmacopoeia, though professional judgement was officially positioned as a 
merely advisory input to ministerial decision-making. Through its design and membership, the 
Committee would thus hold together multiple, overlapping modes of drug standardization.  
The Committee clearly had other unintended political and structural consequences. In 
cooking up a new, official committee that would create uniquely Canadian drug standards, 
Henderson successfully secured the support of the CMA and the CMPA, and Lancaster similarly 
enlisted his Deputy Minister despite the objections of other senior Departmental officials. Yet, 
the resulting Committee was not what either had envisioned. Seemingly blind to the trade-offs in 
soliciting the state’s imprimatur for scientific work, Henderson had sought to enlist governmental 
authority to empower a mode of professional regulation; yet, through interactions mediated by 
bureaucrats and lawyers, the ultimate outcome saw professional judgment and expertise 
officially subordinated to state control. With the anticipated Part V of Schedule B to be made 
subject to the Minister’s decision, pharmaceutical fact would be proclaimed by the state – drugs 
would be what Canada said they were. Rather than sous chefs to the British, elite physicians 
and pharmacists would instead, increasingly, serve to legitimate the plans of National Health 
bureaucrats. Indeed, taking a broader view, one can argue that Henderson’s efforts backfired 
spectacularly. The structure and functions of the Committee contributed not only to diminishing 
academic scientists’ independence in drug regulation, but to augmenting drug manufacturers’ 
regulatory influence. In part, this unintended outcome resulted from how Canadian medical 
elites had framed the problem – to return to the earlier equine metaphor, they continued to focus 
on what horses should be, yet displayed little interest in whether barn doors should be closed. 
Meanwhile the drug industry, focused on keeping barn doors open, took its seat at the table.  
This chapter has also described the regulatory practices and techniques through which the 
Committee, with its myriad intended and unintended consequences, were accomplished. In a 
theme that will continue to resound within the next two chapters, the Committee was enacted 
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through various practices of delegation. A regulatory culture and ever-deepening habits of 
delegation permeated drug standardization in National Health, both within Lancaster’s Food and 
Drug Division and within the Laboratory of Hygiene. The Food and Drugs Act itself was strongly 
premised upon the delegation of powers to standardize drugs. Statutory modes of delegation 
included the effective delegation to pharmacopoeial works with primacy given to the British 
Phamacopoiea, and the formal delegation to Cabinet to regulate standards of quality and 
potency for biological drugs. In performing these powers for biologics, National Health officials 
developed a long-standing habit of delegating themselves regulatory power without lawful 
authority. In 1928, they purported to standardize drugs listed on Schedule B before any 
Schedule B had been brought into existence; in 1934, they purported to supplant official tests 
authorized to be prescribed in regulations with the internal bioassay methods practiced by staff 
in the Laboratory of Hygiene; and in 1942, they purported to regulate human tissue preparations 
when only animal tissue preparations were listed on Part II of Schedule B. Notably, these 
practices of building bureaucratic power, without deferential regard to statutory constraints, were 
never extended to sex hormones. With licensing viewed as an endorsement, National Health 
regulators chose not to perform estrogen as a therapeutic substance. However, this habit of 
legally dubious delegation would prove central to the creation of the Committee. Despite 
opinions of the Department’s solicitors that adding a new “Part V” to Schedule B, 
uncontemplated by the Act, would be an unlawful sub-delegation, Lancaster’s insistence that 
drug standards created by the Committee should be housed in a new Part V prevailed.   
Administrative lawyers past and present might, of course, reasonably disagree on the legality 
of the 1942 order-in-council that established the Committee and its duties. They might say that 
the intent, at least on the face of the order, was clear – the Committee would only give advice. 
In this chapter, however, the goal has not (simply) been to assess the legality of the order, nor 
of the Department’s earlier enactments. For the purpose of establishing that National Health’s 
drug standardization practices embraced routine delegation of a regularly unauthorized nature, 
it is enough to set out the legal concerns of the Department’s own solicitors at the time. Rather, 
the objective is to describe the practices and techniques by which the Committee was achieved.  
In this respect, the order performed several critical acts of “coordination”. First, the suggestion 
that the Committee would serve an advisory role was essential in bringing together diverse 
actors. A careful read of the order, and its silences, would have raised questions about the 
nature, extent, and direction of such advice. Nonetheless, a nominally advisory role, with 
vagueness on the limits of delegation, allowed the Committee to cohere. Still, as will be seen 
with later actions on estrogen, the fragile understandings on the nature and extent of delegation 
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to the Committee, that had plagued negotiations, never settled. As Mol observes, in practice, 
controversies about an object are often dissolved or diffused, rather than stabilized or closed. 
The order in council also performed multiplicity. Fundamentally, it held together two different 
ways of regulating drugs. On its face, it assigned the Committee two duties: the duty to advise 
the Department with regard to any modifications to the British Pharmacopoeia considered to be 
necessary in the public interest; and the duty, upon request of the Department, to advise it on 
proposed regulations respecting any drug included or to be included in Schedule B. The order 
made this multiplicity “hang together”, in Mol’s words. It did so through addition – by adding two 
modes of regulatory practice without regard to their overlapping aspects or potential tensions. 
Finally, and critically, the order erased any traces of the legal dispute over Lancaster’s plan to 
create a new Part V and allow the Committee to decide its contents. After months of internal 
debate, and without anybody within the Department mounting a coherent legal defence of the 
plan, National Health had little way to render the plan compatible with the Act. Therefore, the 
regulatory technique adopted, to ensure the plan and the statute could hold together, was to 
simply ignore and bracket out the incompatibility, by erasing any evidence of the plan from the 
face of the order in council. This erasure would preclude the raising of any red flags, at the 
Department of Justice or amongst stakeholders. Relatedly, another practice facilitating 
delegation to the Committee was National Health officials’ habit of consulting Departmental 
lawyers only after solidifying their regulatory intentions, a practice which skewed advice away 
from developing legal options and towards finding ways to allow invalid proposals to proceed.  
To conclude, this chapter has highlighted practices by which the delegation of drug standards 
was done at National Health. Rather than apprehend delegation solely as a doctrine, delegation 
can be considered a technological practice. The chapter has thus sought, tentatively, to bridge 
an analysis of delegation in its doctrinal sense, with a more STS-inspired approach to how 
realities are performed. Whether a committee born through a chain of translations initially 
sparked by two persons’ desire to create national drug standards yet resulting in increased 
industrial and bureaucratic power, or the drugs themselves that were later the subject of 
standardization, new socio-material realities were done.  
Indeed, by the fall of 1944, the Committee would effectively dictate standards of quality and 
potency for over 200 drugs in a Canadian Supplement to the British Pharmacopoeia, including 
for estrone, estradiol benzoate, and DES.150 In exchange, National Health officials would secure 
the Committee’s technical input – and importantly, its legitimacy – on their upcoming regulatory 
                                                          
150 Curran 1946 at 501. 
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proposals, including its Sex Hormone Regulations. Many of the practices and techniques that 
had enacted the Committee would soon be revived to enact estrogen. Furthermore, the multiple 
ways of regulating drugs, reflected in the Committee’s composition and mandates, would 
reverberate in how this new regulatory assemblage apprehended estrogen. Through diverse 
institutional, epistemic, and regulatory practices, estrogen would be materialized multiply. 
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Chapter Four 
“At some loss as to the precise object you have in mind”: enacting estrogen multiply, 
1943-1944 
 
“The provision of reference standards for these preparations has been a difficult problem. At the time 
physiologically active sex hormone preparations were introduced for sale on the Canadian market most 
manufacturers appeared to be satisfied in expressing the potency of the product in terms of animal units, 
with little regard to the design of the test, dosage response relationships, precision, reference standard or 
any means of regulatory control of the activity of the product. Some manufacturers used small animals, 
others large animals, depending on the method of assay used, and possibly there was a competitive 
element for the greater number of units per dose. The chaotic state of affairs was well summed up by 
Professor Burn of Oxford University when he stated that "the field of tame laboratory animals 
has been nearly exhausted and it remains now for the bolder spirits to discover methods in which a lion or 
elephant unit may be described.” – Leonard Pugsley (1951). 
 
“May they multiply.” – toast given to pituitary hormones by Leonard Pugsley and others in Dr. Collip’s lab, 
in the early 1930s.1  
 
This chapter provides an account of how estrogen was standardized in Canada in the mid-
1940s. It follows a group of scientist-regulators, from within and outside the Department of 
Pensions and National Health and centred on the Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial 
Standards, assembled in the preceding chapter. This chapter also adds to that network those 
government lawyers, in National Health and at the Department of Justice (DOJ), that joined this 
cast of actors late in 1943 and provided legal advice on proposed regulations throughout the 
first half of 1944. 
When it came to standardizing estrogen, the Committee proceeded along two parallel – yet 
rarely intersecting – regulatory tracks. On the first track, its members were creating new drug 
standards in what would become the Canadian Supplement to the British Pharmacopoeia, 
continuing the long-standing professional way of regulating drugs discussed in the last chapter. 
On the second track, Committee members were simultaneously enlisted to review and comment 
on National Health’s proposed Sex Hormone Regulations, part of an emerging administrative 
mode of regulating drugs in which government agencies rather than physicians or pharmacists 
would set standards. Section 1 of this chapter recounts disputes in and around the Committee, 
in 1943, detailing how academic physicians and pharmacists, representatives of drug 
manufacturers, and National Health officials debated the standardization of estrogen. The most 
                                                          
1 As referenced in Li 2003b at 94. 
92 
 
sustained debate related to whether and if so what bioassay methods, aimed at testing potency, 
should be adopted to identify sex hormones. These actors also debated how to apprehend 
estrogens – as pure substances or as industry-made products – as well as questions of how 
estrogen should be standardized, by whom, at what point in time, and in what (if any) doses.  
These two regulatory tracks led, by the summer of 1944, to a series of new enactments.2 
However, before each of the new regulations were made, National Health officials and 
government lawyers raised concerns about their legal validity. Section 2 of this chapter explores 
some legal techniques that were deployed by these regulators, and especially by DOJ counsel 
Elmer Driedger, to work through and around the ultra vires aspects of these regulations. In 
focusing on the details of technical practices that DOJ and National Health counsel regularly 
employed to render as valid those draft regulations that they believed were legally dubious, this 
thesis refuses the idea that drug regulation can be understood by reducing it solely to a 
reflection of the power or interests of dominant social and economic actors. Instead, by looking 
at the routine moves taken in the making of these regulations, one sees how socio-technical 
orders were also performed with, and inseparable from, the personal, institutional, and 
professional practices and habits of government lawyers. What estrogen would be and do, at 
this time in Canada, was contingent on these legal “techniques of validating”, entangled as they 
were with the government’s ability to purport to lawfully enact regulatory standards for estrogen.  
Section 3 analyzes one specific enactment. Made in May 1944, the Sex Hormone 
Regulations were unique as an exercise in drug standardization. They delegated to drug 
manufacturers the power to choose assay methods, to prepare their own reference standards, 
and, crucially, to decide on the doses of estrogen products. Additionally, the regulations 
contained an unusual definition of “sex hormones”’; eschewing the usual references to biological 
sources, physiological effects, or therapeutic functions, estrogen was defined as a product 
“purporting” to have estrogenic properties. Perhaps the most historically noteworthy feature of 
the Sex Hormone Regulations, however, and an element that would ultimately travel to other 
regulatory areas such as cosmetics, was their novel approach to labelling. In devising new types 
of potency labels and caution labels, the Regulations effectively replaced standards with labels, 
aiming not to protect women consumers but rather to ensure that National Health was supplied 
with industry information on test methods while avoiding responsibility for unsafe use or dosage. 
                                                          
2 Summarized here, the Canadian Supplement was dependent upon the creation of a new Part V of Schedule B to the Act, and 
was itself ultimately made Division III of the general Food and Drug Regulations, in 1944. The Sex Hormone Regulations were 
premised upon Part II of Schedule B to the Act, and would ultimately be made as part of Division II of those general regulations.  
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Throughout the chapter, estrogen is shown to have been enacted as multiple varieties of the 
same substance. Section 4 describes how this was most clearly realized and articulated by Esli 
Woods, the Dean of Pharmacy at the University of Saskatchewan, at the Committee’s final 
meeting of 1944. At this meeting, members addressed other frustrations with the effects of their 
regulatory performances, including their concerns with drug manufacturers’ unresponsiveness 
to National Health’s proposed methods for standardizing sex hormones. Unsurprisingly perhaps, 
firms preferred the freedom to enact estrogen with varied and incommensurable potency tests. 
Natural and synthetic, biological and chemical, pure substances and ready-made drug 
product, pills and injections, prescribed by doctors and purchased over the counter, valuable 
and worthless, safe and hazardous. As Dean Woods explained, these multiple varieties of 
estrogen were material. They were not (just) scientific, cultural, or legal representations of 
estrogen, but ontologically distinct entities, performed through legal-material practices with 
sensitive rodents’ bodies, sticky caution labels, diverse dosage ranges, and deleted regulatory 
preambles. In becoming therapeutic, estrogen emerged not just in laboratories, pharmaceutical 
firms and clinics, but, in Canada in the 1940s, through regulators’ performances of material 
distinctions in their efforts to define, enumerate, test, classify, and label estrogenic drugs. 
 
 
1.  The Committee attempts to standardize estrogen, 1943  
 
In three meetings and much more correspondence, over 1943, the physicians, pharmacists, 
drug manufacturing researchers, and the Department’s own pharmaceutical chemists and 
pharmacologist, aided by its sole endocrinologist, discussed dozens of new drug standards. No 
drug proved more contentious than estrogen, in its various forms and modes.  
 
1.i. “Canadian Standards should specify methods of assay around which 
everything seemed to centre”: the Committee meets, January 1943 
 
The Committee members assembled for the first time on January 15 and 16, 1943, in the 
library of the now-demolished Daly Building in Ottawa. From the outset, National Health officials 
strategically centred the Department. With members gathering around a large U-shaped table, 
the Chief Dominion Analyst, Harry Mills Lancanster, took up his position as Chair at the base of 
the U. Lancaster was flanked by his assistant Aime Valin and by long-time analyst and 
Committee Secretary Linton Davidson. Dr. Wodehouse, the Deputy Minister, attended much of 
the meeting. On the Friday morning, he welcomed the Committee members with an assurance 
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that they would be free to make any motions or recommendations, without restriction, 
emphasizing that they were there because the Department sought the Committee’s direction. 
Following Wodehouse’s warm welcome, Lancaster reset the tone. He gave extended opening 
remarks in which he strongly intimated that members should defer to the Department on 
challenging regulatory issues, giving as his example the regulation of sex hormones. It would be 
necessary, he cautioned, “to avoid mistakes arising from the taking of snap judgments”, and the 
Sex Hormone Regulations would call for the Committee’s “careful and mature” consideration 
after it had heard from Dr. Pugsley.3   
Pugsley was a biochemist who had worked with the Department’s Laboratory of Hygiene 
since 1939. In the early 1930s, he had done master’s and doctoral studies at McGill,4 where he 
had specialized in endocrinology. His doctorate had been supervised by Dr. Collip – the 
acclaimed endocrinologist who, backed by Ayerst, had extracted and isolated the human and 
equine estrogens that lead to the development of Emmenin and Premarin respectively.5  As the 
Department’s only endocrinologist, in addition to conducting research,6 Pugsley was charged 
with developing the Sex Hormone Regulations. In doing so, he worked closely with Dr. Clarence 
(Clare) Morrell, the Laboratory of Hygiene’s senior pharmacologist.7 Morrell had joined the 
Laboratory in 1930, after earning bachelor’s and master’s degrees from the University of 
Toronto and a Ph.D. from Harvard, including time spent at Yale and the University of London, 
and then working for two years with the West African Yellow Fever Commission in Nigeria.8 
                                                          
3 January 14-15 meeting minutes and materials, in Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943 and Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1943-1944. 
4 “Reports to the Reader: About the Authors” (July 1951) 6 Food Drug Cosm LJ 483 [“About the Authors, 1951”] at 483-484.  
5 Leonard I Pugsley, “Studies on Calcium and Phosphorus Metabolism” (PhD dissertation, McGill University, 1932) 
[unpublished]. Pugsley worked in Collip’s lab during his graduate studies, publishing studies with him; see e.g. JB Collip, LI 
Pugsley, H Selye and DL Thompson, “Observation Concerning the Mechanisms of Parathyroid Hormone Action” (1934) 15:6 Br J 
Exp Pathol 335. See also Allison Li, “COLLIP, JAMES BERTRAM” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, Vol. 19, University of 
Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, online: <http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/collip_james_bertram_19E.html>; and Li 2003b at 
91. Allison Li tells a story about how Pugsley and other graduate students, travelling to a conference in the US during the 
prohibition era, filled a number of bottles of Scotch for the trip and labelled them “emmenin”; see Li 2003b at 94. 
6 After joining National Health, Pugsley published a number of scientific articles on hormones and bioassay methods; see 
Leonard I Pugsley & Clare Morrell, “Variables Affecting the Biological Assay of Estrogens” (1943) 33:1 Endocrinol 48; Leonard I 
Pugsley, “Application of the Principles of Statistical Analysis to the Biological Assay of Hormones” (1946) 39:3 Endocrinol 161; S. 
Bird, LI Pugsley & MO Klotz, “The Quantitative Recovery of Synthetic Estrogens from Tissues of Birds (Gallus Domesticus), the 
Response of the Birds’ Testis, Comb and Epidermis to Estrogen and of Humans to Ingestion of Tissues from Treated Birds” 
(1947) 41:4 Endocrinol 282; CG Willis, SE Rampton & LI Pugsley, “Variables Affecting the Assay of Testosterone Propionate Using 
the Seminal Vesicle Response of the Juvenile Castrated Male Rat” (1949) 44:3 Endocrinol 251. He also published a law journal 
article on the regulation of endocrinal products; see Leonard I Pugsley, “Canadian Control of Endocrine Products” (1951) 6 Food 
Drug Cosm LJ 532 at 533-534 [“Pugsley 1951”]. 
7 On Morrell’s scientific work, see Chapter 3, section 1 at notes 84-85. 
8 “About the Authors” (1954) 9 Food Drug Cosm LJ 500 [“About the Authors, 1954”] at 500; and “Reports to the Reader: About 
the Authors” (October 1950) 5 Food Drug Cosm LJ 627 (1950) [“About the Authors, 1950”] at 628. 
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On the second day of the meeting, with Pugsley now also in attendance, the Committee 
members were presented with his complete draft of the Sex Hormone Regulations. In effect, 
members were being asked to comment on the Department’s settled regulatory conclusions, 
rather than being invited to engage in any foundational or frank discussion about policy 
objectives or a range of potential regulatory approaches.9 This effort to constrain and shape the 
Committee’s input was not somehow justified by the simplicity of the regulatory task at hand. To 
the contrary, as summarized by Pugsley himself a few years later, as seen in this chapter’s 
opening quote, in the early 1940s in Canada, the nascent market for sex hormones was in a 
“chaotic state of affairs”. Estrogenic products were being manufactured using wildly variant 
means of expressing and testing potency, creating challenges for their regulatory control.  
In briefing the Committee on the proposed regulations, Pugsley and Morrell explained that 
they would define “sex hormone” to include all products, synthetic or natural, purporting to have 
androgenic, estrogenic, gonadotrophic, or progestational properties. But how would National 
Health officials know whether a product that purported to have “estrogenic properties” actually 
did? In biological standardization, hormones were commonly defined by some characteristic 
biological activity in a biological system – in a snappier ontological version, hormones were what 
hormones did – so how would National Health know if a product was a sex hormone?  
The solution presented by the draft regulations seemed, at least superficially, to reflect what 
was then a quite uncontroversial approach to characterizing, testing, and standardizing 
biologics, including estrogenic drugs. Pugsley had considered, in drafting the regulations, the 
two central questions: how to measure if a substance was estrogenic, and what to measure this 
substance against. Put more precisely, the draft regulations mentioned methods of assay for 
measuring and expressing in quantitative units a drug’s estrogenic activity (also referred to as 
potency or strength), and they prescribed certain physical reference materials that would serve 
as standards of reference for measuring the potency of preparations.10 The theory of estrogenic 
                                                          
9 At this first meeting, Pugsley proffered no explanation as to why the Department proposed to regulate sex hormones separate 
from the Biologicals Regulation, most recently amended in 1942. At that time, for all other biologics regulated under the Food 
and Drugs Act, National Health had prescribed their standards of quality and potency in a substance-specific part of the existing 
Biologicals Regulation. By contrast, for sex hormones, the Department was proposing a discrete, standalone regulation.   
10 The standards referenced in the Sex Hormone Regulations were not textual standards but rather physical reference material. 
In biological standardization, the word “standard” has two meanings: “It usually refers to a batch of samples of a reference 
material – a ‘biological standard’ – with which other preparations of similar material are quantitatively compared. The 
properties on which comparison are made are various; usually it is one or more kind of response of biological activity in a 
biological test system – the biological assay. A measured amount of a biological substance is assigned to define a quantity of 
that activity, in terms of a number of ‘units of biological activity’. In this sense, the International Unit (IU) to quantify biological 
activity is analogous to the metre as the physical unit of length… the other common, qualitative, meaning of ‘standard’ is a set 
of criteria or specifications to characterize quality, as in a monograph of a drug in a pharmacopoeia.” Derek R Bangham, A 
History of Biological Standardization: the characterization and measurement of complex molecules important in clinical and 
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identity underlying the draft regulations was therefore consistent with a physiological and 
pharmacological conception of estrogen, namely that a product’s “estrogenic properties” would 
be a function of bioassay testing for activity, rather than a chemical conception of estrogen in 
which analytical chemical assays confirm the purity and amount of a constituent compound. 
Combined, the reference material and the assay method would identify a sex hormone. 
While in principle this was straightforward, Pugsley had struggled to prescribe potency 
standards and reference standards in the draft regulations. With respect to reference standards, 
as discussed further below,11 while the pure substances had standardized in the 1930s through 
the League of Nations, finished drug products and mixtures had not been widely standardized.12 
With respect to potency, the draft regulations became even less precise. Pugsley’s draft 
stipulated that sex hormone products would be measured in “International Units, where those 
existed”, to be estimated by test methods employed in the Laboratory of Hygiene. This potency 
provision went on to state that where “International or Canadian Standards have not been 
established and stable standards cannot be furnished by the manufacturer, the methods of 
assay and of expressing potency shall be acceptable to the Chief of the Laboratory of 
Hygiene”.13 As of 1943, endocrinologists understood that there were two International Units for 
estrogens,14 which in manufacturing and regulatory practices had often been confused. As 
summarized by two US government pharmacologists in a 1941 article, the “existence of two 
international standards with the correlated two international units, not equivalent in biological 
potency, has caused misunderstanding and confusion in the minds of many individuals…The 
erroneous concept that an international unit of estrogenic potency is a single standard is widely 
accepted.”15 Confusion was augmented in Pugsley’s draft by his slide away from biological units 
and towards chemical assay. This occurred in a labelling provision – dropped from the final 
regulation – that required packaging to state a product’s potency expressed either in 
International Units or on a weight volume basis for pure products.16 Furthermore, although by 
                                                          
research medicine (Bristol: Society for Endocrinology, 1999) [“Bangham 1999”] at 7. See also Chapter 1, section 1.ii; and Lezaun 
2012. 
11 See section 1.ii below.  
12 Bangham 1999 at 34-35. 
13 Draft Sex Hormone Regulations, January 15, 1943, in Library and Archives Canada, Department of Health fonds, RG 29, 
“Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoieal Standards”, 1942/06-1943/10, volume 252, file no. 339-4-8 (Part 1) [“(Possibly) 
Morrell’s Committee file, 1942-1943”]. 
14 One for estrone and one for estradiol benzoate.  
15 Curtis & Witt 1941 at 364. 
16 Draft Sex Hormone Regulations, January 15, 1943, s 4(d), in (Possibly) Morrell’s Committee file, 1942-1943. A unit measured 
through bioassays quantifies biological activity rather than chemical mass. For a helpful explanation, see Bangham 1999 at 7-9. 
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1941 the potency of estrogenic preparations was “almost universally estimated by some 
modification of the Allen-Doisy vaginal smear technique on rodents”, the regulatory control of 
estrogenic drugs involved modifications to this technique to reflect the fact that preparations, not 
pure substances, were being tested, and “to allow statistical evaluation of the results.”17 
Moreover, increasing uniformity in research and regulatory laboratories was not paralleled in 
manufacturing practices, where assay procedures remained diverse and even firms using the 
Allen-Doisy method often modified it. Finally, consistent with National Health’s approach since 
1934 to many Part II biologics, Pugsley’s draft regulations did not attempt to stabilize methods 
directly in law. His draft was silent on the potency test methods that should be used to identify 
sex hormones, and subdelegated to departmental officials the power to decide on test methods. 
Pugsley’s effort to address the potency of sex hormone products did not sit well with the 
Committee. Committee members felt that Canadian regulatory standards for sex hormones 
fundamentally would need to specify methods of assay, around which, in the words of the 
minutes, “everything seemed to centre.”18 As experts in biological standardization understood, 
the measurement made the material: “the identity of certain hormones is virtually ‘defined’ by 
the reference material and the particular assay method used to quantify activity.”19 A regulation 
purporting to govern sex hormone preparations, that failed to prescribe the methods by which 
sex hormones were identified and defined, was no sex hormone regulation at all. In Committee 
members’ minds, the chaotic diversity of estrogenic potency should be circumscribed through 
careful selection of assay methods, defined unitage, and reference materials. 
The National Health officials strongly resisted the idea that test methods should be 
prescribed in the regulations themselves. With his 13 years of experience with the Biologicals 
Regulation and with the amendments made, in 1934 and 1942, allowing for sub-delegation of 
methods to bureaucrats, Morrell argued for departmental discretion. He characterized the 
Department’s concern as financial. Inevitably, he noted, methods of biological standardization 
would change, such that prescribing test methods in the regulations themselves would require 
constant and expensive regulatory amendments. To break the deadlock, he offered that the 
Laboratory of Hygiene could instead informally distribute its internal bioassay methods, upon 
application by universities or manufacturers. Their interests satisfied, the professors backed 
down. With a motion moved by Henderson and seconded by Cook, the Committee 
recommended that the Department multigraph its biological test methods and supply them 
                                                          
17 Curtis & Witt 1941 at 364. 
18 January 15-16, 1943 meeting minutes and materials, in Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1942-1943. 
19 Bangham 1999 at 34-35. 
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loose-leaf form “to as large a group as necessary, including teachers in Colleges of Medicine 
and Pharmacy and University Libraries.”20 This would not be the only time, in their discussions 
of standardizing estrogen, that in performing their mandate to provide advice on drug standards, 
the academics would conflate their teaching and research interests with the public interest. 
Always keen to ensure access to test methods, the professors frequently regarded regulations 
prescribing drug standards less as a means to protect public health and more as codified 
teaching aids. One member went so far, at the next meeting, to criticize the draft monographs 
intended for the future Canadian Supplement as too “cold and legalistic in their phraseology” 
and as not elaborate or detailed enough for teaching pharmacy students.21 
Though methods of standardization received the most sustained attention at the meeting, 
they were not the only aspect of the draft regulations considered by the Committee. Shedding 
light on a perceived purpose of the regulations, Committee members also discussed the classes 
of products that the regulations should “recognize”.22 Far from aiming to restrict the composition, 
manufacture, sale or use of sex hormone products, the regulations were premised on giving sex 
hormones official government recognition, in effect endorsing them as drugs. Revealing 
manufacturers’ support for the regulations, Cook advocated that their coverage be extended to 
apply to additional types of estrogenic drugs. With an eye to Ayerst’s strategy for differentiating 
Premarin from other estrogenic drugs, he suggested that the regulations should be amended to 
recognize hormone preparations into two distinct categories: one for oestrogenic substances, 
administered by injection; one for conjugated substances, given by mouth. With no dissention, 
Pugsley agreed to amend the draft regulations accordingly, thus ensuring greater regulatory 
recognition and market differentiation for Ayerst’s conjugated brew of equine estrogens.23  
During this discussion of the draft regulations, only one Committee member expressed 
concern with the hazards of sex hormones. Wing Commander Dr. Ray F. Farquharson, of the 
University of Toronto medical faculty, took the position that sex hormone products should only 
be sold on prescription. Prescriptions were one of the few means, absent prohibition, by which 
dangerous drugs could be controlled in Canada. The idea that potentially injurious drugs should 
                                                          
20 January 15-16, 1943 meeting minutes, in Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1942-1943 and in (Possibly) Morrell’s Committee 
file, 1942-1943. 
21June 10-11, 1943 meeting minutes, in (Possibly) Morrell’s Committee file, 1942-1943. 
22 January 15-16, 1943 meeting minutes and materials, in Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1943-1944. 
23 Similarly, with respect to gonadotrophins, Cook also successfully advocated that the regulations should require the source of 
this hormone to be identified, again allowing for product differentiation between gonadotrophins derived from humans and 
horses. See Davidson’s Draft “Report of Canadian Committee on Pharmaceutical Standards”, in Davidson’s Committee 
Materials, 1942-1943; and A Linton Davidson, “Report of Canadian Committee on Pharmaceutical Standards” (March 1943) 48 
Can MAJ 266, online: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1827694/pdf/canmedaj01700-0146.pdf>.  
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be sold only on prescription was quite new in Canadian law;24 the first regulation under the Act 
that enumerated a list of potent drugs, prohibited for sale to the public without prescriptions, was 
made in 1941.25 As Davidson commented in his departmental history, drugs added to the 1941 
prescription list either had “a narrow margin between an effective and a poisonous dose or may 
produce undesirable effects if taken for long periods without competent supervision.”26 Over a 
decade’s worth of studies had suggested a correlation between estrogen dosage and toxicity, 
so Farquharson’s recommendation was not scientifically controversial. However, no Committee 
member supported his recommendation, and the suggestion was never raised again.  
At the very first meeting of the Committee, the ontological precariousness of estrogen thus 
came into view. Estrogen’s status as socio-technical and legal object – rather than a purely 
natural object – is underscored by the debate on the need to regulate bioassay methods in 
order to apprehend estrogens.27 From the outset, National Health and the Committee appear as 
a regulatory site where, beyond laboratories and clinics, estrogen would be materialized. 
 
1.ii.  “At some loss as to the precise object you have in mind”: apprehending 
estrogen as pure substance or as ready-made drug product, early 1943 
 
Over the course of 1943, and as anticipated by the order in council establishing it, the 
Committee was engaged in two parallel regulatory activities. On the one hand, the Committee 
was reviewing and providing comments on Dr. Pugsley’s draft Sex Hormone Regulations. In 
entirely separate discussions, it was also developing a new Canadian Supplement to the British 
Pharmacopoeia. Both regulatory activities would immediately come to engage estrogen. Just as 
rapidly, it would become evident that the estrogen performed in the practices of bureaucrats, 
manufacturers, and professors of medicine and pharmacy was not the same estrogen.  
After its first meeting, the Committee members continued to flesh out their list of candidate 
drugs for inclusion in the Canadian Supplement. As Davidson had responsibility for drafting all 
                                                          
24 In the 1930s, provincial laws governing pharmacists and drug dispensing, and imposing prescription or other requirements on 
potent drugs, were highly inconsistent across provinces; see Curran 1956 at 595-596. The Act was amended in 1939 to allow 
drugs that may be injurious to health to be restricted to sale on prescription; Chapter 3, note 96. In 1946, this power was 
expanded – driven by concerns over resistance to penicillin – to allow drugs to be restricted to sale on prescription “in the 
interest and for the protection of the public health”; see SC 1946, c 23 and Appendix IV to the Food and Drug Regulations. 
25 PC 1941-8442 (31 October 1941), Canada Gazette, Vol LXXV, No 19, at p 1496 (November 8, 1941). See also Davidson 1949a 
at 84; and Davidson 1949b. Included were aminopyrine, barbiturates, Benzedrine, cinchophen, neocinchophen, dinitrophenols, 
sulphonamides, and thyroid (like sex hormones, also listed on Part II of Schedule B to the Act). In 1944, the list was extended to 
veterinary drugs; see PC 1944-2194 (27 March 1944), Canada Gazette, Vol LXXVIII, No 16, at p 1552 (April 15, 1944). 
26 Davidson 1949b. 
27 Von Schwerin, Stoff & Wahrig 2013b at 26-30; see also Chapter 1, section 1.ii, particularly that content at notes 72-77.  
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the monographs, in March, Henderson sent Davidson a revised list of drugs.28 Newly on his list 
were estrone and estradiol benzoate,29 as, at the end of 1942, both substances had been added 
to the US Pharmacopoeia (“USP”).30 After discussing the substances with Pugsley,31 Davidson 
wrote back to Henderson. Pugsley, he advised, “seemed to be at some loss as to the precise 
object you have in mind”.32 Rather than see the two estrogens as drug entities appropriate for 
pharmacopeial monographs, Pugsley saw them as manufactured, pre-made, industry products. 
As estrone and estradiol benzoate preparations would be controlled under his forthcoming Sex 
Hormone Regulations, Pugsley saw no need for them to be included in the Supplement.  
Henderson was befuddled. While he did not hold “any very strong brief” for including estrone 
and estradiol benzoate in the Supplement, and he appreciated that hormone products would be 
controlled by future regulations, he nonetheless felt that “surely it is advantageous to have a 
definition of such pure and active substances as these” included in Supplement. In his view, 
these definitions would “doubtless form the reference substances for hormonal testing and a 
complete description of their characteristics should be available for workers and practitioners”.33  
This was not reducible to divergent views on how these substances should be represented.  
Rather, multiple versions of estrone and estradiol benzoate were realized – made real – in 
relation to diverse scientific and regulatory practices. Oudshoorn has shown how divergent 
material practices, in different and networked disciplines, shaped concepts about sex hormones: 
“hormonal drugs are neither ready-made laboratory products that are subtly marketed to their 
audiences, nor are they compounds simply discovered in nature. The specific “nature” of the 
drug and the interests that become embodied in it are shaped in the networks of the different 
groups that called hormonal drugs into existence”.34 Gaudillière has similarly shown how 
divergent testing logics and practices existed within different manufacturing firms’ laboratories.35 
                                                          
28 March 17, 1943 letter from Henderson to Davidson, in Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1943-1944. 
29 The American spellings were estrone and estradiol benzoate. In the 1940s, Canadian regulators used British spellings. 
Estradiol benzoate is an ester of estradiol that had been synthesized by Schering, the German drug manufacturer, in 1933. It 
was often used in estrogenic preparations intended for intramuscular injection, typically combined with oil (peanut mostly). 
30 The pharmacopoeia of the United States of America: twelfth revision, U.S.P. XII: official from November 1, 1942 (Easton: Mack 
Printing Company, 1942) (“USPXII”). 
31 March 24, 1943 memo from Davidson to Morrell, in Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1943-1944. 
32 April 5, 1943 letter from Davidson to Henderson, in Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1943-1944. 
33 April 7, 1943 letter from Henderson to Davidson, in Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1943-1944. On April 14, 1943, 
Henderson likewise proposed that diethylstilbestrol should be added to the Supplement, as it was then proposed for addition 
both to the USPXII and to the sixth addendum of the British Pharmacopoeia; see Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1943-1944. 
34 Oudshoorn 1994 at 83. 
35 Chapter 1, section 1.i. and section 1.ii. 
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Likewise, within biological testing practices, difference was performed by testing done in 
regulatory control of drug products or in pharmacological characterization of pure substances.  
Working in the Laboratory of Hygiene, which had regulatory responsibilities for controlling 
industry products by testing them on laboratory animals to determine if their activity and identity 
corresponded with their labels, Pugsley was occupied by whether an estrogenic preparation did 
(and therefore was) what its manufacturer claimed. As of 1942, when Pugsley first drafted the 
regulations, estrogenic preparations had emerged on the market in three basic forms: in oil 
solutions, in aqueous solutions, and as tablets, capsules, or powders. Of these, most 
preparations on the market were oil solutions with “quite high” potency intended for parenteral 
administration, while the various aqueous extracts by contrast tended either to have little activity 
or quickly deteriorated, and the oral tablets were only just appearing.36 Not only did the product 
form change regulatory tests, but the specific formulants were also highly material. These 
nontherapeutic agents played many roles, whether “to emulsify, stabilize, suspend, preserve, 
dilute, solubilize or flavour”,37 and were essential partners in any dosage form or preparation. 
Indeed, these agents lived up to their names. They acted to sometimes radically change 
potency test results; as Doisy explained, “[d]epending on the solvent and on the division of the 
dose, estrone may be four or two hundred and sixty-six times as potent as estriol”.38 Thus, for 
Pugsley, estrone and estradiol benzoate only became “estrogenic” when mixed with 
nontherapeutic agents like oils, fats, or milk, presented in a liquid solution, tablet, or ointment, 
and delivered in various doses to various animals. In the Laboratory of Hygiene, an enforcement 
chemist was required to “rely entirely on the results of his analysis of the finished product”, and 
to “use analytical procedures which give him accurate information on the amount of the drug 
present and assure him that the values obtained have not been influenced in any way by the 
presence of other substances in the formulation”.39 This challenge was pronounced with orally-
administered conjugated estrogen products, for which there was no generally accepted assay 
method nor official reference standard, and which, when tested with existing methods, proved 
that labelled potencies were wildly imprecise.40 For Henderson, a university-based 
pharmacologist, estrone and estradiol benzoate were estrogenic and could be known as such, 
                                                          
36 Curtis & Witt 1941 at 364-365; and Trites 1940 at 100. Trites indicates that, as of January 1940, a single topical estrogen 
preparation, marked as “Progynon-DH Lanel” and manufactured by the German firm Schering, had appeared on the Canadian 
market. However, it is unclear whether this product remained available in Canada by 1943.  
37 Blake 1976 at 279; see also generally 279-84. 
38 Edward Doisy, “The Estrogenic Substances” (1941) 16:6 JAMA 501 [“Doisy 1941”] at 504. 
39 Frank H Wiley, “The Analysis of Drugs” (1961) 16 Food Drug Cosm LJ 733 [“Wiley 1961”] at 735. 
40 William Homer Lawrence & CW Chapman, “The Bioassay of Some Commercial Conjugated Estrogens” (1952) XLI:11 J Am 
Pharm Assoc 624 [“Lawrence & Chapman 1952”]. 
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regardless of product mixtures. Not engaged in the regulatory practice of testing manufacturers’ 
claims, his laboratory practice would primarily involve working with “pure” substances and 
extracts. In regulatory testing in the Laboratory of Hygiene, and in pharmacological research at 
the University of Toronto, estrone and estradioal benzoate were simply different things.   
Though not put in such terms by Pugsley or Henderson, one might also reduce their dispute 
to the question, as much legal as ontological, of whether these two estrogens were “medicine”, 
to be administered to patients, or were “drugs”, a concept encompassing drug ingredients, 
substances, or materials. The Act was not particularly helpful in answering such a question. 
Legally speaking, after the 1939 amendments, “drugs” were defined as a broader category of 
substance than “medicines”. A drug included inter alia “all medicine for internal or external use 
for man or animal” and “any substance, mixture of substances and any article that may be used 
for the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of disease in man or animal”. Medicine, on 
the other hand, was itself defined to mean “any substance or mixture of substances that may be 
used in restoring, correcting or modifying organic functions”.41 That is, a drug was defined to 
mean both a medicine ready for administration to humans and also a medicinal ingredient or 
article. Further, the Act simultaneously provided that “drugs” could be mentioned or described in 
Schedule B,42 and that “any material” could be added to or removed from Schedule B.43 When 
considered through the lens of the statute, estrone and estradiol benzoate were drug and 
medicine, substance and mixture, article and material.44 When considered in the hands of 
practitioners, the laboratory practices and tests that performed these estrogens were multiple.   
                                                          
41 SC 1939, c 3, ss 1 and 2, which amended s 1(c) and added s 2(j) respectively to the Food and Drugs Act.   
42 Food and Drugs Act, s 6(3)(c). 
43 Food and Drugs Act, s 3(i). 
44 Debate engaging the question of whether estrone was a drug or an ingredient was not limited to the Canadian Committee on 
Pharmacopoeial Standards. In 1944, the US Customs Court considered the matter, in Roche-Organon, Inc v United States, 1944 
Cust Ct LEXIS 25. Released on April 29, 1944, the decision did not seem to come to the attention of Committee members or 
National Health (nor would it, as a foreign customs decision, be likely to come to their attention). The matter involved whether 
imported “estrone crystals (urine concentrate)”, consisting of about 90 percent oestrone, was a “medicinal preparation” or a 
“drug” for customs purposes (with medicinal preparations receiving less favourable tariff treatment). The Court applied an 
existing test, holding that if the imported estrone, when arriving in the US, possessed sufficient therapeutic properties to be 
used medicinally without the use of any other active agent, then it was a medicinal preparation and not a drug. The estrone was 
held to qualify as a medicinal preparation, regardless that to be administered to patients it needed to be further compounded, 
in the US, with various inert bases to form different manufactured products. Regardless of this, the estrone itself underwent 
“no chemical change” in the manufacturing process. Notably, the Court reached this conclusion without considering potency or 
dose, both of which are changed by combining pure estrone with inert bases. Roche brought a second case – not technically an 
appeal, but with the same intent and effect – in 1947. This time potency was considered. For this and other reasons, the 
opposite conclusion resulted in the second case; see Roche v United States, 1948 CCPA LEXIS 323. 
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Changing industrial dynamics were also at play. Henderson’s understanding of the role of 
pharmacopoeia was that which had predominated in decades and indeed centuries past, when 
pharmacopoeia guided drug making. By the 1940s, at the beginning of what some would call 
the therapeutic revolution, the function of pharmacopoeia was evolving, as they increasingly 
became reference rather than recipe books, and as pharmacists increasingly became suppliers 
of pharmaceutical firms’ products rather than drug makers.45 Canadian pharmacists were not 
whipping up complex estrogenic drugs in pharmacy backrooms, yet nonetheless Henderson 
held to the principled position that all drugs should be defined in pharmacopoeia. 
When the Committee gathered for its second meeting, in June 1943, and it turned to the draft 
list of drugs for the Canadian Supplement, the estrogens proved to be the most controversial. 
Their inclusion on the list triggered a deeper and sustained debate among Committee members, 
one that engaged fundamental epistemic and ontological issues of how to apprehend, construct, 
reflect, and respond to the troublesome and temperamental estrogens.46 From the outset, 
Ayerst’s scientist Dr. Cook challenged the proposed inclusion of estrone and estradiol benzoate. 
Resonant with Pugsley’s earlier views, Cook felt that these standards simply were not needed. 
Of the commercially available drug products containing oestrone and oestradiol benzoate, 95% 
were manufactured in the United States to standards under the USP, arriving in Canada in 
ready-made, mass-produced dosage forms (whether tablets, capsules, suppositories, or single-
dose injections). With Ayerst having just been acquired by a US drug firm in March 1943,47 
Cook adopted a discourse of Canadian regulatory impotence. He argued that Canadian 
regulators had no ability to influence potency standards embedded within imported drugs, or 
relatedly, the doses in which those drugs would be offered on the Canadian market.  
The medical professionals, in contrast, insisted on the need for National Health to be as 
comprehensive as possible in its drug standardization efforts. Henderson insisted that these two 
substances be standardized to assist physicians, and Esli L. Woods, the young new Dean of the 
University of Saskatchewan’s pharmacy faculty, also emphasized that the Supplement should 
be as complete a guide as possible for pharmacists. The discourse that Henderson and Woods 
leveraged hinged on a principle of “no special treatment” and on the assumed value of providing 
as much information as possible to practitioners – regardless of whether that information would, 
practically speaking, make any difference to Canadian physicians prescribing imported drugs. 
                                                          
45 Quirke 2005 at 177. 
46 June 10-11, 1943 meeting minutes, in (Possibly) Morrell’s Committee file, 1942-1943. 
47 American Home Products Company acquired both Ayerst McKenna & Harrison Ltd. and its small US subsidiary; Mira Wilkins, 
The History of Foreign Investment in the United States 1914-1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), at 547. 
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National Health officials slid between and combined discourses of futility and pragmatism. 
The department’s senior pharmacologist, Dr. Morrell, agreed with Cook that, because estrone 
and estradiol benzoate were not administered “in pure form” but typically arrived on the 
Canadian market in ready-prepared dosages, that rather than try to standardize these 
substances through the Supplement, they could instead be controlled post-manufacture under 
the future Sex Hormone Regulations.48 Intriguingly foreshadowing the shift from standards to 
labelling that would ultimately be achieved in the Sex Hormone Regulations,49 Lancaster 
suggested that instead of promoting drug standardization per se, these new regulations would 
nonetheless ensure drug uniformity by requiring the use of proper names. When the Ayerst 
scientist doubled down, arguing that tethering manufacturers to standards would remove 
incentives to improve products, Morrell interjected to remind everyone that, unlike in the U.S., 
there was no process in Canada for regulators to test the safety of new drugs. In this way, 
National Health adopted industry’s futility discourse while deploying that same message to 
stress, subtly, that Canadian regulators should still take whatever action was open to them to fill 
any gaps left by the US FDA. Unspoken in this debate, but surely hovering over it, was the fact 
that Premarin had been marketed in Canada before the US FDA ever deemed it to be safe.  
Also unspoken in the debate, at least expressly, was women’s health. Patients went 
unmentioned. So did consumer protection. Nobody expressed any views on the perceived value 
of these two estrogens to treat any disorders. The physicians and pharmacists emphasized that 
estrogens should not be exempted from standards; manufacturers asserted the realities of US 
market control and the underlying industrial standards built into imported drugs; and National 
Health officials accepted the difficulty of influencing manufacturers while identifying other 
regulatory avenues towards uniformity. All participants were concerned with standardization, if 
from diverse logics. Yet the women who would consume these drugs disappeared from view. 
At a stalemate, the Committee members broke for lunch at the Chateau Laurier. That 
afternoon, without further discussion, they decided to include estrone and estradiol benzoate in 
the Supplement.50 Rather than squarely resolve the dispute by forcing a decision as to which 
logic or practice of standardization should take priority when determining whether a drug should 
be added to the Supplement, the members appear to have bracketed their disagreement.  
                                                          
48 It is notable that, at the January meeting, Morrell took the opposite view with respect to vitamins. Despite that the USP then 
contained standards for vitamins, he argued that vitamin monographs should be included in the Canadian Supplement; ibid. 
49 See section 3 below. 
50 Technically, following the practice of the British Pharmacopoeia, the Canadian Supplement monographs would be headed by 
Latinate names. Thus, in addition to oestrone and oestradiol benzoate, the main headings of would be oestradiolois benzoas 
and oestronum respectively. None of the Committee members ever spoke of these substances using these stylized Latin names. 
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The same debate re-opened the next day. This time, though, it involved DES. Morrell queried 
whether stilboestrol and stilboestrol dipropionate should be included in the Supplement, as had 
been proposed by Henderson. Surprisingly, Cook reversed his position from that taken the 
previous day, and advocated that stilboestrol and stilboestrol dipropionate be included, although 
he advocated that the two monographs not be completed until the British Pharmacopoeia 
Commission finalized its next addendum. The Committee agreed, and Cook assumed personal 
responsibility for reviewing the draft DES monographs before the Committee’s next meeting.51 
Thus Ayerst would have significant influence in determining what DES would be and would do.  
Charged with advising on how DES should be enacted, Cook delayed giving any advice. 
Over the summer, Davidson persistently sought his input on the draft DES monographs. For 
stilboestrol, Davidson had based his work on the draft USPXII monograph, but for stilboestrol 
dipropionate, with little guidance material available, Davidson had prepared a “more or less 
skeleton draft”, 52 and asked Cook to fill in the details.53 To the great frustration of National 
Health officials, Cook ignored these repeated entreaties (including Davidson’s effort to enlist 
Cook’s secretary in securing his reply).54 With the Committee’s fall meeting approaching, 
Lancaster had to intervene, by making a long-distance phone call that spurred Cook to return 
the DES monographs with his revisions. However, they were not returned in time to circulate in 
the package of materials that Committee members were expected to review before assembling 
that fall. With no other members ever engaging in such non-responsive behaviour, National 
Health officials came to view Cook’s delay as a deliberate tactic rather than an oversight. 55 
Premarin was being actively positioned by Ayerst as the main competitor to DES, yet nobody 
contemplated whether asking Ayerst’s research director to draft standards for the quality, purity, 
and potency of DES might pose a conflict of interest. The technical details of these standards 
were by no means neutral – they had political, economic, and ethical consequences. DES had 
been characterized, in laboratories and in advertisements, as the most potent of the estrogenic 
                                                          
51 June 10-11, 1943 minutes and materials, in (Possibly) Morrell’s Committee file, 1942-1943. 
52 August 25, 1943 letter from Davidson to all Committee members, in Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1943-1944. 
53 Letters from Davidson to Ayerst on July 5, 1943; August 5, 1943; August 16, 1943; August 31, 1943; and September 13, 1943; 
and letters from Ayerst to Davidson on August 30, 1943; September 14, 1943; and September 16, 1943; all in Davidson’s 
Committee Materials, 1943-1944. 
54 This is the one of the only appearances by a woman in Canadian archival materials from the 1940s regarding sex hormones. 
In the summer of 1943, Mr. Davidson exchanged some letters with Rebecca Scott, the secretary to Dr. Cook, pleading for her 
help in enlisting Dr. Cook’s reply; in Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1943-1944. On Scott, see also Chapter 3 at note 4.  
55 Davidson was not naively trustful of Cook. For example, in September 1943, he exchanged correspondence with Mr. Hunter 
of the EB Shuttleworth Chemical Co., in which he shared information about the draft regulation to control variability in 
capsules, tablets and ampoules. On the expectation that Cook would consult Hunter about it, he asked Hunter to keep the 
exchange confidential from Cook; see September 15, 1943 letter from Davidson to Hunter, in Davidson’s Committee Materials, 
1943-1944. 
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drugs. When it came to potency, Premarin was at a competitive disadvantage. Yet Davidson 
advised Cook that, if Cook saw fit to exclude a unit of potency for stilboestrol in its monographs, 
then the Committee would surely agree with Cook’s advice.56 When Cook finally sent comments 
on the DES monographs, despite that they followed the USPXII monograph “rather closely”, he 
nonetheless suggested changes. He recommended that the DES monographs should “omit the 
statement of potency in international units, as these standards are applicable strictly only to 
oestrone or to oestradiol monahenzoate (sic)”.57 Beyond concealing DES’ potency, he also 
advocated to widen the dosage range, and to mention two modes of administration.58 Sensitive 
to the greater potency of DES, Ayerst was working to brand its Premarin tablets, characterized 
by oral administration and flexible dosage, as more convenient and less nauseating.  
The Supplement monographs were not the only matter of debate. Continuing to engage in the 
disjointed practice established at its very first meeting, at its June 1943 meeting, the Committee 
again considered the Department’s draft Sex Hormone Regulations entirely separately from the 
question of whether to standardize estrogens in the Supplement. Not only did they address 
these regulations at different moments in their meetings, but in different terms. In contrast to 
their discussion of the Supplement, during which Committee members referred to estrone, 
estradiol, stilboestrol, or other such common names, when discussing the Department’s Sex 
Hormone Regulations, they shifted to speak of “sex hormones” or “sex hormone preparations”.59 
Their discussion of the draft regulations continued to centre heavily on what methods of assay 
should be adopted by National Health. That spring, Pugsley and Morrell had written down the 
bioassay methods then being used in the Laboratory of Hygiene to test three substances – the 
“male hormone”, the “oestrus-producing hormones”,60 and chorionic gonadotrophins – and 
Davidson had circulated these methods documents to the Committee. While most members 
reviewed the internal test methods favourably, Cook claimed that the methods were not actually 
used by any manufacturers; if manufacturers were materializing estrogenic drugs using variant 
potency tests, that could undercut National Health’s ability to test and control those products. 
Once again, the Committee’s proceedings featured onto-epistemological divergence on the 
question of what “oestrus-producing hormones” were, what they did, and how to measure them. 
                                                          
56 July 5, 1934 letter from Davidson to Cook, in Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1943-1944. 
57 September 16, 1943 letter from Cook to Davidson, in Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1943-1944. Cook’s recommendation 
was consistent with some of the leading literature; see e.g. Doisy 1941. His recommendation was adopted both for stilboestrol 
and for stilboestrol dipropionate. Both prescribed the Doisy-Allen test but neither used International Units to express potency. 
58 In the final Canadian Supplement, the first of these two recommendations by Cook was rejected and the second accepted. 
59 For the historiography on the scientific shifts in the names assigned to the steroid “sex” hormones, see Chapter 1, section 1i. 
60 This was the collective name assigned in the Department’s bioassay methods document for estrone and estradiol benzoate. 
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And once again, the debate was not resolved but rather deferred. Rather than counter Cook’s 
claims about the industry’s practices, a sex hormone sub-committee was formed. Comprised of 
Cook, Morrell and Henderson, the sex hormone sub-committee was tasked with consulting US 
commercial laboratories on their assay methods, and with reporting back at the next meeting.  
 
1.iii.   “It was not for the officers of the Department to take a stand …until they 
were satisfied that there was danger to the public”: the Committee meets, 
October 1943 
 
Perhaps over the summer of 1943 Cook was busily consulting US drug manufacturers on 
their bioassay methods; perhaps he had lacked the time to review the DES monographs; 
perhaps, as he said, it had been an unusually strenuous summer.61 Or, perhaps, knowing that 
the Canadian Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (“CMPA”) was planning an 
intervention, Cook’s delay was meant to ensure that he acted consistently with the CPMA.  
At the Committee’s fall meeting, held over October 1-2, 1943, and without prior notice, the 
CPMA submitted four resolutions.62 One resolution expressed concern that industry was not 
being afforded sufficient time to study the Committee’s proposed recommendations that 
involved changes to regulations.63 The CPMA intervention was less than well received. The 
Deputy Minister intervened swiftly and forcefully with the CPMA president. Wodehouse claimed 
that Committee members were not to lobby for industry interests, and that the CPMA should 
instead communicate with him. As mentioned, Wodehouse had taken largely the opposite 
position the previous year, when he was seeking the CPMA’s support for the Committee.64 With 
the Committee an ongoing site of struggle between medical professions, government, and 
industry, the ongoing tactical efforts to position industry scientists simultaneously as 
independent advisors and industry representatives were to be expected. 
                                                          
61 September 16, 1943 letter from Cook to Davidson, in Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1943-1944. Cook’s delay throughout 
the summer was not limited only to DES. He also failed to approve the June 1943 minutes or to give input on National Health’s 
regulatory proposal for variability standards for tablets and capsules; see the correspondence cited at supra notes 53-55. 
62 The CPMA tendered its resolutions through Committee member A.K. North, and not through Cook. 
63 Two resolutions focused on intellectual property issues, which constantly arose in the Committee’s deliberations (and would 
cause ongoing debate in the years to come). Another sought to separate “technical matters” from regulatory matters, through 
formation of a new technical committee; see October 1-2, 1943 meeting minutes and materials, in Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943. 
64 See Chapter 3, section 2. See also “Report of Canadian Committee on Pharmaceutical (sic) Standards” that the Department 
wrote and published in the Canadian Medical Association Journal in March 1943, supra note 23, in which Committee members 
were identified as ‘representing’ the Canadian Medical Association (Henderson, Mousseau), the Royal College of Physicians and 
Surgeons of Canada (Farquharson, Lewis), the CMPA (Cook, North), or the Department (Morrell, Valin, Lancaster, Davidson). 
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Aside from this drama, this meeting in October 1943 proved pivotal in enacting estrogen. 
The first item up for discussion was bioassay methods in the Sex Hormone Regulations. On 
behalf of the sex hormones sub-committee, Cook provided an interim report, drafted on a 
Chateau Laurier notepad right before the meeting. He reported that he had now contacted U.S. 
commercial laboratories - and, as it turned out, there would be little criticism from US firms of 
the Department’s bioassay methods for the estrogens. However, one US firm had suggested 
that more study was needed on the bioassay methods for gonadotrophins. Thus, reflecting 
Morrell’s desire to avoid prescribing methods of assay directly in the Sex Hormone Regulations, 
Cook concluded his report by advising that the sub-committee would expedite its study of 
bioassay methods so that National Health could later publish a “book of official methods”.65  
By the October meeting, then, a clear question was emerging for the Committee’s decision: 
who should decide how to measure the potency of sex hormones, and when should this occur? 
This question was squarely at issue when the Committee returned to the Sex Hormone 
Regulations on the second day of the meeting. Noting that it was “rather futile” to finalize 
regulations before settling on methods of assay, Henderson advocated that the Department 
should wait until the methods were ready before it made the regulations. At this point, a member 
shifted the discussion away from methods and towards reference standards, allowing Morrell to 
emphasize his long-favoured means by which sex hormone preparations could be standardized. 
Rather than wait for methods, Morrell suggested, National Health would create reference 
standards based on manufacturers’ submitted samples of their hormonal products. Henderson 
agreed that where no reference standards already existed, the Department should accept a 
manufacturer’s standard, however this did not resolve who should determine the test methods 
for potency, and whether this should occur before the regulations were made.  
Discussion was shut down by the Deputy Minister. Robert Wodehouse was attending the 
meeting during the discussion of the Sex Hormone Regulations. He expressed his view that:  
“…the Department should not discourage, through lack of knowledge, any company or 
laboratory from continuing research and attempting to bring out new products so long as 
no harm was being done. It was not for the officers of the Department to take a stand, in 
any new field, until they were satisfied that there was danger to the public.”66  
 
                                                          
65 October 1-2, 1943 minutes (Appendix B), in Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943; and Cook’s report on Chateau Laurier stationary, in 
(Possibly) Morrell’s Committee file, 1942-1943. On the “book of methods”, see content associated with infra notes 195-198. 
66 October 1-2, 1943 minutes, in Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943. Wodehouse’s position strongly contrasted with the 
“precautionary” approach to DES taken by senior FDA officials between 1939-1941, before the FDA ultimately issued a new 
drug approval for DES; see Langston 2010 at chapter 3. 
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With this remarkable intervention by Wodehouse, who was merely a guest and observer, the 
Committee backed off any further scrutiny of the Sex Hormone Regulations. Immediately 
following his intervention, Committee members voted to defer the question of whether sex 
hormone products should be licensed. They would never return to this question. Furthermore, 
the Committee decided to give advance approval to the regulations, passing a motion that it 
would “agree in principle to the proposed Sex Hormone Regulations after they had been 
redrafted and received, but before being submitted to council”. A few weeks later, in the course 
of routine correspondence seeking approval of minutes, Davidson enclosed the revised draft of 
the regulations, casually noting that he was “assuming” that members approved.67 No member 
ever provided any further comments on the draft regulations.68 The Deputy Minister had aligned 
with Ayerst’s position that Canada should not standardize the potency of estrogenic drugs, 
which would be allowed to multiply with many doses, test methods, and standards. Estrogenic 
drugs could be as potent as industry preferred, manufactured in whatever doses it desired.  
From here, estrogenic multiplicity snowballed even further. Maintaining its disjointed and 
bifurcated approach, the Committee considered, again separately from the Sex Hormone 
Regulations, the estrogens proposed to be listed on the Canadian Supplement. It gave final 
approval to all the monographs that would be included in the Supplement, and to the full list of 
drugs that it was recommending become Part V of Schedule B to the Act.69 The monographs 
and the Part V list included estrone, estradiol benzoate, stilbestrol, and stilbestrol dipropionate. 
On the face of it, these estrogens were about to be standardized in Canada. Or were they? On 
closer review, the monographs embedded many ambiguities, delegations, and diversities. First, 
in the estrone and estradiol benzoate monographs, the assay method for potency was left to the 
discretion of the Laboratory of Hygiene. That is, while these monographs adopted International 
Units for expressing potency, they did not set out a method for measuring the potency of 
                                                          
67 November 5, 1943 letter from Davidson to Committee members, in Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1943-1944. 
68 Despite this, the Department continued to position the Sex Hormone Regulations as something that the government had 
endorsed on the Committee’s recommendation, rather than a departmental initiative to which the Committee had acceded. As 
one official example, a preambular recital to the final regulations provided: “WHEREAS the Minister of Pensions and National 
Health reports that the Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards constituted under the authority of Order in Council 
of the 5th June, 1942 (P.C 4739), has recommended that standards of quality and potency be prescribed, and labelling 
requirements specified, in respect of sex hormones mentioned or described in Part II of Schedule B to the Food and Drugs Act, 
and that officers of the Department of Pensions and National Health have concurred in such recommendation.” 
69 October 1-2, 1943 meeting minutes and materials, in Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943. As approved, the Canadian Supplement 
simply reinstated many British Pharmacopoeia monographs in their original form before the wartime addenda; MG Allmark, 
“The Pharmacopoeias and their Status under the New Canadian Food and Drugs Act” (1954) 9 Food Drug Cosm LJ 251 [“Allmark 
1954”]. However, Davidson also drew heavily upon the USPXII monographs; see Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1943-1944. 
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estrone and estradiol benzoate.70 Furthermore, the stated dose ranges described were fairly 
wide. The monographs for stilboestrol and stilboestrol dipropionate were silent both on the 
unitage and the method of assay for potency. This silence on bioassay methods was atypical in 
pharmacopoeias, although it did align with the Department’s (unlawful) approach to 
subdelegating to the Chief of the Laboratory the power to prescribe how potency would be 
expressed and tested for numerous biological drugs under the Biologicals Regulation.  
Another ambiguity, also related to assay methods, was whether these four substances were 
biological substances or chemical compounds. At this meeting, members had debated whether 
to include any structural chemical formulae at all, in any of the monographs.71 At Dean Hurst’s 
motion, the diagrams were generally included. The monographs for the four estrogens enact 
these substances, to differing degrees, as both biological and chemical. Each featured a 
chemical diagram, and the DES monographs included chemical tests for identity and purity. 
Finally, intriguingly, neither the estrone nor the estradiol benzoate monographs identify any 
“estrogenic properties” of the substances. By contrast, under the “tests for identity”, the two DES 
monographs each state that these two substances produce “vaginal oestrus in ovariectomized 
adult female albino rats following the subcutaneous injection of 0.002 mg in oil”. No such effects 
or properties are identified for estrone or estradiol benzoate (nor did the monographs identify 
any symptoms, diseases, or disorders that these estrogens were meant to treat). Yet, as will be 
discussed further, in the Sex Hormone Regulations, the definition of a “sex hormone”, its very 
identity, was stated to hinge on its purported estrogenic properties. In the Regulations, what an 
estrogen was depended on what it was purported to do. Here, in the Supplement, the very place 
that Henderson originally envisioned would provide definition of these pure substances, the 
monographs declined to define these two estrogens by how they would act with bodies. 
 
2. Techniques of validating: enacting Part V, the Canadian Supplement, the 
Parenteral Regulations, and the Sex Hormone Regulations  
At its meeting in October 1943, the Committee ultimately endorsed a heterogenous group of 
laboratory, manufacturing, and enforcement practices that, taken together, served to materialize 
                                                          
70 In these monographs, each milligram of estrone was prescribed to have a potency of 10,000 international units, and each 
milligram of estradiol benzoate was prescribed to have a potency of 10,000 international (benzoate) units. 
71 October 1-2, 1943 meeting minutes and materials, in Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943. The primary reason for the debate was that 
some diagrams had been rendered erroneously or incompletely. Henderson, a pharmacologist, also suggested that they would 
be expensive; Dean Hurst, a pharmacist, wanted them included. The legal significance of the Committee’s decision to enact 
these drugs both biologically and chemically is addressed below; see the content associated with infra notes 85-89. 
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estrogen in many different forms, potencies, and properties. However, legal vehicles were 
needed to drive these practices and potencies forward. Specifically, the government of Canada 
still needed to formally enact, as law, the Canadian Supplement (and a new Part V of Schedule 
B) and the Sex Hormone Regulations (and amendments to Part II of Schedule B). Before they 
could be made, National Health solicitors and DOJ counsel were required to perform these 
enactments as intra vires. This section describes the “techniques of validating” that were 
employed by these officials to materialize these enactments and their estrogens.  
As described in the last chapter, Harry Lancaster, the Chief Dominion Analyst, had long 
insisted that the necessary precondition to enacting the Canadian Supplement was to amend 
Schedule B of the Act by adding an entirely new “Part V” to the schedule, only after which could 
legally binding drug standards of quality and potency, in the form of the Supplement, be made 
for those drugs.72 As seen, however, his plan had received a rough ride from National Health’s 
other senior officials and its solicitors Gunn and Russell, which was only resolved with the 
erasure of this plan from the order in council creating the Committee. Still, in 1943, the fact 
remained that on its face the Act spoke of Schedule B as comprising four discrete parts – Parts I 
through IV. It did not mention any Part V, nor did it explicitly authorize adding new Parts.  
Moreover, National Health solicitors remained unconvinced of the plan’s validity. On 
December 15, 1943, Gunn sent National Health’s draft order in council proposing to amend 
Schedule B to DOJ. The proposal was twofold – it added the Committee’s list of drugs, including 
oestrone, oestradiol benzoate, stilboestrol, and stilboestrol dipropionate, in a new Part V; and it 
revised Part II of the schedule by, among other changes, adding “Sex Hormones”.73 When 
transmitting the proposal to the Deputy Minister of DOJ, Gunn expressed his doubts that 
Cabinet had the jurisdiction to add the new Part V.74   
The matter was assigned to Elmer Driedger, at that time a relatively junior counsel, but 
already with expertise in legislative drafting. Before preparing his advice, he met with Lancaster. 
In their meeting, Driedger suggested that the significance of the four Parts may have been 
removed by the statutory amendment adding s. 3(1)(i) in 1934, a suggestion finding no obvious 
                                                          
72 See Chapter 3, section 1.  Lancaster and his staff continued to hold this understanding throughout 1943. See e.g. Davidson’s 
letter in January 1944 noting that because PC 1944-96, adding Part V to Schedule B, had by that time been made, the Canadian 
Supplement could now be finalized in a formal regulation, in Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1943-1944. 
73 In the draft order, and also the final order, Part II was amended to state:  
“Preparations of Pituitary, Adrenals, Sex Hormones and any other animal tissue preparations or any synthetics 
purporting to have physiological action similar to any of the foregoing. 
Parenteral products for the treatment of allergy; Antibacterial products of the growth of fungi or of bacteria, for 
example penicillin, their salts, derivatives and any preparation containing any of them.” 
74 December 15, 1943 letter from Gunn to Varcoe, in EA Driedger’s Schedule B File, 1943. 
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support in the text or legislative history of the 1934 amendments.75 Together, they concluded 
that Part V could be justified as authorized by s. 3(1)(i) of the Act. Yet, lacking confidence in the 
legality of this conclusion, they decided to erase mention of s. 3(1)(i) from the face of the order 
amending Schedule B. Just as with the creation of the Committee, where the foundation of the 
order amending Schedule B was legally dubious, the solution was to render the order silent.76    
Driedger then provided a written opinion that was equally difficult to square with the Act.77 
He framed the question as whether the Governor in Council had authority to add a new Part to 
Schedule B. In answering this affirmatively, he relied primarily on s. 3(1)(i). As he noted, this 
provision empowered the Governor in Council to add such “material” to Schedule B as the 
Minister deemed necessary in the public interest; he argued that, construed literally, s. 3(1)(i) 
authorized the Governor in Council to “add or remove anything from the schedule”. However, to 
“add any material” had a different literal meaning than to “add anything, including new parts.” 
Indeed, his construction of “any material” was inconsistent with National Health’s own position a 
few years later (after Lancaster had retired). As explained in a 1949 journal article by its then 
legal advisor Robert Curran, “the Department interpreted the word ‘material’ to mean drugs or 
classifications of drugs”.78  That interpretation of “any material” to mean any material substance 
in the form of drugs is, literally, more defensible than “the parts comprising the schedule”.  
Driedger sought to bolster this questionable literal construction with a purposive one, opining 
that the purpose of the 1934 amendment adding s. 3(1)(i) to the Act was “to provide flexibility 
necessary to meet changing conditions resulting from advancements in science and alterations 
for trade conditions”. Anticipating the question of why flexibility would somehow be frustrated by 
having to add the Canadian Supplement drugs to existing Parts of Schedule B, he wrote that the 
“Department does not wish to include them in the existing parts because then it would be 
necessary to revise completely the existing regulations.” Without any further elaboration, this 
logic is flawed, as listing drugs in the existing parts of Schedule B did not trigger any regulatory 
action – listing was just a precondition for those drugs to be regulated later, if so desired. As he 
had discussed doing with Lancaster, Driedger also removed most preambular recitals from the 
draft order amending Schedule B, ensuring it was silent on its doubtful source of authority.  
                                                          
75 For discussion of this 1934 amendment, see Chapter 3, section 1, particularly the content associated with notes 63-64. 
76 December 1943 memo to file by Lancaster, in National Health’s Parenteral Drug Regulations File, 1943-1944. 
77 December 15, 1943 opinion letter from Driedger to Varcoe, in EA Driedger’s Schedule B File, 1943. For further context, see 
also National Health’s Parenteral Drug Regulations File, 1943-1944. 
78 Curran 1949 at 403. Additionally, in his later book, Curran characterized s. 3(1)(i) as “merely authority to enable Schedule B to 
be kept up-to-date and to be amended in such as way as the public interest may demand”, and he did not mention the 
provision in his discussion of the various “important sections” added to the Act in 1934; see Curran 1953 at 154, 178. 
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Through ongoing and routine interactions with departmental and DOJ solicitors on the ever-
increasing volume of subordinate legislation being enacted under the Food and Drugs Act, 
National Health officials were coming to register the significance of this emerging technique of 
stripping enactments’ preambular recitals of references to sources of authority.79 For example, 
when later briefing Aime Valin, then in his role as the new Chief Dominion Analyst after 
Lancaster’s retirement in 1945, Davidson carefully emphasized that the recitals in the order 
amending Schedule B had intentionally referred only to the Act generally and not to any specific 
sections of it. Silencing the recitals was, in this time, becoming a quotidian practice increasingly 
employed by National Health to enact delegated drug standards and thus to materialize drugs. 
With no consultation within the wider Department on the contents or purpose of Part V, the 
(silenced) order amending Schedule B was made on January 11, 1944.80 Before that date, sex 
hormones and estrogens had never been mentioned in Schedule B. After that date, with the 
addition of sex hormones to Part II, and of oestrone, oestradiol benzoate, stilboestrol, and 
stilboestrol dipropionate to Part V, the statutory scene changed from one of estrogen-deficiency 
to hormonal excess. The enactment of estrogenic multiplicity was not accidental; or, put more 
accurately, Lancaster and other departmental officials on the Committee were aware that 
estrogen was assuming multiple identities in Schedule B.81  
National Health was now ready to incorporate into law the Canadian Supplement, with its 
pharmacopoeial monographs for each of the drugs listed in the new Part V. On April 11, 1944, 
the Canadian Supplement to the British Pharmacopoeia received legal imprimatur as Division III 
of the Food and Drug Regulations.82 Once again, the order in council enacting the Supplement 
as part of the regulations was stripped of any content referencing its dubious source of statutory 
authority.83 Henderson and Lancaster’s plan had finally come to fruition. Nonetheless, as with 
the orders creating the Committee and Part V of Schedule B, departmental and DOJ solicitors 
                                                          
79 For recent socio-legal work examining the co-production of legal drafting, technicalities, and form, on the one hand, and time 
on the other, see Emily Grabham, “Time and technique: the legal lives of the 26-week qualifying period” (2016) 45:3-4 Econ Soc 
379; see also Grabham 2016. For other leading scholarship on legal technicalities that bridges law, anthropology, and STS, see 
Annelise Riles, “New agenda for the cultural study of law: Taking on the technicalities” (2005) 53:3 Buffalo LR 973; and Annelise 
Riles, “Infinity within the brackets” (1998) 25:3 Am Ethnol 378. 
80 PC 1944-96 (10 January 1944), Canada Gazette, Vol LXXVIII, No 4, at p 354 (January 22, 1944). See also Chapter 2, note 16, 
and see National Health’s Parenteral Drug Regulations File, 1943-1944. The publication of this order caused internal confusion 
within National Health. Superintendents of Laboratory from two regional offices each wrote to Lancaster and Valin in February 
1944 seeking explanation as to why Part V had been added, what its significance was, and where to find any associated 
standards for the drugs listed; see National Health’s Parenteral Drug Regulations File, 1943-1944.  
81 See e.g. Lancaster’s comments to Davidson in June 1944, conveyed in a letter to Professor Henderson, regarding the future 
possibility of amalgamating the multiple standards that had emerged for sex hormones and other drugs as a consequence of 
National Health and the Committee’s recent regulatory enactments; in Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1944.  
82 PC 1944-2515 (11 April 1944), Canada Gazette, Vol LXXVIII, No 30, at p 2983 (July 22, 1944). 
83 Neither s 3(i) nor s 6(3) were mentioned, although some words from each found their way into the preamble; ibid. 
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considered that much of the Canadian Supplement was legally invalid, and to obscure this, they 
deployed the same technique of erasing uncomfortable information from preambular recitals. 
Davidson approached National Health’s solicitor in February 17, 1944, proposing to insert 
the Supplement and its monographs as a new Division III of the Food and Drug Regulations, for 
the purpose of creating legally binding standards for the drugs recently listed in Part V. 
Davidson explained to Gunn that the monographs first defined each drug substance, followed 
by a description of what each substance “must contain when assayed by a certain method”. Still 
doubtful of the approach, Gunn suggested it might be better to amend the Act, but recognizing 
this was not desirable, he began working to finalize Davidson’s proposed regulation.84 It is 
unclear whether Davidson told Gunn, though, of the recent developments in Britain regarding 
estrogen; by this time, Davidson had received the British Pharmacopoeia Commission’s draft 
monographs for its seventh addendum, which included draft monographs for oestrone and 
oestradiol benzoate. While taking pains to note its considerable agreement with the Canadian 
Supplement’s monographs, the British Pharmacopoeia Commission stressed that Britain had 
“definitely abandoned” biological methods of defining and testing oestrone and oestradiol 
benzoate, and were treating them as “pure chemical substances”. Likewise for DES, while 
noting Canada’s use of a biological test, it advised that the “intention of the Commission is to 
continue treating this substance as a pure chemical compound and to rely on chemical tests.”85 
Perhaps unaware of this development, Gunn forwarded to DOJ his draft regulation for 
enacting the Canadian Supplement. His draft preambles stated, among other things, that these 
regulations defined official methods for biological testing of the drugs listed in Part V. In early 
March 1944, DOJ signed off on these proposed regulations.86 Yet, likely spurred by reflection on 
the British Pharmacopoeia Commission’s letter, National Health officials identified a validity 
concern soon thereafter. On March 15, 1944, the Assistant Chief Dominion Analyst, Aime Valin, 
alerted the Departmental Secretary that, while the Act empowered regulations mandating 
biological testing methods for drugs,87 the “great majority” of the substances described in the 
Canadian Supplement monographs were “not susceptible to biological assay, but are tested by 
chemical methods only”. Having absorbed the practice of erasing evidence of invalidity from the 
                                                          
84 February 17, 1944 memo to file by Gunn, in (Possibly) Morrell’s Committee file, 1942-1943. 
85 Ibid. Davidson replied to the British Pharmacopoeia Commission on February 17, 1944, the same date as his meeting with 
Gunn, so estrogen would have been on his mind. His letter, while addressing many substances, does not mention the countries’ 
divergent approaches to defining oestrone, oestradiol benzoate or stilboestrol; see Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1944. 
86 National Health’s Parenteral Drug Regulations File, 1943-1944. 
87 Food and Drugs Act, s. 6(3)(b); see discussion in Chapter 3, section 1, particularly the content associated with notes 39-48. 
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face of delegated legislation, Valin concluded his letter by suggesting that the word “biological” 
be deleted from the regulation’s preambular recitals.88 
Despite that the Act expressly conferred power to prescribe only biological testing methods, 
DOJ agreed to this deletion.89 Thus, spurred by National Health officials’ reflection on divergent 
testing methods for estrogens, Canada knowingly enacted regulations that defined chemical 
testing methods for many Canadian Supplement drugs (if not for estrogens themselves), 
pursuant to a provision that empowered it only to define biological testing methods. In 1944, 
National Health’s practice of erasing, from delegated legislation’s preambles, reference to 
statutory provisions that provided only questionable legal authority was becoming entrenched. 
Another regulatory practice relied on by National Health officials, surprising from today’s 
vantage point, was their habit of engaging solicitors very late in the regulatory day. As with the 
decision to create the Committee, discussed in the last chapter, Gunn was consulted at the end 
of the process, rather than at a stage when officials were identifying and developing options for 
incorporating the Canadian Supplement into law. Only after these officials had settled on their 
desired option, and prepared a rough draft of the regulation, did they seek their solicitor’s 
approval. Such practices risked solidifying path-dependence, fostering hesitance on the part of 
departmental solicitors to scuttle long-identified but legally invalid regulatory plans, and creating 
resistance among bureaucrats to legal advice that arrives late and is perceived as an 
impediment. This practice was viewed as enough of a barrier to coherent policy development 
and regulatory drafting that, by 1946, DOJ would create a new Legislative Section, with 
Driedger at its head, to discipline the preparation of all legislation. By the early 1950s, in an 
apparent effort to solidify this practice, Driedger was publicly emphasizing the need to involve 
departmental lawyers in policy decisions and for earlier involvement of legislative counsel.90  
In February 1944, at the same time that National Health food and drug officials were working 
to enact the Canadian Supplement, they were also facing requests from other units within the 
Department to further revise Part II of Schedule B, which had just been amended in January. 
The Part II amendments were short-lived due to wider Departmental reaction to how parenteral 
products had been addressed.91 As noted, senior Departmental laboratory officials had been 
                                                          
88 March 15, 1943 letter from Valin to Barlow, in National Health’s Parenteral Drug Regulations File, 1943-1944. 
89 March 28, 1943 letter from DOJ Deputy Minister Varcoe to Gunn, in National Health’s Parenteral Drug Regulations File, 1943-
1944. In later writing, Driedger characterized this issue of the vires of a regulation, in a situation where an act expressly confers 
power, as a simple question (in contrast to the more difficult issue of where a statute does not explicitly confer power to make 
a certain type of regulation); see Driedger 1960 at 22-27.  
90 Driedger 1953 at 38-41. 
91 Parenteral drugs are those administered by injection, either intravenously or intramuscularly. 
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taken aback and confused by the surprise amendments to Schedule B.92 In particular, the Chief 
of the Laboratory of Hygiene, Dr. G. Donald W. Cameron, advocated for replacing the two 
paragraphs in Part II – the first on animal tissue preparations (now including “sex hormones”), 
the second on parenteral products serving as anti-allergens and antibacterials (in particular, 
penicillin) – with one paragraph capturing all parenterals, including sex hormones. 93 It is hard to 
discern what motivated Cameron’s position, beyond perhaps frustration at not being consulted. 
It seemed counterproductive to his own staff’s simultaneous efforts to finalize the draft Sex 
Hormone Regulations, which were meant to control not only parenterally administered products 
but the newer oral products made of DES or conjugated equine estrogens. Whatever the 
motivation, Cameron’s reaction and Lancaster’s counterreaction render visible yet further 
multiple versions of estrogen, as a substance to be taken orally or injected intramuscularly. 
Aiming to correct Cameron’s impression that Part II covered only parenteral products, on 
February 4, 1944, Lancaster dictated a memo to Davidson from a hospital bed at the Ottawa 
Civic.94 Emphasizing that each of the two paragraphs of Part II covered drugs with many modes 
of administration, he explained that some kinds of sex hormones were not administered only by 
injection, and further that some penicillin preparations were anticipated for topical use. With that 
clarification, senior departmental officials then reached agreement that Part II should be revised 
such that the first paragraph would still list animal tissue preparations (including sex hormones) 
however administered, and the second should control all parenteral preparations.95 Accordingly, 
Part II was amended again, in May 1944.96 While not National Health’s intention, it became 
arguable that both paragraphs of Part II covered injectable estrogenic drugs. 
These efforts to revise Part II, in the spring of 1944, can be viewed as a simple matter of 
clarifying legislative text or of remedying insufficient internal consultation. Beyond this, however, 
                                                          
92 See supra note 80. 
93 National Health’s Parenteral Drug Regulations File, 1943-1944. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. Additionally, Mr. Papineau-Couture, the Superintendent of Laboratory in Montreal, raised further issues with the clarity 
and scope of Part II in March 1944, identifying how the French version had been drafted with a narrower meaning than the 
English version. An erratum correcting the French version was published in the Canada Gazette on April 8, 1944. 
96 PC 1944-3308 (4 May 1944), Canada Gazette, Vol LXXVIII, No 21, at 2104 (May 20, 1944); see also Chapter 2, note 16. This 
amendment to Schedule B replaced Part II, as last amended through the January 11, 1944 order, with the following: 
“Preparations of Pituitary, Adrenals, Sex Hormones and any other animal tissue preparations or any synthetics 
purporting to have physiological action similar to any of the foregoing. 
Drugs of natural or synthetic origin, which are not hypodermic tablets, and which purport to be sterile and which are 
intended for parenteral administrations, including application to open wounds, alone or with any added solvent, 
diluent, preservative or other substance and including products for the treatment of allergy and anti-bacterial 
products of the growth of fungi or of bacteria (or which penicillin is an example), their salts, derivatives and any 
preparations containing any of them.”   
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they illustrate conceptual confusion about “sex hormones”, and furthermore, the ontological 
plasticity and adaptability of estrogen in its multiple modes. The Chief of the Laboratory of 
Hygiene viewed hormones as animal tissue preparations to be administered by injection. Yet, by 
this time, estrogens were being summoned synthetically. Further, the many modes of 
administering estrogen to human bodies – oral, parenteral, topical – were growing as diverse as 
their many modes of bureaucratic administration. These multiple drug forms were different 
estrogens. Even when products contained the same active ingredients, diverse modes of 
administration arose from and fostered divergent clinical, manufacturing, advertising and 
regulatory practices, and elicited varied effects in human and nonhuman bodies. 97  
Resistant to simple categorizations and materializations, estrogens continued to multiply 
with the enactment, in 1944, of the Sex Hormone Regulations. Since January 1943, these 
regulations had been National Health officials’ desired means to define and control sex hormone 
preparations, although they had backed down and acceded to the view of Henderson and other 
Committee members that oestrone, oestradiol benzoate, stilboestrol, and stilboestrol 
dipropionate should be standardized through monographs in the Canadian Supplement. In 
contrast to the Supplement and Part V, though, the Sex Hormone Regulations faced the reverse 
reception from DOJ. As will be seen, not only did concern with the legal validity of these 
Regulations multiply estrogen’s potencies, but these regulations also ushered in a new type of 
label that laid the groundwork for an early experiment with risk regulation in Canada. 
The vires debates to this point, regarding Canadian drug standards proposed in 1944, were 
about the scope of authority to regulate. There had been no express and arguably no implied 
authority to add Part V to Schedule B, and similarly no authority to prescribe chemical rather 
than biological test methods in the Canadian Supplement. The Sex Hormone Regulations raised 
a new vires concern, regarding the validity of subdelegating standard setting. The peak of WWII 
proved, not surprisingly,98 to be a critical moment in Canadian legal history for bolstering power 
to subdelegate to officials.99 In January 1943, the Supreme Court of Canada decided the 
Chemicals Reference. The federal government had referred questions to the Court regarding 
the validity of regulations, made by the Governor in Council under the War Measures Act, 
                                                          
97 In the context of oral contraception in Brazil, see Sanabria 2016 at 159, critiquing constructions of “similarity” in the Pill built 
only upon the active ingredient which fail to consider how diverse marketing and packaging practices produce different objects. 
98 See e.g. S.A. de Smith, “’Rule of Law’, Book Review of Rule of Law: A Study by the Inns of Court of the Conservative and 
Unionist Society” (1955) 69:2 Harv L Rev 396, observing at 398 that, with the start of WWII, parties to the long-standing prewar 
debate about the merits and validity of delegation were increasingly ready to “concede wide regulatory powers to the state”. 
99 It is not my goal here to trace changes in the delegatus rule over time, but rather to assess the likely influences on Elmer 
Driedger when he rendered his opinion, in 1944, that the potency provision of the Sex Hormone Regulations was ultra vires. 
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allowing civil servants to regulate the wartime control of chemicals, and the validity of an order 
thereunder, by the Controller of Chemicals, controlling production and consumption of glycerine. 
The Court held that, under the War Measures Act, the regulation granting civil servants power to 
legislate was valid.100 Despite that the statute did not contain express authority to sub-delegate 
this power to administrators, reading across the opinions, it appears this authority was found to 
be implicit in the broad statutory delegation granted by Parliament to the Governor in Council.  
On the heels of the decision, John Willis, at that time a professor at Dalhousie University’s 
Faculty of Law, quickly wrote Delegatus Non Potest Delegare.101 Published in March 1943, his 
short article effectively synthesized the “rule” against sub-delegation, which, in a “nutshell”, 
provided that delegated powers cannot be further delegated.102 In Willis’ articulation, the sub-
delegation rule was at best a presumption or maxim of statutory construction, which could be 
displaced by express statutory language or the wider context or purpose of the statute. He 
argued that lawyers and judges would need to balance the maxim against a recognition of the 
complexities and virtues of “modern government agencies”, adopting constructions that “best 
accord with the facts of government” and that enabled expert civil servants to do their jobs.  
For Willis, a legal realist and defender of an expanding administrative state,103 the 
Chemicals Reference decision was a godsend. Willis “took the case as his point of departure 
and used it as a principal buttress for his conclusions”, and in no small measure due to his 
article, the case has since been cast as a leading authority on sub-delegation.104 However, and 
as persuasively shown by John Mark Keyes, armed with the unusually broad and explicit power 
of the War Measures Act, in fact it seems that “the majority of the court considered the maxim to 
be entirely irrelevant”. Of the five concurring opinions, Chief Justice Duff “did not even mention 
it”; Justices Rinfret, Davis, and Kerwin “found the Governor in Council's powers to be so broad 
that there was no need to consider the maxim”; and only Justice Hudson gave any detailed 
consideration to the delegatus rule.105 As Keyes concludes, “[t]he only generally applicable 
                                                          
100 Reference as to the Validity of the Regulations in Relation to Chemicals Enacted by Order in Council and of an Order of the 
Controller of Chemicals Made Pursuant Thereto, [1943] SCR 1. Only paragraph 4 of the regulation was held to be ultra vires. 
101 Willis 1943. Willis had also written an earlier article on delegation, published in the US ten years earlier and less frequently 
cited; see John Willis, “The Delegation of Legislative and Judicial Powers to Administrative Bodies” (1932-1933) 18 Iowa LR 150.  
102 For readers interested in the nutshell pun, see Willis 1938 or Chapter 2, note 38. 
103 See e.g. R Blake Brown, “The Canadian Legal Realists and Administrative Law Scholarship 1930-1941” (2000) 9 Dal J Legal 
Stud 36; and R C B Risk, “Lawyers, Courts and the Rise of the Regulatory State” (1984) 9 Dal LJ 31.  
104 John Mark Keyes, “From Delegatus to the Duty to Make Law” (1987) 33 McGill LJ 49 at 65. 
105 Ibid at 65-66. 
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principle that can be extracted from the decision is that the delegatus maxim is merely a rule of 
construction that can be excluded by express or implied authority to subdelegate.”106 
Published in the Canadian Bar Review, the article certainly would have come to Driedger’s 
attention. Although no doubt greatly sympathetic, as government counsel, to Willis’ political 
project, it is less clear that Driedger would have agreed entirely, in 1944, with Willis’ analysis of 
the Chemical Reference. Writing in the same journal almost two decades later, and without 
citing Willis, Driedger drew a bolder conclusion that “there is no rule or presumption for or 
against sub-delegation”.107 He drew this conclusion even in the face of the Supreme Court later 
decision in Brent, which had invalidated regulations under the Immigration Act that unlawfully 
delegated to civil servants the Governor in Council’s powers to limit admission to the country.108 
Relying on the Chemicals Reference as his sole counterweight to Brent,109 he expressed the 
view that, rather than any presumption, “in each case it is a question of interpretation of the 
language of the particular statute.”110 Assuming that his views remained consistent over time, 
Driedger was not likely to rely on the delegatus rule in analyzing the validity of draft regulations.  
At the end of March 1944, following uneventful consultations with industry, the Sex Hormone 
Regulations were ready for that analysis. As with previous enactments, the departmental 
solicitor believed that elements of the regulations were ultra vires – although there is no record 
of him so advising food and drug officials at National Health. He raised his concerns more 
surreptitiously. When sending the draft Sex Hormone Regulations to DOJ for review, Gunn 
apparently sought to neuter the Canadian Supplement monographs for estrone, oestradiol 
benzoate and DES, and subtly characterized the regulations’ potency standards as ultra vires: 
I would ask you to consider whether it might not be desirable to have a definite 
statement in the recital to the effect that the standards of the drugs concerned are not 
otherwise dealt with by the Food and Drugs Act or the Meat and Canned Foods Act. May 
I direct your particular attention, too, to the last line of the Regulations under the caption 
“Potency”. I wonder whether Parliament would pass legislation giving to the Chief, 
Laboratory of Hygiene, this power?111  
 
                                                          
106 Ibid at 66. 
107 Driedger 1960 at 23. 
108 Attorney General of Canada v Brent, [1956] SCR 318, 2 DLR (2d) 503. 
109 Driedger 1960 at 23, with reference to the opinion of Chief Justice Duff. 
110 Ibid. 
111 March 30, 1944 letter from Gunn to DOJ Deputy Minister Varcoe, in EA Driedger’s Sex Hormone Regulations File, 1944. 
Driedger rejected this proposed recital, without giving reasons. Notably the Act already provided that Canadian standards in 
regulations took precedence over pharmacopoeial standards, making such a recital redundant; see the content associated with 
notes 39-42 in Chapter 3. This rule was complicated, though, by the fact that the pharmacopoeial standards in the Supplement 
were arguably themselves also Canadian drug standards in regulations; see the content associated with note 131 in Chapter 3. 
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The potency provision that Gunn took issue with, in section 3, provided that: 
  The units of the sex hormones for the purpose of these regulations shall be  
International Units, wherever they exist, as estimated by the methods employed in the 
Laboratory of Hygiene. In the case of products where International or Canadian 
Standards have not been established and stable standards cannot be furnished by the 
manufacturer, the methods of assay and of expressing potency shall be acceptable to 
the Chief, Laboratory of Hygiene.112  
 
Predictably, DOJ sent a question back to Gunn: were the Sex Hormone Regulations 
intended to permit the Chief to prescribe potency standards?113 When that question was 
referred to the Assistant Chief Dominion Analyst, Valin tried to justify the clause as aiming to 
ensure that manufacturers’ methods of “expressing potency or activity” of sex hormone products 
were acceptable. The clause “was inserted to prevent manufacturers using unreliable methods 
of assay and to prevent misleading and unwarranted statements as to potency for a class of 
products which are difficult to control on account of no stable or satisfactory reference standard 
being available.” Valin explained that, as the control of hormone products was “very 
complicated” and as it was “not thought advisable for the present to put them under a license”, it 
was felt necessary to give the Chief some discretionary power to scrutinize and if necessary to 
disagree with manufacturers’ methods and claims about their products’ potency.114   
Unlike with earlier enactments, this time, Driedger’s opinion was negative. In his view, the 
potency clause was invalid. Rather than the Governor in Council prescribing potency standards, 
as envisioned by the Act, the regulation subdelegated this power to a departmental official.115 
Faced with this wrinkle, National Health officials improvised. Valin proposed a solution for those 
products for which International or Canadian standards did not exist, and for which 
manufacturers could not furnish a stable standard. What if, he suggested, rather than requiring 
manufacturers to meet the Chief’s standards for measuring the activity or potency of a sex 
hormone product, Canada instead required pharmaceutical firms to attach a label to the 
product? Such a label could furnish “full details of the unit of potency employed and of the 
                                                          
112 March 1944 version of the draft Sex Hormone Regulations, in EA Driedger’s Sex Hormone Regulations File, 1944. The 
italicized text is that specific portion to which Gunn brought DOJ’s attention. 
113 April 17, 1944 letter from DOJ Deputy Minister Varcoe to Gunn, and April 20, 1944 letter from Gunn to Valin, in National 
Health’s Sex Hormone Regulations File, 1944-1945. 
114 April 24, 1944 memo from Valin to Gunn, in National Health’s Sex Hormone Regulations File, 1944-1945. On April 26, 1944, 
Gunn forwarded this memo to the Deputy Minister of DOJ, stating that it appeared to answer the question that DOJ had asked; 
see EA Driedger’s Sex Hormone Regulations File, 1944. 
115 May 4, 1944 legal opinion from Driedger to Varcoe, in EA Driedger’s Sex Hormone Regulations File, 1944. 
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method of assay used” by the firm in manufacturing the drug product.116 Driedger and Valin 
discussed the proposed solution on the phone. A few days later, Driedger gave a written opinion 
advising that the revised potency clause, which they had discussed on the phone as a “quickie 
amendment”, was unobjectionable.117 Or perhaps it was the “junkie amendment” – Valin’s 
handwritten note of the phone call is hard to decipher: 
 
Figure 5: Portion of Aime Valin’s notes of phone call with Elmer Driedger, May 1, 1944  
 
Library and Archives Canada, “Canadian Committee on Pharmaceutical (Standards – Proposed 
Regulation – Sex Hormones”, RG 29, Vol 250, File 339-4-3, reproduction copy no. e-01119340 
 
Whether quick or junk, it was made.118 On May 18, 1944, Cabinet enacted the Sex Hormone 
Regulations, complete with the clause requiring potency labelling in lieu of potency standards.119 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers were not at all displeased by this novel turn to potency 
labelling. When consulted earlier that spring on the draft regulations, some firms had sought 
additional labelling requirements. As one example, British Drug Houses (Canada) Ltd., a 
manufacturer of potent DES products, had advocated that the regulations be revised to require 
                                                          
116 Ibid. As shown by certain of the Canadian Supplement monographs, if National Health wished to prescribe potency units and 
official bioassay test methods within the regulations, it had the technical ability to do so.  
117 Ibid.  
118  PC 1944-3721 (18 May 1944), Canada Gazette, Vol LXXVIII, No 28, at p 2292 (June 3, 1944) [“Sex Hormone Regulations”]. 
The Sex Hormone Regulations were added to the Food and Drug Regulations as part of Division II. Subject to amendments, 
some of which are discussed in Chapter 5, the Sex Hormone Regulations remained in force until 1980; see SOR/80-544, s 9. 
119 Sex Hormone Regulations, s. 3.  
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that a product’s potency be indicated, both on ampoule labels and on outer box labels.120 Every 
manufacturer that commented on the draft regulations was content, in principle, with labelling 
requirements, proposing only minor adjustments.121 Manufacturers wanted to be able to market 
their products as highly potent, regardless that the methods they used to ground such claims 
might be variable, unreliable or contrary to test methods underpinning International Units. 
This turn to labelling in no way aimed to promote what, in modern parlance, might be called 
the consumer’s “right to know”. If anyone’s right to know was at issue, it was the Department’s. 
The information to be summoned by these potency labels discloses what the Department 
viewed as the problem: finding a means by which to assess pharmaceutical firms’ claims about 
their drugs. With quantitative information about potency test methods and units, National Health 
could continue its long-established way of regulating drugs through misbranding or adulteration 
rules. Labels would therefore be Department’s intelligence agents, the technology by which 
National Health officials could keep informed about what was materializing in industry’s labs.  
Born of a desire to avoid unlawfully delegating to government scientists, National Health 
instead, ironically, delegated to industry the power to set its own potency standards. By thus 
delegating the power to decide how to apprehend estrogenic activity, it was left to industry to 
decide what estrogen would be and what it would do. Furthermore, approaching delegation as 
more than an administrative law doctrine, labels also had a job to do. National Health delegated 
to industry the power to materialize potency and delegated to the new potency label the duty to 
report back on what industry was up to. Obviously, firms were required to print and affix this 
label. But the label would be an active participant in the Department’s efforts to test these firms’ 
products and claims, creating the possibility of mediation between industrial test methods and 
regulatory test methods. This form of “delegation” was also, of course, perfectly lawful.  
What is most striking about Driedger’s legal opinion on the Sex Hormone Regulations is not 
his reasoning or conclusion. Though his reasons were summary by present standards,122  
they appear unimpeachable, given the prevailing views on sub-delegation and his own more 
statutorily-driven interpretive approach. Rather, what is remarkable is the persistent silence, in 
Driedger’s and National Health’s files, on the consequences of his opinion for other biologics. In 
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the preceding decade, under the same enabling provision, Canada standardized the potency of 
biological drugs, from digitalis to thyroid to epinephrine, using a clause very similar to that which 
Driedger concluded was invalid for sex hormones.123 In the Biologicals Regulation, as it had 
been amended in 1934 and again in 1942,124 Cabinet had repeatedly delegated its power to 
prescribe methods for testing drugs’ potencies to the Chief of the Laboratory of Hygiene. 
Perhaps Driedger was unaware that a similar clause was in place for many other drugs on 
Schedule B. But Lancaster, Valin, Davidson, and the Food and Drug Division knew. Having 
received an opinion indirectly confirming that National Health’s approach to potency standards 
for many drugs was unlawful, they did nothing. They did not bring the issue to the attention of 
Driedger or the departmental solicitor. They did not bring it to the attention of the Committee. 
They did not fix the invalid aspects of the Biologicals Regulation. Sex hormones – mostly 
estrogenic products and administered almost exclusively to women – were put in a class of their 
own. These “drugs for women” were the only drugs for which National Health would claim that it 
could not require industry to meet departmentally determined methods for testing potency. 
 That estrogen was singled out for lesser regulatory treatment is confirmed when 
considering other regulations made within weeks of the Sex Hormone Regulations. In the spring 
of 1944, these other regulations either maintained government supervision over industry’s 
methods of testing potency or continued to subdelegate power to prescribe potency tests to 
departmental scientists. In 1944, National Health recommended and Cabinet regulated new 
dose and potency standards for injectable liver extract.125 Initially, the regulatory proposal was to 
limit the potency of liver extract sold in Canada to three strengths, and to make the usual sub-
delegation to allow the Laboratory of Hygiene to set the test method.126 The final regulation, in 
March 1944, continued to set three doses of liver extract injectable;127 with respect to potency 
testing, it now required manufacturers to demonstrate acceptable potency as a condition of 
                                                          
123 Chapter 3, section 1, particularly the content associated with notes 59-70. 
124 Regulations for Fixing Standards of Quality and Potency, and Defining Official Methods of Biological Testing of Drugs 
Mentioned or Described in Parts I and II of Schedule B of the Food and Drugs Act, RS 1927; and Regulations for the Licensing, 
Manufacture and Sale of Drugs Listed in Parts II and III, Schedule B of the Food and Drugs Act, RS 1927, PC 1942-9056 (6 
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125 Liver extract injectable had already been regulated in the 1942 Biologicals Regulation, ibid, at p 25. Section 3 of the 1944 
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satisfy the Deputy Minister of National Health that its manufacturing and test methods resulted in a drug producing a 
satisfactory clinical and hematopoietic response to pernicious anemia. This largely qualitative approach was likely difficult to 
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126 For records of the Committee’s discussions regarding revisions to the liver extract injectable regulations, see (Possibly) 
Morrell’s Committee file, 1942-1943 and Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943. Discussion here on liver extract is necessarily summary. 
127 PC 1944-2195 (27 March 1944), s 1, Canada Gazette, Vol LXXVIII, No 16, p 1553 (April 15, 1944), providing that “Liver Extract 
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license, to submit bioassay protocols every two years for approval, and to notify and obtain 
approval of the Deputy Minister of changed manufacturing methods that could affect potency.128 
In short, without prescribing test methods, National Health was still required to approve or reject 
the potency of liver extract products. Even more blatantly, in June 1944, National Health 
subdelegated to departmental scientists the power to set bioassay tests for penicillin. Critical to 
treating injured soldiers during WWII, penicillin attracted significant regulatory attention from 
National Health in 1943-1944, with draft regulations first considered by the Committee in June 
1943,129 and with penicillin added to Part II of Schedule B of the Act in January 1944.130 To 
obtain advice on a regulatory approach to penicillin – and in particular to determine how to 
regulate dosage, reference standards, and potency testing – the Department called a special 
meeting of the Committee and other experts on June 10, 1944.131 Despite the opinion received 
from Driedger a month earlier, the Committee, including National Health members, 
recommended that the methods for testing potency of penicillin be delegated to the Laboratory 
of Hygiene.132 Made in September 1944, the penicillin regulations did precisely what DOJ and 
departmental solicitors had only just concluded was unlawful with respect to sex hormones.133  
This chapter’s thick description of Canadian regulators’ standardization practices, in 1943-
1944, displaces conventional understandings of drugs. Rather than stable substances with 
inherent properties that produce predictable effects, estrogen and its effects acted, and were 
enacted, in relation to other actors and practices. The drug standards resulting from these 
practices were themselves recipes for potent socio-material realities. Returning to the idea that 
biological standardization performs what a drug is by apprehending what a drug does – its 
activity, capacity, potency – the ontic potential of potency labels becomes evident. Estrogen was 
what estrogen did. And deciding what estrogen did was delegated to industry. Going back to an 
earlier equine metaphor, despite having no ability to close the regulatory barn door before the 
pharmaceutical “horse” bolted, Canada nonetheless handed over to industry its extant powers 
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to decide what a horse could do. Estrogen was subject to different regulatory practices than any 
other drug in Canada in the 1940s. This differential treatment is troubling when one considers 
that, in contrast to those biological drugs that regulators worried would lose their potency or that 
were the subject of exaggerated potency claims by industry, estrogen was known to be highly 
potent and harmful at high doses. 
Besides, it is not as if industry was given power to test the potency of estrogenic products 
for which National Health had nonetheless set mandatory doses.134 As will now be analysed, the 
Sex Hormone Regulations were unusual in their definitions, vague on reference materials, and 
silent on dose. If the dose made the poison – as it was thought to for estrogen – the Regulations 
gave exclusive rights to pharmaceutical firms to make and measure their poison. 
 
3. Substituting labels for standards: the Sex Hormone Regulations, May 1944  
The provision that delegated power to materialize potency to industry, requiring labels in lieu 
of prescribing test methods, was not enacted alone. Section 3 had relatives, three to be precise, 
in the form of three other provisions. How did this provision relate to the rest of the Sex 
Hormone Regulations? How did the regulations, as a whole, enact estrogen and its effects? 
Empowered by the regulations, what could estrogen become – what was it activated to do – in 
bodies, clinics, laboratories, factories, markets, or homes, in the 1940s in Canada?  
There are two directions from which such questions can be productively contemplated. First, 
I address some of the coordination efforts at work in the Sex Hormone Regulations, through the 
unusual definition of “sex hormones” and the vague requirement for reference standards, and 
how these provisions aimed to secure sex hormones as fixed, given, and natural. Second, I 
identify some critical absences, namely a lack of certain regulatory controls commonly used to 
protect Canadians from potent or unstable biologics in the 1940s. In light of these novel 
regulatory elements, I evaluate whether the Sex Hormone Regulations actually created any 
“drug standards” at all, which I approach by considering their “special labelling provision” and 
labelling’s role in creating market access for products “standardized” through naming practices. 
The section concludes by addressing the “caution label” rule. Historically noteworthy as the first 
example under the Food and Drugs Act of labels being deployed to responsibilize consumers, 
the caution label functions as a cautionary fable, reminding us that mandatory labels on 
consumer products can originate as substitutes for or alternatives to safety standards.  
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As will now be evident, the Sex Hormone Regulations were made under statutory provisions 
empowering the Governor in Council to set standards for quality,135 and potency, of biological 
drugs. As an exercise in standardization, however, these Regulations were curious. In fact, 
compared to Canadian drug standards of the time, whether with respect to definitions, reference 
standards, dose, licensing, or labelling, the Sex Hormone Regulations were unique. Returning 
to Busch’s typology, as already seen, the regulations did not create filter standards for potency, 
meaning estrogenic drugs were not required to meet any quality-driven test for estrogenic 
activity, as expressed using any specific potency unit. Nor, relatedly, did these regulations rely 
on typical logics underpinning what Busch calls industrial standards, which aim to ensure 
products as all “the same”. Leaving aside potency, what other standards were enacted by the 
Sex Hormone Regulations? On their face, the regulations might be said to standardize estrogen 
through two means: a definition of sex hormones,136 and the provision of reference standards.137  
Definitions perform critical ontological and political work in regulatory regimes. They do not 
just reflect but also provoke and spur into action the objects being regulated, which in turn 
stimulates policy choices on how to control those objects.138 Ontological description drives 
regulatory prescription and vice versa.139 In the Sex Hormone Regulations, “sex hormone” was 
defined, and marshalled as an object for regulation, to “include all products synthetic or natural 
purporting to have oestrogenic, androgenic, gonadotrophic and progestational properties”.  
Under the Food and Drugs Act, biological drugs had been commonly defined with reference 
to their plant, animal, or bacterial source material; sometimes these definitions were augmented 
by indicating a requisite method of extraction from that source.140 Furthermore, a few biological 
drugs included in their definitions a reference to the disease that the drug was used to treat; for 
example, insulin was defined as the active principle of the pancreas that affects the metabolism 
of carbohydrates in the animal body and is of value in the treatment of diabetes.141 By contrast, 
sex hormones were defined only in reference to their purported properties – an estrogenic sex 
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hormone was something purporting to have estrogenic properties. This was a wholly novel 
approach to defining a drug under the Food and Drugs Act.142 In the food and drug context, the 
regulatory genesis of the word “purporting” was the January 1944 amendment to Part II of 
Schedule B. To that list of animal tissue preparations, this amendment had added the clause “or 
any synthetics purporting to have physiological action similar to any of the foregoing”.143 Thus, 
the construction of sex hormones as products with purported properties is a direct legacy of 
DES. DES was the reason for the synthetics clause added to Part II of Schedule B, and, as of 
1944, DES appeared to be the only synthetic hormone being marketed as a drug in Canada.144   
To modern ears, the word purporting has a pejorative ring, evoking falsehood or pretense. 
To National Health officials in the 1940s, however, the word articulated the concept of 
“represented” or “claimed” properties.145 An industry-made product would become a “sex 
hormone” if its manufacturer represented it to have estrogenic properties, and estrogenic 
properties were those capacities apprehended through a continued legacy of diverse bioassays 
for potency. Pugsley himself had described this as “a chaotic state of affairs”.146 However, with 
the choice of potency tests now confirmed, by law, to be delegated to manufacturers, this chaos 
would continue. Bringing the ontological politics of the Sex Hormone Regulations into clearer 
perspective, the definition of “sex hormone” reaffirmed that power over what an estrogen was, 
and what it could do, would be held by industry. National Health’s concern was not “what should 
sex hormones be”, but “how can we measure whatever industry claims is a sex hormone?”  
The second way that the Sex Hormone Regulations appeared, superficially, to standardize 
estrogen was through reference standards.147 For most drugs standardized by the Biologicals 
Regulation, an official standard was prescribed to be the reference material stored at the 
Laboratory of Hygiene and available upon request.148 Although the Sex Hormone Regulations 
similarly indicated that reference materials would be kept by the Laboratory of Hygiene, they 
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148 See Chapter 3, section 1, particularly the content associated with notes 60-62. 
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went on to provide, unusually, that either “International standards or Canadian Standards must 
be used wherever they exist”. Further, the provision stipulated that if neither of these materials 
existed “the manufacturer shall be required to submit a suitable quantity of his product to be 
used as a standard for checking the uniformity of that product”. This was vague, to say the least. 
Translated, the legal standard was one of two reference materials without saying which one; 
and where neither existed, the standard would be whatever a manufacturer chose to submit.   
What was enacted by such “standards”? If anything, they provoked multiplicity, uncertainty, 
irregularity, even ungovernability. Seven years later, Pugsley would admit as much, 
acknowledging that under the Sex Hormone Regulations, “[t]he provision of reference standards 
for these preparations has been a difficult problem”.149 Though claiming that many problems had 
been solved by manufacturers supplying reference material for their products,150 he nonetheless 
conceded that this problem continued for Premarin and other conjugated estrogenic drugs: 
The problem of adequately describing the unit of potency for products currently 
described as oestrogenic substances, and prepared as a concentrate of human or 
equine pregnancy urine, has not been solved to date. In the absence of significant 
amounts of material, considered by most authorities not to occur naturally in the urine, 
the stand has been adopted that the potency of these products is best described with 
reference to the International Standard Oestrone.151 
Pugsley was by no means the only scientist to acknowledge this problem, as researchers 
struggled to propose defensible bioassay methods for standardizing orally-administered 
conjugated estrogens and revealed that very few manufacturers’ products corresponded to their 
labelled potency.152 Unbeknownst to Pugsley, this problem would remain a challenge long into 
the future; even today, there is no defined reference standard available for Premarin.153    
The Sex Hormone Regulations are all too easy to identify as a failure of standardization. 
What if, however, one takes estrogen seriously as a bio-social actor? As an active participant in 
                                                          
149 Pugsley 1951 at 533. Valin had also acknowledged, prior to the making of the regulations, that sex hormone products, as a 
class, were “difficult to control” precisely because manufacturers had not made available stable or satisfactory reference 
standards; see April 24, 1944 memo from Valin to Gunn, in National Health’s Sex Hormone Regulations File, 1944-1945. 
150 Ibid at 534. 
151 Ibid at 535.  
152 See e.g. Lawrence & Chapman 1952.  
153 Q. Ashton Actor, Endometrial Cancer: New Insights for the Healthcare Professional, 2013 ed. (Atlanta, GA: ScholarlyEditions, 
2013) at 100: “The estrogenic content of PMU varies even with respect to the currently marketed product PREMARIN. The total 
estrogen content varies as well as the presence or absence of some of the estrogenic components depending upon the mare, 
and what stage of pregnancy the mare is in when the urine is collected. Thus, the simple extraction of ‘estrogens’ or 
‘conjugated estrogens’ leads to a conjugated estrogen product that varies both in relative concentration (one steroid 
component relative to another steroid component) as well as in the presence of a number of the ‘estrogenic species’ (some 
species may be missing from one batch and present in another. This had lead to difficulties in the development of a generic 
equivalent of PREMARIN, mostly because of the lack of a defined reference standard and the complex nature of the product.” 
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the always cultural, historical, and gendered performance of socio-material realities?154 
Springing from many sources, functional through many forms, estrogen was hard to pin down. 
Materialized through the measurements of bioassays, estrogen’s effects within nonhuman and 
human bodies – and thus its very identities – were performed in encounters and in intra-actions. 
Refracted this way, through Barad or Haraway, estrogen does not precede or pre-exist its bodily 
or regulatory relations.155 Might this cause one to see the Sex Hormone Regulations differently? 
Well, perhaps. After all, in defining a sex hormone as that which purports to have estrogenic 
properties, the question of estrogen’s effects was left open, and this accords, in many ways, 
with a material-semiotic account of pharmaceuticals’ “properties” as constituted through their 
social, legal, economic, informational, and bodily relations.156 At the risk of presentism, it is now 
known that oestrone, oestradiol benzoate, DES, Premarin, and all the other estrogenic products, 
in their myriad forms – let alone all the (other) industrial chemicals that mimic estrogen – have a 
huge range of bodily effects, some of which lie latent for decades or are transgenerational.157 To 
a lesser extent, though, estrogen’s diverse effects were also understood in 1944, as shown in 
the historical accounts. Indeed, growing knowledge of diverse effects resulted directly from the 
same multiplicity of bioassay methods that, in the Sex Hormone Regulations, the Department 
chose not to stabilize. Further, the plethora of bioassays, while characterized some laboratory 
scientists who desired homogeneity as chaotic, had benefits for pharmaceutical innovation 
“since they became almost indispensable for assessing the diversity of functions – and therefore 
the diversity of indications – that potent physiological agents could display”.158  
In performing estrogen as open-ended, and with multiple and relational effects, the 
regulatory definition of “sex hormone” also declined to enact any clear nature-culture divide. 
Instead, it held “natural” and “synthetic” estrogens tightly together. Discourses on endocrine 
disruption that insistently separate natural hormones from synthetic chemicals have no 
resonance in these regulations; those desensitized to the ontological politics of DES or 
Premarin might even proclaim that they enact an estrogenic natureculture.159 Alternatively, 
following Oudshoorn and Mol,160 this estrogenic unity is best understood as an accomplishment. 
                                                          
154 See Chapter 1, section 1.i., particularly the content associated with notes 23-33. 
155 Barad 2003; and Haraway 2008.  
156 See Chapter 1, section 2.i., particularly the content associated with notes 138-144, and section 2.iii., particularly the content 
associated with notes 209-212. 
157 See e.g. Liboiron 2016 at 97-98. 
158 Gaudillière 2010 at 176. 
159 See Chapter 2, section 2.1., particularly the content associated with notes 156-165. 
160 See Chapter 1, section 1.i. and section 2.i.  
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The multiple bioassays and the chemical tests, the synthesis in labs and the collection of urine 
in horse stables, the injections by doctors and tablets from drug stores, these practices that 
enacted estrogens were numerous, varied, and often incompatible. To make diverse estrogens 
hang together, as “sex hormones” rather than as a swelling miscellany, National Health tried 
through this definition to present estrogen, natural and synthetic, as one singularity. Such 
coordination efforts performed sex hormones as stable, ahistorical, given by nature.  
Whether reflecting naturecultures or naturalizing drugs for diseases that did not yet exist, the 
Sex Hormone Regulations did not only rely on novel standardization techniques and definitions. 
They also relied on two absences: silence on dose, and a refusal to license sex hormones. In 
Canada, dose specifications were a relatively common approach used to protect consumers 
from potent or unstable drugs.  For pharmacologists and physicians in the 1940s, the safety of a 
potent drug was a function of its dose (and relatedly, of dosage administered over time). 
Discovering the relationship between dose and response was the magic key that would unlock 
the mystery of when a drug stopped being safe and instead became a hazard. Researchers 
strove mightily to determine and to document the safe therapeutic dose range for a drug; as 
seen, the Canadian Supplement monographs for oestrone, oestradiol benzoate, stilboestrol, 
and stilboestrol diproprionate all set dose ranges for intramuscular injection.161 Likewise, for 
many other biologics regulated in the 1940s, whether in the Canadian Supplement or the 
Biologicals Regulation, dose was defined.162 Dose was so central to safety that, in 1942, 
Canada enacted new regulations prescribing minimum and maximum dosage limits, in tablets, 
capsules, ampoules, and other forms of administration, for some 70 drugs.163 However, sex 
hormones did not make the cut, then or in later amendments to the dosage regulations.164  
Why did National Health not prescribe dose for sex hormone products, in the Sex Hormone 
Regulations? One might be tempted to conclude that Committee members assumed physicians 
would supervise dosage, tinkering with the amount of estrogen that they administered as their 
patients responded or had undesired “side effects”. That might be a safe assumption by the 
mid-1950s, when sex hormones became prescription drugs, but in 1944, it was not. One lone 
Committee member had advocated that sex hormones be sold only on prescription, yet his 
                                                          
161 The Canadian Supplement monograph for stilboestrol included dose ranges which also covered oral administration. 
162 For such an amendment to the Biologicals Regulation concurrent with the Sex Hormone Regulations, see supra note 127.  
163 PC 1942-9056 (6 October 1942), Canada Gazette, Vol LXXVI, No 181, Extra, at pp 21-32 (October 16, 1942). 
164 PC 1944-3520 (11 May 1944), Canada Gazette, Vol LXXVIII, No 21, at 2104 (May 20, 1944). See also March 20, 1944 memo 
from Driedger to Varcoe and March 20, 1944 letter from Varcoe to Gunn, in Library and Archives Canada, “Pension and National 
Health Amendments to Food and Drugs Regulations, 1944”, RG 13, volume 2115, file no 1468. 
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recommendation had been ignored. While some Canadian physicians in the 1940s were 
administering estrogenic drugs, women could also buy them over the counter.  
Recalling the Committee’s debates during 1943, situated alongside industrial, political, and 
statutory developments, the answer seems clear. Ayerst – and perhaps also the CPMA – was 
opposed to standardizing dose, as this would limit its freedom to devise new products. Thinking 
again of Premarin, estrogenic drugs were recently being produced on assembly lines, arriving in 
Canada as tablets, capsules or other pre-made forms. Prescribing doses would therefore 
frustrate manufacturers’ ability to produce new forms, no insignificant concern when Premarin’s 
“flexibility of potency and dosage” was one of its major selling points.165 
Without engaging here in any detailed semiotic analysis of Premarin advertisements,166 in 
the years after the Sex Hormone Regulations were enacted, Ayerst targeted Canadian doctors 
with advertisements emphasizing Premarin’s growing ranges of available doses and 
potencies.167 In 1945, Ayerst was selling Premarin tablets (No. 866) “for the most severe 
symptoms”, pitching a new “Half-Strength” Premarin tablet (No. 867) for “when symptoms are 
moderately severe”, and promoting its ageing, placentally-derived product Emmenin as being 
“for mild symptoms”. By 1950, Ayerst no longer needed to expressly convey, with text, that 
Premarin was a drug for menopause. Containing the infamous tagline that Premarin “imparts a 
feeling of well-being”, an ad that year also conveyed the drug’s ontologically precarious status 
as “highly potent” and “essentially safe”. More to the point, this ad shows that dose had further 
diversified by 1950, moving beyond the full strength and half strength pills to include a double 
strength tablet (No. 865), quarter strength tablet (No. 868), new liquid dosage form (No 869), 
and, for the especially anxious woman – or her husband – the option of Premarin combined with 
a sedative. Messaging again to male physicians that Premarin would promote, in their female 
patients, “a feeling of well-being and a revival of interest in normal activities” – visually depicted 
as sewing, gardening, and painting – an ad in 1951 again emphasizes a range of potencies and 
dosage (now also bundled with methyltestosterone to boost wives’ flagging libidos). In this 
period, the freedom to manufacture multiple doses and potencies was critical to the market 
differentiation strategy that Ayerst was pursuing to enroll physicians to medicalize menopause. 
                                                          
165 See Figure 8. 
166 For a semiotic analysis examining how Premarin ads, published in physicians’ journals between 1986-2000, aimed to 
persuade Canadian physicians to prescribe the drug, see Patricia Peppin & Elaine Carty, “Semiotics, Stereotypes, and Women's 
Health: Signifying Inequality in Drug Advertising” (2001) 13 Can J Women & Law 326. 
167 See Figures 6, 7 and 8. 
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Figure 6: 1945 ad for Premarin and Emmenin, Ayerst, McKenna & Harrison Ltd.  
 
Vancouver Medical Association. The Vancouver Medical Association Bulletin: March 1945. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.14288/1.0214401 (Original work published March 1945). 
 
UBC Open Collections, History of Nursing in Pacific Canada, online: 
<https://open.library.ubc.ca/collections/historyofnursinginpacificcanada>. 
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Figure 7: Ad for Premarin, Ayerst, McKenna & Harrison Ltd, 1950 
 
Vancouver Medical Association. The Vancouver Medical Association Bulletin: February, 1950. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.14288/1.0214411 (Original work published February 1950).  
UBC Open Collections, History of Nursing in Pacific Canada, online at 
https://open.library.ubc.ca/collections/historyofnursinginpacificcanada 
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Figure 8: Ad for Premarin, Ayerst, McKenna & Harrison Ltd, 1951 
 
Vancouver Medical Association. The Vancouver Medical Association Bulletin: November 1951. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.14288/1.0214637 (Original work published November 1951). 
UBC Open Collections, History of Nursing in Pacific Canada, online: 
<https://open.library.ubc.ca/collections/historyofnursinginpacificcanada>. 
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A cognate reason that the dose of estrogenic drugs was not regulated, though never made 
explicit in any of the Committee’s deliberations, was that estrogen’s diseases were still in the 
making. A therapeutic dose needs a disease. With Premarin and DES freshly unleashed and 
menopause not yet stabilized as a medical ailment, dosage remained uncertain. Finally, despite 
over a decade of research connecting estrogens to cancer, National Health continued to enact 
sex hormones as innocuous and ineffective. Safe and worthless drugs could be taken in any 
dose. At one level, this performance was personal. Pugsley, the departmental lead on the sex 
hormones file, was a former protégé of Ayerst’s partner Dr. Collip and had worked in Collip’s lab 
when Emmenin was at the peak of its success. At another level, scientists were beginning to 
perform Premarin as harmless; in 1943, the Journal of Clinical Endocrinology published a series 
of studies lauding Premarin, solidifying the idea that menopause was a disorder.168  
Beyond scientists’ predilections and practices, ineffectiveness and safety were also 
reproduced through a second key absence in the Sex Hormone Regulations. Though listed on 
Part II of Schedule B, sex hormone products were not made subject to licensing requirements. 
This meant that the regulations eschewed all controls on the manufacture and sale of estrogenic 
drugs: precluding inspection of plants, equipment, products, and records; preventing review of 
technical qualifications of staff; and pre-empting both batch testing and the approvals of batches 
for import or sale. Regardless of the emergence of DES, Premarin, and other new products, the 
regulations therefore maintained National Health’s fifteen year-long practice of carving 
estrogenic products out of licensing. It should not be forgotten that the US did not license sex 
hormone products,169 which undoubtedly created resistance to licensing within National Health. 
Nevertheless, to point only to American practices on sex hormones – when in other respects the 
Canadian regulatory regime on sex hormones diverged – would underdetermine the influences 
on National Health officials. This lingering licensing practice also flowed from a longstanding 
performance, by senior officials, of sex hormones as therapeutically ineffective and of licenses 
as endorsement. “Considering that many things have little or no value”, Lancaster had told 
Davidson from his hospital bed in February 1944, it “would be a pity to require a licence for such 
things because a licence carries implicitly some form of approval by the Department.”170 
Regulators were catalyzing sex hormones while refusing to sanction them, doing estrogens as 
simultaneously potent and weak, complicated and easy, effective and worthless, all the while 
                                                          
168 See e.g. Laman Gray, “Clinical Study of a New Type of Estrogenic Preparation for Oral Use” (1943) 3:2 J Clin Endocrinol 92; 
and S Glass & Gordon Rosenblum, “Therapy of the Menopause, Superiority of Conjugated Estrogens—Equine over 
Diethylstilbestrol” (1943) 3:2 J Clin Endocrinol 95.  
169 See Chapter 3, section 1, particularly the content associated with notes 87 and 92. 
170 February 4, 1944 memo dictated by Lancaster to Davidson, National Health’s Parenteral Drug Regulations File, 1943-1944. 
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bracketing and ignoring the differences between versions of estrogen. To return to an old 
metaphor: with no ability to close the barn door, and having failed to standardize horses to be 
less potent creatures, National Health could have repaired the pasture fence or made the barn 
more inviting. But thinking of all tamer beasts in the barn – the goats, sheep, chickens – and not 
wanting to overreact for those more domesticated creatures, National Health did nothing.  
Hold these regulatory elements together: purported properties, vague reference standards, 
delegated potency tests, disavowal of licensing conditions, lack of dose specifications. In effect, 
the Sex Hormone Regulations fostered more rather than less variability, greater rather than 
fewer products, altogether an expanding range of doses, potencies, and bodily effects. Did the 
Sex Hormone Regulations create “drug standards” at all? Thinking again with Busch’s typology, 
which has already caused rejection of the notion that these regulations either created “filter” 
standards or promoted a logic of industrial standards, did these regulations nonetheless create 
another type of standard? Recalling Busch’s unranked “division” standards, exemplified by 
McIntosh and Granny Smith apples, did the regulations codify product differentiation, letting 
estrogenic products to be positioned as “different” from each other and thus assigned different 
market values and prices? At first blush, as the definition holds all “sex hormones” together as 
things of like kind, the regulations did not seem to create unranked categories. However, turning 
to the final section of the Sex Hormone Regulations, division standards suddenly emerge. 
Section 4 governed labelling.171 Contrary to the other provisions, this “special labelling 
provision” for sex hormones imposed more extensive requirements than did labelling rules for 
other biologics in Canada.172 In addition to the typical requirements that labels identify the name 
and address of manufacturers, a product’s proper name and potency, lot number, and expiration 
date,173 the Sex Hormone Regulations created what in essence were division standards. 
Specifically, paragraph 4(c) required outer packages, and inner labels,174 to state: 
(c) The descriptive or proper name of the product distinct from the trade name.  
In the case of pure synthetic or natural crystalline products, the proper name 
shall be: -- Oestrone, oestradiol, oestriol, stilboestrol, androsterone, testosterone, 
progesterone, and esters and derivatives of these.  
                                                          
171 Sex Hormone Regulations, s 4.  
172 For the general labelling rule for biological drugs at that time, see 1942 Biologicals Regulation, “General Requirements”, s 1. 
Robert Curran described section 4 as a “special labelling provision” unique to sex hormones; see Curran 1953 at 185. 
173 Ibid and Sex Hormone Regulations, ss 4(a), (b), (d), (e) and (f). The only sex hormone requiring an expiration date on its label 
was “gonadotrophins in aqueous solution”; see s 4(f). Sex hormone labels were also required to include the “name of solvent or 
vehicle used in distributing products in liquid form and the name and amount of preservative in these products; see s 4(g).  
174 Sex Hormone Regulations, s 4(j). 
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In the case of mixed or impure products, the proper names shall be: -- 
Conjugated oestrogenic substance (S), oestrogenic substance (S), androgenic 
substance (S), progestational substance (S) and esters and derivatives of these.  
In the case of gonadotrophins the proper name shall be gonadotrophin with a 
qualifying statement to indicate the source, e.g., chorionic gonadotrophin, 
gonadotrophin from pregnant mare's serum.  
 
Section 4 thus prescribed proper names for both “pure synthetic or natural crystalline” 
estrogenic drugs and for “mixed or impure” estrogenic drugs. For mixed or impure products – 
DES in a sugar milk tablet, estrone with peanut oil in an ampoule for injection – the proper name 
would be  “oestrogenic substance”. At Cook’s request, Premarin was given its very own proper 
name of “conjugated oestrogenic substance”. Thus, while the coordination practices underlying 
section 1 joined all estrogens together as “sex hormones”, the naming practices underlying 
section 4 enacted unitary and bounded estrogens.  
Arguably, then, the Sex Hormone Regulations inverted the traditional relationship between 
standards, tests, and indicators, as mapped out by Busch.175 In that traditional relationship, a 
label would indicate that a test for meeting a certain standard has been satisfied. Here however, 
the labels mandated by section 4 could not pronounce that any particular test for any particular 
standard was met. Rather, the primary effect of the requirement to assign proper names to sex 
hormone products was to crystallize these products as ontologically real, to call sex hormone 
products into being as distinct, all the while without knowing or indicating their beings or doings. 
Assigning proper names constituted an estrogen, legally and economically, as its own “thing”, 
separate from other kinds of estrogens. 
As Johnson beautifully analyzes in his legal-material medieval history of shipwrecks off the 
coast of Suffolk, naming shapes the real – the name assigned to a wreck “shaped the 
possibilities of its use, worth, distribution, and meaning”.176 In this legal-material history of 
estrogen in Canada in the 1940s, the conditions of possibility were likewise shaped by naming 
practices. These divisions allowed doctors, consumers, manufacturers, advertisers, retailers, 
pharmacists, and other market actors to enunciate what an estrogen “was” and to delineate 
differences with other estrogens. In this respect, the Sex Hormone Regulations would facilitate 
product differentiation, price discrimination, physicians’ prescribing practices, pharmacists’ 
dispensing and compounding practices, and pharmaceutical firms’ marketing strategies. The 
divisions created by the requirement to label with proper names reflect the logic of merchant 
                                                          
175 See Chapter 1, section 2ii.  
176 Johnson 2015 at 424-425. 
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standards, acting to gain estrogen access to markets through distinctions that solidified a 
product’s unique identity while ensuring its comparability to other estrogenic products. Although 
other Committee members and National Health may have had quite different intentions than did 
Cook, requiring these proper names on product labels surely served to smooth market entry. 
To be clear, using regulations to assign proper names to drugs was not a wholly novel 
practice at National Health.177 Much more unique was the innovation in paragraph 4(h), which 
later attracted the characterization, by the Department’s legal counsel Robert Curran as a 
“special” labelling provision for sex hormones that was appropriate “having regard to the 
dangers which may be inherent in their use”.178 Paragraph 4(h) required manufacturers to 
include the following statement on outside labels: “Caution Label–to be used only on the advice 
or on the prescription of a physician”. For the first time in the history of Canadian drug 
regulation, a label was deployed to discipline consumers, almost all of whom would be women.  
In devising this mandatory caution label, Pugsley, Morrell, and other National Health officials 
undeniably accepted that sex hormones posed a hazard. However, with the Committee rejecting 
Dr. Farquharson’s suggestion that such products should only be sold on prescription, any 
pharmacist or retailer could lawfully sell an estrogenic drug to anyone. That this caution label 
would cause women to refrain from buying or using estrogenic products, without securing their 
physician’s supervision, was magical thinking. As an American food and drug lawyer observed, 
in criticizing Canada’s regulatory approach to sex hormones: “a label statement directing a 
person to see a physician about whether he should use a drug he has already bought is a futile 
gesture”.179 In this regard, the purpose of the caution label appeared to be less about protecting 
women and more about protecting National Health (especially as estrogen continued to remain 
exempt from prescription requirements). Thus, as a regulatory device, the caution label nakedly 
sought to make women consumers responsible for National Health’s decision not to subject 
estrogenic drugs to classic drug standards, license conditions, or medical supervision.  
When read in the context of the Sex Hormone Regulations as a whole, the caution label 
makes legible the fundamental trade-off at the heart of the regulations. As with the potency 
                                                          
177 See e.g. Chapter 3 at note 146. 
178 Curran 1953 at 185. 
179 William W Goodrich, “International Uniformity – the Possible and the Impossible in Food, Drug and Cosmetic Laws” (1951) 6 
Food Drug Cosm LJ 885 [“Goodrich 1951”] at 889. Under the US FDCA, approved drugs had to be labelled with both ingredients 
and warnings, and labels also had to provide adequate directions for use to the consumer. With concern that some directions 
for use were too complex to include in labelling, the Durham-Humphrey Amendment of 1951 exempted those drugs that could 
be safely used only under the supervision of a physician, requiring instead of a label the legend: "Caution: Federal law prohibits 
dispensing without a prescription.” See Patricia I Carter, “Federal Regulation of Pharmaceuticals in the United States and 
Canada” (1999) 21 Loy LA Int'l & Comp L Rev 215 at 219. See also Davidson 1949a at 85-86. 
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labels that substituted for potency standards, the caution labels were not motivated by 
empowering consumers with information, nor by steering towards good market choices.180 They 
were not intended to shape manufacturing practices, nor to convey or augment existing 
regulatory standards of safety. The special labelling rules for sex hormones were not adopted to 
supplement standards – rather, they were adopted as an alternative to standards. Rather than 
building safety into estrogen, the caution labels acted in lieu of regulatory standards of identity, 
potency, and dosage. Rather than assuming responsibility for ensuring that estrogenic drugs 
were crafted in doses and potencies that avoided toxicity, or delegating that duty to prescribing 
physicians, National Health delegated to the caution label the task of disciplining women 
consumers to avoid hazards. Scripted into products marked with this caution label was a mixed 
message to middle aged women, communicating that while the drug was safe enough to buy 
without a prescription, they should still follow their doctor’s orders. Embedded is the further 
assumption that, given the social class and economic status of the women buying these drugs, 
the caution would reinforce their inclinations to be good girls and run along to their doctors. If 
less educated or imprudent women failed to exercise such common sense, any resulting harm 
could not be pinned on Canada. The caution labels could thus “standardize” subjectivities of 
women and prescribing physicians, and performatively enact the contradictory realities – “highly 
potent” yet “essentially safe” – materializing estrogenic drugs in clinics and markets.181 
It was foreseeable that non-compliance with the Sex Hormone Regulations would go 
unenforced. Of its substantive provisions, arguably only the labelling section was enforceable. 
Presumably, violation of labelling requirements – representing one’s product as more or less 
potent than it was according to the manufacturer’s own test methods, misrepresenting the type 
of estrogen or the liquid formulant in the product – could be prosecuted, if not as a direct 
violation of section 4 of the Sex Hormone Regulations, then as the statutory offence of 
misbranding or adulteration.182 On at least one occasion in the 1940s, National Health officials 
                                                          
180 Xaq Frohlich traces the history of US FDA nutritional labelling requirements, confirming that the “informational turn” in 
labelling governance, in which the FDA began to regulate food markets through consumer empowerment, emerged only in the 
1970s. In the 1940s, however, health information on food labels was believed to “confuse” consumers. Instead, just as with 
drug regulation in Canada and the US, food labelling in the 1940s under the US FDCA focused on the “standards of identity” 
system, for which “the master metaphor was the recipe” (151). Xaq Frohlich, “The informational turn in food politics: The US 
FDA’s nutrition label as information infrastructure” (2017) 47:2 Soc Stud Sci 145 [“Frolich 2017”] at 147, 151-154. 
181 See Figure 7. 
182 The question of whether violations of regulations under the Food and Drugs Act were directly enforceable was controversial 
and attracted commentary. In the 1927 statutory amendments, regulations were confirmed to have the same force and effect 
as the Act’s provisions; Food and Drugs Act, s 3(3), as added by SC 1927, c 56, s 9. Curran regularly argued that the Food and 
Drug Regulations were enforceable, making claims such as “[u]nder our Act, a violation of the regulations carries exactly the 
same penalty as a violation of the Act”; Curran 1953 at 316. Driedger did not so readily accept that s 3(3) of the Act had that 
legal significance. In his 1960 article, he noted that the Food and Drugs Act “did not expressly confer authority to prescribe 
penalties for breach of a regulation”, and that the statute itself “prescribed a penalty only for breach of a provision of the Act.” 
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warned a pharmaceutical company that it was in breach of the regulations’ labelling rules.183 By 
contrast, the reference standard rule was too vague on what the requisite standard was, in any 
given situation, to enforce. Besides, this rule caused such a “multiplicity of standards” that, by 
1951, National Health officials had largely abandoned the law and instead entered “working 
arrangements” with manufacturers on the “adequacy of standards available for their product”.184 
On the regulations’ potency standards, with drug firms left to their own devices when measuring 
and expressing their products’ potency, unless potency labels were missing, it is conceptually 
challenging to conceive of a violation of any potency “standard”. These barriers to enforcement, 
combined with a National Health policy “to avoid court action if at all possible”,185 make it 
unsurprising that there were apparently no prosecutions during the 1940s or early 1950s.186  
 
4. Confronting multiplicity and duplicity: the Committee meets, September 1944 
In 1944, this assemblage of scientist-regulators would create Canadian standards for almost 
200 drugs and biological products.187 This was an accomplishment – though perhaps not in the 
sense intended by the Committee. One of its most thoughtful members spent time, over the 
summer of 1944, mulling over the consequences of Canada’s new drug standards. After 
reflection, Esli Woods wrote to the Secretary of the Committee.188 In an incisive appraisal, the 
Dean of Pharmacy diplomatically detailed the recent proliferation of “sources of official 
standards and methods”, which he believed had unintentionally undermined the uniformity of 
drugs in Canada.189 Troubled by the challenges that proliferating standards posed for training 
                                                          
However, Driedger also noted an English decision, in Willingdale v Norris, [1909] 1 KB 57, that held that a statutory provision 
prescribing a penalty for a statutory breach extended also to a regulatory breach; see Driedger 1960 at 5-6. 
183 The matter concerned the failure of a US supplier, Adson-Intrasol Laboratories, to identify on its labels the lot number or the 
oil added to its oestrone preparation Estrovin, which was purchased by the Canadian company Hyman Surgical Supply Co. See 
the correspondence from December 7, 1944 to March 27, 1945, in National Health’s Sex Hormone Regulations File, 1944-1945.  
184 Pugsley 1951 at 534-535. 
185 Curran 1953 at 193, adding that “[a]ccordingly, in the absence of a flagrant and defiant violation of the Act, every effort is 
made to bring about an adjustment of the situation without the necessity of prosecution.”   
186 Food and Drug Newspaper Clippings, 1949-1953; Monthly Prosecutions and Seizures Reports, 1950-1953; Inspectors’ 
Reports, 1950-1953; National Health’s Sex Hormone Regulations File, 1944-1945; and Pugsley 1951. 
187 Curran 1946 at 501. 
188 August 25, 1944 letter from Woods to Davidson, in Library and Archives Canada, Department of Health fonds, RG 29, 
“Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoieal Standards”, 1944/06-1945/05, volume 253, file no. 339-4-8 (Part 3) [“Possibly 
Morrell’s Committee File, 1944-1945”]. 
189 The proliferating sources of Canadian drug standards that Woods summarized, in addition to the British Pharmacopoeia 
which remained “official in Canada except insofar as its monographs are modified or replaced by Canadian regulations”, were: 
1) the Canadian Supplement dealing with the “miscellaneous” list of drugs in Part V of Schedule B of the Act; 2) a number of 
orders in council that were not necessarily connected to Schedule B but could also be authorized under s 3(a) of the Act (such 
as the vitamin regulations); 3) drug standards in Division II of the Food and Drug Regulations (such as the Sex Hormone 
Regulations); 4) the methods employed by the Laboratory of Hygiene “giving details of methods of biological assay which are 
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pharmacy students, Woods was also worried about the legal and moral implications for 
practicing pharmacists, as without fixed, stable, and readily available methods of determining 
conformity to standards, pharmacists could not meet their responsibilities to ensure the quality 
of their preparations. In his view, drug quality and professional responsibility would necessitate 
a greater “degree of stabilization of standards and methods”. Woods was observing, in candid 
and careful fashion, what departmental officials were coming to acknowledge privately. That 
summer, Lancaster and Davidson had also discussed how the flurry of enactments had 
multiplied standards, including for sex hormones. Lancaster felt the best solution would be to 
amalgamate the Division II biological drug standards with the Division III Supplement 
monographs, through an eventual consolidation of the Food and Drug Regulations.190   
When Committee members returned to Ottawa that September for the year’s final meeting, 
assembling again in the Daly Building’s comfortable library, Dean Woods explained with “some 
anxiety” how the “multiplicity of sources” of standards would materialize multiple versions of the 
same drug. This situation would presumably worsen after the war when, with the anticipated 
rescindment of orders under the War Measures Act, the addenda to the British Pharmacopoeia 
would once more apply in Canada. For example, there would be “two varieties of ephedrine” 
and “two kinds of thyroid”. 191 Woods could have added “two varieties of oestrone” and “two 
types of oestradiol benzoate”, let alone the other modes of estrogen that had been enacted. 
Lancaster mounted a half-hearted defence, maintaining that the Committee’s activities had 
not made the situation more confusing than it already was before, and stressing that, whatever 
standards might exist in foreign pharmacopeia, Canadian regulations took precedence. This 
was certainly correct, and yet, with respect to estrogen,192 his answer dodged the issue. 
Canadian regulations themselves created two sets of standards. Estrogen was enumerated as 
sex hormones in Part II of Schedule B, with accompanying regulatory standards, and as four 
molecules in Part V, with accompanying regulatory monographs – but which trumped? For five 
                                                          
recognized as official”; and 5) the Canadian Formulary’s Addendum, “the scope and status of which is not a present clearly 
defined”. Woods provides the clearest summary of the enactments, their sources of authority and the relationship between 
them, of any found in the archival materials reviewed for this thesis, including memos by solicitors of National Health.  
190 June 19, 1944 letter from Davidson to Henderson, Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1944. This consolidation eventually 
occurred, beginning in 1947 and concluding in 1949; see Chapter 5, section 1, particularly content associated with notes 17-19. 
191 September 18-19, 1944 meeting minutes and materials, in Possibly Morrell’s Committee File, 1944-1945. 
192 Incidentally, this was also an issue for ephedrine and thyroid. As of 1944, each of these were addressed both in the 
Biologicals Regulation in Division II as well as in various Canadian Supplement monographs in Division III. 
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years, Lancaster had sidestepped that question, and no government solicitor had ever 
confronted it either.193 By leaving it unresolved, estrogenic reality in Canada had multiplied.194  
Dr. Cook did not attend the September meeting. Emboldened by the absence of Ayerst’s 
scientist, Committee members voiced frustration with industry foot-dragging on test methods for 
sex hormones. Normally receptive to industry interests, Morrell was especially scathing. On 
behalf of their subcommittee on sex hormones, yet without Cook’s input, Morrell tabled a status 
report. After recalling how the subcommittee had entrusted Cook with consulting US commercial 
laboratories regarding National Health’s proposed bioassay methods for sex hormones, his 
report put on the record that, but for Parke Davis’ constructive criticism of the method for 
gonadotrophins, manufacturers had failed to respond. Given that this effort had “extended for 
over a year and with very little response from manufacturers”, he recommended its termination, 
as “[c]ontinuation of this procedure in respect to all new methods would, in our opinion, unduly 
delay our adoption of official methods.” He proposed that National Health proceed to officially 
adopt its methods for oestrone and oestradiol benzoate, advising that the Laboratory of Hygiene 
was preparing what he referred to as a “book of official methods”.195 A portion of this book was 
already typewritten, and Morrell suggested that it would be complete by the end of 1944.196 
Yet delay tactics were not exclusive to industry. The idea of a book of official methods had 
its genesis in the Committee’s debate, at its very first meeting, regarding the centrality of test 
methods to the regulation of sex hormones. At that meeting, bureaucratic opposition to codifying 
methods in regulation, industry resistance, and academic willingness to concede the issue in 
exchange for teaching and research support had combined to pave the way for regulatory 
sanction of sex hormones without conventional standards. This compromise had been brokered 
through a promised book of methods, which would act as a companion to the regulations. But 
the book never materialized. In meetings and letters over the next seven years, Morrell and 
                                                          
193 The only example of a National Health official starting to grapple with this question, before the meeting held on September 
17-18, 1944, was in a draft memorandum by Davidson, which he apparently prepared in response to Dean Woods’ August 25, 
1944 letter. It asserts that Division II standards, such as the Sex Hormone Regulations, “are paramount in this country”. See 
undated memo entitled “Pharmcopeoial Drug Control in Canada, in Possibly Morrell’s Committee File, 1944-1945. 
194 Mol 2002. 
195 Appendix A to the September 18-19, 1944 meeting minutes, in Possibly Morrell’s Committee File, 1944-1945. 
196 As of September 1944, official biological methods had been adopted, but not released outside the Laboratory of Hygiene, for 
the following substances: arsphenamine, neoarsphenamine, digitalis, pituitary extract (posterior lobe), androgenic hormones, 
oestrogenic hormones, thiamine, vitamin A, vitamin D, and some antisera and antitoxins. At this time, the Laboratory of 
Hygiene was studying potential bioassay methods for riboflavin, vitamin C, penicillin and pyridoxine, gonadotrophic hormones 
and progesterone. It also had settled on chemical test methods for vitamin C, vitamin A, pantothenic acid, pyridoxine, and 
thiamine. See September 18-19, 1944 meeting minutes and materials, in Possibly Morrell’s Committee File, 1944-1945. 
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others would routinely promise a printed book of methods, at no distant date.197 Although the 
Laboratory was developing and applying internal methods, National Health did not finalize or 
circulate any such book at any time before the early 1950s. By then, the Laboratory’s resistance 
to publishing its methods no longer appeared motivated, as Morrell had professed at the 
Committee’s first meeting, by administrative concerns about printing costs. Rather, consistent 
with Deputy Minister Wodehouse’s intervention during the development of the Sex Hormone 
Regulations, in 1950, the Chief of the Laboratory of Hygiene candidly connected resistance to 
disclosing its methods to the Department’s distaste for holding drug manufacturers to standards: 
“We are rather loath to outline procedures … since there is a marked tendency among 
manufacturers to look upon a method described … as the only method. This would be a 
backward step since there would be no incentive for manufacturers to develop their own 
techniques … We are most anxious to avoid becoming a party to any directives which 
could have the effect of stifling the initiative on the part of the manufacturers. That is why 
in the Biologics section of the Food and Drug Act, specific tests have been omitted.”198 
 
In this way, estrogen initiated new regulatory practices and, eventually, legislative change. 
Fuelled by estrogen, techniques of validating burrowed deeper into the bureaucratic culture of 
National Health. Not only did methods of standardization continue to be unlawfully subdelegated 
to departmental officials, but the Department’s methods were not distributed to drug makers or 
made transparent. Eventually, the statutory provision requiring official test methods to be 
prescribed in regulations was simply dropped from the revised Food and Drugs Act in 1953.199   
*** 
This chapter has composed a Canadian history of the standardization of estrogen. In 
assembling the heterogenous activities, debates, and decisions of a group of scientist-
regulators – including the physicians, pharmacists, industry researchers, and National Health 
                                                          
197 See e.g. June 19-20, 1945 meeting minutes and materials and May 31, 1946 meeting minutes, in Library and Archives 
Canada, Department of Health fonds, RG 29, “Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards”, 1945/06-1946/0, volume 
253, file no. 339-4-8, (Part 5) [“Possibly Morrell’s Committee File, 1945-1946”]; October 1, 1947 letter from Woods to Davidson 
and October 11, 1947 letter from Davidson to Woods, in Library and Archives Canada, Department of Health fonds, RG 29, 
“Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards – Correspondence”, 1946/11-1948/05, volume 252, file no. 339-4-7 (Part 
7) [“Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1946-1948”]; December 1947 meeting transcript, in Library and Archives Canada, 
Department of Health fonds, RG 29, “Canadian Committee on Pharmaceutical (sic) Standards”, 1947/08-1948/10, volume 249, 
file no. 339-4-1 (Part 7) [“Unknown Committee Member’s File, 1947-1948”]; July 6, 1949 letter from Mathews to Davidson and 
July 11, 1949 letter from Davidson to Mathews, in Library and Archives Canada, Department of Health fonds, RG 29, “Canadian 
Committee on Pharmaceutical (sic) Standards”, 1948/10-1949/09, volume 249, file no. 339-4-1 (Part 8) [“Unknown Committee 
Member’s File, 1948-1949”]. 
198 May 4, 1950 memo from James Gibbard to Morrell, in Unknown Committee Member’s File, 1948-1949. 
199 Food and Drugs Act, RS 1952-1953, c 38, s 24; see also Chapter 2, note 17. 
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officials on the recently formed Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards, and 
extending this network to include the Laboratory of Hygiene and the Department of Justice – it 
has shown how, in the mid-1940s in Canada, estrogen was enacted with a variety of epistemic, 
institutional, and regulatory practices. Thinking with Mol’s relational materialism,200 I have 
illustrated that estrogen was done multiply in this regulatory network. Further, working with a co-
production framework,201 I have also begun to show how estrogen, with its variable potencies, 
unfixed doses, and unpredicted dose-response relations, in turn engendered new techniques in 
Canadian drug regulation. This second theme will be developed, in the context of estrogen’s 
influence on cosmetics regulation, in Chapter 5. Thus, this composition builds two contrapuntal 
themes within one arrangement – as regulatory processes enact potent substances, and as 
potent substances catalyze legal change.  
The concept of toxic enactment captures these two intertwined dynamics, approaching 
toxicity and law as enmeshed through practices. Toxic enactment rejects ontological 
understandings of substances – whether drugs, cosmetics, or other industrial chemicals – as 
fixed entities with inherent properties, varying only in how they might react within individual 
human bodies.202 Instead, toxic enactment conceives of substances, and their potencies and 
effects, as performed in relation to regulatory actors, practices, and processes. This chapter has 
sought to further denaturalize the notion that estrogen existed in stable form outside of its socio-
material relations with other substances, with lab instruments and animals in bioassays, with 
manufactured dosage forms, with advertising messages, and with human actors’ attempts to 
define, enumerate, test, classify, and label estrogen as drugs – all of which were reflected in 
and produced by regulatory processes in the mid-1940s. Since then, estrogen has been 
thoroughly naturalized as a drug, indeed as one of the most prescribed drugs in the history of 
medicine. Yet this chapter has shown that estrogen is not an ahistorical or static substance, but 
a thing in the making, an object in the doing. Relatedly, it has challenged the conventional view 
that regulation reacts to innovation, responding to technological artefacts or to pre-existing 
material realities. That view often fosters critiques that law has failed to reflect established or 
emerging science, but without recognizing thicker entanglements of regulation and materiality. 
Just as laws can respond to techno-material realities, so can regulatory practices enact matter. 
Taking relational materialism seriously, law substantiates toxicity, in the epistemic sense of 
                                                          
200 For a summary of Mol’s empirical approach to theorizing ontology, see Chapter 1, section 2.i. 
201 For research done in what Jasanoff calls a co-production idiom, see Chapter 1, section 2.iii and Introduction at note 51. 
202 Beyond sex hormones, for work in ANT or material-semiotics on substances, drugs, or chemical exposures, see Chapter 1, 
section 2.i, particularly that content at notes 131-142 (Murphy 2006, Shapiro 2015), and 149-153 (Barry 2005); and Chapter 1, 
section 2.iii, particularly that content at notes 211-215 (Lezaun 2012) and 220-223 (Cloatre 2013). 
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providing a means by which toxicity is represented and proven in various regulatory fora and, 
concurrently, in the ontological sense of making toxicity real.  
In the specific context of historically contingent enactments of estrogen, historians of sex 
hormones have persuasively described how measurement practices, in university laboratories 
and pharmaceutical firms, were central to calling estrogen into being.203 More generally, STS 
scholars have long shown how, as a technique of definition, measurement makes matter and 
meaning.204 This chapter builds upon this scholarship by uncovering the role of regulators and 
their enactments in materializing estrogen and its potency. The physicians and pharmacists on 
the Committee themselves apprehended that, in standardizing estrogenic drugs, “everything 
seemed to centre” on bioassays. However, reflecting and producing these professionals’ 
declining influence on drug standards in mid-century Canada, the multiple regulations ultimately 
enacted in 1944 effectively endorsed diverse standardization, allowing industry to submit its own 
reference standards and to select its own test methods. These regulations effectively split 
bioassay methods into two types – those used by firms when manufacturing drugs, and those 
adopted in the Laboratory of Hygiene to control those products. If the purpose of standards was 
to ensure estrogenic substances in industry and government labs met a quality threshold and 
were the “same things”, then by this measure, the regulations made in 1944 were a total failure. 
Instead, this chapter shows that, with the suite of regulations in 1944, estrogen was becoming 
multiple. Taken together, the Canadian Supplement and the Sex Hormone Regulations 
simultaneously performed estrogen as ready-made preparations and as pure substances, as 
biological and chemical substances, as synthetic and natural, and as drug substances that 
could be measured and materialized in different potencies, forms, and doses, without licensing 
oversight. These regulations also left open what estrogen did, and thus what it was, by refusing 
to define “purported” properties of estrogenic products or identify diseases for which they were 
indicated, creating space for industry, physicians, and women to experiment with its effects. 
By another measure, however, the Sex Hormone Regulations succeeded in “standardizing” 
estrogen.205 In the first of many moves to supplant traditional standards with labelling, these 
regulations devised proper names for various estrogenic drugs and required these names to be 
stated on product labels. In effect, this rule enacted distinctive classes of estrogen. Unwilling or 
unable to prescribe potency measurements or units, properties, sources, or diseases as their 
techniques for defining estrogen, regulators instead sought to define estrogen, and to make it 
                                                          
203 For historical work on sex hormones by Oudshoorn and Gaudillière, and others, see Chapter 1, sections 1.i. and section 1.ii. 
204 For just one influential account, see Barad 2003. 
205 For Busch’s relevant taxonomies of standards, see Chapter 1, section 2.ii. 
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standard, through naming. As Fausto-Stirling and others have shown, the naming of various sex 
hormones was hotly debated by scientists in the 1930s, and was a powerful technique for 
defining steroid hormones as sexed substances with particular functions. As suggested by 
Ayerst’s advocacy for naming “conjugated substances” under this rule, naming was also a 
precondition for effective marketing and prescribing practices.206 Conjugated substances thus 
became standard, even when the recalcitrant mix of estrogens comprising Premarin were 
strongly resistant to biological standardization. Using Busch’s typologies, requiring estrogenic 
products to be labeled with distinctive names created the divisions that are commonly enacted 
in merchant standards, which aim at enhanced market access. Listing “different kinds” of 
estrogen aligned strongly with pharmaceutical firms’ emerging marketing and advertising 
strategies, helping these drugs to circulate.  
How had labels in lieu of standards been achieved? What tacit practices, tactics, and 
techniques had materialized estrogenic drugs to be potent and variable? One common practice 
was stalling.207 Ayerst’s scientist on the Committee repeatedly delayed efforts to standardize 
bioassay methods in the Sex Hormone Regulations and the Canadian Supplement, and the 
Department’s Laboratory of Hygiene likewise dragged its feet, failing to release its own internal 
test methods for estrogen among other drugs. Other delay practices included National Health 
officials engaging legal counsel on proposed regulations at a late stage, after regulatory options 
had been developed, discussed in the Committee, sent out to industry, and drafted.208 While 
stalling contributed to the enactment of regulations that left standards open, the more systemic 
and significant regulatory habit was a deepening culture of delegation within National Health. 
The multiplicity enacted in 1944 flowed from the Department distributing and diffusing its 
regulatory powers. For those tasks that National Health was unable or unwilling to perform itself, 
it effectively delegated to industry or consumers. For tasks that National Health officials wished 
to perform themselves (such as determine bioassay methods), while retaining the flexibility to 
change their minds or avoid publicity, they subdelegated responsibility down into the 
bureaucratic depths and kept commitments out of regulations.  
                                                          
206 See Fausto-Stirling 2000 at 187-193; see also Chapter 1, section 1.i, particularly the content associated with notes 20-22; and 
Introduction at note 43. 
207 For industry delay tactics in toxics regulation, see Jody A Roberts, “Unruly Technologies and Fractured Oversight: Toward a 
Model for Chemical Control for the Twenty-First Century”, in Soraya Boudia & Nathalie Jas, eds Powerless Science? Science and 
Politics in a Toxic World (New York: Berghahn, 2014) at 288-296. Roberts argues that, in the history of industrial involvement in 
chemical regulation, industry tries to “stall attempts at the construction of new regulations for as long as possible”, either by 
pushing for voluntary regulations or stressing the need for additional science. Here, CPMA members supported the Sex 
Hormone Regulations, but pushed for voluntary test methods and sought to delay finalization of methods within government. 
208 This practice would soon change. In 1946, DOJ established a Legislative Section, headed by Driedger. Driedger was soon 
emphasizing publicly that departmental and legislative counsel were typically involved early in the process; see Driedger 1953. 
147 
 
As the regulatory assemblage expanded to encompass government lawyers, so did the 
legal techniques evolve. Thinking with Shapiro,209 this chapter has drawn out certain legal 
techniques that actively operated to install a potent and multiple estrogen into Canadian laws 
and bodies. In reviewing and revising the Department’s draft regulations for form and validity, 
DOJ counsel routinely rendered these regulations as intra vires through what I have called 
techniques of validating. As also described in Chapter 3, one such technique used to work 
around concerns that enactments lacked validity was to “silence the recitals”. Where it was 
doubtful that lawful authority existed to make an order in council, as with adding Part V to 
Schedule B and approving the Canadian Supplement where it primarily relied on chemical test 
methods, DOJ simply removed mention of any statutory provisions thought to (not) authorize the 
enactments. Originally a technique used where validity was uncertain, soon National Health and 
DOJ were stripping out or making vague any reference to authorizing provisions in regulations. 
The Sex Hormone Regulations could not benefit from this technique. As a result of a legal 
opinion that only Cabinet had the jurisdiction to set standards for testing and expressing potency 
of sex hormones, National Health was uncharacteristically constrained in trying to enact an ultra 
vires regulation. In this case, the Department had to improvise. It did so by amending the Sex 
Hormone Regulations, before they were made, to require manufacturers to supply information 
on their potency test methods through labels. In its unpredicted potencies and unfixed doses, 
materialized as simultaneously safe and potent, estrogen would continue to provoke an evolving 
strategy of regulating drugs through labels. It spurred the Department to devise a novel “caution 
label” for estrogenic drugs, warning consumers who had bought these products not to use them 
except on a physician’s advice. Rather than confine estrogen to sale on prescription, or set dose 
limits, National Health assigned responsibility for ensuring safety to women consumers. 
As current day scientists know, whether “natural” or “synthetic”, estrogens regularly resist 
the dose-response logics embraced by conventional pharmacology.210 They know that effects 
can be as much a function of timing as dose, and that low doses may be more toxic than high 
doses. They know there is no safe threshold – no safe dose – for many estrogenic substances. 
However, in the 1940s, a simpler dose-response paradigm was almost universally accepted, 
including by the scientists appointed to the Committee or working at National Health. Viewing 
toxicity through monotonic dose-response curves, faced with potent substances that had been 
associated with cancer and reproductive problems in laboratory studies, these actors 
                                                          
209 See Chapter 1, section 2.ii, particularly the content associated with notes 139-142. 
210 See Introduction particularly that content associated with notes 9-19. 
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nonetheless decided to allow the pharmaceutical industry to decide in what potencies and 
doses estrogen should be made and sold. In so doing, conventional dose-response logics were 
written out of estrogen regulation under the Food and Drugs Act. Potency was obscured through 
proliferating reference standards and test methods, and dose was erased entirely. As will be 
seen in Chapter 5, by rendering safe doses of estrogen largely imperceptible, the regulations 
would make it difficult to apprehend estrogen in cosmetics. Shortly after National Health evaded 
dose-response considerations for estrogenic drugs, it would re-introduce such considerations 
back into the regulation of “safe doses” of estrogenic cosmetics, once again by turning to labels.  
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Chapter Five 
“An administrative ruling has been made on an upper limit of potency for one month's 
supply”: regulating estrogen with labels, 1945-1953 
 
Estrogens will produce such changes in tissues and, in susceptible experimental animals at least, large 
doses of estrogens have increased the incidence of cancer. To quote one authority on this subject, Novak 
(1944) said, “it is the consensus that the clinical employment of estrogens in the customary therapeutic 
dosage presents no hazard, but prolonged used of these substances is contraindicated in persons 
suffering from cancer, or who have a familiar history of cancer. This is one potent argument against the 
use of proprietary cosmetics containing estrogenic substances.” – EL Devlin, 1952.1  
 
…while the ordinary housewife is well able to determine when her food is grossly adulterated, subtleties 
and the refinements in sophistication in this modern world are likely to pass unobserved under her 
scrutinizing gaze and, therefore, an organization such as the Food and Drug Directorate is necessary to 
protect her and her loved ones from fraud, sickness and possible death. – A. Linton Davidson (1949a). 
 
Notwithstanding the opinion of a great constitutional lawyer of long ago that “Parliament can do anything 
except change a man into a woman or a woman into a man,” it would have been preferable if cosmetics 
and devices were treated as individual subjects in the legislation, rather than to distort the ordinary 
meaning of a drug by including in it things which common sense rejects from it. – Robert Curran (1949) 
 
In the previous chapter, the Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards, National 
Health, and Department of Justice performed estrogen multiply. They did so through a series of 
enactments, themselves dependent upon techniques of validating, that declined to stabilize 
estrogen’s potencies, doses, reference materials, forms, modes, or properties. Enacted as 
potent and multiple and unleashed into markets and bodies, by the end of the 1940s, estrogen 
was exerting its own influence on regulations under the Food and Drugs Act.  
A new generation of National Health officials would seek to rein in estrogen. Unlike their 
predecessors, they were motivated less by securing independent Canadian pharmacopoeial 
standards, and more by avoiding irksome regulatory differences that interfered with trade with 
the US. In section 1, this chapter describes National Health’s efforts to consolidate estrogen and 
its enactments. In 1949, the four estrogens were dropped from the Canadian Supplement, and 
the Sex Hormone Regulations were adjusted to subdelegate bioassay tests to the Laboratory of 
Hygiene, consistent with National Health’s approach to many other biological drugs.  
Estrogen continued to shapeshift, however, provoking new regulatory techniques in Canada. 
In 1949, the government finally brought into force those statutory amendments, passed in 1939, 
                                                          
1 March 21, 1952 letter from Devlin to Venus Products Ltd., in Food and Drug Newspaper Clippings, 1949-1953. 
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allowing for cosmetics to be regulated as a sub-category of drugs. And it enacted the first 
cosmetics regulation in Canadian history – a regulation specifically governing cosmetics 
containing sex hormones. In another turn towards using consumer labels as a regulatory device, 
and in an early example of risk regulation in Canada, the Department directed women buying 
estrogenic cosmetics to ensure that they used these potent products “with care”.  
Soon, however, the Department concluded that being careful was not enough. Fearing that 
estrogenic skin creams could have hazardous or systemic effects, especially at high doses, 
National Health officials nonetheless had little means to prevent women from “overdosing” on 
these cosmetics. Indeed, as potency standards and dose ranges had been erased from 
estrogen regulations in 1943, the relationship between estrogenic dose and estrogenic effect 
had been rendered imperceptible. Section 2 describes how, in further amendments to the Sex 
Hormone Regulations in 1950, National Health required a new label unique to estrogenic skin 
creams. This time, women would be directed by a product label to “use only as directed”, and 
the product package would be required to provide directions for use. Many of these products 
were high-end cosmetics imported from the US, arriving in Canada in jars containing a “30-day 
supply”. For those products immune to the US FDA’s regulatory supervision, however, National 
Health inspectors sought to negotiate the content of these “directions for use”, by persuading 
manufacturers to direct women to use a certain amount of a certain potency of estrogenic skin 
cream every 30 days. Adopting a form of governance that they called “administrative ruling”, 
their powers to standardize dose and potency delegated not by law but by labels, National 
Health officials quietly reintroduced dose-response logics back into estrogen regulation.  
Absorbed into cosmetic products and regulatory practices, estrogen thus spawned new 
techniques of governance. Labels delegated power to National Health officials to govern 
administratively, and delegated responsibility to women to use products safely. Mediated by 
labels, estrogen and administrative practices were co-produced. This entanglement of estrogen, 
cosmetics, and labels was highly gendered. Section 2 includes some of the advertisements 
published by manufacturers of estrogenic breast and face creams that were investigated by 
National Health inspectors under the revised Sex Hormone Regulations in the early 1950s.  
It is easy to read the techniques devised for estrogenic cosmetics as a sexist substitution of 
labels for standards. Still, estrogen had its own part to play. Having been performed in diverse 
ways in factories, clinics, laboratories, boardrooms, and now at women’s vanity tables, its 
effects rendered unknown at different doses, and in myriad molecular and manufactured forms, 
estrogen was not a stable object with which regulators could smoothly interact. If not by 
Nature’s design or regulators’ intent, estrogen was prepared to act up. 
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1. Estrogenic consolidation and cosmetic innovation: 1945-1949 
 
After decades of advocating for greater Canadian control over drug standards and for 
diminished British influence, in 1945, Harry Lancaster and Velyien Henderson exited the scene. 
Henderson died, and after years of poor health, Lancaster took early retirement. A new 
generation of scientists was responsible for food and drugs at National Health. Born and trained 
in the US, Dr. Clare Morrell was elevated after Lancaster’s retirement to the position of Assistant 
Chief Dominion Analyst. When Aime Valin retired in 1946, Morrell became the Chief.2  
Part and parcel of the explosion in regulated drug standards, the Department’s bureaucratic 
machinery and infrastructure also expanded considerably in the second half of the 1940s.3 In 
the fall of 1944, the government hived off pensions from the Department, creating a new 
Department of National Health and Welfare.4 Shortly thereafter, the food and drug divisions 
went through a major reorganization and expansion. In 1946, National Health created a Food 
and Drug Directorate (often still referred to, in this period, as the Food and Drug Divisions), 
comprised of three divisions and five regional offices. Morrell was appointed Director of the 
entire directorate. He also headed the Food and Drugs Division, which was primarily 
responsible for administering the Food and Drugs Act. The remaining two divisions were the 
Proprietary or Patent Medicine Division and the Advertising and Labels Division. R.D. Whitmore 
was Chief of the latter, which assumed responsibilities for compliance and inspections; in 1947, 
this Advertising and Labels Division was rechristened Inspection Services.5   
Morrell believed that, as in the US, Canada should regulate cosmetics that had the potential 
to be injurious to health. In the fall of 1945, he advocated for the creation of an advisory 
subcommittee on cosmetics, which would include dermatologists, to advise the Department on 
emerging cosmetics challenges. The Deputy Minister, Dr. Brock Chisholm, was unsupportive 
and the cosmetic subcommittee was never established.6 Unfazed, National Health officials 
                                                          
2 Davidson 1949a at 93; Cameron 1959 at 323; Herder 2014 at S104; Henderson Obituary 1945; and “Retirement, J.G.A. Valin” 
(June 1946) 10:6 Can J Comp Med 180. 
3 Timmermans & Epstein 2010 reviews scholarship showing how standards have “proven enormously effective as dimensions of 
statebuilding”, extending the regulatory state’s administrative capacities and “consolidating bureaucratic rule”; at 82-83. 
4 An Act to establish a Department of National Health and Welfare, SC 1944-1945, c 22.; and An Act to amend The Department 
of National Health and Welfare Act, SC 1945, c 7. Pensions was now the responsibility of a new Department of Veterans Affairs. 
5 Davidson 1949a at 93; Davidson 1949b; Cameron 1959 at 323; About the Authors, 1954 at 500; and About the Authors, 1950 
at 628. Whitmore joined the Department as a Dominion Analyst in 1920, analyzing drugs and reviewing claims by advertisers; 
see “Colleagues Honor R.D. Whitmore On His Retirement”, The Ottawa Journal (10 March 1951), p 7 (Newpapers.com). 
6 September 21, 1945 memorandum from Morrell to Valin, April 9, 1946 letter from Chisholm to Valin, August 1, 1946 and 
September 18, 1946 letters from Morrell to Cameron, in Library and Archives Canada, Department of Health fond, RG 29, 
“Advisory Committees”, volume 613, file no. 339-5-6. 
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began preparing to request that the statutory amendments regarding cosmetics, passed in 
1939, be proclaimed into force. Officials advised the cosmetics industry of the Department’s 
plans for regulating cosmetics; in response, the Toilet Goods Manufacturers’ Association 
provided the Department with a lawyer’s opinion that the statutory licensing provision was 
unconstitutional.7 The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) quickly confirmed this view. In Elmer 
Driedger’s opinion, the cosmetics licensing provision was “of doubtful validity”. The crux of 
Driedger’s advice was that the provision could not be supported as criminal legislation “because 
nothing is prohibited”. In effect, National Health was precluded from licensing a substance under 
the criminal law power unless licensing was integrated with a criminal prohibition, and relatedly, 
National Health was therefore precluded from licensing anything but injurious substances.8   
However, as the Food and Drugs Division remained committed to regulating cosmetics, 
Driedger devoted significant efforts working with its officials in the spring of 1946 to draft a new 
bill. The draft bill added a new Part to the Food and Drugs Act, with a central provision that 
would prohibit the sale of “injurious cosmetics”, and that furthermore would empower regulations 
respecting registration, packaging, and labelling of cosmetics; restricting the use of ingredients; 
and prescribing standards and fixing limits of variability.9 In May 1946, on its way to Parliament, 
the bill hit a snag. The Minister of National Health and Welfare, Brooke Claxton, decided at the 
last minute that registering cosmetics might prove contentious and decided to drop all cosmetics 
provisions from the bill,10 which otherwise passed.11 Minister Claxton’s resistance to regulating 
cosmetics went beyond the registration measures in the new bill as, on July 1, 1946, the 
definition of “drug” in the 1939 amendments was proclaimed into force “except the portion of it 
which applies to cosmetics”.12 
                                                          
7 January 22, 1946 letter from Chisholm to Varcoe, in EA Driedger’s Cosmetics Regulation File, 1946-1947. 
8 January 25, 1946 legal memorandum from Driedger to Varcoe, January 29, 1946 draft letter by Driedger, and February 1, 1946 
final letter from Varcoe to Chisholm, all in EA Driedger’s Cosmetics Regulation File, 1946-1947. 
9 January 25, 1946 legal memorandum from Driedger to Varcoe, and March 19, 1946 legal memorandum from Driedger to 
Varcoe, in EA Driedger’s Cosmetics Regulation File, 1946-1947. 
10 May 27, 1946 letter from Curran to Varcoe, in EA Driedger’s Cosmetics Regulation File, 1946-1947. 
11 The Act was amended in July 1946, but, as in 1939, without its intended cosmetics provisions. As in 1939, the central focus 
was on authorizing more expansive regulatory powers to control the sale of drugs by prescriptions, specifically for antibiotics 
like penicillin which were not “ordinarily injurious to health but if too frequently administered might lose their full effects”. See 
Davidson 1949a at 92; and An Act to Amend the Food and Drugs Act, SC 1946, c 23. 
12 Proclamation, 1 July 1946, bringing into force part of section one of “An Act to amend the Food and Drugs Act”, in Canada 
Gazette, Vol LXXX, No 29 at p 4837 (July 20, 1946). 
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At the end of 1946, Minister Claxton moved to National Defence.13 With Claxton’s departure 
came the possibility of renewed political priority for cosmetics. The new Minister, Paul Martin, 
would also have a new Deputy Minister. Having served as the Chief of the Laboratory of 
Hygiene since 1939, Dr. G. Donald W. Cameron was characterized as a “particularly happy 
appointment” as Deputy Minister of Health due to his familiarity with the Department and its 
priorities.14 By 1947, the Food and Drugs Division was expanding its capacity to research and 
control cosmetics, having creating a Cosmetics Section within Laboratory Services and 
appointing an analyst as its cosmetics specialist.15 Moreover, with Robert Curran, the new legal 
counsel to National Health, Driedger revised and polished the Department’s draft cosmetics 
regulations in 1947, preparing for a time when the Food and Drugs Act would empower them.16  
 Cosmetics regulation was just one piece of a massive expansion of the Department’s 
bureaucratic machinery and capacities. From WWII onwards, there had been an explosion of 
orders in council and regulations “which, through a mass of amendments, were fast becoming a 
labyrinth out of which even the administrative officials sometimes found it difficult to extricate 
themselves.”17 Beginning in 1947, the Food and Drug Divisions began the task of consolidating 
the Food and Drug Regulations, primarily aimed at streamlining but also introducing some 
substantive revisions.18 The Food and Drug Regulations were repealed and replaced, in their 
entirety, on April 5, 1949.19   
In revising the regulations, National Health officials endeavoured mightily to constrain and 
consolidate estrogen. Recognizing and troubled by the multiple drug standards wrought in 1944, 
they sought greater uniformity through amendments to three estrogenic enactments: the 
                                                          
13 Paul Martin Sr. was appointed as the new Minister of National Health and Welfare in 1946, serving in that portfolio for over 
ten years. At the same time, Dr. Brock Chisholm resigned as Deputy Minister of Health when he was appointed Secretary of the 
interim committee of the World Health Organization.  See Davidson 1949a at 92; and Cameron 1959 at 323. 
14 Davidson 1949a at 92; and Cameron 1959 at 322-323. Cameron would serve as Deputy Minister of Health for two decades; 
see Canadian Museum of History, “Dr. G. Donald W. Cameron”, online exhibition, “Making Medicare: The History of Health Care 
in Canada, 1914-2007”, online: <https://www.historymuseum.ca/cmc/exhibitions/hist/medicare/medic-3k02e.shtml>.  
15 Davidson 1949a at 9; and March 1, 1946 letter from Curran to Driedger, in EA Driedger’s Cosmetics Regulation File, 1946-
1947. 
16 EA Driedger’s Cosmetics Regulation File, 1946-1947. 
17 Curran 1949 at 391. Davidson 1949a at 105-106. Davidson’s research showed that, from 1940-1945, there were 42 
enactments, “many covering vast numbers of drugs” such the vitamin regulations and the Canadian Supplement. Among these 
regulations were many creating food standards, including for flour and bread, sausage, ice cream, grain and grain products. 
18 Davidson 1949a at 95; Curran 1949 at 391, 397 and 403-404; and December 11, 1948 letter from Davidson to Woods, in 
Unknown Committee Member’s File, 1948-1949. The Food and Drug Regulations were consolidated in a new form and format. 
They were published in loose-leaf, to make amendments easier and cheaper. The format saw them divided into four parts: 
general administrative and interpretive provisions, foods, drugs, and vitamins. Appendix II listed certain drugs with dosage 
limits; Appendix III prescribed proper names for certain drugs; and Appendix IV listed certain drugs as prescription drugs. 
19 PC 1949-1536, SOR/49-145 (5 April 1949), Canada Gazette, Vol LXXXIII, No 10, at p 882 (May 25, 1949).  
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Canadian Supplement, Sex Hormone Regulations, and Schedule B to the Food and Drugs Act. 
The Department’s primary strategy for bringing uniformity to the estrogens was to remove them 
from the Canadian Supplement.20 Oestrone, oestradioal benzoate, stilboestrol, and stilboestrol 
dipropionate were all deleted from Part V of Schedule B,21 and their monographs were removed 
from the 1949 Food and Drug Regulations. The old guard like Davidson clung to the idea that 
the Supplement had value, but other officials were coming to view the Supplement as spent; 
having served its purpose during and after the war, it was now ready to be retired.22 The 
Supplement’s obsolescence was hastened with a revised British Pharmacopoeia in 1948, which 
remedied the decline in pharmacopoeial standards occasioned by the “wartime addenda” and 
included most of the prewar monographs that National Health had incorporated, in 1944, into 
the Supplement. Thus, only a small subset of the monographs, about 40, were retained in the 
regulations.23 Beyond this pragmatic reason for dropping monographs, however, was National 
Health’s continuing and widening shift away from professional ways of regulating drugs and 
towards administrative modes of regulation.24 Even the new name of the Canadian Supplement 
reflected this, now styled within the regulations as “Drugs of Part V of Schedule B to the Act”. As 
Director of the Food and Drug Divisions, Morrell continued to entertain superficially the notion of 
a Canadian Pharmacopoeia, and he generally accepted that sometimes “peculiarly Canadian 
(drug) standards will have to be maintained”, 25 but in a sharp departure from the wartime 
nationalism, he was strongly inclined to follow the Americans’ lead on drug standards, 
particularly to better facilitate importation of drugs from Canada’s largest supplier: 
It is always a subject for debate as to what standard shall be written into the Canadian 
Regulations. Shall that of the United States Pharmacopoeia be adopted, or of the British 
Pharmacopoeia, or some other existing standard, or shall a special Canadian standard be 
devised? Unless there are important reasons for doing so, the latter course is to be avoided. 
There is no point in having differences just to be different. It would be an ideal course to 
choose the International Standard and nomenclature, provided it was also used by a 
substantial number of countries trading with Canada. Many of the irksome differences in 
standards, which have no real significance from the medical point of view, but which if they 
                                                          
20 The Canadian Supplement was now found in Division 6 of Part C of the Food and Drug Regulations; ibid at 973. 
21 PC 1949-1537, SOR/49-144 (5 April 1949), Canada Gazette, Part II, Vol LXXXIII, No 10, at p 879 (May 25, 1949) [“Schedule B 
Amendment, April 5, 1949”]. 
22 See e.g. Davidson 1949b; Davidson 1949a; Curran 1949; Morrell 1950; Allmark 1954; Pugsley 1967. 
23 Allmark 1954 at 253; this trend continued and, by 1954, most of the Canadian Supplement monographs were discarded. 
24 On “ways of regulating drugs”, see Chapter 1, section 1.ii., particularly content associated with notes 105-116.   
25 Morrell 1950 at 659. 
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exist mutually exclude the products of different countries, would disappear and the labeling 
of imports would not cause the trouble it now does.26 
 
As the Department phased out the Supplement,27 it also phased out the Canadian 
Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards. Despite the heated debates on estrogen among 
Committee members in 1943, in 1949, National Health did not bother to seek the Committee’s 
approval to drop the four estrogens from the Supplement, returning unilaterally to its original 
plan to regulate estrogenic drugs solely through the Sex Hormone Regulations. The exact 
timing of the Committee’s demise is unclear, as rather than formal disbandment, it fizzled out. 
Yet it was certainly on its deathbed by 1950, and gone by 1952.28 There were other deaths not 
metaphorical.  On March 1, 1950, while at home writing a sermon, Linton Davidson had a stroke 
and died. With his passing, so passed the practice of correspondence, figurative and literal, 
between Department and Committee members on old and new ways of regulating drugs.29  
In addition to dropping the four estrogens from the dwindling list of drugs in Part V and the 
Supplement, National Health also had amendments made to the Sex Hormone Regulations.30 
These amendments tinkered with the provisions that set standards (or more accurately, with the 
provisions that delegated standard setting to National Health officials or to manufacturers). 
Under the vague provision enacted in 1944 for reference standards, many manufacturers had 
submitted reference materials for their products. With the proliferation of commercially available 
sex hormone products in the 1940s, this meant that the samples submitted also proliferated, 
becoming an unwieldy “multiplicity of standards” in the Laboratory.31 In 1949, National Health 
ended manufacturers’ duties to submit standards and instead delegated to the Food and Drug 
Laboratories the power to decide which materials it would keep as standards.32 With respect to 
                                                          
26 Ibid at 660; see also 656-656. 
27 According to Professor Ferguson, the Committee member who replaced Henderson after his death, by 1951, the Canadian 
Supplement had been discontinued; see JKW Ferguson & GHW Lucas (revising authors), Henderson’s Materia Medica (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1951), at the Preface. Pugsley later wrote that it was discontinued in 1949; Pugsley 1967. 
28 Ibid. Pugsley later wrote that the Committee was renamed the Canadian Drug Advisory Committee in 1953; Pugsley 1967.  
29 Davidson Obituary 1950. Davidson had been a lay member of the Anglican clergy, in charge of services at the parish of St. 
Peter’s Carlington, and Assistant Lay Secretary of the Synod of the Diocese of Ottawa. A month before his death, his wife had 
died after a long ailment; see January 1950 correspondence, in Library and Archives Canada, Department of Health fonds, 
RG29, “Canadian Committee on Pharmaceutical (sic) Standards”, 1949/09-1950/12, Volume 249, file no. 339-4-1, (Part 9) 
[“Unknown Committee Member’s File, 1949-1950”]. 
30 In this chapter, except when indicated otherwise, the “Sex Hormone Regulations” refer to Division 2 of Part C of the Food and 
Drug Regulations; PC 1949-1536, SOR/49-145 (5 April 1949), in Canada Gazette, Vol LXXXIII, No 10, at p 945 (May 25, 1949) 
[“Sex Hormone Regulations”]. 
31 Pugsley 1951 at 534-535. 
32 Sex Hormone Regulations, ss C.02.003 and C.02.004. The Laboratory of Hygiene and Food and Drug Laboratories were 
different entities. The former continued after the 1947 re-organization, but some responsibilities for testing and controlling 
food and drugs, like sex hormones, were transferred to the Food and Drug Laboratories; see Cameron 1959 at 320-324. 
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potency, there were minor revisions that, contrary to Driedger’s legal opinion in 1944, expressly 
subdelegated power to the Food and Drug Laboratories to set test methods for measuring the 
potency of any products expressed in terms of the International Standard or the Canadian 
Reference Standard. The potency labels remained, though, with tweaks to the rule for clarity.33   
The most substantive amendment to the Sex Hormone Regulations was the addition of 
cosmetics. On May 1, 1949, Canada finally brought into force the 1939 amendments to the Act, 
making the legislative decision to define cosmetic and to make “any cosmetic” a subcategory of 
drug (the unconstitutional licensing provision was never brought into force).34 As a result, in 
1949, cosmetics became subject to the general provisions of the Food and Drug Regulations 
related to drugs. Further, cosmetics could now be specifically regulated. The first – and the only 
– cosmetics that Canada regulated, in 1949, were cosmetics containing sex hormones.35  
By 1949, estrogen had been infused into skin creams for a decade. Consistent with the fact 
that it was primarily white middle and upper-class women who sought out hormone replacement 
therapy,36 estrogenic cosmetics were similarly classed. By 1939, they had arrived for sale in 
Eaton’s and other Canadian department stores as luxury skin creams,37 though breast 
enlargement creams also arrived by the slightly seedier route of mail order.38 With estrogenic 
activity conjured from oestrone, oestradiol, oestriol, equilin, equilenin, and even from DES, 
these products contained hormones whipped into emulsion creams or mixed into oils.39 
Imported from the US, where, unlike drugs, cosmetics did not require pre-market approval under 
the US FDCA, they were not supported by scientific studies showing their safety.  
There was, in particular, a paucity of physiological evidence of whether, and to what extent, 
estrogens in skin creams were absorbed into the blood stream and into bodies, although some 
                                                          
33 Ibid, s C.02.005. One small difference between s C.02.005 and section 3 of the 1944 Sex Hormone Regulations is that, rather 
than give potency information on a label, it was now to be given “with every package”. Scholars have explored how packaging 
practices and materials enact different drugs, including for estrogen (see e.g. Cloatre 2013; and Sanabria 2016). I have no 
physical product packages from that time, nor images thereof, and examining packaging is beyond the scope of my thesis. 
34 An Act to Amend the Food and Drugs Act, SC 1939, c 9 (most cosmetic provisions), proclaimed into force 5 April 1949, 
SOR/49-143, Canada Gazette, Part II, Vol LXXXIII, No 10, at p 878 (May 25, 1949). 
35 Sex Hormone Regulations, s C.02.000; and Curran 1949 at 411.  
36 Watkins 2007 at 8, adding that “as more women obtained health insurance, either privately or through government-funded 
programs in the 1960s and 1970s, and as HRT became more popular in the 1980s and 1990s, more women of lower 
socioeconomic status joined the ranks of hormone users”, and “[w]omen of color took HRT in much lower proportions”. 
37 See Chapter 3, section 1, at note 103. In the US, hormonal cosmetic products became available for sale at roughly the same 
time in the late 1930s; see Hugo Mock, “Legal Limits of Cosmetic Labeling and Advertising” (1951) 6 Food Drug Cosm LJ 865 
[“Mock 1951”] at 870-871; and James Bennett, Cosmetics and Skin: Hormone Creams, Oils and Serums” (2018), online: 
http://www.cosmeticsandskin.com/bcb/hormone-creams.php [“Bennett 2018”]. However, it was not until the early 1940s that 
these hormonal cosmetics were identified as containing estrogen or estrogenic substances per se.  
38 See e.g. Figure 2. 
39 Bennett 2018; and Watkins 2007 at 85-86. 
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researchers had tested the systemic effects of such creams. For example, in a 1938 study, 
researchers examined creams that contained either androgens or estrogens.40 Using what was 
characterized as a low dose, they established that sex hormones were easily absorbed through 
the skin of various animals, and that face cream “sold commercially and recommended for the 
removal of wrinkles from normal women has decided internal effects when applied daily on the 
skin of experimental animals”.41 They concluded that the ready absorption of topical estrogen, 
and the demonstrable effects on lab animals, presented a possible hazard to female 
reproductive functions and urged more study.42 However, over the next decade, the studies 
were sparse, and the cosmetic industry’s newfound enthusiasm for estrogen was abundant. As 
Elizabeth Watkins shows, in assembling advertisements from the 1930s and 40s, the industry 
promoted the message that youth and beauty were synonymous, and its “ads imparted a clear 
message: use of estrogen-containing creams would make a woman’s skin look younger”.43 
Neither the FDA nor the American Medical Association (“AMA”) harboured any positive 
feelings towards estrogenic skin creams. To the contrary, from the late 1930s to the early 
1950s, there was “a strong bias by the US medical profession against the over-counter sales” of 
estrogenic cosmetics.44 Concerned about their carcinogenic potential, the AMA had initially 
campaigned against these creams. After the AMA published a 1939 editorial that was highly 
critical of Estrocreme, a product represented for use in breast enhancement,45 its manufacturer, 
Hirestra, sued the AMA in defamation. Supportive of the AMA’s position, the FDA supplied 
expert evidence. However, in its decision, the Federal Court rejected this evidence, holding that 
the animal studies relied upon by the FDA to claim that estrogens were carcinogenic were 
insufficient to prove a likelihood of cancer in women. Langston finds that, as a result of the court 
decision, the FDA backed down from efforts to regulate estrogenic breast creams, its resolve 
deflated.46 Taking a longer view, however, the FDA regained its enthusiasm by the late 1940s, 
when it began targeting all sorts of estrogenic creams with prosecutions for misbranding.47  
                                                          
40 Carl R Moore, Jule K Lamar & Naomi Beck, “Cutaneous Absorption of Sex Hormones”, (1938) 111:1 JAMA 11.  
41 The researchers used one-fifth of the recommended “daily dose” for women; ibid at 13.  These effects included stimulating 
mammary growth in normal male guinea pigs, inducing vaginal cornification in spayed female rats, maintaining or increasing 
growth of the uterus in spayed rats, and reducing the weight of testes (by 80 percent) and the weight of seminal vesciles (by 90 
percent) in young male rats; ibid at 12-14. 
42 Ibid at 14. 
43 Watkins 2007 at 84-85; see also Rothman & Rothman at 95-97. 
44 Mock 1951 at 870. 
45 “Endocreme: A Cosmetic with a Menace”, Editorial, (April 9, 1938) 110:15 JAMA 1194.  
46 Langston at 47. I have not been able locate any reported copy of the court’s decision in Hirestra in electronic databases.  
47 Bennett 2018. 
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Though it is not apparent whether Elmer Driedger knew of estrogenic creams, he had no 
difficulty, conceptually or legally, with apprehending cosmetics as a subcategory of drugs. 
Robert Curran, in contrast, often overtly disparaged this legislative decision. Curran was 
National Health’s chief legal advisor, having joined the Department at the end of the war, and so 
his public disdain for Canada’s legislative approach can be jarring. Right after the statutory 
amendments were brought into effect in 1949, he wrote a journal article for a mainly American 
audience, mocking the Canadian legislation in sexist terms (as set out in the quote at start of 
this chapter),48 advancing in less than subtle rhetoric a gendered distinction between drugs and 
cosmetics. Acknowledging that medicinal ingredients were found in cosmetics, he nevertheless 
opined that cosmetics were “not expected to contain a high degree or medication nor are 
extensive therapeutic claims likely to be made for them”. For Curran, the boundary was clear: 
“[t]he borderline between cosmetics and drugs, of course, rests upon the claims which are 
made”.49 Moreover, he felt that cosmetic companies’ claims must be given broad latitude, and 
puffery should not be discouraged.50 After all, the public was not deceived by exaggerated or 
false claims, as nobody really thought that cosmetics would do “what Nature has failed to do”.51  
No substance challenged such rigid distinctions more strongly than estrogen.52 As will be 
seen, some estrogenic “cosmetics” were more potent than “drugs”, and manufacturers often 
implied therapeutic values for their estrogenic cosmetics. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
advertisements for Premarin, a “drug”, and Helena Rubinstein’s hormone cream, a “cosmetic”, 
made many of the same claims: youthful beauty, reproductive femininity, natural vitality, and 
happier husbands. Yet Curran never mentioned estrogen, or the new regulation governing 
estrogenic cosmetics, in his criticisms of the cosmetics scheme under the Food and Drugs Act. 
                                                          
48 Ibid; see also Robert E. Curran, “Revision of Canadian Food and Drugs Act”, (1952) 7 Food Drug Cosm LJ 711 [“Curran 1952”] 
at 715. 
49 Curran 1952 at 718. In this paper, originally delivered at a September 1952 meeting of the American Bar Association’s 
Division of Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law, Curran explained that the upcoming revised Food and Drugs Act would no longer 
include a misbranding offence for cosmetics, for the reason that puffery was to be expected for cosmetics.  
50 Curran 1946 at 503; see also Curran 1952. The AMA published a study, in 1954, concluding otherwise: “it is recognized and 
accepted that a certain amount of puffery is necessary in the field of promotional cosmetic advertising. However, some 
manufacturers of creams containing estrogens have made claims, either directly or by innuendo, that overstep these limits”; 
see Howard T Behrman, “Hormone Creams and the Facial Skin” (May 8, 1954) 155:2 JAMA 119 [“Behrman 1954”] at 122.  
51 Curran 1952 at 718. 
52 In contrast, Hugo Mock, counsel to the Toilet Goods Association, accepted the overlap between cosmetics and drugs, with 
estrogen a frequent example. In a 1951 article, he wrote of estrogen as a “physiological cosmetic”; Mock 1951 at 870-871. In a 
1946 article, he wrote: “I submit that the definition of cosmetics and drugs in both these Acts is purely one of convenience 
rather than one of scientific terminology and that the distinction between drugs and cosmetics is largely an artificial one which 
will tend more and more to be broken down. … Necessarily, hormone preparations sold at cosmetic counters are both drugs 
and cosmetics.” See Hugo Mock, “Cosmetic Law … History and Observation” (1946) 1 Food Drug Cosm LQ 61 at 63. 
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Perhaps his silence on estrogen was because it challenged his insistence on “common 
sense” distinctions between drugs and cosmetics. The evolving scheme on sex hormones also 
appeared, at least superficially, to challenge this distinction. Beyond recognizing that cosmetics 
could be just as potent as drugs, in 1949, the term “sex hormones” disappeared from the Act. 
Concurrent with the regulatory amendments and the cosmetics proclamation, Schedule B was 
amended, with the term “sex hormones” deleted from Part II of the schedule, and the phrase 
“hormones, and preparations of hormones” added to Part I.53  Were hormones being de-sexed? 
The change was part of an intentional, broader policy decision that the only hormonal drugs still 
requiring licensing were insulin and liver extract.54 Yet these sexless hormones did not last. 
Whomever had held the pen, in redrafting Schedule B, had forgotten its integration with the 
standards in the Sex Hormone Regulations. As of April 5, 1949, those regulations provided that 
“[t]he drugs referred to in this Division are included in the term sex hormone as mentioned or 
described in Part I of Schedule B to the Act”.55 Without the term sex hormone, this cross-
reference was meaningless. Soon realizing its error, National Health returned the term to 
Schedule B three months later. 56 Momentarily gender-neutral, estrogen was rapidly re-sexed. 
Tempting to shrug off as a drafting error, triggered by a well-intended but legally mistaken 
effort to remove the “sex” from sex hormones, in fact this incident was less benign. Recall that, 
under the scheme for biologics, drugs on Part 1 could be standardized but not controlled 
through licensing. Why did National Health officials feel it necessary, in the first place, to move 
(sex) hormones from Part II to Part I? Why did they wish to make (sex) hormones not just 
unlicensed, as they had already been for two decades, but also “un-licensable”? One reason is 
that, in 1947, the US formally excluded all hormones from licensing through regulatory 
amendments, codifying a longstanding informal policy of the Public Health Service.57 National 
Health’s decision to shift all “hormones” from Part II to Part I of Schedule B reflects how the 
Food and Drug Divisions were increasingly inclined, by the late 1940s, to shadow US 
developments. Although this is a convincing explanation on the face of the Schedule B, Canada 
                                                          
53 Schedule B Amendment, April 5, 1949. 
54 Pugsley 1951 at 536-539. That insulin and liver extract were licensed was confusing (and arguably unlawful), considering that 
the April 1949 amendments to Schedule B relocated all hormone products to Part I rather than Part II. In his article, Pugsley 
takes obvious pains to justify this, claiming that, regardless of the plain language of Parts I and II, the reference to hormones in 
Part 1 really meant sex hormones (whether parenterally or orally administered), and Part II was really for parenteral drugs 
including non-sex hormones like liver-extract, insulin, and anterior pituitary preparations; see Pugsley 1951 at 532-533. Further, 
National Health also decided to treat drugs prepared from anterior pituitary hormones as if they were “parenteral” products on 
Part II and not “hormones” on Part I, to preserve the possibility of licensure; see Pugsley 1951 at 533 and 539-540. 
55 Sex Hormone Regulations, s C.02.001. 
56 PC 1949-3483, SOR/49-281 (13 July 1949), Canada Gazette, Part II, Vol LXXXIII, No 15, at p 1533 (August 10, 1949). 
57 Coleman 2016 at 578. 
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did not, in fact, fully emulate the US regulatory decision. In practice, National Health officials 
decided to keep a few hormonal drugs, like liver extract and insulin, under licensure, and to 
reserve the possibility of licensure for pituitary hormones. Put another way, and by Pugsley’s 
own admission, the only hormones made un-licensable, in practice, were sex hormones.58  
The second reason that estrogen was made un-licensable was driven by prevailing gender 
norms – which found expression in the journal articles by Curran discussed above – that viewed 
cosmetics as little more than natural products for deceptive women. On the same day that 
hormones were moved to Part 1, Canada obtained legislative authority to regulate cosmetics 
generally,59 and amended the Sex Hormone Regulations to regulate estrogenic cosmetics 
specifically.60 Cosmetics, however, were legally difficult to license. At least, that was the 
message that National Health officials had taken from Driedger’s legal opinion in 1946, which 
had caused them concern that licensing rules in the Biologicals Regulation might also be invalid 
(though Driedger had brushed off that concern in his opinion). With sex hormones now legally 
recognized, as of April 1949, as superficial stuff of ladies’ make-up, cosmetics dragged estrogen 
down into an “un-licensable” class. Far from being de-sexed, estrogen was being reproduced as 
ever more gendered, as natural feminine substances that did not require licensing. 
That estrogen was provoking gendered distinctions within Canadian law is supported by the 
techniques through which the Sex Hormone Regulations newly regulated hormonal cosmetics, 
in the absence of either licensing or registration. While these regulations continued to prescribe 
(or rather to delegate the prescription of) unconventional “standards” for sex hormone products, 
beyond this, in its newly endorsed form of cosmetic products, estrogen would again be ruled 
through labelling. Once again, the label devised was novel to Canadian food and drugs law, and 
once again, these labelling innovations were only used for products sold to women. Section 
C.02.0009 now prohibited the sale of cosmetic products containing a sex hormone unless the 
label carried the statement: “This preparation contains a potent sex hormone. Use with care”.61  
No Canadian consumer had previously been directed by a label to use a product “with 
care”.62 In the 1940s, most food and drugs in Canada bore labels that served to state what the 
                                                          
58 See supra note 54. 
59 See supra note 34. 
60 See supra note 35. 
61 Sex Hormone Regulations, s C.02.009(a)(v). 
62 The phrase “use with care” had its origins in a proposal by the Dominion Council of Health, a federal-provincial advisory body. 
In 1939, the Act was amended to empower Cabinet to define conditions of sale of drugs likely to be injurious to health. This was 
in response to the Council urging greater control of over-the-counter sales of potent drugs. However, a regulation imposing 
prescription controls was not immediately made. According to Davidson, the “first thought in dealing with this subject was to 
require a caution to appear on the label to the effect that the contents should be used with care”. However, when National 
Health consulted the Canadian Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association on this proposal, it had “approved the principle but 
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product was purported to be. These labels impliedly represented that the product met regulated 
standards of quality or identity, and exposed manufacturers to misbranding prosecutions if their 
products did not “measure up” to these regulated recipes, comparable to the US regulatory 
approach.63 At this time, labels did not typically bear health information, including because 
regulators believed that “such information would ‘confuse’ the ordinary food consumer.”64  
Thus, as with estrogenic drugs five years earlier, in 1949, National Health performed a novel 
regulatory move, enlisting labels to direct women to attend carefully to their own safety when 
using estrogenic cosmetics. For these products, only used by women, the rules were suddenly 
different. Safety would no longer be ensured by a “recipe”, built into the drug or food product by 
a standard found in a pharmacopoeia or a conventional regulatory standard. Women consumers 
would instead be made responsible for ensuring their own safety through careful product use.  
It would be easy to conclude that this differential regulatory treatment, in which consumer 
warnings were substituted for safety standards, reflected gendered norms about cosmetics. Yet 
estrogen was now a wily substance, not readily amenable to regulatory controls. As materialized 
by physicians, manufacturers, and government regulators in 1944, and by ongoing inattention in 
National Health’s laboratories in the intervening years to its physiological activity,65 estrogen 
was both powerful and indeterminate. When National Health had avoided traditional standards 
for estrogenic drugs – such as those afforded by dose limits, prescription controls, or ingredient 
restrictions – it had scripted into estrogen an inherent unpredictability. Enacted as both potent 
and safe, estrogen naturally provoked the injunction to “use with care”. Rules had engendered 
estrogenic crystals, and now estrogen was crystallizing gendered rules. 
 
2. Resurrecting dose through “administrative ruling”, 1950-1953  
One year after introducing “use with care” labels to regulate estrogenic cosmetics, Canada 
again amended the revised Sex Hormone Regulations.66 Repeating the pattern, the 
amendments adopted another new form of product label, which continued the trend of 
delegating responsibility for safety to women consumers. National Health’s latest labelling 
innovation was specific to estrogenic cosmetics, provoked by the ambiguities that had been 
                                                          
asked for such modifications as might easily have nullified its effect”; Davidson 1949a at 84. In 1941, a different regulatory 
approach was taken. Nevertheless, Davidson and Morrell would have been aware of the earlier “use with care” proposal. 
63 Frolich 2017 at 147, 151-154. 
64 Ibid at 147; and Curran 1953 at 29.  
65 See infra note 72. 
66 PC 1950-2084, SOR/50-170 (25 April 1950), Canada Gazette, Part II, Vol LXXXIV, No 10, at p 626 (May 24, 1950). Section 15 of 
this amending regulation revised the existing s C.02.009 and added a new s C.02.010.  
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materialized in estrogenic drugs. Having erased dose and potencies from standards for sex 
hormones in 1944, by rejecting the notion that these qualities and capacities should be legally 
prescribed, departmental officials now subtly reintroduced dose-response considerations into 
the regulation of estrogen. They did so through a combination of imposing new labelling rules 
and by purporting to make “administrative rulings”, an unorthodox mode of regulating food and 
drugs in Canada. In the process, estrogen and labels became ever more entangled.  
The amendment split the existing cosmetic rule in two. A new provision now exclusively 
governed estrogenic cosmetics,67 while the existing rule was limited to cosmetics “containing 
any sex hormone other than a sex hormone purporting to have oestrogenic properties”.68 Why 
National Health retained this latter provision is unclear, as at the time, there were no cosmetics 
being sold with purported androgenic, gonadotrophic, or progestational properties– no 
testosterone tonics, no gonadotrophic lip gloss.69 Only estrogen, that spring of youthful and 
reproductive femininity, had infiltrated cosmetics. Nevertheless, should any other hormonal 
cosmetics ever materialize, their manufacturers would continue to be obliged to advise 
consumers to “use with care”.70 
The new provision, limited only to estrogenic products, prohibited sale of any “preparation 
manufactured for use as a cosmetic containing a sex hormone purporting to have oestrogenic 
properties unless demonstrated to be free from systemic effect from sex hormones”, and unless 
new labelling requirements were satisfied.71 In promoting this amendment, National Health 
officials were alive to physicians’ continuing concerns about the carcinogenic hazards of 
estrogen in cosmetic products. As cosmetics were now a legal subcategory of drug, National 
Health could have limited these preparations to sale only under prescription, though physicians 
presumably would not have been receptive to being asked to prescribe creams intended to 
reduce wrinkles. Alternatively, National Health could have standardized cosmetics. For potency, 
in theory, Canada could have prohibited the sale of cosmetics containing estrogenic substances 
that exceeded a certain potency expressed in international units, using test methods determined 
by the Laboratory of Hygiene and measured against reference materials, as for drugs. 
                                                          
67 1949 Sex Hormone Regulations, as amended in 1950, C.02.010 (emphasis added). 
68 Ibid, C.02.009. 
69 As James Bennett documents, some major cosmetics firms, including Helena Rubinstein and Revlon, added progesterone or 
pregnenolone (or esters thereof) to estrogenic face creams in the late 1950s; see Bennett 2018.   
70 1949 Sex Hormone Regulations, as amended in 1950, C.02.009(a)(v). Estrogenic cosmetic labels would also need to include a 
statement of the sex hormone’s potency in terms that met the revised approach of 1949 to defining potency; s C.02.009(a)(iv). 
71 These labelling requirements are discussed in detail below; see that content associated with infra notes 77-81. 
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Standardizing dose, however, was more elusive. Pharmacopoeial monographs could fix 
estrogen dose ranges to guide drug dispensers and prescribers, and regulated drug standards 
could dictate the dose of certain dosage forms, whether in ampoules, suppositories, tablets, or 
capsules. As seen in the previous chapter, though, in designing its Sex Hormone Regulations in 
the mid-1940s, National Health had written dose out of estrogen regulations. Eschewing such 
standards made it difficult to conceive of a “safe” or “hazardous” dose of estrogen. Instead, the 
regulatory regime left it to firms to standardize products’ doses and to physicians to supervise 
dosage over time (assuming women who purchased estrogenic drugs over the counter in the 
1940s asked for physicians’ advice). Consequently, in the latter half of the decade, the 
Laboratory of Hygiene had little incentive to monitor pharmaceutical companies’ evolving dose 
ranges, or to research their physiological impacts. Nor is there evidence that it did so.72 What 
amount of estrogen in an oral, injectable, or topical preparation was safe? What dose made the 
poison? National Health did not know. Its scientists, and those on the Committee, had focused 
squarely on knowing potency through measuring, but had ignored the other half of Paracelsus’ 
formulation. Imperceptible within regulatory control activities, dose was left to clinicians and their 
patients, delegated to the unpredictable relations between drugs, bodies, and time. 
Once statutorily empowered to regulate skin cream, National Health had to face up to dose. 
Content to defer to the expertise of large pharmaceutical firms with in-house laboratories, 
alchemical experiments by cosmetics outfits elicited more skepticism. Steeped in a regulatory 
culture resistant to imposing limits on borderline products out of fear that this would amount to 
endorsement, National Health officials were in a bind. With dose erased from drug standards, 
how could they determine what dose – what amount – of a cosmetic was safe?  
This question was complicated by the fact that skin cream, infused with hormones or not, 
rarely came packaged in daily “doses”. Even had National Health scientists monitored the 
effects of estrogenic preparations, in cold laboratories with mass-produced rodents and in 
comfortable homes of middle-aged women, face cream and bodies met each other in ways less 
precise. In that creamy form, in registers both material and conceptual, estrogen was slippery.73 
Performed simultaneously as safe and potent in mass-produced pills and medically-supervised 
injections, in daily, mundane beauty regimens, estrogen was less knowable and more fluid.74 
How much cream a woman applied before going to bed in the evening, or when starting her day 
                                                          
72 The Laboratory did do this research for agricultural uses of estrogen, however; see content associated with infra notes 75-76. 
73 For a post-ANT (material-semiotic, relational materialism) study that attends among other things to the “texture” of ordering 
practices, see John Law & Marianne Elisabeth Lien, “Slippery: Field notes in empirical ontology” (2012) 43:3 Soc Stud Sci 363. 
74 Marianne De Laet & Annemarie Mol, "The Zimbabwe bush pump: Mechanics of a fluid technology" (2000) 30:2 Soc Stud 
Sci 225. In the context of pharmaceuticals, see e.g. Cloatre 2013 and Sanabria 2016. 
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in the morning, was not determined quantitatively or mechanically, but through manual, sensory, 
affective practices. How much cream does it take to make your skin feel softer, smoother, 
firmer, less wrinkled? A dry winter’s wind, a poor night’s sleep, a husband’s bad mood – one’s 
relations with estrogen changed. When these practices changed, so did estrogen. In its 
cohabitation with wealthy women and their skin, estrogen enacted an ambiguous toxicity. 
Dr. Leonard Pugsley was responsible for advising on this question. Like Morrell, Pugsley 
had also been promoted after the war. In the 1947 re-organization, he became the Chief of 
Laboratory Services, overseeing ten sections within the central laboratory in Ottawa and serving 
as the technical adviser to five regional laboratories by guiding research and testing for food, 
drugs, and cosmetics. He also continued to research and analyze hormonal products.75 In this 
capacity, his research was quietly influential, leading National Health and eventually the US 
FDA to end the agricultural practice of using DES in chicken feed.76 With cosmetics though, 
Pugsley would prove much more willing to take his cues from US companies and regulators.   
In 1951, Pugsley wrote a journal article about the Canadian regulation of endocrine products, 
in which he simultaneously highlighted and obscured Canada’s practices.77 Aimed primarily at 
an audience of American regulators and industry, he sought to explain and defend the recent 
amendment for estrogenic cosmetics. He claimed that, while National Health had considered it 
advisable to “limit the amount” of estrogen in cosmetic products, it had nonetheless decided 
against setting any upper limit on potency in the regulations “because such would tend to 
indicate approval and freedom from any undesirable side effects” at lower potencies.78 Instead 
of regulated limits, Canada had chosen to limit the amount of estrogen that women would use 
through a new labelling requirement added to the regulations. This double-barreled labelling 
rule, in section C.02.010, required estrogenic cosmetic labels to include the statement: “Use 
only as directed”,79 and then required manufacturers to indicate “directions for use”.80 
                                                          
75 About the Authors, 1951 at 483-484; Davidson 1949a at 92-94; and SJ Cook, “Canadian Chemistry” (1947) 25:32 Chem Eng 
News Archive 2326. The sections of Laboratory Services were Food Chemistry, Pharmaceutical Chemistry, Cosmetic Chemistry, 
Biophysics, Pharmacology and Toxicology, Vitamins and Nutrition, Animal Pathology, Physiology and Hormones, Biometrics, and 
Organic Chemistry and Narcotics. The Ottawa laboratory was “devoted almost entirely to work of an investigational character, 
such as the development of improved methods of analysis and biological tests”; Davidson 1949b. 
76 Langston 2010 at 67-68 and 178 (notes 15 and 16). 
77 Pugsley 1951. Half of Pugsley’s article addressed the regulation of sex hormones, in drugs and cosmetics, including “sex gland 
tissue”. The other half addressed new regulations on liver extract injectable, insulin, and anterior pituitary preparations. 
78 Ibid at 536.  
79 1949 Sex Hormone Regulations, as amended in 1950, s C.02.010(a)(v). This requirement applied to inner and outer labels. 
80 Ibid, s C.02.010(b)(ii). Additionally, unmentioned by Pugsley and seemingly innocuous, but necessary to the practices later 
adopted by National Health officials to put an upper limit on potency, the amended regulations also required a statement of 
the product’s weight or “net contents”; ibid, s C.02.010(b)(iii). 
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Thus, as with the caution label for estrogenic drugs and the self-care label for cosmetics, 
again National Health expressly chose a label as an alternative to a safety standard. In 1949, 
women had been told to “use with care”, but care of the self was no longer enough – women 
would now need to comply with explicit directions to keep themselves safe from cancer. Yet 
what exactly those directions should be was not articulated in the Sex Hormone Regulations, 
and, in his article, Pugsley maintains a strategic silence on how this new labelling rule would 
limit estrogenic exposures. Were directions being left to manufacturers, or were National Health 
officials “directing the directions”? Most glaringly, his article is silent on what amount had been 
identified by the Department as its “upper limit of potency.81 Thus, the reintroduction of dose-
response logics to estrogen regulation in Canada was left implicit and made discretionary. 
Digging deeper, it seems that potency limits were set through two distinct practices: first, by a 
practice of US cosmetics firms under the influence of the US FDA (and by the FDA under the 
influence of Helena Rubinstein); and second, through administrative practices of National Health 
officials negotiating label directions with those firms that had not received the FDA’s message.  
Though the legal source of the FDA’s authority to stipulate the potency of estrogenic skin 
creams is murky,82 the material source of the “rule” is not. The rule was enmeshed in the 
products and marketing practices of Helena Rubinstein, the upscale cosmetics firm that led the 
industry in luxury hormonal products. In the 1940s, the company had packaged its “Estrogenic 
Hormone Cream” in jars that it advertised as containing one month’s supply.83  By indicating that 
the jar held a “30-night supply” and that women should “use it for one month” to obtain results, 
such ads implied how much cream should be used.84 Part of a wider strategy to paint its product 
as scientific and therapeutic,85 this marketing tactic made cream seem like medicine and the 
amount like dosage. Such ads aimed to persuade women to view the 30-night supply as the 
minimum amount needed for a wrinkle-free complexion, and thus to buy a jar every month.  
                                                          
81 Pugsley repeatedly references a “upper limit”; Pugsley 1951 at 536. I found no evidence of any quantitative upper limit.  
82 This thesis does not attempt to trace comprehensively the US FDA’s efforts, in the 1940s and early 1950s, to control 
hormonal skin creams. A summary of those efforts is given simply to situate National Health’s approach to implementing the 
“directions for use” labelling requirement in the 1950 amendment. 
83 Pugsley echoed this advertising language and endorses the expertise of the cosmetics industry in setting this standard: 
“These preparations are recommended by cosmetic manufacturers in terms of one month's supply”; see Pugsley 1951 at 536. 
84 See Figures 8 and 9, infra. 
85 Bennett 2018; and Watkins 2007 at 85-87. 
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
 
Figure 9: Ad for Helena Rubinstein’s Estrogenic Hormone Cream, 1945.86 
 
“A scientific preparation that will help you achieve beauty for your skin by retarding the effects of 
aging. 30-Night Supply.” 
                                                          
86 Advertisements, Toronto Daily Star (1900-1971) (6 April 1945), 21, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Toronto Star. 
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
Figure 10: Ad for Helena Rubinstein’s Estrogenic Hormone Cream, 1947.87 
“Estrogenic Hormone Cream – Contains natural hormones which your skin absorbs? Result? You 
look younger! Use it for one month. See the change. 4.50.” This direction that the product be used 
for a 30-day period was only made for estrogenic cream, and for no other of these products.   
                                                          
87 Advertisements, Toronto Daily Star (1900-1971) (17 October 1947), 11, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Toronto Star. 
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By the late 1940s, Helena Rubinstein’s marketing moves were taken up, tentatively, as an 
informal policy position by the US FDA. In effect, the FDA adopted the position that existing 
manufacturing and marketing practices of Helena Rubinstein (and other reputable firms) 
reflected a permissible potency and dose for estrogenic skin creams. In 1951, counsel to the US 
Toilet Goods Association disclosed the FDA’s “latest pronouncement on the subject”: 
As to the local effectiveness of estrogens in the doses commonly used, we believe that the 
literature as of today shows, after allowance is made for enthusiasm in some of the 
publications, slight morphological and physiological alterations in older skins not produced 
by the same ointment base without the estrogen. Whether or not these effects can be 
extended for more than two or three months has not yet been determined. In replying to 
inquiries in regard to harmful local systemic effects we have pointed out that the cosmetics 
on the market in this country contain from 10,000 to 20,000 units of estrogenic substances 
per ounce. The directions in most cases specify that a small quantity be applied to the face. 
These articles have been widely distributed for about ten years and there have been no 
reports in medical literature which suggest harmful effects resulting from their application.88 
 
Similarly, Bennett finds that the FDA “appears to have settled on 10,000 International Units 
(IU) of oestrogens per ounce as an acceptable amount for hormone creams, as long as the 
amount used was no greater than 2 ounces per month.” This limit was intended “to ensure that 
a user would have a maximum exposure of 670 IU of oestrogens per day.”89 It seems that the 
“limit” was an administrative interpretation by the FDA of whether an estrogen cream was a drug 
or cosmetic (and whether it was misbranded as either).90 The ambiguity of this interpretation 
makes more sense in context of ongoing debates in which pharmaceutical firms and their 
lawyers increasingly challenged the FDA’s authority to issue regulations and, relatedly, often 
opposed the FDA’s efforts to regulate with administrative rulings or interpretations, insisting 
such efforts were “simply advisory in character” and lacked the force of law.91 At one point, the 
                                                          
88 Ibid at 870-871 (emphasis added). Mock does not provide any citation or source for the quoted US FDA position statement.  
89 Bennett also finds that “[t]he amount of oestrogens present in American OTC hormone creams differed widely but most fell 
below the 10,000 IU per ounce limit that the FDA used as a safe measure” and that “[w]hen products exceeded the 10,000 IU 
per ounce the FDA usually confiscated them.” He lists these creams and their potencies: “Nu-Youth Hormone Day or Night 
Cream (1,500 IU oestrogens); Second Youth Estrogenic Hormone Cream (7,500 IU oestrogens); Bette Knowlton Special Formula 
Cream (50,000 IU oestrogens); Revlon White Sable Hormone Liquid Cleansing Creme (6,000 IU oestrogens); Allure Fountain of 
Youth Wrinkleproof Cream (7,500 IU oestrogens); Dorothy Gray Cellogen Cream (10,000 IU oestrogens).” See Bennett 2018. 
90 This informal rule persists to the present day in the US, where: “[p]roducts containing estrogen, estrone, estradiol, 
progesterone, placental extract or vitamins may be considered drugs, misbranded drugs, or misbranded cosmetics … the 
estrogen content of an OTC product, be it a drug or a drug as well as cosmetic, may not exceed 10,000 IU per ounce. Users must 
be directed to limit the amount of product applied daily so that no more than 20,000 IU of estrogen or equivalent be used per 
month.” MLM Law, “FDA Cosmetics Handbook” (2018), online: https://www.mlmlaw.com/library/guides/fda/Coshdbok.htm.  
91 Charles Wesley Dunn, “The New Prescription Drug Law Enacted by the Durham Bill (H.R. 3298) As A Part of the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act” (1951) 6 Food Drug Cosm LJ 951 at 955. 
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FDA tried to crystallize its “rule of thumb” on estrogenic cream into a firmer rule. In 1950, when 
the House Commerce Committee was considering amendments to make it easier to restrict the 
sale of prescription drugs, the FDA asked Congress to write into the act an “exemplary list of 
prescription drugs” to guide interpretation of a new definition of prescription drugs.92 On that list 
was “Estrogenic Substances - except skin creams containing not more than 10,000 International 
Units of estrone, or the equivalent of other estrogens, per ounce of cream”.93  Industry opposed 
this list and the Durham-Humphrey bill passed in 1951 without it.94 Regardless, right after the bill 
passed, the FDA officially limited estrogenic drugs to sale on prescription.95  
As in the US, Canadian practices of setting upper potency limits on estrogenic cosmetics did 
not depend on any express authority to limit potency or dose. By emulating the Americans’ 
policy, Canada appeared to be a “shadow regulator”,96 and yet its legal forms and processes 
were modified. Rather than a murkily authorized limit of 10,000 IU of estrone potency per ounce, 
Canadian regulators chose a qualitative standard to distinguish cosmetics from drugs, with the 
test requiring estrogenic cosmetics to be “demonstrated to be free from systemic effect”.97 This 
test did not necessarily depend on dose-response reasoning or evidence. Moreover, on paper, 
this appears to be a highly precautionary standard requiring positive proof of safety. How could 
this test be congruent with the American policy, derived from cosmetics manufacturers, of 
limiting the potency of estrogenic cosmetics to a certain strength in a certain amount of cream? 
 The answer lay in labelling. Under section C.02.010, to be permissibly marketed as a 
cosmetic, not only did a preparation need be free of systemic effect, but as noted, it must 
include the statement “Use only as directed” and provide “directions for use”.98 These labels 
were the technique by which dose-response considerations, erased from the Sex Hormone 
Regulations in 1943, were smuggled back into Canadian estrogen regulation. By requiring 
cosmetic estrogen to bear product labels that directed use, in practice, National Health 
inspectors could attempt to force companies to direct the amount of cream that women should 
                                                          
92 Ibid at 966. The definition of prescription drug was seen by the pharmaceutical industry as the “major controversy” in the bill.  
93 Ibid at 969 (emphasis added). This articulation of what, presumably, was already the FDA’s working rule gets the closest to 
expressing estrogenic potency units in a way that reflected the science of the day. As noted in Chapter 4, while this had been 
widely misunderstood amongst regulators and manufacturers alike, there was not in fact one International Unit in which 
estrogenic activity was expressed, but two; see Chapter 4, section 1.i, particularly that content associated with notes 10-11. 
94 Ibid at 951.  
95 Goodrich 1951 at 888-889.  
96 The concept of “shadow regulator” is mentioned in Lexchin 2016 at 133. 
97 1949 Sex Hormone Regulations, as amended in 1950, s C.02.010. 
98 1949 Sex Hormone Regulations, as amended in 1950, s C.02.010(a)(v) and s C.02.010(b)(ii). Additionally, the amended 
regulations also required a statement of the product’s weight or “net contents”, at s C.02.010(b)(iii).  
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use. If a certain amount of cream contained a certain amount of estrogenic activity, National 
Health could deem it to have no systemic effect. If a firm was not willing to issue directions to 
use those amounts of cream – in another idiom, doses – its product would be deemed a drug.  
Pugsley painted this labelling approach as deriving from a “ruling on potency”, writing that 
“[a]n administrative ruling has been made on an upper limit of potency for one month's supply.”99  
The dose of a potent estrogenic substance would determine if it was a cosmetic or a drug, in 
accordance with some ruling by some unidentified official. Having eradicated dose from 
standards for estrogenic seven years earlier, National Health officials were awarding 
themselves the discretion to determine dose through “rulings”. Clearly, the techniques for 
standardizing dose had shifted far away from traditional dose specifications, bioassay methods, 
and reference standards. Dose was now a matter of standardizing women’s behaviour and, to 
that end, enrolling manufacturers to include specific directions on their product labels. 
There is no evidence, to be clear, that any “ruling” in an adjudicative sense had in fact been 
made. Pugsley’s article was translating the Canadian approach to his American audience. US 
food and drug lawyers, bureaucrats, and industry representatives were accustomed, if not 
always favourable, to the FDA’s administrative rulings, which were authorized by legislation. 
The Food and Drugs Act and its regulations did not, in contrast, permit National Health officials 
to make administrative rulings. The officials administering the Act and its regulations were 
permitted to interpret their language, subject to the possibility of judicial review, but had not 
been delegated power to issue rulings. Pugsley’s assertion to the contrary was unusual. Yet it 
provides another example of the Department’s ongoing practice of delegating power to make 
biologics standards to civil servants and industry, rather than codify standards in regulation.  
Nevertheless, this story stays with the term “administrative rulings”. In many respects, it 
perfectly captures a mode of regulation emerging for biological drugs at National Health in the 
1950s. The term strongly evokes American regulatory practices, which National Health was 
increasingly emulating and reproducing, albeit with variations, including in its new approach to 
estrogenic cosmetics.100 The term also holds in mind the move away from regulated standards, 
prescribed in subordinate legislation, and towards more individualized standards, exercised 
through administrative discretion. In contrast to an administrative “rule”, administrative ruling 
                                                          
99 In the same article, in the context of pituitary extracts, Pugsley claimed the Food and Drug Regulations “allow the Division to 
exercise administrative rulings to ensure that crude preparations do not appear on the market”; Pugsley 1951 at 539-540. 
100 In September 1951, William Goodrich, counsel with US Federal Security Agency, responded to Pugsley, noting discrepancies 
in Canadian and US law on sex hormones in a paper delivered at a conference and published later in the same journal. While he 
was critical of Canada’s failure to put sex hormones under prescription and of the futility of labels directing patients to get a 
physician’s advice on drugs after purchase, Goodrich did not note any differences between Canadian and American approaches 
to estrogenic cosmetics, presumably because, on that front, Canada was emulating its southern neighbour. See Goodrich 1951. 
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reflects the processual dynamic in this mode of governance. Administrative rules tend to be 
written down, codified, intended to apply generally; rulings, by contrast, evoke orally rendered 
judgement unique to individual cases. Rather than one fixed interpretation, rulings were more 
fluid and flexible. As shown by Pugsley’s article, the “upper limit” in his ruling remained 
unspoken and unlocatable, except perhaps in private communications. Moreover, the term 
helps to reveal the ambiguity of the source of authority for the ruling. “Administrative rulings” 
were made by unidentified rulers, their authority delegated by an unidentified source of power.  
For the purpose of this history of estrogen regulation, “administrative ruling” also provides a 
convenient label not found in the historiography of Canadian public law. The interwar “battle 
over the legitimacy of delegated legislation” is well-known, the protagonists and antagonists 
including Hewart and Dicey, the American legal realists, and Canadian scholars like John Willis, 
and I do not rehearse it here. Yet by WWII, this battle was won (or lost, depending on one’s 
perspective). Delegating authority through subordinate legislation, much of which subdelegated 
power to administrative officials, was the new constitutional and political reality in Canada, just 
as it was in Britain and the US. However, and put here in very general terms, the regulatory 
state – or perhaps better, the administrative state – was moving into a deeper and more 
thoroughgoing form of delegation by the 1950s, developing a range of practices by which 
administrators governed through discretion. As Michael Taggart put it, by the late 1940s, 
“subdelegated legislation was difficult to distinguish from less formal guidance or advice, often 
contained in circulars or the like”.101 In addressing the conceptual and nomenclatural confusion 
over this emerging form of administrative governance, which “in other forms is with us today”, he 
settles on the concept of “quasi-legislation”.102 Reminding us that R.E. Megarry had adopted this 
label in 1944,103 and had “included under this rubric administrative interpretations of statutes, 
glosses on statutes, and officially sanctioned arrangements between private parties that waived 
the law or affected operation of the law between citizen and citizen”, Taggart characterizes the 
defining feature of quasi-legislation as a lack of “binding legal effect”. One can understand 
National Health’s approach as quasi-legislation, although in repurposing “administrative ruling”, I 
hope to capture the fluidity, informality, and discretionary nature of this way of regulating. 
                                                          
101 Michael Taggart, “From ‘Parliamentary Powers' to Privatization: The Chequered History of Delegated Legislation in the 
Twentieth Century” (2005) 55:3 Univ Tor Law J 575 at 603. 
102 Ibid at 603-605. Taggart also notes that, as of 2005, “the sobriquet ‘administrative quasi-legislation’ has fallen a little out of 
fashion; in fashion are ‘soft law’ (adopted from international and EU law), ‘bureaucratic law’ (from the United States), and the 
anodyne ‘tertiary rules.’ In many respects, concern about quasi-legislation has displaced that about delegated legislation 
proper. Indeed, it is possible to see history repeating itself, with quasi-legislation or soft law provoking the same sort of vitriolic 
reaction from latter-day Hewarts”; ibid at 604. 
103 RE Megarry, “Administrative Quasi-legislation” (1944) 60 Law Q Rev 125. 
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Dose-setting through administrative ruling was especially common for estrogenic creams 
marketed for breast enhancement. In the early 1950s, National Health inspectors contemplated 
“directions for use” for firms selling breast creams. Officials adopted varying performances of 
the dose-response relationship. For example, in 1950, spurred by a series of ads for five breast 
creams, Inspection Services asked the department’s cosmetics lead whether estrogenic breast 
creams had systemic effects.104 J.T. Thompson reported back with a particular enactment of the 
dose-response relationship. He started with the desired physiological response, growth of 
mammary tissue, then worked backward to judge what amount would achieve it. In his view, the 
requisite dose would be so high as to cause systemic effects. Admittedly, this view allowed 
Thomson, responsible only for cosmetics, to take a hands-off approach to breast cream: 
“I don’t think bust development creams should be classed as cosmetics or USED except 
under medical supervision. To be effective, the dosage must be heavy, and I should 
think some degree of systemic effect would be unavoidable. Enough at least to put the 
preparations out of the cosmetic class. Having thus politely washed my hands of them, I 
get out from under!”105 
Pugsley, however, sent his own separate report to Inspection Services, taking issue with 
Thomson’s view that breast creams had systemic effects (and thus could not be cosmetics). 
Pugsley enacted the dose-response relationship differently. He acknowledged that these 
estrogenic creams would cause growth in mammary tissue, but rather than move on to ask what 
dose was needed to achieve that physiological response, he argued that growth in mammary 
tissue was inherently cosmetic: “I would say this is an effect on local tissue and not necessarily 
systemic action”. Ironically, Pugsley’s articulation suggested that breast creams did not actually 
meet the legal test for an estrogenic cosmetic, which provided that a product was a drug “unless 
demonstrated to be free from systemic effect”. Moreover, to ask if a product was “necessarily” 
harmful reflected a lower threshold than to require it be “proven free” from harm. Pugsley’s 
enactment of this weaker standard was entangled with his commitment to the idea that labelling 
provided an adequate regulatory response. Even though the five creams were advertised at 
30,000 I.U. of estrogenic potency – three times stronger than what the US FDA commonly 
tolerated for cosmetics – Pugsley felt that a label with directions would suffice. He advised 
Inspection Services to ensure that the manufacturers agreed to “the 30 day limit”, yet gave no 
                                                          
104 November 7, 1950 memorandum from Curran to Whitmore enclosing five breast cream advertisements, in Food and Drug 
Newspaper Clippings, 1949-1953. 
105 November 1950 handwritten note from Thomson to Whitmore, in Food and Drug Newspaper Clippings, 1949-1953. 
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advice on what that amount should be.106 His advice would have confused the inspectors, as the 
five creams had already been advertised for sale in a 30-day supply. In this case, the “30 day 
rule” would have required inspectors to ask the US firms to shrink down the size of the jars they 
sold in Canada. Neutered by this regulatory approach, inspectors predictably took no action.   
National Health’s most protracted investigation of estrogenic creams was pursued from its 
Vancouver office in 1952.107 Inspector E.L Devlin was dutifully trying to bring Venus Products 
into compliance with the Sex Hormone Regulations. Venus sold a breast cream called Formula 
V-7, advertised with a pseudoscientific booklet. Devlin crafted a long, careful letter setting out 
regulatory requirements and the “potential dangers” of estrogens taken at high doses or for 
prolonged periods. His letter performed a subtly different variant of dose-response. Like 
Pugsley, he began by focusing on the intended response. Unlike Pugsley, he found that, given 
effects of estrogen on breast tissue, one should assume that applying Formula V-7 to breasts 
would affect “the body hormone balance”, such that the product must be “regarded as having 
systemic effects”. Thus, he deemed Formula V-7 to be drug (though at 6000 I.U., it was one-fifth 
the potency of the five creams deemed to be cosmetics in 1950). As a drug, Formula V-7 would 
need to comply with the drug labelling rule in Section C.02.007 which, according to Devlin, 
“requires that the proper name, Oestrogenic Substance, be used and the potency be declared in 
International Units per ounce, indicating what amount is to be used over a 30 day period.”108 
Without question, Devlin’s interpretation was legally incorrect, although it further exemplifies 
how the distinction between cosmetics and drugs was enacted in informal, fluid administrative 
ruling of officials. Unlike section C.02.010 governing cosmetics, the drug labelling rule in section 
C.02.007 did not, in fact, require any labels to provide “directions for use” or to stipulate what 
amount should be used. By allowing its officials to indirectly influence use and dose, cosmetic 
labelling rules afforded National Health more power to limit estrogenic dosing than it had for 
drugs. In any event, Venus Products complied with Devlin’s direction,109 promising to label its 
jars with the weight, the fact that the product contained 6000 I.U. of Oestrogenic Substance per 
ounce, and a direction to not use more than 1 and 2/3 ounces each month”.110 Whether women 
hoping for fuller chests would follow that direction was another matter. Arguably, National 
Health’s turn to regulating through label directions may have made the creams more dangerous. 
                                                          
106 November 7, 1950 memo from Curran to Whitmore (note by Pugsley), in Food and Drug Newspaper Clippings, 1949-1953. 
107 While Vancouver was the lead, advertisements for Formula V-7 were identified by inspectors in Winnipeg and monitored by 
Ottawa; see April 17, April 25, April 28, and May 6, 1952 letters, in Food and Drug Newspaper Clippings, 1949-1953. 
108 March 21, 1952 letter from Devlin to Venus Products Ltd., in Food and Drug Newspaper Clippings, 1949-1953.  
109 Sex Hormone Regulations, SOR 49-547, s C.02.007.  Devlin also requested other labelling changes pursuant to s C.002.007. 
110 March 26, 1952 letter from Venus Products Ltd. to Devlin, in Food and Drug Newspaper Clippings, 1949-1953. 
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In this case, Devlin asked Venus to remove an insert from its advertising booklet for Formula 
V7. The insert outrageously asserted that while “Formula V7 is not intended for the discovery of 
existing cysts but if its use is instrumental in doing so, then it may be considered an additional 
though unintentional benefit”, and Venus tried to argue that the insert was an “amplification” of 
the directions for use on the label. In its startling association of Formula V-7 and breast cancer, 
the insert may very well have caused women to have second thoughts about using the product. 
Because it was a “somewhat misleading” direction, though, Devlin insisted that it be removed.111  
Leveraging power through labels, the Inspection Service was enacting dose controls that 
National Health senior officials and Committee members had rejected in 1943. Taking a vague 
labelling rule for cosmetics that had become infused in practice with dose-response 
considerations, shifting those considerations back into the regulation of drugs, asking not just 
“how to measure” but also “how much”, inspectors resurrected dose and reinserted it into the 
regulatory regime. Without doubt, reining in a little local company dabbling in quackery was not 
the same as interfering in innovations of major pharmaceutical firms. Power was material. Yet 
estrogen too was powerful, insistent that regulators re-embrace logics previously disavowed.   
Devlin wrapped up his compliance efforts with Venus Products in May 1952. Less than a 
month later, a Select Committee of the US House of Representatives, known as the Delaney 
Committee, released its final report on chemicals in cosmetics. The report followed two years of 
high-profile congressional hearings, chaired by Congressman James Delaney, to investigate the 
use of chemicals in foods and cosmetics.112 Medical experts of various specialties, including 
endocrinologists, allergists, and dermatologists, had testified at the hearings, and many had 
been questioned regarding the potential hazards of estrogenic skin creams.113 Some witnesses 
equivocated,114 while others were crystal clear that these products could be hazardous.115 
                                                          
111 March 26, 1952 letter from Venus Products to Devlin, March 28, 1952 letter from Devlin to Venus Products, and May 16, 
1952 letter from Devlin to senior National Health officials, all in Food and Drug Newspaper Clippings, 1949-1953.  
112  H.R. REP. No. 2182, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), as published in (1952) 7 Food Drug Cosm LJ 563 at 564 [“Delaney 
Committee’s Report on Cosmetics, 1952”]. 
113 House of Representatives, Chemicals in Food Products: Hearings Before the House Select Committee to Investigate the Use of 
Chemicals in Food and Cosmetics, Hearing Transcripts, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (October-November 1951) [“Delaney Committee 
Hearing Transcripts, 1951”]. 
114 Ibid, Testimony of Dr. Ervin Erstein, Assistant Clinical Professor of Dermatology, Stanford University, 20 November 1951 at 
739-740; and ibid, Testimony of Dr. Thomas H. Sternberg, Professor of Dermatology, University of California at Los Angeles, 23 
November 1951 at 919-920, testifying that estrogenic creams were unsafe and that he had seen “cases of poisoning by 
estrogen overdosage”, but that he was not prepared to conclude that such creams were carcinogenic. 
115 Dr. Carl Hartman, Ortho Research Foundation; see ibid at 751 and 755, and About the Authors, 1951 at 486. See also Dr. H.V. 
Allington, Dermatologist, 20 November 1951 at 750-751, testifying that “the hormone preparations are in every sense of the 
word potent and potential dynamite” and there “should be a great deal more known before hormones are released for general 
distribution indiscriminately”; Dr. Samuel Ayres, Dermatologist, 23 November 1951 at 925-927, testifying that “continued use of 
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Figure 11: Booklet insert for Formula V-7 Treatment, Venus Products Ltd, 1952. 
Library and Archives Canada, RG29, Vol 259, File 347-1-6 (part 4), reproduction copy 
number I-115336 
Venus Products objected to National Health’s request that it remove this insert from its advertising 
booklet, claiming it was part of its directions for use. Venus was candid about its reasons for these 
“directions” to women users: “Our only hope was that in the event of cancer being discovered 
coincidental with the use of Formula V7 that the victim would think and do a little investigating before 
going off half cocked and blaming us unjustly. One claim with the publicity that would be sure to attend 
regardless of how unjust that claim was or whether our product was proven harmless in the highest court 
the results to us would be so adverse that it could well put us out of business”.116 
                                                          
sex hormones in certain amounts are capable of producing malignant change”, the creams might stimulate existing malignancy, 
and there was not enough evidence to conclude the creams could be used safely except under a physicians’ supervision. 
116 March 26, 1952 letter from Venus Products to Devlin, in Food and Drug Newspaper Clippings, 1949-1953. 
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Almost all stated, or at least implied if they recommended physician supervision, that the hazard 
would be a question of dosage.117 As the products were sold as both night creams and day 
creams, the Committee’s report observed that women could be “covered by these substances 
24 hours of every day”.118 The Committee also expressed concern that, as it was known that 
estrogens were absorbed dermally, these cosmetics may cause “undesirable physiological 
changes”.119  However, as the expert witnesses had disagreed on the likelihood of systemic 
effects, the Committee recommended only that there should be more research.120  
Only a few such studies were ever done. One found that, even at small doses, estrogenic 
cream could produce systemic effects – namely, endometrial hyperplasia – if applied over a 
long period.121 Another found that the creams did not induce any visible or clinically observable 
changes to the appearance of facial skin.122 Overall, the small body of research indicated that 
not only were estrogenic skin creams ineffective, but they were harmful.123 Regardless, some 
researchers were willing to argue the industry position that, even if used for years, there was no 
evidence they caused “cancerous changes in the skin”, and there was “a consensus of opinion 
amongst experienced observers that cosmetic hormone creams with a maximum potency of 
10,000 IU per ounce (31 g.) of vehicle, if used in the manner by the informed manufacturer, are 
free from systemic effects.”124 Estrogen was being performed as harmful and worthless by 
medical practitioners, and as safe and controllable by cosmetic manufacturers and researchers.  
Faced with a substance that could not be pinned down, National Health officials retreated to 
regulating claims rather than regulating potency. By 1953, the centrality of labelling to the safety 
of estrogen had become routinized. When local Toronto inspectors raised questions about an 
advertisement for Lady Esther Hormone Cream, which boasted of the cream’s high potency and 
ability to “renew the beautifying effects of your own waning hormone supply”, Whitmore  
                                                          
117 Testimony of Dr. Ervin Erstein, assistant clinical professor of dermatology, Stanford University, 20 November 1951 at 740, 
and Dr. Thomas H. Sternberg, Professor of Dermatology, University of California at Los Angeles, 23 November 1951 at 919, ibid.  
118 Delaney Committee’s Report on Cosmetics, 1952 at 613. 
119 Ibid at 613-614. 
120 Ibid at 614.  
121 Minnie B Goldberg & Franklin I Harris, “Use of Estrogen Creams” (1952) 150 JAMA 790-791 1952. 
122 Behrman 1954 at 122; and Watkins 2007 at 86. 
123 In the early 1960s, the AMA and the FDA would issue statements opposing estrogenic cosmetics, but these declarations “had 
little effect on the marketing of estrogen skin creams”; Watkins 2007 at 86. 
124 SM Peck & EG Klarmann, “Hormone Cosmetics” (1949) 173:1034 Practitioner 159 at 165, as cited in Bennett 2018. 
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Figure 12: “Stay Lovely … Stay Loved … with Lady Esther Natural Estrogenic 
Hormone Cream”, 1953 
Library and Archives Canada, RG 29, Vol 258, File 347-6-6 (Part 2), reproduction copy 
number e-011195706 
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Figure 13: “Your husband looks at you with new interest”, 1952 
 
Toronto Daily Star (1900-1971). Feb 6, 1952: 27. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: 
Toronto Star. 
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confidently advised that the claims were “within the realm of permitted cosmetic puffery”.125 
Labelled at 10,000 I.U. and marketed as a 30 days’ supply, Lady Esther’s Hormone Cream 
exemplified compliance with the unwritten rules and bureaucratic discretion characterizing this 
mode of “administrative ruling”. Advertisements by Lady Esther, Helena Rubinstein, and other 
hormone cream manufacturers exploited North American women’s fear of aging and “preyed on 
women’s economic and emotional dependence on men”, raising the scenario “of a husband 
fleeing his wife’s wrinkled skin and finding comfort in the arms of a smoother-skinned 
woman”.126 However, National Health inspectors had no power, and perhaps no inclination, to 
find any “objectionable greasiness” in the many ads warning middle-aged women that, if they 
did not use these potent estrogenic skin creams, they would lose their husbands.127    
*** 
Ten years before Lady Esther’s advertisement came to the attention of National Health 
inspectors, the Deputy Minister of Health, Robert Wodehouse, had intervened to ensure that the 
Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards would endorse the Sex Hormone 
Regulations without recommending dose or potency limits. In the intervening decade, with the 
practices of Canadian regulators, estrogens had become biologics that eluded measurement 
and domesticated cream permissibly claimed as the “Greatest Agent Known for Counteracting 
Signs of Age”,128 potent substances that some physicians believed should only be sold on 
prescription and “natural” cosmetics that would let middle-aged wives “Stay Loved”,129 
substances of questionable therapeutic value that should not be endorsed through licensing and 
medicine effective for “menopausal symptoms” and other “estrogenic deficiency”.130  
Potent but safe, hazardous but ineffective, natural but an artifice, systemic but cosmetic, 
estrogen was a provocation to regulators. By the early 1950s, regulators continued to view “low 
doses” as the key to ensuring that estrogen was safe. However, whether for drugs or cosmetics, 
Canadian regulators never studied, defined, or regulated any thresholds for safe doses. Dose 
                                                          
125 October 26, 1953 memorandum and November 2, 1953 memorandum, in Food and Drug Newspaper Clippings, 1949-1953. 
In the early 1950s, there were no seizures or prosecutions involving any sex hormone preparation, whether drug or cosmetic; 
see Monthly Prosecutions and Seizures Reports, 1950-1953. 
126 Watkins 2007 at 87. 
127 See e.g. Figures 12 and 13. In the bottom right corner, the ad for Lady Esther Hormone Cream indicated that the product had 
“no objectionable greasiness!” 
128 Figure 12. 
129 Ibid. 
130 1950 and 1951 Premarin ads, in Figures 7 and 8 respectively. 
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had been repeatedly delegated – to pharmaceutical manufacturers, clinicians, cosmetics firms, 
and women consumers.  
National Health did attempt to consolidate and unify estrogen in 1949, by removing four 
estrogenic molecules from the Canadian Supplement and by extending to sex hormones its 
practice of (unlawfully) subdelegating bioassay methods to government scientists. Rather than 
regulate dose, however, National Health began regulating “potency limits” through 
administrative practices – first for cosmetics, then for breast creams deemed to be drugs. Still, 
National Health officials did not enact dose-response relations in a uniform way. Its inspectors, 
tasked with scrutinizing advertisements to identify and pursue non-compliance, always on the 
alert for fraudulent or misleading claims in pursuit of the Act’s public health and consumer 
protection purposes, were inherently suspicious of overblown claims made for estrogen creams 
and inclined to assume adverse effects, working from this assumption of hazard to ensure safe 
doses. The Chief of National Health’s Laboratory Services, by contrast, as an endocrinologist, 
had an openness to hormones and scientific skepticism of unproven claims that these creams 
caused systemic effects. Pugsley worked from an assumption of safety that viewed labels less 
as a means to reduce dosage, and more as a performance of administrative oversight. Both 
practices, however, ultimately sought to accomplish “potency limits” through regulatory 
techniques and material technologies of labelling. For regulating ambiguously potent 
substances marketed exclusively to women, labels were becoming instrumental.  
In this entanglement of law, gender, and toxicity, estrogen was not the only phenomenon 
becoming naturalized. The concept of menopausal women was also being normalized. Estrogen 
was a substance whose bodily effects were being rendered, in regulatory practices, as 
unpredictable, deceptive, malleable, and individual. In turn, National Health began regulating 
dose and potency through labelling directions that displaced responsibility for safety away from 
the Department, targeting directions at women assumed to have those same characteristics.  
Born from a “junkie” or “quickie” improvisation aimed to sidestep perceived legal constraints, 
with estrogen, consumer caution labels were also becoming naturalized as a regulatory 
technique. As seen in the previous and current chapters, estrogens were the first substances for 
which labels were used in lieu of standards in Canada, first for drugs and then for cosmetics. 
Labels allowed regulators to require potent ingredients to be identified in consumer products, to 
caution women to use cosmetics “with care”, to discipline women to regulate their own exposure 
by following directions, and, in all of these functions, to displace responsibility for ensuring a 
standard substance with predictable properties away from the state. Caution labels for drugs 
and cosmetics made it explicit, for the first time, that women would need to assume 
181 
 
responsibility for their own safety. National Health’s potent mixture of labels, delegation, and 
administrative governance to apprehend and respond to the hazards of estrogen is, therefore, 
an early example of risk regulation in Canadian law.  
Mandatory labelling of gendered consumer products would soon travel to other contexts. 
While the 1949 Sex Hormone Regulations had contained the first cosmetics regulation in 
Canadian history, standalone cosmetic regulations followed three years later.131 With a focus on 
dangerous ingredients, these regulations governed cosmetics with “appropriate cautions as well 
as with advertising or label claims” – techniques first introduced with estrogen.132   In cosmetics 
regulation and beyond, estrogen would leave its mark on Canadian law.133 
 
                                                          
131 Part E of the Food and Drug Regulations, SOR/52-271, in Canada Gazette, Part II, Vol LXXXVI, No 14, at p 585 (July 23, 1952) 
[“1952 Cosmetic Regulations”]. See also Curran 1953 at 181.  Sex hormones in cosmetic products were still regulated, in 1952, 
by the Sex Hormone Regulations, although this changed in 1954 when the relevant provisions were transferred into Part E. 
132 Curran 1953 at 181. See also 1952 Cosmetic Regulations, s E.01.001(c) (label requirements included “adequate directions for 
safe use” and any required “warning, caution or special direction”). These regulations also required some labelling cautions 
specific to certain cosmetic products, such as hair dyes that contained para-phenylene-diamine or other coal tar dye base. 
133 The 1952 Cosmetic Regulations also had other influences, shadowing in many respects the US FDCA approach to cosmetics. 
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PART III 
Musings on potency, on power, on possibility: a conclusion 
This thesis has shared an account of law-in-estrogen and estrogen-in-law, in Canada in the 
1940s and early 1950s, examining how these realities were enacted with regulatory practices.  
In this time and place, regulating estrogen was coterminous with materializing estrogen as a 
potent substance. Put differently, I have argued in this thesis that toxicity and law – or, further 
collapsing the distinction between the onto-epistemological and the political that this formulation 
solidifies, that potency and power – were co-produced.1 In exploring the historicity of estrogen 
as a legal phenomenon, and the historicity of labelling as an estrogenic phenomenon, I have 
illustrated how mid-century regulatory practices performed the dose and made the poison. By 
the early 1950s, a potent estrogen was thoroughly installed into Canadian laws and soon to 
encounter millions of Canadian bodies, and Canadian regulators had conducted their first 
experiments with using labels, rather than standards, to intervene in dose-response relations. 
In these concluding reflections, I return to the present, to ask whether this historical 
entanglement of potency and power might resound in current regulatory performances. Does 
this story of estrogen and regulation matter today, and if so, for whom? I also briefly consider 
the concept of toxic enactment that has arisen from and driven this historical narrative.  
The Introduction provides a sense of where this history travels.2 By the mid-1950s, estrogen 
was already being performed differently in Canada; prescriptions were required for the sale of 
estrogenic drugs and, in a move that would radically change socio-material realities, estrogen 
emerged in the form of the contraceptive pill. Yet the multiple potencies and doses, scripted into 
estrogen in the 1940s, continued. Premarin became hugely popular in the 1960s, fuelled by its 
promotors’ injunctions to be “Feminine Forever”.3 By the 1970s – after decades in which DES, 
Premarin, and the Pill circulated in doses and dosages, in forms and formulations, no longer 
conceivable – stories began emerging of suffering and illness, disease and death. As estrogen 
turned from “hero to villain”,4 the main regulatory response was patient package inserts – in 
essence, a new, lengthier, more informative label.5 As in the 1940s and 1950s, if for different 
                                                          
1 Antonio Negri, The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza’s Metaphysics and Politics, trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2003). Originally published as L'anomalia selvaggia. Saggio su potere e potenza in Baruch 
Spinoza, Negri identified as “potere” and “potenza” what in English translations of Spinoza had both been reduced to “power”.    
2 See Introduction, particularly that content associated with notes 11-18. 
3 Robert Wilson, Feminine Forever (New York: Evans, 1966). 
4 Watkins 2007 at 93. 
5 Another response, in Canada, was to ban the sale of cosmetics containing estrogen; Cosmetic Regulations, CRC, c 869, s 15(b). 
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reasons, compared to other drugs, estrogen was unique in attracting these inserts. Beyond 
these labelling techniques, the material residue of this legal history persists in many bodies. 
Perhaps this story of law-in-estrogen and estrogen-in-law can generate historically informed 
debates about how endocrine disrupting chemicals should be regulated today.6 Toxicity and 
labels, after all, seem ever more imbricated.7 Go to the drugstore, stand in an aisle, scan the 
shelves for a moisturizer without parabens, a sunscreen without oxybenzone, a non-toxic nail 
polish. Do you see other people – probably women,8 maybe with small children in strollers – 
reading the labels? Ponder that, on average, American women use 12 personal care products, 
containing 168 cosmetic ingredients, every day,9 and that teenaged girls use nearly 17 products 
containing an estimated 174 ingredients daily.10 Recall how, in 1952, the Delaney Committee 
worried that women might be covered by creams containing estrogen 24 hours of every day”.11  
Then think of Environment and Climate Change Canada and Health Canada’s joint response, 
in June 2018, to the lengthy report released a year earlier by the House of Commons’ Standing 
Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development.12 After hearing evidence and 
receiving briefs,13 the Standing Committee had made numerous recommendations for amending 
CEPA to provide greater protection from endocrine disrupting chemicals.14 The two departments 
                                                          
6 Many scholars have connected histories of hormonal drugs, especially DES, to current debates about endocrine disrupting 
chemicals, see e.g. Roberts 2007 and Langston 2010. 
7 It should be noted that when it comes to hormonal changes materialized through topical skin products, not everybody has 
been given the option of attending to their own exposures. Transgender women and genderqueer people wanting softer skin, 
less body hair, or breast enhancement may find themselves limited by the option of buying over-the-counter drug and cosmetic 
products and following label directions. If they wish to use estrogen to shape their embodiments, their care is medicalized, 
supervised by a physician who may be willing to prescribe estrogen off-label. While boundaries between estrogenic drugs and 
cosmetics were blurred in the 1930s-1950s, for trans or genderqueer people seeking more feminine embodiments in 2018, 
those boundaries are rigidly enforced. Indeed, in this enactment, labelled drug indications are necessarily disregarded. 
8 For the gendered nature of “precautionary consumption” of toxics, a phenomenon that typically relies upon product labels, 
see Dayna Nadine Scott, Jennie Haw & Robyn Lee, “‘Wannabe Toxic-Free?’ From precautionary consumption to corporeal 
citizenship” (2017) 26:2 Environ Politics 322; Norah MacKendrick, “More work for mother: chemical body burdens as a maternal 
responsibility” (2014) 28:5 Gend Soc 705; and Norah MacKendrick & Lindsay Stevens, “‘Taking Back a Little Bit of Control’: 
managing the contaminated body through consumption” (2016) 31:2 Sociol Forum 310. 
9 Environmental Working Group, “Exposures add up – survey results” (2004), online: 
http://www.ewg.org/skindeep/2004/06/15/exposures-add-up-survey-results/#.W1fbT2inE2w. Men were found to use, on 
average, six products daily, containing 85 unique chemical ingredients. 
10 Environmental Working Group, “Teen Girls’ Body Burden of Hormone-Altering Cosmetics Chemicals: Detailed Findings” 
(September 2008), online:  https://www.ewg.org/research/teen-girls-body-burden-hormone-altering-cosmetics-
chemicals/detailed-findings#.W1ffCminE2w. 
11 See Chapter 5, section 2, particularly that content associated with notes 112-119. 
12 Environment and Climate Change Canada, “Follow-Up Report to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Environment 
and Sustainable Development on the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999” (June 2018), online: 
https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/eccc/documents/pdf/cepa/FollowUpCepaReport-eng.pdf [“Canada’s Follow-Up Report 
on CEPA 1999, June 2018”]. 
13 I disclose that I contributed to the three briefs authored by Dayna Nadine Scott.  
14 See Introduction at note 1. 
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agreed with the recommendations, even choosing to highlight endocrine disruptors as 
“chemicals of high concern” in the Minister of Environment’s press release accompanying their 
response.15 However, with not enough time (or priority) to introduce legislative amendments in 
this parliamentary session, the departments indicated that, for the time being, they would 
continue to employ “available risk management tools” – including product labels. Product labels 
may “further improve Canadians’ access to information they need to make informed decisions 
about the products they use”, and, moving beyond label technologies, the “use of technologies 
such as cell phone apps could help consumers make point-of-purchase decisions”.16 Thus, as in 
the 1940s and early 1950s with estrogen, as an alternative to stronger legal tests for what 
substances can be and do, Canadian regulators are considering using labels and other 
information-providing technologies to delegate to (women) consumers the responsibility to make 
decisions about whether to buy and how to use chemicals of high concern. Though using labels 
in lieu of standards was an estrogenic innovation 75 years ago in Canada, today it has become 
thoroughly naturalized as a regulatory response for products containing ingredients of concern.  
In summarily noting the continued entanglement of hormone-disrupting chemicals and labels, 
it is important not to lose sight of how these relations materialize. Whether working explicitly with 
enactment, or within other frameworks that account for what people think, say and do, dose-
response relationships are done in different ways by different people, institutions, interactions, 
disciplines, times, and places. As conceptualized in this thesis, toxicity is enacted by and enacts 
regulatory practices – and practices change. Contrary to unnuanced claims being made by 
some STS scholars working on toxicity, it is not the case, at least in Canada, that “[n]early all 
existing environmental regulations and laws around toxicants are based on threshold limits – 
normally measured in relation to effects on human bodies”.17 When examining environmental 
laws governing toxic substances like endocrine disruptors, an approach recognizing that 
                                                          
15 Government of Canada, “Government of Canada is Working to Improve Canada’s Law on Pollution Prevention and Toxic 
Chemicals, the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999” (29 June 2018), press release, online: 
https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/news/2018/06/government-of-canada-is-working-to-improve-
canadas-law-on-pollution-prevention-and-toxic-chemicals-the-canadian-environmental-protection-act-1999.html  
16 Canada’s Follow-Up Report on CEPA 1999, June 2018, at 34-35.  
17 Max Liboiron, Manuel Tironi & Nerea Calvillo, “Toxic politics: Acting in a permanently polluted world” (2018) 48:3 Soc Stud Sci 
331 at 335. The sole citation for this claim is an article limited to examining the nuclear industry (Shannon Cram, “Living in dose: 
Nuclear work and the politics of permissible exposure” (2016) 23:3(80) Public Culture 519). The three co-authors then appear to 
qualify their claim, temporally if not jurisdictionally, writing that “almost all environmental laws developed since the 1970s” are 
based on these thresholds; at 335. I note these ahistorical and universalized claims not to single out these authors – other STS 
scholars also make unfounded claims about law – but to emphasize that interdisciplinary work on toxicity, and its interactions 
with law, benefits from careful study of legal and regulatory processes and practices. For example, though this can also be 
empirically debated, Dayna Nadine Scott allows space for varied regulatory practices by making the more insightful, nuanced 
claim that “all of our current regulatory regimes are based on the notion of a threshold”; Scott 2015 at 387 (emphasis added).  
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governance and law are contingent, mutable achievements would instead examine ways that 
regulatory practices intervene in and produce variable dose-response relations or thresholds.  
While this point can only be sketched summarily here in this conclusion – more definitive 
claims would require careful, empirical research and analysis – there appear to be parallels 
between how Canada regulated estrogen in the 1940s and current federal regulation of 
endocrine disrupting chemicals. The Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 (“CEPA”) is 
the primary legislation governing the assessment and regulation of toxic substances,18 and 
central to CEPA’s toxics scheme is a legislated test for determining if a substance is “toxic”.19 
That toxicity test fundamentally relies on dose-response logics (although not necessarily 
conventional ones), by providing that a substance is only harmful to the environment or to 
human life or health if it is entering or may enter the environment in a quantity, concentration, or 
under conditions that make it harmful. In other words, to determine if a substance is toxic, 
Canadian assessors must consider how much or what amount of a substance is sufficient to 
make it harmful – that is, what dose makes the poison. Yet the legislation is silent on the 
question of “how much is safe”, disavowing any quantitative thresholds and leaving this question 
to varied administrative practices.20 Evidence of exposure quantities and concentrations is scant 
or speculative, particularly for exposures through consumer products (which, unlike some 
industrial point sources, are not monitored under the act). With the question of “how much” 
Canadians are exposed to an endocrine disrupting chemical made very difficult to answer, 
administrators are left to their own discretionary practices to determine how to perform an 
exposure-response assessment. This resonates with the historical case in this thesis. For 
National Health’s endocrinologist, relatively high potency estrogenic creams did not have 
systemic effects because the amount of exposure could be hypothetically limited through labels; 
for National Health enforcement officials, a relatively low potency estrogenic cream was deemed 
to have systemic effects because it was intended to grow mammary tissue. Current Canadian 
practices for regulating endocrine disrupting chemicals appear steeped in the same potent 
mixture of imperceptible exposures, uncertain thresholds, and dose-response logics: in 
determining if a substance is toxic, assessors faced with the absence of any pre-determined 
safe thresholds enact multiple, varying, discretionary administrative practices to apprehend how 
much of a substance is harmful, how much is released, or how much Canadians are exposed. 
                                                          
18 Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, SC 1999, c 33. Part 5 of CEPA governs the control of toxic substances. 
19 Ibid, s 64. 
20 For clarity, I do not take a view here on whether quantitative thresholds are normatively preferable, but merely explain s 64. 
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Just as National Health officials in the 1940s and 1950s turned to labelling to grapple with 
exposures to unstandardized potent substances, today, well-intentioned advocates and 
academics posit that, in the absence of regulatory prohibitions on endocrine disrupting 
chemicals, labelling can serve as a stop-gap or a band-aid.21 This recalls the position that Dr. 
Henderson and his academic colleagues on the Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial 
Standards enacted, in January 1943, when they abandoned a call for regulated potency 
standards in exchange for National Health’s promise to circulate information about bioassay 
methods, including to researchers.22 Yet enacting endocrine disrupting chemicals as entities for 
which consumers and researchers need “more information” may buttress the Canadian 
government’s plans to postpone legislative reform by promoting labels, and other technological 
fixes, to help (women) consumers navigate their own safety in the marketplace. 
This thesis has experimented with a concept that I have called toxic enactment. It conceives 
regulatory practices as actively involved in enacting toxicity, and toxic substances as actively 
involved in enacting legal orders. In musing about whether toxic enactment helps to make better 
sense of the world – whether that world is in the past, the past folded into the present, or in 
possible futures – I do not wish to exaggerate its potential. One concern with using the concept, 
at least in the field of legal history, is that it potentially reifies the problematic idea that ‘theory” is 
the only legitimate means of producing scholarly knowledge. Compelling, well-researched 
accounts of the legal past can have value regardless of whether they engage directly with 
theoretical constructs. Perhaps this study did not need to tinker with Mol’s concept of 
enactment, toxic or otherwise, to describe how estrogen emerged with evolving modes and 
techniques of drug and cosmetic regulation in Canada in the mid-20th century. 
Conversely, enactment has given me a unique entry point into understanding this topic and 
constructing this narrative. The historiography of sex hormones, particularly in the work of Nelly 
Oudshoorn, Anne Fausto-Sterling, Celia Roberts, and Jean-Paul Gaudillière, often builds, if to 
different extents, on network theories, examining how interactions between the material and 
discursive practices of scientists, industry, clinicians, and other social actors materialized 
estrogenic drugs. Other regulatory histories of sex hormones, such as that by Nancy Langston, 
                                                          
21 Environmental Defence Canada, “Full Disclosure: the case for stronger household product labelling – Full Research Report” 
(Environmental Defence, 2017), online: https://environmentaldefence.ca/report/full-disclosure/; and Endocrine Disruptors 
Action Group, “Toxic by design: Eliminating harmful flame retardant chemicals from our bodies, homes, and communities” 
(Endocrine Disruptors Action Group, 2006), online: https://endocrinedisruptorsaction.org/2016/10/11/toxic-by-design/.    
22 Endocrine Disruptors Action Group, ibid, at 17: “Although labelling is a limited solution to a flawed regulatory system, it may 
help us track and advocate against the ongoing substitution of one harmful chemical for another. What labelling can do is 
provide researchers, consumers and organizations with data … labels can be a tactical way to monitor the activities of 
manufacturers and gather data…”. 
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provide crucial insights without explicit reference to theory, using source material evidencing the 
deliberations and activities of federal food and drug regulators. By extending a focus on 
networked practices to regulators and regulation, while still attempting to hold onto how 
estrogen materialized through material practices like diverse bioassay methods, varying forms 
and modes of application, and different labelling practices, toxic enactment has helped me to 
bridge potent methodological elements from these multiple historiographical traditions with my 
largely regulatory source materials. Following Gaudillière, this bridge has allowed me to narrate 
a more integrated history of estrogen and regulation, unlocking fresh ways of approaching each.  
Furthermore, if one takes seriously, as I do, Mol’s argument that it is possible to approach 
ontological questions empirically in social science and humanities research, and that relational 
materialism is more of a methodological commitment than a theoretical explanation, then I 
believe it is no great leap to conclude that (toxic) enactment can be a productive framework for 
empirical legal research, including in legal history. While the term enactment may have been 
popularized by an ethnographer, archival documents are just evidence of past human activities, 
and there is no principled reason that legal historians cannot adopt praxiological methodologies.  
If anything, the larger challenge is thinking law and materiality together. As Tom Johnson 
notes, despite the suspect politics of severing law from the world, law is still “commonly seen as 
a discourse, something that is distinct from, yet gives meaning to, things in the ‘real world’.” 
However, for at least some topics, close readings of certain types of historical evidence can 
reveal law’s material formations and matter’s legal forms. Holding together matter and law – or, 
even more tightly, potency and power – subverts insistent representations of toxicity as 
“wayward particles behaving badly”,23 allowing us to approach toxicity as “a way to focus on 
how forms of life and their constituent relations, from the scale of cells to cultures, are enabled, 
constrained, and extinguished within broader power systems”.24 In this way, toxic enactment 
might potentiate efforts to apprehend and intervene in the chemical reactions of law and toxicity.  
For scholars of public law or the regulatory state, enactment may no longer feel like a 
theoretical concept. The metaphor has been literalized in law, much like “constitution”. Many 
lawyers and legal scholars think of enactments as concrete nouns – statutes and regulations, 
physically printed in books or from websites, rules that you hold in your hand. Long buried is the 
sense of enactment as an abstract noun –– an activity that is made to happen and that makes 
other acts happen. As Mol puts it, to speak of objects being enacted in practices “suggests that 
                                                          
23 Max Liboiron, Manuel Tironi & Nerea Calvillo, “Toxic politics: Acting in a permanently polluted world” (2018) 48:3 Soc Stud Sci 
331 at 333. 
24 Ibid at 336. 
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activities take place – but leaves the actors vague. It also suggests that in the act, and only then 
and there, something is – being enacted”.25 In law, enactments as statutes and regulations can 
seem like codified, calcified, captured objects, rather than dynamic things, performed in 
practices, which themselves activate new actions, practices, and realities. By re-apprehending 
laws and regulations as enactments compounded in relational practices, rather than as separate 
and static elements, perhaps we can begin to see the possibility of formulating other worlds.   
  
                                                          
25 Mol 2002 at 32-33. 
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